Avodah Mailing List

Volume 31: Number 148

Thu, 15 Aug 2013

• 1. Re: Must we agree with the Torah? (Micha Berger)
• 2. Desire for the Prohibited (Micha Berger)
• 3. Re: Must we agree with the Torah? (Micha Berger)
• 4. Re: Eishet Yefat Toar (Micha Berger)
• 5. national kollel support (saul newman)
• 6. pre- leap year ki tisa (saul newman)
• 7. Re: Must we agree with the Torah? (Lisa Liel)
• 8. Re: Must we agree with the Torah? (Daniel M. Israel)
• 9. Re: Must we agree with the Torah? (Micha Berger)
• 10. Re: Must we agree with the Torah? (Daniel M. Israel)
• 11. Re: Must we agree with the Torah? (Zev Sero)
• 12. Re: on orthopraxy (David Riceman)
• 13. Re: Synthetic meat (Elazar M. Teitz)
• 14. Synthetic Meat, Parev (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi, its Kosher!)
• 15. checking sources (saul newman)
• 16. Synthetic Meat (Sholom Simon)
• 17. abuse vs gneiva (saul newman)

On Sun, Aug 11, 2013 at 01:10:41PM +0000, Kenneth Miller wrote:
: We often think of ourselves as intelligent creatures, but we are
: also emotional creatures. One of the effects of our emotional side is
: (as Rambam put it), "l'olam yhe daato shel adam m'ureves im habriyos -
: A person's personality will inevitably be influenced by those around him."

: This is one of my answers to the question of how Hashem can command
: an emotion such as emunah, and how that emotion can be obtained: Simply
: surround yourself with believers, and eventually it will rub off on you.

The Rambam expects yedi'ah to come from reason, but ahavah and yir'ah
which are also clearly commanded emotions to come from experience. In
Yesodei haTorah 2:2 he says they are products of things like spending
time admiring His handiwork.

Is that emotional, an aesthetic judgment? Or is it that which the person
is judging and finding beautiful?

As y'all must surely have noticed, my theme in the Farber Document Theory
contretemps has been that anyone who has had episodes of success when
living al pi halakhah would not take seriously anything that questions
the TSBP's self-description of its origins. Such theories don't fit
one's life experience. I recently had to post a parallel clarification
in a comment.

http://rechovot.blogspot.com/2013/08/why-orthodox-judaism-cannot-r
efute.html
(Don't let the URL scare you, it's not about document theories being right,
but the lack of common assumptions for dialog.)

    ...
    The Rebbetzin's Husband
    August 13, 2013 at 8:31 AM
    ...
    R' Micha-
    Lack of attractive religious experiences, perhaps, but also
    experiencing attractive things outside religion - which many of us
    have, particularly in the MO world.
    ...

    Joel-
    ...
[Reply to RJR deleted, but just letting the chevrah know he's in the
discussion too. -micha]



    Micha Berger
    August 13, 2013 at 10:59 AM
    ...
    I want to clarify something I feel our host misunderstood about my
    earlier comment. I am not saying that people are irrationally going
    with what they find attractive, as an aethetic judgment. Rather, I
    am discussing the properties of the religious experience themselves,
    the thing they are making the judgment about. E.g. a mathematician
    isn't convinced because he is attracted to the beauty of the
    proof. There are properties of the proof such as it being simple
    (once you know it), and having a broad explanatory power to a wide
    number of seemingly unrelated questions that exist beyond taste, the
    elements that may make a mathematician find it elegant and beautiful.

    Similarly, I could like or not like keeping Shabbos. But if I
    experience everyone once in a while a true menuchas hanefesh, if I
    have that redemptive experience and healing of the soul, then I am
    less likely to accept postulates that disconnect the laws of Shabbos
    from revelation. Even before I decide I like that feeling, it's part
    of the world I exist in. And postulates have to fit experience.


I would say this is a third approach which you are not considering.
Before we get to rational arguments, we get to the things we reason
about, the givens we accept as true. These come from experience, whether
first-hand or accepted from sources we consider reliable.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole
mi...@aishdas.org        heart, your entire soul, and all you own."
http://www.aishdas.org   Love is not two who look at each other,
Fax: (270) 514-1507      It is two who look in the same direction.

I wasn't sure I should do this, because it may derail the conversation.
But I decided to change the subject line so as to start a new thread,
and risk it.

On Sun, Aug 11, 2013 at 01:10:41PM +0000, R' Akiva Miller wrote on
the thread "Must we agree with the Torah?":
: So too here: If Hashem sees pork as something to be avoided, then
: I want to avoid it as well. I don't really need the Taamei Hamitzvos
: that I mentioned in my previous post. What I *do* need is a real love
: of Him and identification with Him: If *He* likes it or doesn't like it,
: then that goes for me too. THAT is "Asei Retzono retzonkha".

Does this mean that a homosexual is charged with not only resisting
acting on that desire for issur, but to try to eliminate it?

With what I called the "classical" answer (as consequently corrected),
it would depend if the issur is considered mefursemet. WRT arayos in
general, the Rambam in 8 Peraqim says that a person could still have
the yeitzer, unlike e.g. the desire to steal. But that's echoing R/Dr
Meir Shinnar, and not based on having a source exact enough to look
up myself to see if the Rambam mentions the example or left us on our
own.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole
mi...@aishdas.org        heart, your entire soul, and all you own."
http://www.aishdas.org   Love is not two who look at each other,
Fax: (270) 514-1507      It is two who look in the same direction.

On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 06:54:52PM +1000, Meir Rabi wrote:
: I gathered through the discussion, that some contributors were suggesting
: that the notion of Ma Hu, Af Atta; applies also to those things He
: prohibits us from doing...
: I don't think this correct. Ma Hu, Af Atta, is illustrated exclusively by
: those Middos that are of interpersonal values...

We were discussing "asei Retzono kirtoznkha", which doesn't have this
limitation. And implies we should not only do His Will because it's
His Will, but we should try to adapt our desires to match His.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 05:05:48AM +0300, Ben Waxman wrote:
> If, by definition, this giyur is done so that they can marry, then this  
> giyur is already not a "proper giyur" (even if she does it willingly),  
> n'est pas?

This giyur doesn't need to be willing. (Like a shifcha or eved, which is
why I didn't know if it had a separate ceremony.) The purity of intent
can't be an issue if intent isn't required.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

http://www.mishpacha.com/Browse/Article/3437/Small-Measures-Big-Payoff-
  r
kobre:  pro
http://www.rationalistjudaism.com/2013/08/what-are-those-quoters
-thinking.html
r  slifkin  :  con
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http://thepartialview.blogspot.co.il/2013/08/remember
ing-amalek-this-shabbos-parshas.html
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On 8/13/2013 6:00 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 06:54:52PM +1000, Meir Rabi wrote:
> : I gathered through the discussion, that some contributors were suggesting
> : that the notion of Ma Hu, Af Atta; applies also to those things He
> : prohibits us from doing...
> : I don't think this correct. Ma Hu, Af Atta, is illustrated exclusively by
> : those Middos that are of interpersonal values...
>
> We were discussing "asei Retzono kirtoznkha", which doesn't have this
> limitation. And implies we should not only do His Will because it's
> His Will, but we should try to adapt our desires to match His.
>    

I have to disagree.  The use of "ratzon" as "desire" is a modern 
development.  It means "will", and there's no implication whatsoever, 
IMO, that we should try to adapt our "desires" to match His.  Only our will.

Lisa

On Aug 8, 2013, at 2:51 PM, Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote:
> RMYG opened asking about lo sachmod eishes rei'ekha:
>> R' Elazar ben Azarya sad that a person should not say, "I don't want to wear Shaatnez,"
>> rather he should say, "I want to, but my father in heaven decreed upon
>> me that I can not!"?
> 
> I replied:
> : What does R' Yisrael Salanter do? He makes a chiluq between kibush hayeitzer,
> : doing the right thing despite taavos otherwise, and tiqun hayeitzer, which
> : is getting the taavos in line. (And primarily a consequence of the hergel
> : set up by kibush).

I'm missing a step in your comment.  How does RYS's chiluk answer the
question?  REBA seems to be explicitly rejecting tiqun hayeitzer as you
have defined it.  (I might, consequently, define it differently, but that
would not address the question at hand.)

--
Daniel M. Israel
d...@cornell.edu

On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 12:16:52AM -0500, Lisa Liel wrote:
> On 8/13/2013 6:00 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
>> We were discussing "asei Retzono kirtoznkha", which doesn't have this
>> limitation. And implies we should not only do His Will because it's
>> His Will, but we should try to adapt our desires to match His.

> I have to disagree.  The use of "ratzon" as "desire" is a modern  
> development.  It means "will", and there's no implication whatsoever,  
> IMO, that we should try to adapt our "desires" to match His.  Only our 
> will.

In Kerisus 13a, milk the mother expressed is leratzon, and milk that
emerged on its own is not. This is beyond "feelings of compulsion", and
actually refers to being done by choice or the body doing it without any
(conscious?) involvement by the mind.

But the wall between will and desire isn't /that/ high. Ratzon is also
the atonymn to be'oneis. For example, all through davening we ask for
things to be done, and done beratzon. If ratzon is the power to do,
and not that it be done willingly, because the person desires to, then
what is being added? Similarly, "eis ratzon".

"The mental faculty
by which one deliberately chooses or decides upon a course of action"
(American Heritage Dict. "will") chooses among the desiderata. Therefore,
to follow Hashem's Ratzon willingly, rather than from feelings of compulsion,
one would perforce have to get one's desires aligned with what He wants
us to do. (Which is how I worded it in my earlier post, quoted above.)


Back in 2002 we discussed the various meanings of "umasbia lekhol chai
ratzon", which doesn't trivially work grammatically. Common translations
take it as a poetic form of "retzon kol chai" -- Hashem satisfies all
desires, or as per the Roqeiach (provided by RYZ zt"l) and the Malbim
as though it were "umasbia lekol chai beratzon" -- Hashem willingly
satistfies. R' Kook writes that it's praising Hashem for providing each
living being with desires, so that we aren't overcome with innui. R'
Shim'on Schwab taes it as a praise that He provides us with desirability,
so that other people are more willing to help us.

Someone tried to take the conversation to Chumash, "Naftali seva ratzon,
umaleih birkhas Hashem", but no one followed.

Each of these imply a meaning for "ratzon", so it may be worth visiting
that conversation http://j.mp/14KiRC3 or
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/ge
tindex.cgi?section=P#POSAIACH%20ES%20YODECHO%20UMASBIA%20LCHOL%20CHAI%20RAT
ZON

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Every second is a totally new world,
mi...@aishdas.org        and no moment is like any other.
http://www.aishdas.org           - Rabbi Chaim Vital
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On Aug 12, 2013, at 11:43 AM, T6...@aol.com wrote:
> If your issue is [1] then you are just wrong. Hashem tells us over
> and over in the Torah that He loves us more. It also says in Pirkei Avos
> that Hashem loves us more. "Ratzah Hakodosh Baruch Hu LEZAKOS ES YISRAEL
> lefichach hirbah lahem Torah umitzvos." Also, "Hu (R' Akiva) haya omer,
> Chavivin Yisrael shenikra'u vanim laMakom....shene'emar 'Banim atem
> laShem Elokeichem.'" (Although I must point out that Hashem loves all of
> mankind, as it also says in Pirkei Avos "chaviv Adam shenivra beTzelem.")

But none of this is loshon of "loves us more."

HaShem has a very different kind of relationship with us than with the
rest of the world. OTOH, the idea that HaShem loves anything is an
anthropomorphism. In the absence of a clear citation in Tanach where
the phrase "loves us more" occurs specifically, I'm not sure that we
have the right to characterize the relationship that way.

> If your issue is [2] then the answer is, there is no reason to hate
> us (and btw anti-Semites need no excuse, they hate us for breathing,
> for occupying space on Planet Earth). Anyone who wants to can join
> the Jewish people, if he is willing to accept all the extra mitzvos he
> will have to keep and if he is willing to share our fate, which may c'v
> include wars, terror attacks, pogroms, expulsions, massacres, fulminating
> New York Times editorials and UN anti-Israel votes -- which have been
> aptly characterized as "Seventy wolves voting on the fate of one sheep."

They also have to accept anti-Semitism from right wing sources. Of which
there is no shortage.

Sorry, not really relevant to my point, but I do get frustrated with
ongoing gratuitous swipes at NYT & Co., which are IMNSHO not contributing
to the discussion.


On Aug 12, 2013, at 10:51 AM, Zev Sero <z...@sero.name> wrote:
> The simplest and most important step is not to avoid saying it among
> ourselves.
> The trouble begins when we start telling ourselves and our children the lies
> that we have to tell those outside, and they -- not knowing any better - come
> to believe them.

1. If we are not careful about when and how we say certain things among
ourselves, we will end up being careless about saying them outside.

2. More importantly, we don't tell lies, inside or outside. Torah is
toras emes. There may be things we phrase delicately or don't volunteer,
but I don't agree that we should lie about anything Torah says, except
perhaps in the rare circumstance where there is a real sekanos nefashos.
And even there, that may be a real case of kiddish HaShem.

--
Daniel M. Israel
d...@cornell.edu

On 14/08/2013 2:06 AM, Daniel M. Israel wrote:
> I'm missing a step in your comment.  How does RYS's chiluk answer the
> question?  REBA seems to be explicitly rejecting tiqun hayeitzer as
> you have defined it.

I don't think he's rejecting this at all.  What he's rejecting is sour
grapes; saying that "dragons don't eat meat that comes from little piggies
that have dirty little feet", i.e. I wouldn't eat it even if it were
permitted, so its prohibition is no burden to me.  Unless, of course, that
is actually the case; I don't think he advocates deliberately developing
a desire for something assur where none existed before!  (Remember that
Chazal explicitly said about some issurim that nobody would want them
anyway, and they only exist so as to painlessly increase our zechuyos.
I doubt REBA is disputing that.  I think he's talking only about those
issurim that one actually would enjoy if they were permitted.)

-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

RAM citing RSN:

<<question--if one became convinced that tora was NOT mishamayim [r'l], 
would the proper response to become orthopraxic, or to drop everything?>>

The phrase "Torah min hashamayim" is not a unique doctrine; it is a 
large family of doctrines.  At one extreme it includes even 
reconstructionists.  Like RAM, I don't understand how propriety is 
related to the question.  But different versions have different 
implications for behavior, as does denying different versions.  But none 
is disposative, just as accepting the most strict version doesn't 
prevent a  person from sinning (WADR to Socrates).

David Riceman

RMeir Rabi wrote:

>It should be noted that there is only a very weak decree that applies to
Ben Pekuah. And it does not even apply to all BeNey Pekuah. This is the
decree that it requires Shechitah. There is no decree to prohibit Tereifos,
there is no decree to prohibit Gid or Cheilev.<

     YD 64:2 states explicitly that if the ben p'kuah stood on the ground
     (the condition that triggers the decree requiring sh'chita), its
     cheilev and its gid are prohibited, v'yeish om'rim (which includes
     Rambam) that if it was full-term, then even without standing on the
     ground the cheilev is prohibited min haTora and carries the penalty of
     kareis.

    Thus, according to the first opinion, there _is_ a decree to prohibit
    gid and cheilev, while according to the second opinion, it is true that
    there is no decree -- but only because its issur is mid'Oraisa, not
    merely by rabbinic decree.

RMR continued:

>If we argue that the Ben Pekuah is Parev, there is no indication that our 
Sages decreed that out should be treated as though it is meaty.<

     I suspect that what was intended was that we can argue that it is
     pareve _because_ there is no indication of a decree that it should be
     fleishig.	(As written, the sentence interchanges the "if" and the
     "then.")  

     However, since the permissibility of BP is because its mother's
     sh'chita permitted it, it is like any other flesh permitted by that
     sh'chita -- i.e., fleishig.  Indeed, the g'mara in Chullin 74b refers
     to the BP, even while alive, as "bisra b'dikula" -- meat in a basket. 
     There is no indication of a decree that it be fleishig because it is
     so midin haTora, not by rabbinic decree.

EMT


     

 And if the beast is not
Shechted properly, some maintain that it is kosher nonetheless. If we argue
that the Ben Pekuah is Parev, there is no indication that our Sages decreed
that out should be treated as though it is meaty.

See the Meshech Chochma, re what Avraham Avinu fed his visitors.
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http://seforim.blogspot.com/2013/08/blog-post.html
i wonder if there is any halachic responsibility to check out loc. cit.'s
...
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> AFAIK a ben pakua (min haTorah) is MEAT that is already shechted (even
> though it is living) with the shechita of its mother. But nowhere is
> there a claim that the BP has lost its status as meat ? it is merely
> meat that it has already satisfied the requirements of shechita. So no
> way is it parev (so far as I know). I will beli neder try to do a
> search in the achronim to see if I can find anything different.

If an egg that is in a chicken that is shechted considered a fleish egg, one would think a BP would certainly be fleish, no?

[is the relevant question below   whether  one can ever  return the victim
to his original state in the case of  abuse  ?]---------- [from a blog]

I just received the following letter which raises a very important
question. It seems at first glance at this gemora that either our
evaluation of sexual abuse and sin is too high or that of theft is too low.

Dear Rav Eidensohn

I am just working on Yevamot (21a) and I came across this Gemara, which
states that the sin of uneven measures is worse than the sin of arayot,
because one can do teshuva for the latter:

*Yevamos (21a)[*Soncino translation and notes] For R. Levi said: The
punishments for [false] measures are more rigorous than those for
[marrying] forbidden relatives; for in the latter case the word used is El,
but in the former Eleh. ? El implies rigour, but Eleh implies greater
rigour than El. Is not Eleh written also In connection with forbidden
relatives? -That [Eleh has been written] to exclude [the sin of false]
measures from the penalty of kareth. In what respect, then, are they more
rigorous? ? In the case of the former, repentance is possible; in that of
the latter repentance is impossible. [Bava Basra 88b - One cannot by mere
repentance make amends for robbing. The return of the things robbed must
precede penitence. In the case of false measures it is practically
impossible to trace all the individual members of the public that were
defrauded.]

Perhaps this goes some way to explain why incest and other sexual crimes
are not treated as seriously as they should be in certain communities.
Firstly, the possibility of real teshuva is something which I imagine
psychotherapists would challenge. But the Gemara says it is possible. And
incest (or other sexual sins) are not as bad as stealing (though I know
that in some communities stealing is also not considered such a serious
sin).
                           Regards,
                             D.

*Artscroll *answers the question based on Rashi (Yevamos 21a) that as long
as a mamzer didn't result from the sexual sins it is possible to do
complete teshuva. In contrast stealing from the masses when it is not known
who the customers are and thus can't return what was stolen and thus can
never completely repent. Thus the gemora is not saying that sexual sins are
less severe than stealing but rather that the punishment from false
measures is more inevitable than for sexual sins. "Thus although the arayos
transgressions carry the harsher penalty (kares), the punishment for using
false measures is more severe in the aspect of its virtual inevitability,
due to the extreme difficult of performing proper penitence to preclude it."
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