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Volume 34: Number 153

Tue, 22 Nov 2016

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Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Message: 1
From: Michael Poppers
Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2016 18:37:35 -0500
Re: [Avodah] Minhag Shtus

?In Avodah V34n152, R'Micha responded to my suggestion (that "the prevalent
*minhag* among non-Yekke Ashk'nazim to not wear a *talis gadol* (and
thereby fulfill *ituf*)
until marriage"
? would be an example of a "
minhag that contradicts halakhah
?> Atifah is a chiyuv? I thought it was minhag to make a point of wearing
a four cornered garment during tefillah.
?*Ituf* is how you properly wear a four-cornered garment -- i.e. it's a
prerequisite when fulfilling *mitzvas tzitzis*.?

One might argue that a minhag to be yosheiv uboteil from some mitzvah
makhsheres or qiyumis (an asei that's not an imperitive) is a minhag
shtus, but I didn't take that for granted. Clearly the MB felt that
without the "derashah", it would be very strange. <
From Tur OC 17 (especially BaCH ad loc.) and from SA OC 17:3, which are
based on the sources I mentioned as well as on TY, a parent (or anyone
obligated by the *mitzvas _chiyuvis_ d'chinuch*) who can afford to buy
himself a *talis* must also buy a *talis* for his son (or ward) so long as
that young man understands how (i.e. has the *da'as*) to be *misateif* (TB)
and/or how to keep two *tzitzis* in front of his body and two behind (TY).

While on the subject (regardless of whether the noted "prevalent *minhag*
among non-Yekke Ashk'nazim" is contrary to *halacha* or merely "very strange"),
I would further suggest that *b'nei mitzva* be encouraged by listmembers
(and anyone else reading this; naturally, in consultation with your Rav) to
ask for a *talis* as a BM gift (or to invest some of the BM-gift cash in a
*talis*) and to be *misateif* during davening.  For me, the benefits are
incalculable, and the few times I've davened Shacharis without a *talis*
(e.g. when unexpectedly away from home overnight into the morning), I felt
relatively naked!  Ask yourself: is it really more important (especially if
you're a [budding] *talmid chacham*, for whom RamBaM considers not wearing
a *talis* a "*g'nai gadol*") to visibly wear your not-yet-married status
like a badge of courage rather than to fulfill a *mitzva* like this one,
whose critical nature is noted day and night in the 3rd *parasha* of
Q'riyas Shma and which can provide you with incalculable benefit?

All the best from
*Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA
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Message: 2
From: Akiva Miller
Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2016 20:17:05 -0500
Re: [Avodah] The Beracha on Matzo

A few weeks ago, I wrote:

: I question the whole logic of "since matzo is the bread on those days."
: Are the definitions of Pas Habaah B'Kisnin so flexible that they would
: vary from one part of the year to another? I do not see evidence of
: this flexibility.

R' Micha Berger answered:

> Isn't this case itself the evidence your looking for?
> Sepharadim appear to say that it is context sensitive, like depending
> on the part of the year. Whereas Ashenazim *might* well hold that being
> used like bread part of the year means it is used like bread, full-stop.
> But I see what you're saying, it tends to differ by function. Like bagel
> chips. If they were made to be bagels and only toasted after baking,
> they're bread. If they were made for the sole purpose of chip manufacture
> -- pas haba bekisnin.

The case itself is not the evidence I'm looking for, because I haven't seen
anything in print to support the practice. Your report of what people *do*
might be accurate, but I want to know if they are correct.

I will rephrase my argument.

Pas Habaa b'kisnin has three distinctive definitions. And the halacha is
clear that these are inclusive of each other. For example, if someone has a
babka and a honey cake and a pretzel in front of him, he can say Mezonos on
any of them, and then eat them all. At no point need he worry that if this
is Mezonos, then another must be Hamotzi. The halacha accepts that if ANY
of these unusual changes are done to the recipe, then it will be a snack
food by definition.

RMB's comment about bagel chip refers to a discussion we had way back in
the Digest 1:38, over 18 years ago, when R' Levi Reisman wrote:

> Twenty years ago, I attended a series of shiurim by Rabbi Yosef Wikler
> (editor of Kashrus Magazine) on the subject of pas haba be-kisnin, ...
> Now we get to the issue of melba toast made with water.  First, bread
> is baked, than it is cut into thin strips and toasted.  What is the
> beracha? Rabbi Wikler said he asked Reb Moshe Feinstein the question and
> his answer was that it depended on the intentions of the bakers when the
> bread was being made.  If the bread was baked with the intention that it
> be made into melba toast, the beracha was mezonos, since the process
> ended with something thin and crispy, not normally used as bread.
> However, if the bread was baked with the intention of using it as bread,
> and only afterwards converted for use as melba toast, then the beracha
> was hamotzi, since it was being baked to be used as bread.
> Applying this logic to bagel chips, it would appear that if the bread is
> made in the bagel chip factory and the entire lot is used to make bagel
> chips, the beracha would be mezonos. However, if the bread was purchased
> from a supplier, part of whose product run was intended for use as bread,
> then the beracha would be hamotzi.
> ...

This discussion of bagel chips may seem to introduce a fourth type of PHBK,
but it merely elaborates on the general rule: The crispiness of the product
is not determined by the first time it comes out of the oven, but is still
in limbo until the manufacturer considers it "done".

I had asked about the "flexibility" of these definitions. My point was that
in every case, the halacha is "If you have a bread-like food, but it is
typically eaten as a snack, then when you do eat it as a snack, it is
mezonos." But I have never seen a situation where a posek says, "If you
have a snack-like loaf or cracker, but it is typically eaten as the basis
of a meal, then when you do eat it as the basis of a meal, it is hamotzi."

Is there any precedent for such a reversal? Is there any precedent for
saying that in certain communities and/or times of year (for example,
Ashkenazi Americans during Pesach) crispy matzah can re-acquire Hamotzi
status, and/or be exempted from the halachos that lower it to Mezonos, such
that a person who wants a piece of this matzah *between* meals as a *snack*
is required to say Hamotzi and Birkas Hamazon? Is there anything in Hilchos
Pas Habaa B'Kisnin that sets a precendent for this?

I would like to offer a possible precedent:

Suppose I have a bag of something that the manufacturer - and his Rav
Hamachshir - labeled "Mezonos Rolls". The ingredients proudly announce that
there is no water at all in these rolls; even the fruit juice was fresh and
natural, and *not* reconstituted from water. Since there is more juice,
eggs, oil, etc, than water in this recipe, therefore, the rolls do meet the
halacha's definition of Pas Habaa B'Kisnin. But the baker was very clever,
and managed to give these rolls a rather bland taste. That's not to say
that they taste bad, only that no one would snack on them. And in fact, no
one *does* snack on them. They are used as a substitute for bread, to make
sandwiches that don't require washing or benching.

As I understand it, the poskim are divided on what to do when eating such a
sandwich. Some say that the sandwich constitutes Kvias Seudah and therefore
it becomes Hamotzi, while others say that it does not constitute Kvias
Seudah and so it remains Mezonos. But my question concerns the case where
there is NO Kvias Seudah: If one does eat such a roll as a snack, what is
the bracha?

I have clear memories of an eitzah given by the OU or the Star-K, though I
cannot find a citation right now. The author took the position that such
rolls, when eaten with a meal, DO become hamotzi, yet he suggested what to
do with such a roll that comes with one's airline meal: Simply eat the meal
on its own, and then later on, one can eat the roll as a snack, saying

If that memory is accurate, then it is a precedent-setting case: Despite
the ubiquity of "mezonos rolls" in certain situations (i.e., on an
airplane) that does NOT reverse the halacha that they are indeed PHBK. If
offer this as evidence to the chevra that the same applies to crispy thin
matzah: Despite the ubiquity of using crispy matzah as the mainstay of
meals in certain situations (i.e., where soft matza is unavailable for
whatever reason), it remains PHBK, and the bracha when snacking on it -
even during Pesach - is Mezonos.

Akiva Miller
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Message: 3
From: via Avodah
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 00:34:57 -0500
Re: [Avodah] minhag shtus

>> The question is whether a cohen
can go to the grave of a  tzaddik, i.e. does the grave of a tzaddik have
tumah. Over the ages there  have been many cases of cohanim visitng the
grave of tzaddikim while others  condemn the minhag. Without exhausting the
subject the Avnei Nezer has a  chiddush that that if the Tzaddik dies
naturally the grave is me-tameh while  if he was called then the grave is
not me-tameh. R Usher Weiss says that its  a nice drasha but not halacha.

Eli Turkel

"If he was called then the grave is not me-tameh."  What does that  mean, 
"if he was called"?  Did you mean to say "if he was killed"?

--Toby Katz


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Message: 4
From: Eli Turkel
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 09:06:37 +0200
Re: [Avodah] minhag shtus

> Of course you are right. Thank you for the correction


> "If he was called then the grave is not me-tameh."  What does that mean,
> "if he was called"?  Did you mean to say "if he was killed"?
> *--Toby Katzt6...@aol.com <t6...@aol.com>..=============*
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Message: 5
From: Eli Turkel
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 15:08:27 +0200
[Avodah] The danger of smelling a food and not consuming it

<<The danger of smelling a food and not consuming it
Someone who smelled the aroma of a food but was unable to eat it should not
swallow the saliva that formed in his mouth because of the food. Swallowing
this saliva can be dangerous and cause harm.

In order to protect him from this danger, a waiter  must be given a taste
of every fragrant food that is served. If many fragrant foods are served at
one meal, he should receive a bit of each one.  >>

These are based on health reasons which don't seem to be applicable today.
I have been at many charedi weddings and doubt if the waiters are given to
eat from each food (though one could argue about how fragrant the dishes

Eli Turkel
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Message: 6
From: Micha Berger
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 14:59:33 -0500
Re: [Avodah] What's the proper procedure for netilas yadayim

Beqitzur, according to the Rama and AhS, the way most of us wash our
hands is not only unnecessary, but raises questions about whether
the water on your hands from the first cup may be metamei the water
from the second. A question with an answer, but could be avoided

Now, less qitzur.

AhS OC 162:7:
    And if he poured on his hands or on his one hand a revi'is all at once
    -- he doesn't need second water at all, because the revi'is is
    entirely metaheir. THis is what we learned in Tosefta Yadayim (pereq 1)

    Memeila, since there is no tamei water there at all, he does not need
    to raise his hands.

    Similarly someone who is tovel his hands in a miqvah...

    That's the halakhah. But even so, it is appopriate to raise his hands
    in any case, because the gemara makes an aspachta from the pasuq...

In se'if 8 he quotes the Rama and enters a discussion of multiple washings.
The Rama's yeish omerim and MA (s"q 2) say that washing 3 times on each hand
(before hamotzi) is enough to remove any need to be careful about anything.
Then he discussed why each washing's water isn't metamei the next one's.

Still, he concludes:
    According to all this, it is a tiqun chakhamim, and with a revi'is
    at once the hands are entirely clean, and also with three times the
    original [water] is entirely gone.

Se'if 9 says that two wachings is lechatkhilah, and if you washed with
once, you do not bother getting more water.

Se'if 11 explains that the common practice of 3x for neigl vasr and 2x
before hamotzi is the Mordechai.
The Tur (quoting the Semag) says it's 2x, plus once to wash them off. And
therefore the BY concludes that uf your hands rater out clean, ythere
is no need for a third.
To which the Rama adds (s' 2) similarly if you have far more than a
revi'is. Wash first with a little to get the dirt off, than pour the
entire revi'is at once, and there is no need for a second [pouring
of water].

Tir'u baTov!

Micha Berger             It is our choices...that show what we truly are,
mi...@aishdas.org        far more than our abilities.
http://www.aishdas.org                           - J. K. Rowling
Fax: (270) 514-1507

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Message: 7
From: Micha Berger
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 17:07:27 -0500
Re: [Avodah] Geonim, Rambam and Other Rishonim on Mesorah and

[In a private email, RZL sent me some sources in the original: the
Maharal, the Chinukh #78, Chagiga 3b [highlighting Rashi], and Berakhos
19b [highlighting R Nisim Gaon]. I put them up at

On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 12:41am EST, RZ Lampel wrote (instead of sensibly
: RMB:
:> Pashut peshat in Chazal is that machloqes is understood in these
:> terms as well.

:> "Eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim, vehalakhah keBH."

: You take it as " pashut peshat"that "divrei E-lokim chaim"means 
: "true [despite being contradictory]," but the rishonim I will cite 
: below hold that what you consider "pashut peshat" is not correct peshat.

I am not sure what you mean by this last sentence -- that pashut peshat
is NOT as I take it, so there is no indication that both shitos are
truely what Hashem Said? Or that this is pashut peshat, but you will
bring rishonim to meet the burden of proof that correct peshat isn't
what the words would seem to mean to the naive reader.

More sources the gemara from the Y-mi already cited about 49 ways to find
something tamei and 49 ways letaheir has a parallel in TB Eiruvin 13b
before getting to the famous bad qol of "eilu va'eilu".

See also Gitin 6b: Eliyahu tells R Aviatar that HQBH discussed both
sides of his debate with R Yehudah about pilegesh begiv'ah. RA himself
said the levi was getting rid of her because he found a zevuv. R Yonasan
said he found a hair.
    Amar Lei: Chas veshalom! Umi ika sefeiqa qamei Shemaya?
    Amar Lei: Eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim hain

He found a fly but wasn't maqpid about it, and he found a hair, over
which he was maqpid.

Notice that eilu va'eilu is being used to mean both sides are true. This
is an actual historical question, not even one in din. But thanks to
there being many ways to look at someone's motives, both sides could be
true even while appearing to contradict.

Chagiga 4b: "Ba'alei asufos" (Qoheles 12:11) -- there are the talmidei
chakhamim who sit in many gathings and are osqin baTorah. These are
metam'ei, and these are mitaheir. These make asur, and these make mutar.
These make pasul, and these make kasher.

Should a man say -- how can I learn Torah from now?

Talmud lomar: "Kulam nasnu miRo'eh echad." One G-d gave them, one
source/leader said them, miPi Adon kol hama'asim barukh Hu.

As it says (Shemos 20:1), "Vaydaber E-lokim es kol hadevarim ha'eileh".

I really find it pretty compelling -- that simple peshat in Chazal is that
H' literally gave us both shitos.

I would have preferred to have this conversation in a more organizaed,
shelav beshlav, fashion.

But since you rushed off that groundwork I was trying to lay about the
non-compelling nature of Western Classical Logic and consequently how
many shitos were given at Sinai, I will reply to your other points.


: You invoke the Maharal, but the Maharal (be'er HaGolah, be'er rishon) 
: explains that halacha is like Hashem's creations...

    ... And Hashem yisbarakh created everything, and He created the
    matter so that is has in it 2 bechinos. Only when it comes to
    halakhah lemaaseh that there is no doubt that one is more iqar than
    the second, like the Acts of H'. Even when something is a compound,
    in any case this is not like the other -- one is more central. For
    wood, which is a compound of four elements, the overpowering iqar
    is the element of wind, as is known.

The first two sentences (before the highlight in your scan) make the
point that I was trying to lay down in that first, groundwork email --
Hashem gave us both shitos. Is this not a reinforcement of the literal
read of evilu va'eilu? Hashem made 2 bechinos, and only when it comes
to lemaaseh we have to choose one.


: You haven't addressed my point that every Gemora's kushya, or at least 
: every tiyuvta-tiyuvta, is assuming the Law of Non-Contradiction....

Because halakhah requires a single pesaq. I think you are assuming that
"tiyuvta" must mean that we cannot find the one shitah given at Sinai and
then presenting my not sharing that assumption as question.

Tiyuvta could mean we cannot figure out which shitah is more consistent
with other pesaqim already made. It could mean any of a lot of different
ways we reach a stalemate.

: Aristotle was wise enough to recognize the truth of this logic, that is 
: to his credit. But it is a logic that everyone from Adam to Moshe 
: Rabbeynu and on has been expected to use to determine truth. Chazal 
: taught the Sinaitic rule that if two pesukim are in contradiction, a 
: third one comes to qualify them, to add conditions to one or both of 
: them so that they no longer contradict.

But this is a rule of derashah. Meaning, you can decide which shitah
to make halakhah using the kasuv hashelishi.

I pointed out cases where Aristo's logic doesn't work. (Quantum Physics
neither, but I don't think that's more than a curiosity for this discussion.
Quantum uncertainty and its violations of De Morgan's Laws are far smaller
than the bugs we ignore in our water.)

That was a central point of that email. In a real world, where categories
have fuzzy edges, and when dealing with the human condition ride with
antinomies, dialectics and ambivalence, two-values logic doesn't work.

Point 2- Halakhah doesn't conform to the Classical 3 Laws of Thought when
    it comes to safeiq.

Point 3- Pashut peshat would lead you to believe the same is true WRT
    shitos in machloqes. And thus the burden of proof is on those who
    want to show a rishon does not believe on such plurality.

Then in the followup email (part II) I intended to show that the burden
is not met.

: When Rashi (Kesubos 57a) explains eilu v'eilu by saying /sometimes/ this 
: consideration is appropriate and /sometimes/ that one is, because the 
: considerations change over according to /slight changes in 
: circumstances/...

Both are true, and sometimes a slight change in circumstance would change
which we should follow lemaaseh. (In Maharal-speak, which yesod becomes

:                 he is working with the logic that "2 or more 
: contradictory statements cannot both be true in the same sense at the 
: same time not (A and not-A)." And that is why he says that if there two 
: Amoraim are arguing over what their mentor held, one of them is saying 
: "sheker,"and we /cannot/ apply "eilu v'eilu divrei Elokim Chaim" to 
: such a situation.

But when the machloqes is over sevara rather than the contents of a quote,
neither is sheqer.

Here's a related quote from R Tzadoq haKohein, Resisei Laylah #17:
    Whenever a new thing about the Torah is found by a wise person,
    its opposite simultaneously arises... When it comes to the realm
    of po'el, it cannot be that two [contradictory] things are true
    simultaneously. In the realm of machashavah, on the other hand,
    it is impossible for a person to think about one thing without
    considering the opposite,

: When RITVA on the same daf quotes Rashi as the correct peshat, it is 
: because he too is working with the Law of Non-Contradiction .(Yes, the 
: same Ritva who elsewhere quotes the kabbalistic teaching about Moshe 
: being told 49 considerations pointing to opposite conclusions,  but who 
: concludes that "that is correct by way of drash, but in the derech 
: ha-emes there is ta'am v'sod ba-davar." And pardon me, but I cannot 
: accept that any one of us can decipher what he means, either in the 
: beginning or the end.)

This is not some qabbalistic esoterica -- it's in both Talmuds and Mes
Soferim! Chazal benigleh say that Moshe was given both set of arguments.

You want to argue that these rishonim did not take those gemaras at
face value, do so. But "I cannot accept" or our inability to decipher
is insufficient reason to take a gemara at anything but what it says.
When the Ritva is confusing, we should start by assuming that whatever
he means, it's consistent with the gemara. Especially when he himself
quotes it.

And as I already noted, it makes sense to me to read this Ritva as
talking about being correct in terms of derashah (emes la'amito), but
not the way to pasqen. Which is why he quotes a gemara about acharei
rabbim being a rule to pick between two shitos each given -- with their
numerous raayos -- to MRAH.

But in any case, I was arguing that any take on Rashi or the Ritva
that says that Hashem did not give us multiple shitos ion Sinai is the
side that needs proof. And you fail to give any; you just express your
inability to accept the alternative.

: RAMBAN on Devarim 17:11 says that one should not be afraid to follow 
: Beis Din Gadol even if one thinks they erred...          He is working 
: with the assumption that the mikreh has a specific intent that is 
: subject to error.

Or a range of valid intents that a Sanhedrin could miss. Or, like the
amoraim who argue over a quote, they mistake what the rov of an earlier
Sanhedrin pasqned, and they are not greater bechokhmah uveminyan. Or...

Saying there can be multiple right answers doesn't mean all answers are
right. (That way lies Conservative Judaism...)

Which ties in to what I said above about tiyuvta. 

: TOS RABBEYNU PERETZ (Eruvin 13b)begins by taking eilu v'eilu as you do, 
: but cannot accept it because it is illogical. "If something is assur it 
: cannnot be muttar, and if something is muttar it cannot be assur." He 
: too is working with the Law of Non-Contradiction. He therefore concludes 
: that Eilu V'eilu merely means that one must follow the chachmei hador. I 
: take it that he means that both shittos of a machlokess are worthy of 
: consideration.

Or, that both are emes, but you cannot in practice hold both.

: SEFER HACHINUCH states that by commanding us to follow the majority 
: opinion, the Torah teaches us the fact that the majority opinion will 
: always conform to the truth more than the minority.

Well, we can't be surprised when the Chinukh follows the Rambam...

But like the Ritva, "the truth" doesn't necessarily mean "the sole shitah
given at Sinai". Once the idioms emes le'amito and emes lehora'ah exist,
a Non-hyphenated use of the word "emes" doesn't prove a rishon read in
a non-literal read of the gemaros.

Really, though, I expect the Chinukh did indeed follow the Rambam on
this too.

:> Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 4:2 (a similar passage in Tractate Sofrim
:> 16:5): R' Yanai said: Had the Torah been given decided, we wouldn't
:> have a leg to stand on. Where? "And Hashem spoke to Moshe." He said
:> before Him: Master of the World, tell me what is the halakhah. He
:> responded "Decide according to the majority...." So that the Torah be
:> interpretable 49 ways tamei and 49 ways tahor.

: I don't have peshat in why we would be at a disadvantage if we were 
: explicitly given a pesak for each and every situation that may arise. 

... aside from it being physically impossible. Not a limitation on the
RBSO, but on human language. There isn't enough room on the planet for
microfilm of text to cover every possible case.

: Probably the thought is that it would be beyond out ability to carry all 
: those details and instead we were given klallim through each situation 
: could be halachically solved. This does not contradict the fact that 
: there is a correct conclusion to reach for.

Except that you're working with a Hashem gave both conclusions to Moshe.

: Heavenly revelations are no longer valid for determining halacha.Why 
: then was there a bas kol by tanur shel Achnai? Among the explanations 
: given are two by Rav Nissim Gaon ( (Brachos 19b). (1) When the Bas Kol 
: declared the halacha follows R. Eliezer b'kall makom, it meant usually, 
: but not necessarily here, or someting similar. (2) It was a test for the 
: Chachamim to withstand the temptation to transgress the principle of lo 
: bashamayim hee, similar to when Hashem grants a false prophet the 
: ability to perform a miracle (or the appearance of one).

It was a test, because halakhah lemaaseh is acharei rabbim. But do you
really think the RBSO lied to them? And if the point is to find the emes,
why would there be a rule that halakhah lemaaseh is sety by acharei rabim,
against what the RBSO reveals?

This is takeh a question on the Chinukh. If acharei rabbim is just to
maximize the chance of being correct, hayitachein a neis wouldn't outrank
rov? The Chinukh would have to say HQBH lied lekhavod R Eliezer,
misled them by giving a general kelal that in this case didn't hold.
Which could well be valid grounds for meshaneh es ha'emes.

But that's a pretty big structure for me to make up there.

: --you invoke the RAN, and cite RMH's translation, which ends
: > Yet [God] also gave him a
: > rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority
: > opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for the decision
: > had already been delegated to them...
: The last sentence reads, in Hebrew,
: /aval massar lo klall yivadda bo ha-emmess/.
:   But [God] gave him a rule /through which one knows the truth/, 'Favor 
: the majority opinion'...

: And the context removes all doubt that the Ran explicitly denies that he 
: is referring only to "Emes leHoraah.vs Emes leAmito. To wit (and this 
: is again something I already cited last time but repeat again.

How do you get that? The Ran says "the decision was delegated" to the
sages of the generation. How would that be anything but emes lehora'ah?
A fact finding mission wouldn't place delegation over any other tool
at your disposal. (As I asked about the tanur shel akhnai.)

: In Drash 5 and 11 the Ran poses a quandary:
:> The Torah took means to prevent a misfortune that can always arise, and ?
:> that is the divergence of opinions and the creation of machlokess, ?
:> almost creating a situation of two Torahs. The Torah's remedy for this ?
:> ever-present danger was to hand over to each generation's Sages the ?
:> right to resolve halachic questions. /For in the majority of cases this ?
:> will result in both a remedy [of the problem of machlokess] and the ?
:> correct decision/.... And even though there is the extremely remote and ?
:> practically absurd possibility that they may make a mistake, the Torah ?did
:> not concern itself with that remote danger. The risk is worth taking for ?
:> the benefit accrued.?

From just before that, in derashah 5:

    It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral, was
    transmitted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah, R Hiyya
    bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and on them was
    written according to all the words...." teaches that HQBH showed
    Moses the details prescribed by the Torah and by the Sages...
    The 'details' provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and
    conflicting views held by the sages of Israel. Moses learned them all
    by Divine Word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet
    [HQBH] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor
    the majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit,
    for the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written:
    'And you shall come to the priest the Levites , and to the judge
    that shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....".

Moshe got both shitos, with no pesaq.

    Yet [HQBH] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor
    the majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit,
    for the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written:
    'And you shall come to the priest the Levites , and to the judge
    that shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....".

Which is the Y-mi.

In any case, is not the point of the Ran that metaphysical truth does
not decide halakhah? That even if beis din picks the metaphysically
more damaging shitah, following pesaq is more important?

The Ran is explaining why the law of contradiction would not apply to
halakhah even if it applies to metaphysics. Not that one shitah is
divrei E-lokim Chaim and the other not, since he oturight says MRAH
got both shitos, with no pesaq "every controversy in detail".

: Down to the Yam shel Shlomo, who wrote (Introduction to Bava Kamma) 
: "Never did two opposite predicates for one subject escape the lips of 
: Moshe" ("shelo yatza hadavar mipi Moshe l-olom lihyos shnei hafachim 
: b-nosei echad")...

Which he contrasts with that which is deduced from what Moshe said
    ... because nothing emerges from the seikhel hapo'al,
    which does not arise sensible seconds and thirds.

(Sounds kind of like R Tzadoq, no?)

Tir'u baTov!

Micha Berger             You are where your thoughts are.
mi...@aishdas.org                - Ramban, Igeres haQodesh, Ch. 5
Fax: (270) 514-1507

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Message: 8
From: Micha Berger
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 13:40:03 -0500
Re: [Avodah] minhag shtus

The AhS YD 214:21-23 is relevent. Unfortunately, it's from his coverage
of Nedarim, which means that only the newer editions of AhS have it.

He cites the Shakh s"q 7 (d"h "vechayavim la'asos ketaqanasam"). The
Shakh distinguishes between a minhag garua and a minhag chshuv. The latter
defined as "shenahagu kein al pi talmid chakham". There is an obligation
for a visitor to follow a minhag garua when bifneihem or when the only
witness is a TC who will understand. (The Shakh phrases it in terms of
when there is no chiyuv.)

So it seems a minhag does NOT require a TC. But it is indeed weaker than
one that was launched by a TC.

Tir'u baTov!

Micha Berger             What we do for ourselves dies with us.
mi...@aishdas.org        What we do for others and the world,
http://www.aishdas.org   remains and is immortal.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Albert Pine


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