Avodah Mailing List

Volume 30: Number 160

Tue, 27 Nov 2012

• 1. yizkor/ST (Prof. Levine)
• 2. Re: HaKafos (was HONORING SHABBOS LUNCH etc) (Akiva Miller)
• 3. Re: Vataamod Meledet (Zev Sero)
• 4. HaKafos (was HONORING SHABBOS LUNCH etc) (Chana Luntz)
• 5. HaKafos (was HONORING SHABBOS LUNCH etc) (Marty Bluke)
• 6. Re: Drops of Wine (Micha Berger)
• 7. What Goes into the Sheimos Bag? (Prof. Levine)
• 8. Re: HaKafos (was HONORING SHABBOS LUNCH etc) (Prof. Levine)
• 9. Re: HaKafos (was HONORING SHABBOS LUNCH etc) (Zev Sero)
• 10. Women in Beit Hakenesset on ST (was HaKafos) (Ben Waxman)
• 11. Maharal; Brain is the Soul, Service to HKBH is but Talmud (Meir Rabi)
• 12. Re: Was Eisav a Rasha by nature? (Micha Berger)

At 04:49 PM 11/25/2012, R. Akiva Miller wrote:

>Here's another data point for this discussion: The Israeli mixing of 
>Yizkor with Hakafos is very noticeable, because it occurs every 
>year; but it is not the only emotional conflict of this sort. Less 
>frequently -- namely, when Shmini Atzeres is on Shabbos -- we have 
>the problem of when to read Koheles. In Chul, this isn't a conflict, 
>because we always read the megillah on Shabbos (except for Shavuos, 
>when it's usually not an option) and Simchas Torah in Chul is never 
>on Shabbos. But in EY it is more complicated.
>
><Snip>
>
>Summary: The question of Yizkor on Simchas Torah is complex, and we 
>do have a range of similar questions which might shed light on this one.

In Frankfurt Yizkor was not said at all, ever.  When Rav Breuer came 
to Washington Heights and Jews from other locations in Germany with 
different minhagim joined KAJ,  then he allowed the saying of Yizkor.

Eliminating the saying of Yizkor in EY on the SA would "solve" the 
problem you refer to,  but I really doubt that people would go for 
it.   Yizkor brings out a lot of people who generally never set foot 
in a shul at another time.  This I do not understand,  given that one 
clearly does not need a minyan to say Yizkor.

Years ago I heard someone say,  "When some people see the two yuds in 
HaShem's name, they think they stand for Yahrtzeit and Yizkor and 
this is their entire Judaism."

YL
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Prof. Levine wrote:

> Permitting dancing on Simchas Torah is due to the fact that ST
> is d'rabanan.  However,  in EY the dancing is done on Shemini
> Atzeres which is D'oreisa.  And this is why I think that
> Simchas Torah has no place in EY.  Dancing is not permitted on
> Shabbos or on a Yom Tov that is D'oreisa,  although today the
> Chassidim and, as a result, others are maikel in this.

As support, he cited http://www.torah.org/advanced/weekly-halacha/5766/bo.html

which says:

> While it behooves a ba'al nefesh (a person who is especially
> meticulous in his mitzvah observance) to refrain from dancing
> and clapping(14) on Shabbos and Yom Tov [except on Simchas
> Torah (15)], especially for non-mitzvah purposes,(16) and many
> people are careful about it,(17) the basic halachah follows
> the opinion of the poskim who hold that nowadays, the
> Rabbinical decree against dancing and clapping is no longer
> applicable.(18)

Now I'll give my comments.

(Parenthetically, I note that this citation explicitly claims that
"nowadays, the Rabbinical decree against dancing and clapping is no longer
applicable", and that the whole problem would only apply to a ba'al nefesh.
But that's not the point I want to raise here.)

Prof. Levine seems to feel that the leniencies of Simchas Torah could apply
in Chutz Laaretz, but not in Eretz Yisrael, and this is the specific point
that I would question.

The Simchas Torah exemption is sourced in footnote 15, which refers to
Mishnah Berurah 339:8. As I read it, that MB is saying that the exception
of Simchas Torah is because of Kavod HaTorah, which wins over the issur of
rikudim, which is "only a shevus". That MB contrasts this situation to
other Simcha Shel Mitzvah (lesser simcha, I suppose) -- his example is
Nisuin -- where the issur of rikud remains in force.

Nowhere in that MB does he mention the idea that Simchas Torah is Yom Tov
Sheni. His psak seems to be based on the reason why we would be dancing,
i.e., the nature of the simcha. Therefore, it seems to me that his psak
would also apply in EY, where Simchas Torah is a Yom Tov D'Oraisa. I
concede that the rabbinic nature of Simchas Torah in Radin may have played
a role mentally, but we must be guided by what he actually wrote.

Akiva Miller
____________________________________________________________
Woman is 53 But Looks 25
Mom reveals 1 simple wrinkle trick that has angered doctors...
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3131/50b2e82d75cb4682d6b85st04vuc

On 23/11/2012 6:31 AM, Liron Kopinsky wrote:
> What does is mean that Va'Taamod [Leah] Miledet? Does it mean that she
> knew that she wasn't able to have children anymore in a biological
> sense, or just that she stopped getting pregnant?

Lich'ora it just means that after having had four babies in about 2.5
years, she stopped.  It doesn't even have to mean that she noticed that
she had stopped; the pasuk is telling us this in its omniscient voice,
while she herself would not have realised this until a month or two later.


-- 
Zev Sero        "Natural resources are not finite in any meaningful
z...@sero.name    economic sense, mind-boggling though this assertion
                  may be. The stocks of them are not fixed but rather
                 are expanding through human ingenuity."
                                            - Julian Simon

RYL writes:

>Permitting dancing on Simchas Torah is due to the fact that ST is
d'rabanan. However,  in EY the dancing is done on Shemini Atzeres which is
D'oreisa

The reference I quoted allowing dancing on Simchas Torah based on the geonim
is from the Beis Yosef - ie Rav Yosef Karo, the author of the Shulchan
Aruch.  Who was writing out of Sefas, in Eretz Yisrael.  So the dancing *he*
is talking about is indeed on Shemini Atzeres, which is, indeed, d'orisa.
He generally banned dancing, *except* for Simchas Torah, which was on Shmini
Atzeres where he was living and for whom he was poskening.

>And this is why I think that Simchas Torah has no place in EY.  Dancing is
not permitted on Shabbos or on a Yom Tov that is D'oreisa,

So you are ruling against the Shulchan Aruch!  

And that is the fundamental problem with this line that you have taken.
Because the old Eretz Yisroel community died out (at least before the 13th
century), and those that replaced them were not just any old group of
Sephardim - but the group of Sephardim that produced the Shulchan Aruch.
The Shulchan Aruch was and has been accepted universally as the gold
standard for halacha from that time on, as accompanied by the Rema's
glosses, various nose kelim etc

You can't just go shlugging off the Shulchan Aruch and trying to get  back
to a time pre-Shulchan Aruch and remain an Orthodox Jew.  The three year
cycle died halachically no later than the 12th century, and we are a product
of the history since then. It is one thing to talk about going back to
minhagim that may have been kept by your Ashkenazi ancestors a couple of
generations ago, and which may have been lost in the transition to places
like America. It is another thing to talk about minhagim that died out prior
to the watershed that is the Shulchan Aruch in halachic history.

>  although today the Chassidim and, as a result, others are maikel in this.

As indeed is the Rema Orech Chaim Hilchos Shabbas siman 339 si'if 3 based on
a Tosphos - ie here indeed is the Ashkenazi custom coming to argue with the
Sephardi custom and halacha, to allow dancing more generally than just on
Simchas Torah.  But it is *universally* agreed that one may dance on Simchas
Torah, even when it is a d'orisa, even for those who do not follow
Tosphos/the Rema.

Later RZS writes:

>The site you quote omits one very important point, which demolishes
>the entire question: "rikud" means jumping; dancing in which both
>feet leave the ground at the same time.  The sort of dancing we do,
>in which we go in a circle while one foot is always on the ground,
>is called "mochol", and that is permitted on Shabbos, even without
>resorting to the Tosfos that permits "rikud".   We do rely on the
>Tosfos for clapping, but not for dancing.

That is the Aruch HaShulchan's argument to allow for (our kind of) dancing
on shabbas (Aruch HaShulchan Orech Chaim siman 339 si'if 9)- it being clear
from there (see eg si'if 8) that he finds Tosphos (and hence the Rema)
problematic as a justification, but feels it imperative to find one.

Again however this is not universally held.  Tosphos, the Rema and the Aruch
HaShulchan find themselves in the position of justifying a situation where
the (Ashkenazi) people were and are doing (even gadolim, as the Aruch
HaShulchan makes clear) things that on the face of it seem to be assur, and
they felt the need to find a limud schus.  The Sephardim never seem to have
faced this problem, and so they have just ruled as per the straight text of
the gemora - with the exception of Simchas Torah, including Simchas Torah in
Eretz Yisrael which is held on Shimini Atzeres.

That puts dancing and clapping on Simchas Torah into the category of a
universal custom, not even just one prevalent all over Ashkenaz, but one
that unites our entire people.  That makes it one that is very, very
difficult to shlug off.

On the other hand, at least as it is carried out today (it is hard to know
what the women were doing historically, and even more important, what they
were feeling, as we have very few records), while our (male) people may be
universally carrying on with this custom, our (female) people are close to
downright miserable.  And while I don't believe that what happens on Simchas
Torah, given that it is only one day a year, is going to drive any girl or
woman "off the derech" without any other factors, I am aware of a number of
cases where Simchas Torah was the final straw, the breaking point, at which
girls/women felt that what went on so clearly demonstrated and proved that
there was no place for them in the joy of the Torah and hence no place for
them in Yiddishkeit.  Ie it works very effectively to crystallise the
alienation that some women may be feeling anyway, which works to tip them
over the edge into non observance or anti observance.

So if there were what seems to me to be a legitimate justification for
stopping a universally practiced, historically rooted, minhag of this
stature, it would be this one, that it serves to mevatel the mitzvah d'orisa
of simchas yom tov of women and girls.  However instead of taking this
action, the other, and to my mind better alternative, would be to make sure
that women and girls felt more included, so that they were also able to
derive simchas yom tov from participation in the minhag, as many men, and
indeed many, many children do - for many children Simchas Torah, along with
Purim, is the highlight of the year, and the days they remember and look
forward to more than any other.  That is not to be sniffed at either, it is
likewise important.  It is usually only at the point that girls start to
feel, or are told, at whatever age that occurs in their community, that they
cannot go into the men's section to dance, waive their flags and collect
sweets that the alienation of Simchas Torah starts setting in.

Regards

Chana

R' Levine wrote:
<Permitting dancing on Simchas Torah is due to the fact that ST
is d'rabanan. However, in EY the dancing is done on Shemini Atzeres which
is <D'oreisa. And this is why I think that Simchas Torah has no place in
EY.

I believe you misunderstood R' Hai Gaon, dancing is permitted on Simchas
Torah because the prohibition against dancing is only d'rabbanan NOT
because ST is d'rabbanon. Even in EY where it is Yom Tov min hatorah, the
prohibition against dancing is only d'rabbanan and therefore permitted for
kavod hatorah.
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Relevent to the notion of mourning the need to kill evil is a famous Rashi
from this week's parashah. (Quoting R' Yehudah bar Ilai in Bereishis
Rabba 76:2, also found in the Tanchuma according to my chumash's copy
of Rashi.)

-micha



Covenant & Conversation
Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks
Office of the Chief Rabbi and United Synagogue

Fear or Distress?

Jacob and Esau are about to meet again after a separation of twenty two
years. It is a fraught encounter. Once, Esau had sworn to kill Jacob
in revenge for what he saw as the theft of his blessing. Will he do so
now -- or has time healed the wound? Jacob sends messengers to let his
brother know he is coming. They return, saying that Esau is coming to
meet Jacob with a force of four hundred men. We then read:

"Then Jacob was greatly afraid and distressed." (32:8)

The question is obvious. Jacob is in the grip of strong emotions. But
why the duplication of verbs? What is the difference between fear and
distress? To this a midrash gives a profound answer:

"Rabbi Judah bar Ilai said: Are not fear and distress identical? The
meaning, however, is that 'he was afraid' that he might be killed. 'He was
distressed' that he might kill. For Jacob thought: If he prevails against
me, will he not kill me; while if I prevail against him, will I not kill
him? That is the meaning of 'he was afraid' -- lest he should be killed;
'and distressed' -- lest he should kill."

The difference between being afraid and distressed, according to
the midrash, is that the first is a physical anxiety; the second a
moral one. It is one thing to fear one's own death, quite another
to contemplate being the cause of someone else's. However, a further
question now arises. Surely self-defence is permitted in Jewish law? If
Esau were to try to kill Jacob, Jacob would be justified in fighting back,
if necessary at the cost of Esau's life. Why then should this possibility
raise moral qualms? This is the issue addressed by Rabbi Shabbetai Bass,
author of the commentary on Rashi, Siftei Chakhamim:

"One might argue that Jacob should surely not be distressed about the
possibility of killing Esau, for there is an explicit rule: 'If someone
comes to kill you, forestall it by killing him.' None the less, Jacob did
have qualms, fearing that in the course of the fight he might kill some
of Esau's men, who were not themselves intent on killing Jacob but merely
on fighting Jacob's men. And even though Esau's men were pursuing Jacob's
men, and every person has the right to save the life of the pursued at
the cost of the life of the pursuer, none the less there is a condition:
'If the pursued could have been saved by maiming a limb of the pursuer,
but instead the rescuer killed the pursuer, the rescuer is liable to
capital punishment on that account.' Hence Jacob feared that, in the
confusion of battle, he might kill some of Esau's men when he might have
restrained them by merely inflicting injury on them."

The principle at stake, according to the Siftei Chakhamim, is the minimum
use of force. Jacob was distressed at the possibility that in the heat
of conflict he might kill some of the combatants when injury alone
might have been all that was necessary to defend the lives of those --
including himself -- who were under attack.

There is, however, a second possibility, namely that the midrash
means what it says, no more, no less: that Jacob was distressed at the
possibility of being forced to kill even if that were entirely justified.

At stake is the concept of a moral dilemma. A dilemma is not simply a
conflict. There are many moral conflicts. May we perform an abortion
to save the life of the mother? Should we obey a parent when he or she
asks us to do something forbidden in Jewish law? May we break Shabbat
to extend the life of a terminally ill patient? These questions have
answers. There is a right course of action and a wrong one. Two duties
conflict and we have meta-halakhic principles to tell us which takes
priority. There are some systems in which all moral conflicts are of
this kind. There is always a decision procedure and thus a determinate
answer to the question, "What shall I do?"

A dilemma, however, is a situation in which there is no right answer. I
ought not to do A (allow myself to be killed); I ought not to do B
(kill someone else); but I must do one or the other. To put it more
precisely, there may be situations in which doing the right thing is not
the end of the matter. The conflict may be inherently tragic. The fact
that one principle (self-defence) overrides another (the prohibition
against killing) does not mean that, faced with such a choice, I am
without qualms. Sometimes being moral means that I experience distress
at having to make such a choice. Doing the right thing may mean that I
do not feel remorse or guilt, but I still feel regret or grief that I
had to do what I did.

A moral system which leaves room for the existence of dilemmas is
one that does not attempt to eliminate the complexities of the moral
life. In a conflict between two rights or two wrongs, there may be a
proper way to act (the lesser of two evils, or the greater of two goods),
but this does not cancel out all emotional pain. A righteous individual
may sometimes be one who is capable of distress even when they know
they have acted rightly. What the midrash is telling us is that Judaism
recognises the existence of dilemmas. Despite the intricacy of Jewish
law and its meta-halakhic principles for deciding which of two duties
takes priority, we may still be faced with situations in which there is
an ineliminable cause for distress. It was Jacob's greatness that he was
capable of moral anxiety even at the prospect of doing something entirely
justified, namely defending his life at the cost of his brother's.

That characteristic -- distress at violence and potential bloodshed even
when undertaken in self-defence -- has stayed with the Jewish people
ever since. One of the most remarkable phenomena in modern history was
the reaction of Israeli soldiers after the Six Day War in 1967. In the
weeks preceding the war, few Jews anywhere in the world were unaware that
Israel and its people faced terrifying danger. Troops -- Egyptian, Syrian,
Jordanian -- were massing on all its borders. Israel was surrounded by
enemies who had sworn to drive its people into the sea. In the event, it
won one of the most stunning military victories of all time. The sense of
relief was overwhelming, as was the exhilaration at the re-unification
of Jerusalem and the fact that Jews could now pray (as they had been
unable to do for nineteen years) at the Western Wall. Even the most
secular Israelis admitted to feeling intense religious emotion at what
they knew was an historic triumph.

Yet, in the months after the war, as conversations took place throughout
Israel, it became clear that the mood among those who had taken part
in the war was anything but triumphal. It was sombre, reflective, even
anguished. That year, the Hebrew University in Jerusalem gave an honorary
doctorate to Yitzhak Rabin, Chief of Staff during the war. During his
speech of acceptance he said:

"We find more and more a strange phenomenon among our fighters. Their
joy is incomplete, and more than a small portion of sorrow and shock
prevails in their festivities, and there are those who abstain from
celebration. The warriors in the front lines saw with their own eyes not
only the glory of victory but the price of victory: their comrades who
fell beside them bleeding, and I know that even the terrible price which
our enemies paid touched the hearts of many of our men. It may be that the
Jewish people has never learned or accustomed itself to feel the triumph
of conquest and victory, and therefore we receive it with mixed feelings."

A people capable of feeling distress, even in victory, is one that knows
the tragic complexity of the moral life. Sometimes it is not enough to
make the right choice. One must also fight to create a world in which
such choices do not arise because we have sought and found non-violent
ways of resolving conflict.

In light of the fact that thousands of seforim were wrecked by 
Superstorm Sandy,  I think the article at

http://rabbikaganoff.com/archives/1587

on the topic of Sheimos is timely.  YL

At 09:02 AM 11/26/2012, Marty Bluke wrote:
>R' Levine wrote:
><Permitting dancing on Simchas Torah is due to the fact that ST is 
>d'rabanan. However, in EY the dancing is done on Shemini Atzeres 
>which is <D'oreisa. And this is why I think that Simchas Torah has 
>no place in EY.
>
>I believe you misunderstood R' Hai Gaon, dancing is permitted on 
>Simchas Torah because the prohibition against dancing is only 
>d'rabbanan NOT because ST is d'rabbanon. Even in EY where it is Yom 
>Tov min hatorah, the prohibition against dancing is only d'rabbanan 
>and therefore permitted for kavod hatorah.

I do not believe that your are correct.

Please see the discussion about Shira and Rikudim that begins on page 
chof daled of the Luach put out by Moreshes Ashkenaz that I have put 
at http://tinyurl.com/9f8by85  On page chof hey he says clearly that 
this heter of dancing on Simchas Torah is only applicable on Yom Tov 
Sheni shel Golius,  since it [Yom Tov Sheni] is d'rabbonon.


Yitzchok Levine 
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On 26/11/2012 5:22 AM, Chana Luntz wrote:
>   However instead of taking this
> action, the other, and to my mind better alternative, would be to make sure
> that women and girls felt more included, so that they were also able to
> derive simchas yom tov from participation in the minhag, as many men, and
> indeed many, many children do - for many children Simchas Torah, along with
> Purim, is the highlight of the year, and the days they remember and look
> forward to more than any other.  That is not to be sniffed at either, it is
> likewise important.  It is usually only at the point that girls start to
> feel, or are told, at whatever age that occurs in their community, that they
> cannot go into the men's section to dance, waive their flags and collect
> sweets that the alienation of Simchas Torah starts setting in.

Indeed, in the communities where this occurs, why don't the women organise
something for themselves?  Whether it's dancing in the women's section, or
if there's not enough room then in another place, or a women's kiddush with
speakers, etc.  I'm not talking about women's hakafos with a sefer torah,
which is controversial, though I don't really understand why; I'm talking
about things that are surely acceptable in even the most conservative circles.
(For the younger girls, who are just old enough to have been denied the men's
section, their own hakafos with toy sifrei torah would probably be a good
idea, and neither scandalous nor demeaning; but of course past a certain age
it would be terribly demeaning.)

-- 
Zev Sero        "Natural resources are not finite in any meaningful
z...@sero.name    economic sense, mind-boggling though this assertion
                  may be. The stocks of them are not fixed but rather
                 are expanding through human ingenuity."
                                            - Julian Simon

This paper states that Minhag Ashkenaz is not to allow women in shul on 
Simchat Torah. Is this still practiced (or was it ever practiced)?

Ben

On 11/26/2012 4:36 PM, Prof. Levine wrote:
>   On page chof hey he says clearly that this heter of dancing on 
> Simchas Torah is only applicable on Yom Tov Sheni shel Golius,  since 
> it [Yom Tov Sheni] is d'rabbonon.

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The Maharal, after saying various things about two questions that he
himself asks in this piece [NeSiv HaTorah end Ch 15], leaves them
essentially unanswered.

1) The RaMBaM and Tur seem to disagree with him since they compiled Seforim
that provided rulings which lead one away from Talmud Gemara.

2) What is to happen these days [in the life of the Maharal] that we are no
longer Baki in Talmud - how are we to Pasken Halacha?



If the Maharal was concerned about the Poskim, and not about the ordinary
individuals - these questions would not have troubled him. The Maharal was
not addressing some rabbi who is paskening for his Kehilla from a Kitzur or
from the web.



The Maharal is troubled by the change in attitude across the entire
community. HKBH, he says, is principally concerned about our engagement
with Torah - that means one thing and one thing only - TALMUD. The focus of
the Torah is the rulings provided by and to be derived from, the Torah.
When this pursuit becomes detached from TALMUD, then the very activities
which we deem to be our service to GD are in fact DESTROYING HKBH's plan
and purpose for this universe. The world stands upon Torah, he says, and
when we become detached from TALMUD in spite of the fact that we are
super-devoted to following all the minutiae and accommodating as many
opinions as possible; we have lost the plot. We, in our frenzied
misdirected devotion to BE OBEDIENT to GD are in fact destroying the world
- MeVaLey Olam. Because HKBH does not want OBEDIENCE.   HKBH wants us to be
engaged in His Talmud.

And that is the message of the Mishna in Avos. Wrestle with your teachers,
raise the dust in the Talmudic struggle, do not accept what your Rebbe has
said just because he said it.



Furthermore, Reb Chaim does not suggest that this battle and questioning
and prohibition/refusal to accept one's Rebbes ideas is limited only to
those who have Semicha. On the contrary he applies the imagery of small
kindling, the students and the insistent, relentless heat of their
questions, being required in order to set the large log ablaze. No one
doubts the value of a reporter who pecks away at a politician or other
authority, to uncover truth and expose untruths. Reb Chaim Shmulevitz would
say, the weakest part of his Shtikel Torah was the part where he shouted
the loudest and thumped on the Shtender the hardest.



To suggest that Reb Ch Voloshiner is urging us to use our brain to argue in
theory but that we should nonetheless in practice follow the guidance of
our Rebbe, is just pure fantasy. It is a mind bending exercise to suggest
that we MUST follow but not follow blindly. That's like telling someone to
shower but not get wet.



It is truly remarkable that the very Mishnah that is the poster Mishnah for
Bittul HaYesh, [cast yourself at the dust of their feet] for sublimation of
one's identity to the supreme authority of a Master, [Aseh LeCha Rav] is in
fact, according to Reb Chayim VeLoshiner, a testimony to the opposite.
Because Bittul HaYesh means Bittul to HKBH, not to a human. It means in
fact, LaMa Li KeRa, because the potential Sevara that resides in our heads
is greater than the Passuk pronounced by HKBH at Har Sinai. And it is the
foundation upon which RaMChaL [in DaAs Tevunos] structures the dialogue
where the seeker is the Neshama but the source for all guidance comes from
the Sechel.



The Maharal clearly differentiates the MeVaLey Olam from the Chachamim who
have not served Torah Sages [Lo ShiMesh]. Such people the Gemara says, are
a Boor, an Am HaAretz but they are NOT MeVaLey Olam - destroyers of the
world. And why not? Because they are still engaged with Talmud.



Rashi explains that the problem is that since the logic, the reasoning, the
Talmud; is not clear, the consequence is that sometimes the Mishna's ruling
will be wrongly applied to a different situation.

The Maharal insists Rashi is wrong [Ein HaPirush KiDeVarav KeLal] since if
the problem would be a WRONG Pesak, then the Gemara would NOT use the word
HALACHA but TaUs; i.e. Those who err by consulting the Mishnah are the
destroyers of the world. The Maharal is adamant that even when the Mishna
is correctly used to rule in that very same situation - such a ruling
destroys the world.



This has nothing to do with the person being a Torah Sage or an ordinary
bloke, a Posek or a pipsqueak. It relates to one thing only - are we
connected to the logic of the Torah or are we just pursuing a religious
life of obedience. What type of a relationship with HKBH and His Torah are
we pursuing?

There is no question that this clearly advocates the notion that this is
precisely how everyone is supposed to do things. This is the ideal Jewish
community, a community that sees itself in constant engagement with HKBH
through Talmud, through HoRaAh that is driven by Talmud.





As far as getting permission to offer rulings and not being Morah Halacha
whilst in the presence or the jurisdiction of one's Rav; that has to do
with Kibbud TCh. The student may not rule FOR OTHERS, but he is certainly
OBLIGATED to follow his own understanding and is PROHIBITED from following
the ruling of his Rebbe when he has questions on it that remain unanswered.



Semicha is recognition that the recipient is qualified to Pasken without
consulting others. [It is certainly not Reshus to think for oneself] Before
Semicha is granted, this TCh participates in debate and decides for
himself; its like training wheels, what is called I believe in the US,
internship. After Semicha he need not consult before issuing a Pesak.


Best,

Meir G. Rabi
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On Sun, Nov 11, 2012 at 02:51:56PM +0200, Marty Bluke wrote:
:                                               Rashi a few pesukim later
: comments on the phrase mimayayich yiparedu, "min hamayayim heim nifradim,
: zeh l'risho vzeh l'tumo".

: From Rashi it seems clear that already in the womb Eisav was a rasha who
: wanted to worship avoda zara. The obvious question is why?

We all have innate tendencies. This one is born with a shorter fuse
and more exteme temper than the other. That one is predisposed with
depression. Take someone born with a craving for spirituality, but it's
overshadowed by an impatience and desire for instant gratification and
a lust for power, and you have someone predisposed for AZ.

People aren't judge for where they are, but for what they did with what
they were given.

Eisav wasn't just born with a propensity toward AZ, he was also equipped
to be the bread-and-butter side of a partnership with Yaaqov. And those
are possibly related -- intead of becoming the supplier of the physical
means for Yisrael's spiritual ends, he turned it around and made his
weaker spiritual drive a way to get his stronger hungers for physicality
and power.

In the ideal world, Eisav would have lived up to that potential, and would
have married Leah. Yaaqov would have married Rachel. Yaaqov would have
become Yisrael and Yisrael alone, never again to be called Yaaqov -- the
way the name Avram permanently replaces Avraham. Instead of temporarily
playing the role (Yaaqov - "supplanting") of the ideal Edom, Yaaqov had
to wear both hats. And thus marry both wives.

Notice, though, that Eisav still had choices. He started out with
a harder challenge, but it was one he could have chosen to struggle
against. Insead, he embraced it.

...
: The Maharal makes a similar comment in Parshas Noach (8,21, bottom
: of the second column) where he says it even more explicitly
: "U'bbeten imo efshar laasos maaseh ra v'ein lo yetzer hara rak shehu poel
: kach b'tivo lfi shehu rasha mibeten." The Maharal says explicitly that a
: person can do bad things without a yetzer hara but rather because he is a
: rasha in his mother's womb.

A yeitzer hara is a drive down the ladder. Not which rung you were born
upon.

Similarly, a rasha is someone bent on descent. Not the person as per his
innate character propensities.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Rescue me from the desire to win every
mi...@aishdas.org        argument and to always be right.
http://www.aishdas.org              - Rav Nassan of Breslav
Fax: (270) 514-1507                   Likutei Tefilos 94:964


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