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Volume 34: Number 161

Sun, 18 Dec 2016

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Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Message: 1
From: Professor L. Levine
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2016 17:58:51 +0000
[Avodah] The Mizinke Dance: Tradition, Folklore or Other?

Please see the article at


from Jewish Action Magazine.

"Based upon the information I had culled, I felt it reasonable to deduce that the mizinke had become a staple at weddings due to one reason: bandleaders."

See the above URL for more.

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Message: 2
From: Rich, Joel
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2016 19:24:26 +0000
[Avodah] It's" an inyan"

what halachic category does "being an inyan" fall into?
Joel Rich

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Message: 3
From: Lisa Liel
Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2016 20:38:05 +0200
Re: [Avodah] It's" an inyan"

On 12/16/2016 9:24 PM, Rich, Joel wrote:
> what halachic category does "being an inyan" fall into?

A vague one.

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Message: 4
From: Ben Waxman
Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2016 19:03:55 +0200
Re: [Avodah] It's" an inyan"

When I've heard it used it is in reference to a custom, a chumrah, based 
a late source, often kabbalistic.

On 12/17/2016 8:38 PM, Lisa Liel via Avodah wrote:
 > On 12/16/2016 9:24 PM, Rich, Joel wrote:
 >> what halachic category does "being an inyan" fall into?
 > A vague one.

Go to top.

Message: 5
From: H Lampel
Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2016 20:53:49 -0500
Re: [Avodah] Geonim, Rambam and Other Rishonim on Mesorah and

RMB (Avodah Digest, Vol 34, Issue 157) maintains that the Ran broke with 
the Rambam and Geonim by asserting that Hashem and Moshe literally 
transmitted, as truth, both sides of future disputes, despite their 
being contradictory and incompatible. The future sages' job was to 
choose between these two truths (based on their proclivities towards 
geverua, chessed, etc.). There is no one-and-only-truth. Any references 
to the sages determining the one truth is referring to a 
hyphenated-emes, the emes-l'hor'a'ah, not the emesses l'amitah. They are 
referring solely a correctly identified previous pesak, but the opposite 
ruling is still an ''emes.''

I argued that this is a misreading of the Ran, because he explicitly 
rejected the concept that it is merely by the decree of the sages that 
objects are tahor or tamie, and actions are mutar or assur. Just as 
poison is poisonous even if the consensus of doctors otherwise, he says, 
so too a tamei object or a forbidden action will produce negative 
effects on the soul, regardless of the consensus of the sages.

Here is another quote from the Drashos HaRan (Drash 5, second version) 
that should make it clear that he does not argue with the Rambam and 
Geonim, and like them does not endorse a ''multiple emeses'' concept.

    ''We are commanded to follow the chachmei hadoros whether they agree
    to the emes OR ITS OPPOSITE... (BM 86) has an Aggada about the
    halacha when there is a safek whether the baheres or the white hair
    appeared first on one's skin. Rabbah bar Nachmani recited, he heard
    in the Mesivta d-Rakia [the tsadikim learning together in Heaven
    after having passed away] that HKB''H says [the person is] tahor,
    but the entire mesivta deRakia says tamei. ...When he passed away he
    said, ''tahor, tahor, and a bas kol went out and said
    Ashreycha...that your body is tahor and your neshama went out

    ''In truth, they entertained no doubt about what they grasped from
    Hashem Yisborach, that He was metaher b-emes *V'LO ZULASO* ...For
    although they knew that AL DERECH HA-EMES the [halacha in the] safek
    case is [that the person is] tahor, they said 'tamei' because the
    Torah's decision is handed over to them [for what they can conclude]
    during their lives, and their seichel compelled them to say tamei.
    It was proper that it should be [considered] tamei EVEN THOUGH IT IS
    THE OPPOSITE OF THE TRUTH ... and the fact they were me-tam-im was
    only due to a shortcoming of their seichel."

The Ran says that only the din of tahor is the ''emes'', V'LO ZULASO, 
explicitly rejecting that tamei is ''another emes'' in Hashem's eyes.  
The context is what is the true state of the object in Hashem's eyes, 
not merely  the true pesak chosen by predecessors. All the hyphenation 
in the world will not change this fact.

So when he said (quoting RMB's translation and capitalizations),

    ''It is a known thing that the whole TSBK and TSBP were given over
    to Moshe... And Moshe learned them all miPi haGevurah, WITHOUT

which I think we're both taking as referring to future issues, yes, the 
Ran is saying Moshe was not explicitly told the pesak. ''However,'' as 
the Ran continues,

    ''However, he was given the rule by which the truth is known, which
    is: acharei rabbim lehatos.'' He was told given the methodologies
    which when applied would determine THE TRUTH. And not a hyphenated
    truth. Because there is a one-and-only emes V'LO ZULASO which in
    rare instances the chochmei hadoros may reach the OPPOSITE of.

In his more recent post, RMB raises an interesting point, that Hashem's 
response to Moshe's request for clarity does not direct him to apply the 
methodology to arrive at the halacha. Hashem instead tells him that the 
future sages will decide. RMB characterizes this as ''a rule that 
depends on a future event, not the revelation at Sinai.'' But all this 
means is that Moshe is aware that the future situations are innumerable, 
and the relevant factors that determine the halacha in each case have 
different strengths in each one of those situations. Moshe is 
overwhelmed. He cannot hope to anticipate every situation, much less 
apply the methodology to every one. So Hashem tells him that the sages 
of each generation will deal with the issues they confront. They will 
apply the methodology that Moshe transmits, and come to the same result 
he would.

This is similar to what R. Avahu tells us in Sh'mos Rabbah (41:6): And 
did Moses actually learn the entire Torah?! It (Iyov 11:9) says that 
'[the Torah] is vaster than the Earth ... and wider than the Sea.' And 
in forty days Moses learned it all?! No. It was the overall principles 
that G-d taught Moshe.''

Indeed, the Maharzu on this passage identifies the 'overall principles' 
with the Thirteen Principles and he identifies the unrevealed details 
with the many laws resulting from their application. He writes, ''These 
'overall principles' [which were given to Moshe] are identical with the 
darcay ha'drash. For each of the rules of Torah interpretation produces 
an infinite number of teachings [which were not (explicitly) revealed to 

And, incidentally, positing that the Ran and other rishonim rejected the 
previous view of the Geonim and Rambam that pesak is a matter of 
retrieval is itself paradoxical. For they would be saying that the real 
explanation of machlokos in talmudical times was forgotten by these 
earlier authorities, and Ran, etc., reviewing the Gemoros and Midrashim 
retrieved the true explanation.

Additionally, if one speaks of ''rov rishonim,'' one must factor in the 
opinion of (how many?) Geonim in addition to the Rambam.

 > : Chagiga 3b:
 > : "Ba'alei asufos" (Qoheles 12:11) ...  "Kulam nitnu
 > : miRo'eh echad." One G-d gave them, one source/leader
 > : said them, miPi Adon kol hama'asim barukh Hu. As it says (Shemos
 > : 20:1), "Vaydaber E-lokim es kol hadevarim ha'eileh".
 > :    ...RASHI: You don't have any of the disputants bringing a proof
 > : from any god's torah, only from the Torah of our G-d." and he
 > : explains: "Parness echad amran" to mean: You don't have anyone
 > :bringing a proof from the words of a prophet who came to argue
 > : against Moshe Rabbeynu."
 >RMB: DH "kulan Keil Echad amran": You do not have a disputant bringing a
 > proof from the bible of another god, only from Toras E-lokeinu

ZL: My point is, had Rashi held that ''kulam nitnu miRoeh echad'' meant 
that Hashem literally assigned and transmitted contradicting halachic 
statuses to all things and actions, he would have said, "kulan Keil 
Echad amran": 'Hashem gave both sides.' Period.

Or he would have left the Gemora without comment, and we would have the 
situation you claimed we have, that the rishonim did not reinterpret it. 
Obviously, something is bothering Rashi. Obviously, I claim, it's the 
literal take.

 >RMB:  DH "Parnes Echad amran": You one have [no] one bring[ing] a 
proof from the
 > words of a navi to dispute against Moshe Rabbeinu.
 > Rashi could well be saying (but admittedly not mukhrakh) that both
 > will indeed find valid ra'ayos in Toras Moshe -- not merely try to
 > find.

ZL: Also docheik. Rashi did not leave the words ''Parness echad amran'' 
at face value, nor simply say, '' "Parnes Echad amran': Moshe gave us 
both sides of the machlokess.''  Instead, Rashi is explaining that what 
the Gemora means by saying ''Parnes Echad amran'' is that both sides of 
the machlokess are basing themselves on Moshe Rabbeynu's words, and not 
someone else's. Obviously a move away from the literal take.


 >ZL:  DH "asei oznekha ke'afrekhtes": "Since their hearts are 
[directed] to heaven [i.e. since they are both making sincere attempts 
/to understand the matter/]...
 > RMB: Woah! Your conculsion is in your bracketed "i.e.", not in the Rashi!

ZL:''Lev l'Shamayim'' means sincere intention. If it doesn't refer to 
their intention to understand the matter, what is it referring to?

 > RMB: Rashi could be assuming that rabbanim who are liban leShamayim are
 > going to find Emes.

I have no problem with Rashi holding that after discussion the consensus 
the rabbanim reach with identify the emes (as the Ran does). But here he 
says nothing about the results of their intentions. In explaining why 
one should learn all the contradicting shittos, Rashi introduces the 
factor of liban laShamayiim. Why? If all the contradicting shittos are 
equally correct, that alone should be the entire reason to learn them 
all. There would be no reason to introduce the factor of liban 
laShamayim. Your suggestion that by saying liban laShamayim, he really 
meant to imply that they are reaching ''an'' emes, is docheik. The ikkar 
is chaser min hasafer. He is saying that one should listen to all the 
shittos, since they are all valid attempts to understand the matter. 
This is obviously an intentional move away from a literal understanding 
that Hashem told Moshe opposite pesakim.

Incidentally, when the Midrashim say that Hashem revealed to Moshe the 
factors pro and con that should be taken into consideration ''l'kall 
davar v'davar,'' I originally thought ''l'kall davar v'davar'' 
translated ''for each and every future situation.'' But the slight girsa 
difference in Midrash Tehillim (Buber 12:7) clarifies that it means 
''for each and every dibur (statement) of Hashem.'' Thus means that when 
Hashem said, for instance, that a sheretz is tamei, rather than listing 
the virtually infinite number of cases this would apply to (i.e. giving 
the Torah in chatichos form), he provided Moshe with 39 factors pro and 
con for what makes something tamie like a sheretz.

 >RMB: (Rashi:) Since all of them have their hearTs toward Shamayim, 
make your ear
 > listen, and learn and know all of them. When you know how to decide
 > which to make kosher, extablish the halakhah like him.
 > "Afrekhes" is the grain-reciever on top of a millstone.

ZL: Like a funnel. The question was: There are so may different 
opinions! Which one should I learn? (By the way, it's asking about 
learning, not poskening.) Answer: Make an effort to widen your ears (and 
mind) like a funnel. Learn all of them. But then, see which makes most 
sense (as it continues below), and learn it that way.

 >RMB:  Notice he does not talk about deciding which is true or right, or
 > even which IS kosher, but "lehavkhin ei zeh YIkasher''
ZL: Actually, ''lehavkhin ei zeh yichshar.'' The incorrect nikud was my 
error. It's from a posuk in Kohelless 12:6. ''In the morning plant your 
seed, and in the evening do not let your hand rest [from doing so 
again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this 
or this, and if both of them as one, they are good.''

In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's ''yichshar'' to mean 

 > RMB:
 > -- to decide which YOU MAKE kosher" and that is who you are qoveia'
 > the halakhah to be like.

ZL: Whether it's ''yichshar'' or ''YIkasher,'' there's no second person 
pronoun there.

Regardless, the thought is LEHAVCHIN which of the two contradictory bids 
will pass scrutiny. It does not mean, to choose (livchor) between the 
two based on one's proclivities towards gevurah or chessed, v'chulu, but 
/lehavchin/, to distinguish (as in /l'havchin/ bein yom uvain layla; 
zocheh /l'havchin/ bein dinie mammonos l'dinei nefashos [Brachos 63b]); 
to test ''/bochein/ levavos''); to determine which conclusion will 
emerge as standing scrutiny (b'zos /tibacheninu/.../v'yibacheinu/ 
divreichem ha-emes itchem''); to determine another's desire (''Al daas 
aviv--b-katan sheh-yeida /lehavchin /she-haKibui /zeh /noach l'aviv 
v'oseh bishvilo'' ).

The Kohelles mashal speaks of an objective observation of which seed or 
plant will succeed in thriving in this particular soil, at this 
particular time and this particular climate, etc. In the nimshal, the 
final halacha mirrors the one reality, determined by the objective 
observation of which of the two options, in the particular circumstances 
at hand, responds positively to the test for truth, conducted by 
application of the methods of drash, precedent, etc.

 > ZL:
 > : Identical to the Ritva ...

 > RMB:
 > Yes. And again, you decided what liban laShamayim means.

ZL: That /liban laShamayim/ means sincere intention is standard and, I 
believe, exclusive usage.

 >RMB:  And ignored that the bechinah is which to make kosher, not which is
 > true.
ZL: The verb here (/yichshar/) isn't even in hiphil or piel, so there's 
no ''making'' kosher here. Again, the operational word is /lehavchin/, 
to distinguish which of the two understandings ''/yichshar/,'' will 
prove viable.  And that understanding, of course, will lead to the 
posek's pesak.

 > RMB:
 > For that matter, the other quote you bring from them also indicates
 > the reverse of your intent. See the Ritvah you quote, right before
 > "ela eilu va'eilu" (some lines before the part you highlighted in
 > <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/mesorahPsakSources2.pdf#page
 > =2>
 > page 2):
 > He says what he sees according to his da'as, and he says what he sees
 > according to his da'as. Not one of them is lying, Rather, "eilu
 > va'eilu". HOWEVER, when we say that students are arguing in their
 > rebbe's words.... is appears that one of them is lying or forgot his
 > tradition...
 > Lying or forgetting is ony an option because they are arguing about
 > what the rebbe said.

ZL: (Just a note that whereas Rashi says ''meshakker'', Tosefos says 
''ta-ah b-shemu-aso.''  Sheker, too, does not necessarily mean 
''lying,'' just saying something that is not true. I don't think Rashi 
would argue with this.)

 > RMB: A normal machloqes, where they disagree about the din is eilu 
va'eilu Divrei E-lokim Chaim, in contrast to (aval) > this case where 
"meshaqer o shakhack".

ZL: What about where they are disagreeing over what a rebbi meant, or 
what the Tannaim or Mishnah meant, or what Moshe Rabbeynu meant? If 
those are not ''normal machlokos,'' you've just eliminated just about 
every relevant machlokos we know of from the category of eilu v'eilu.

 > RMB:
 > What you say is a rule, Rashi and the Ritva are explicitly saying is
 > the exception.

    ZL: Ritva: ''It is better for us to say that two Amoraim are having
    their ?own argument about their own opinions, than to say that
    ?Amoraim are arguing over one Amora. Meaning, it is more ?likely to
    say that R. Yochonon and R. Yehoshua ben Levy ?are arguing their own
    points?that each one says what the halacha ?should be in his own
    opinion, so that neither one of them ?would be saying something that
    [by necessity] is false, but ??"these and those are the words of the
    Living G-d." But when ?we say that the disciples of one mentor are
    arguing over ?what his words were, one saying this, and one saying
    that, it ?seems that one of them is lying or forgot the information
    he ?learned, something one should refrain as much as possible ?from
    saying. And as Rashi z"l explains.?

    And although here, nevertheless, R. Yochonon and R. ?Yehoshua ben
    Levy are [still] arguing over what Tannaim were ?arguing over, this
    too is [merely] arguing over their own ?opinions, for they did not
    learn [the correct understanding of ?the Tannaim's dispute] from the
    Tannaim and did not ?receive a transmitted report originating from
    them. Instead, ?each of these Amoraim is saying what seems to him to
    be ?correct to say the Tannaim are arguing over. ?''

When they are making opposite claims of what is reasonable and resultant 
from the rules of the 13 middos, eilue v'eilu does apply.

That's the rule.

When they are making opposite claims of what their immediate teacher's 
words (or even intent) were, eilue v'eilu doesn't apply.

That's the ''exception.''

I did not say otherwise. We're just disagreeing over what Ritva is 
saying eilu  v'elilu means in such cases means.

But according to you, why is Ritva saying one /cannot /say eilu v'eilu 
when they are disagreeing over their rebbi's words? According to you, 
even if one of them is wrong about whether the rebbi said assur or 
mutar, he is still saying divrei Elokim, because, according to you, 
Hashem said both.

As I explain it, Ritva is explaining that eilu v'eilu divrei Elokim 
Chaim means that each side is offering a sincere and competent attempt 
to gauge the Emes (l'amito) whether correct or not. Disagreement about a 
rebbi's very words (a rare occurence) indicates, or at least creates the 
impression of, incompetence (forgetting or lying), so eilu v'eilu divrei 
Elokim does not apply. But when their opposite claims of what someone in 
the more distant past said or meant, their competence is not called into 
question. It is natural for information to get lost over time. 
Therefore, it still qualifies as divrei Elokim.


 > RMB:
 > I again wish you had gone le'at le'at, as I tried to redirect the
 > conversation.

ZL: I am going step-by-step, and first tackling your claim that rov 
rishonim hold that Hashem and Moshe literally handed down opposite 
halachos for situations, and hold that the identical situation has 
opposite halachos (if not l'maaseh, then klappei shmaya). I do not want 
to go to the next step (although I have what to say about it) before 
this is settled. (Reminds me of, l-havdil, the Ramban's Vikuach, where 
he does not want to discuss whether the Talmud teaches that Moshiach 
that his opponent alleges claim, is G-d, before settling whether the 
Talmud holds Moshiach came.)

 >ZL: ... : Thus, Rashi (Sota 47a-b) writes that the first of the Zuggos
 > brought to : an end "Torah b'amitah, v'ein dofi v'shikcha
 > umachlokess." The : reference to forgetfulness-free, dofi
 > (two-panim)-free, and : machlokess-free as the characteristic of
 > "Torah b'amitah," (and not just : halacha b'amitah), indicates that
 > there was a true, single din for each : situation that was the emes
 > of Torah, as opposed to when machlokos began.

 > 47a DH "ha'eshkolos": It is explained in the gemara that all of them,
 > until their era, there was no machloqes among the chakhmei Yisrael.
 > They all said things as they were given to Moshe from Sinai. And they
 > were the first who disagreed about the semichah of qorbanos on YT, as
 > is says in Chagiga (16a). This was the first machloqes in Israel in
 > words of Torah
 > Nothing about Torah ba'amitah being machloqes free.

ZL: It's the last Rashi on 47b.

  > You are assuming that Rashi means "there was no machloqes ...
 > [because] they all said things as they were given..."

ZL: No. There was no machlokess. [Rather,] they all said [the same 
things; namely] things as they were given to Moshe at Sinai. Torah 
b'amitah, v'ein dofi.

 > RMB: Which is not accumulative either, and goes back to forgetting /
 > imperfect retrieval.

ZL: Yes. As I laid it out, I see all rishonim acknowledging that 
machlokoess is due to loss of a key principle given at Sinai that would 
determine the weight of the various relevant factors, to reveal the true 
status of the thing or action in question.

 > RMB: The missing connective could just as well be "despite".

ZL: "there was no machloqes among the chakhmei Yisrael /despite /the 
fact that they all said things as they were given to Moshe from 
Sinai''?? This does not make sense. And Rashi would have to say ''af al 
pi'' if he meant ''despite.'

 >RMB: For that matter, there are cases of Rashi acknowledging different
 > Batei Din haGadol before the zugos having conflicting pesaqim, that
 > only weren't machloqesin because the two sides were different pesaqim
 > lemaaseh for different eras.

ZL: Agreed. Also, conflicting pesakim between Moshe and Aharon, Dovid 
haMelech and Shaul, Esther and Mordechai, Esther and the Sanhedrin. When 
we say there was no machlokess previously, we mean that after all 
discussion, a conclusion was reached. The semicha machlokess, was 
however, the first to remain unsolved through generations (Tosefos  
Chagigah 16a DH Yosey ben Yoezer etc., Gra note 1 on Temura 16a, 
Maharatz Chayos, Mishpat haHoraa. 9). The machlokess was not settled in 
the generation that raised it (the generaiton of Yosey ben Yoe-ezer). 
Thus, when he died, we had the first phenomenon of unsettled machlokess 
and Torah with dofi.

 > RMB:
 > Eg, the shisin in the mizbeiach in bayis sheini. Zevachin 61b, DH
 > "shisin hosifu". According to Shelomo, the mitzbeiach in bayis sheini
 > wasn't atum ba'adamah,

ZL: Quibble: It was a fact (not just the opinion of Shlomo) that the 
mizbeyach in Bayis Sheini wasn't atum ba'adamah. The difference between 
Shlomo and the Sanhedrin of Bayis Rishon and Ezra's Sanhedrin of Bayis 
Sheyni was whether the Torah's prescription of ''mizbach adamah'' 
required that it be atum ba'adamah, made of solid earth, or only that it 
be attached to the ground.

 > RMB: and according to Ezra, no one in bayis rishon did nisuch as the
 > shisin were alongside the mizbeiach, not eithin it.

ZL: They both did libations, and in both cases the liquid flowed into 
the permanently located drain holes in the ground, a requirement all 
agreed to. The only difference is that in Bayis Sheyni, Ezra's Beis Din 
allowed digging channels through the alter leading to the drain holes. 
This allowed an expansion of the alter even though it would cover the 
drain holes. (Again, Shlomo took ''mizbach adamah [Shmos 2:24] to mean 
an alter of solid dirt, while Ezra took it only be a requirement that 
the alter was attached to the ground.) Ezra's new interpretation of the 
posuk left Shlomo's nissuch just fine. On the other hand, you could say 
that according to Shlomo, Ezra built an illegitimate mizbeach, which is 
indeed a daunting thought, but such is the nature of machlokess. 
(Although one may in this case claim that Shlomo would have agreed that 
the Torah allowed for a secondary meaning of mizbach adama if and when 
the times required a larger alter.)

 > : [ Rashi (Sota 47a-b) writes that until the era of Zugos, there was 
no machloqes among the chakhmei Yisrael.
 > They all said things as they were given to Moshe from Sinai. And they
 > were the first who disagreed...This was the first machloqes in Israel in
 > words of Torah] the first of the Zuggos
 > brought to an end to "Torah b'amitah, v'ein dofi v'shikcha
 > umachlokess."
How could this fit the notion that Moshe literally handed down
 > opposite halachos? Will you say that through the generations up
 > until the Zugos, even though they knew the Torah b'amito, they
 > preserved the shitta that was not Torah b'amito to be available for
 > later generations to choose?
 >RMB:  Yes.

 > Or, that he was literally handed down a system by which both are
 > derivable -- by HQBH's Intent, of course -- because He wanted to
 > "Say" both!

ZL: Now you're getting closer to my claim, if you would just eliminate 
your last 6 words. And with the qualification that nevertheless, 
ultimately the derivability of one halachic option is stronger than its 
 > Which is what I believe the Qorban ha'Eidah
RMB: <h
 > page 4 is saying. Beis Shamai derives Torah because they are working
 > the system, mevi'im ra'ayah min haTorah

ZL: Beis Hillel was also working the system. ''Both of them were 
bringing proofs from the Torah.'' I hope you don't think BH disregarded 
the system yet because they were nice, the halacha goes their way.

 > "veChadei QBH becharifus pilpulam". Their deductions are more
 > joy-making, as Beis Shammai were the more charifin. But BH, through
 > their anavah, were zokhin to reach the emes [lehora'ah]. Not emes
 > le'amito,

   ZL:  I disagree with your proposal [and insertion in brackets] that 
''emes,'' stam, and all the less, ''THE emes,'' stam, is used to 
indicate ''emes lehora'ah'' vs ''emes'' period. If you can find a 
rishon, never mind rov rishonim, explicitly making such a distinction, 
let me know. This is simply not the way the language is used.

RMB: as HQBH wouldn't be thrilled with a bright person's ability
 > to all the better to fool himself.

    ZL:  The Korban HaEidah himself indicates that charifus is reasoning 
so involved, complicated and tedious that others cannot follow it or 
even stay awake. The pesak of the charif may still be factually wrong 
(or right) about the un-hyphenated emes. Nevertheless, Hashem is 
thrilled with people who take Torah seriously and engage in intensive 
and sharp debate with proofs about its meaning, even if they reach the 
wrong conclusions, ''for through this is seen the esteem of the glory of 
His Torah.''

I'm sure that the nachas of seeing one's sons engaged and animated and 
arguing over learning Torah is not dependent upon whether one agrees 
with their conclusions.

Yet somehow, as a rule, the anivasdik attitude of Beis Hillel, 
demonstrated by their treatment of their opponents, helped them arrive 
at the unhyphenated emes. And in cases where they were finally modeh to 
Beis Shammai, even though they were wrong at first, they eventually 
conformed to the truth. And not to forget, at times BS also showed 
humility and were modeh to BH.

RMB : Nor would their wrong answer help
 > you decide another case.

ZL: Nothing was said about their wrong answer helping. ''It is also 
impossible that there will not come out of their pilpul something needed 
for teaching elsewhere.'' The sevaros and facts, corrections and 
tweakings developed in the argumentation, even when ultimately not 
relevant in the case in dispute, can be applicable or helpful in other 
cases. Similar to Rashi in Kesubos: Different sevoros apply, subject to 
slight changes in circumstances.

 > RMB:
 > And last, you don't quote to the end, and the final words "...
 > mimenah nora'os ALIBA DEHILKHITA".

These final words fit my claim just fine because I'm saying the point of 
poskening alibah dehilchisa is to distinguish the un-hyphenated emes. 
The halacha is always like BH, for they were zocheh to be mekavven to 
the emes because they were humble. And it is written: ''This is the 
Torah...from it will be seen wonders according to the halacha.''

But note that the Korban HaEida is commenting on the eili v'eilu quality 
of the machlokos between BS and BH. So you now seem to be saying that 
''mimenah nora'os ALIBA DEHILKHITA'' indicates that eilu v'eilu refers 
to corectly matching a previously established halacha. This contradicts 
what you said previously, that eilu v'eilu refers not to emes l-hora-a, 
but to contradictory emeses la-amita.


 > RMB: More, when I have the time.

ZL: I am amazed you find the time for what you do. Bli nedder, I'll 
respond to your new post eventually.

Zvi Lampel
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