Avodah Mailing List

Volume 25: Number 224

Thu, 19 Jun 2008

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Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Message: 1
From: David Riceman <driceman@att.net>
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 11:23:21 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] D'rabanan vs. D'oraita


Micha Berger wrote:
> I think a problem is that people tend to conflate a number of very
> different distinctions:
>     Qabbalah vs Scholasticism
>     mysticism vs rationalism
>     maximalism vs minimalism
>   
This deserves a long, nitpicking post.  First of all Kabbalah itself was 
extremely scholastic.  Compare the Ramak's discussion of atzmuth 
v'keilim in Pardes Rimmonim to Scotus' discussion of substance in his 
essay "Concerning Metaphysics".  I used to think that the major 
distinction to be made was the classical distinction between 
Aristotelians and Platonists: do universals exist? Wolfson thought that 
Maimonides was an Aristotelian in this respect (see Crescas's critique 
of Aristotle pp.664-666, though he hedges a bit in The Philosophy of 
Spinoza I p. 152).  I'm no longer sure; the first part of the Guide, for 
example, reads like a Platonist's dictionary.

My current impression is less clearcut.   One of the things that's hard 
to remember nowadays is that there were two competing physical theories 
in those days, unlike today when modern scientists agree on the basic 
principles.  When it comes to physical phenomena (the existence of 
demons is a good example) the "philosophers" were Aristotelians and the 
Kabbalists were neo-Platonists.  Both had a legitimate scientific theory 
on their side (and today we would accept neither theory).

When it comes to spiritual phenomena, however, I don't think I can come 
up with a distinction that adequately differentiates the two groups.  I 
think the Rambam would have rejected the Zohar on the grounds of God's 
unity (see Tshuvoth HaRivash #157), but I don't think the kabbalists and 
the philosophers line up neatly on opposite sides of that issue.

Now to the detailed complaints:
> In the days of the rishonim, there were two competing tendencies in
> which problems bothered people, and therefore also in how to frame the
> answers -- Qabbalah and "Philosophy", by which they meant the use of
> Aristotilian and neo-Platonic thought to explain religion (Scholasticism).
>   
The kabbalists also used neo Platonic thought (and some Aristotelian 
types of argument) to explain religion.
> Scholasticism is only compatable with rationalism. You wouldn't see much
> point in using philosophical tools to understand religion if you weren't
> defining religion as something that is to be understood.
>   
See my remark above about the Ramak.  The kabbalists did think religion 
could be understood, they just used a different conceptual framework.  
The third group here was the philosophically naive Talmudists (for 
example, the Northern French contributors to the anti-Maimonidean 
polemic).  It complicates the dichotomy, but it makes your statement at 
least arguable.
> I use the word "Scholasticism" rather than the word the rishonim did,
> Philosophy, because the mequbalim also used philosophical terms: tzurah,
> chomer, atzilus, etc... are all found in Aristotle and Plato as well.
>   
Where do Plato or Aristotle mention "atzilus"? Maybe there are some 
parallels in Philo and Plotinus.
> <snip>
>
> In contrast, the mystic's faith focuses on the incomprehensible. Religion
> that is centered on G-d will have much that is simply beyond
> understanding. Rather, the mystic aspires to experience and live religion,
> and takes joy, not frustration, in the Divine Mystery.
>   
This is certainly the case for many Christian and Buddhist mystics.  Can 
you cite any examples of Jewish mystics who fit this description?
> <snip>
>
> In this sense of the term, Breslov is exceedingly mystical. They shun
> philosophy. Thinking gets in the way of happiness and thus brings on
> despair, which in turn is the road away from productivity in general and
> avodas Hashem in particular. The philosophical study of G-d objectifies
> Him; and thus interferes with emunah peshutah.
>   
Again I'd like to see sources.  I've read only a few bits of Likkutei 
Moharan, but it doesn't seem to me to fit this description.
> <snip>
>  However, what I mean by minimalism is
> an unwillingness to accept extraordinory claims. A maximalist would look
> at the mesorah, and not even raise questions as to how the universe could
> be only 6 days older than civil humanity. The whole world was flooded, and
> every species of animal fit on a floor that was 1.4 acres (using CI amos).
>
> But for a rationalist who already found a basis for accepting the reality
> of a G-d who can defy nature if He so chooses, maximalism is no less
> rationalist than minimalism. Both are fully explanable from the same
> first principles. It is no longer an issue of explanatory framework
> or which issues bother me, but of whether I believe G-d minimizes His
> interferance in the natural order.
>   
This is a nice distinction.  When did maximalism begin.  Can you, for 
example, name a rishon who was a maximalist?

David Riceman




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Message: 2
From: "Moshe Y. Gluck" <mgluck@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 11:32:01 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Your brother's a Mumar; here's the solution!


R' ZS:
> :                                                            But at least
> : there you have a shtar and witnesses, and devarim shebelev einam
devarim.
> : Here we're talking davka about devarim shebelev.  If the tenai is not
> : meant seriously it's worthless.  And I don't believe it is possible for
> : any couple to take it seriously, especially bish'as biah.  Any couple
who
> : make this tenai and mean it, shouldn't be getting married.

I question your point that a T'nai verbalized in front of witnesses may be
nullified by Devarim She'b'leiv. 

R' MB: 
> The AhS proposed this idea for avoiding her becoming a yevamah, and RMYG
> asked why the same tenai couldn't be used to avoid agunos. I think what
> RZS is now saying boils down to ein adam oseh be'ilaso be'ilas zenus,
> and not even bitenai.

The AhS makes it clear (157:17) that even if the T'nai is Chal and the
Kiddushin is not the Bi'os are still _not_ Be'los z'nus: "Kivan she'hee
m'yuchedes eilav l'vado v'einah k'zonah."

<SNIP>
> The AhS groom trying to avoid her becoming a yevamah to a mumar is
> doing it out of concern for his bride. Rather than a denial of love, his
> willingness to make his marriage conditional is an expression of it. He
> is trying to save her from someone he believes could really keep her an
> agunah -- his meshumad brother would would never consent to yibum. But
> beshe'as ma'aseh, who could be seriously thinking they would need to
> protect her from himself and still be in a state of mind where he would
> want to protect her?

Again, this is predicated on Devarim She'b'leiv being able to be Mevatel a
T'nai and a Maaseh made in front of Eidim. Also, IMHO, I think you're
looking at this backward - it isn't that he wants to protect her - it's that
he wants to marry her, and the only way to do that is to do so Al T'nai that
should the unthinkable happen, etc. etc.

KT,
MYG




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Message: 3
From: Zev Sero <zev@sero.name>
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 13:06:56 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Your brother's a Mumar; here's the solution!


Micha Berger wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 18, 2008 at 01:21:37AM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
> : >Couples in love sign prenups all the time.
> : 
> : And it's a big question how serious they can possibly be...
> 
> The kesuvah itself is a prenup.

But it simply provides for what will happen after the marriage is over,
as it *inevitably* will be unless "bila` hamavet lanetzach" happens
within the next few decades.  Every marrying couple knows that their
marriage is unlikely to last literally forever, and they must provide
for what happens afterwards.  There are three ways a marriage can end,
and the ketuba provides for all three (if it ends with her death, but
she leaves sons, they will eventually receive her ketuba money).
That's different from a prenup that focuses only or primarily on the
event of divorce, something that he doesn't really believe will happen.

That's why I distinguished this tnai from the AhS's, which is
*exclusively* about the possibility of the husband dying before they
have their first child.  *That* is a possibility every husband can
certainly take seriously; nowadays people buy life insurance for this
precise reason, and they pay good money for it, so they certainly take
it seriously.  It *may* therefore be reasonable to assume that every
man is capable of making such a tnai, each and every time, even in the
heat of passion, and mean it.


> The AhS proposed this idea for avoiding her becoming a yevamah, and RMYG
> asked why the same tenai couldn't be used to avoid agunos. I think what
> RZS is now saying boils down to ein adam oseh be'ilaso be'ilas zenus,
> and not even bitenai.

No.  Ein adam oseh... is about people's yosher.  A person doesn't
leave a chaticha dehetera to take an identical chaticha de'isura.
That's why RMF says it doesn't apply to secular people today, since
it's quite obvious that they think nothing of be'ilat zenut.
But an honest and upright person may very well agree to do a be'ilat
zenut in order to save his wife from a terrible fate.  Ein omrim
la'adam chatei bishvil sheyizkeh chaver'cha, but he may well be willing
to do so, especially when it's not just chaver'cha but ishto kegufo.
The AhS's position isn't muchrach, but at the same time it isn't
mushlal.


> I think this latter formulation is more tenable than his earlier post
> which presumes a young couple in love. Using Shalom Aleichem as a cultural
> source, he found it plausible to tell an audience of the AhS's day that
> (as the songwriter later put it) "the first day I met you was on our
> wedding day..."

And yet I think even those couples were in love; at first not with the
actual person they were marrying, whom they didn't yet know, but with
the *idea* they'd formed of that person.  They knew each other's names,
even if not their faces, and I assume they did hear general descriptions
of each other's appearances, on which they could hang their fantasies
of what married life would be like, so by the time they actually met
it's quite shayach that they felt enough love that they didn't go into
it like a cold business transaction, with the possibility of divorce
looming high in their minds.   Especially if they didn't see a lot of
divorces around them, so that possibility was mostly theoretical in
their minds.  


> is trying to save her from someone he believes could really keep her an
> agunah -- his meshumad brother would would never consent to yibum.

You mean chalitzah.  Yibum he might very well consent to, or even insist
on, but that's precisely what the husband wants to save her from.


-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas



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Message: 4
From: Zev Sero <zev@sero.name>
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 13:07:52 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Your brother's a Mumar; here's the solution!


Micha Berger wrote:
> I forgot to add:
> I also agree with RZS's question about devarim shebeleiv. But this
> question is on the AhS's original proposal WRT avoiding yibum. RMYG's
> asking that if it would work for yibum, why not for agunah in general
> would presume we had an answer.

I was careful to draw a distinction between the two cases.


-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas



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Message: 5
From: "Eli Turkel" <eliturkel@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 18:13:02 +0200
Subject:
[Avodah] Miriam and Tzippora


First it is not clear that "Isha Kushit" was Tzippora - see Rashbam who assumes
it was an Ethopian woman from when Moshe was king there.

Second there is an interesting pshat from R. Chaim Soloveitchik that the sin
was not LH but rather one of the 13 principles of Rambam that MR was on a higher
level than other prophets.

Eli Turkel


<<Rashi (B'haalos'cha 12:1) quotes Rabi Nasan: "Miriam was at Tziporah's side
when they told Moshe, 'Eldad and Medad are having nevuah in the camp.' When
Tziporah heard, she said, 'Oy to their wives! If they get nevuah, they'll
separate from their wives, like my husband separated from me.' That's how
Miriam knew."
Was it Lashon Hara for Tziporah to say this to Miriam? It sure sounds like a
complaint to me.If it was not LH, why not? And if it was, then are there any
Chazals which take Tziporah to task for this?
>>

First of all, it obviously wasn't LH - as there is no mention of her being
punished - unlike Miriam.

Secondly, I see that the Shaarei Ahraon quotes "Eimek Hanetziv" saying that
Tzipporah was definitely not complaining about MR being away from her. Had
she been upset about it, MR would've divorced her to allow her to remarry.

The comment she made to Miriam about feeling sorry for the wives of Eldad
uMedad, was because she felt that not all women would agree to put up with
such a lifestyle.>>

-- 
Eli Turkel



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Message: 6
From: David Riceman <driceman@att.net>
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 12:30:30 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Did Tziporah say Lashon Hara?


SBA wrote:
> Secondly, I see that the Shaarei Ahraon quotes "Eimek Hanetziv" saying that
> Tzipporah was definitely not complaining about MR being away from her. Had
> she been upset about it, MR would've divorced her to allow her to remarry.
>   
Would this have worked? Moshe Rabbeinu haya melech (see Tanhuma 
Beha'alothcha 9, cited by the Rambam but I don't recall where).  A 
king's wife may not remarry (H. Melachim 2:2).

OTOH Tzippora could have prevented him from taking the job of 24/7 navi 
if she objected.  See EH 76:5.

David Riceman



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Message: 7
From: Zev Sero <zev@sero.name>
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 13:08:50 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Did Tziporah say Lashon Hara?


SBA wrote:

> Secondly, I see that the Shaarei Ahraon quotes "Eimek Hanetziv" saying that
> Tzipporah was definitely not complaining about MR being away from her. Had
> she been upset about it, MR would've divorced her to allow her to remarry.

Moshe Rabbenu was a melech, and a melech's ex-wife cannot remarry.


-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas



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Message: 8
From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 15:14:42 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] D'rabanan vs. D'oraita


RDG allowed me to bounce his reply to my post to the list:
: In his petiha klalit to Dor Revi'i, there is a discussion...
: The gist of the discussion is that ma'akhlaot assurot do damage, but the
: damage is cumulative over time, so it is only after eating a lot over a
: long period of time that they do damage.  The only problem with eating
: on an occasional basis is that it is forbidden to do so even once. When
: you can rely on a rov to eliminate the issur, the issue of damage to the
: person is no longer a problem because the bad effect from the food is
: dissipated.  That is why sakanta hamira mei-issura.

A bunch of disjoint thoughts:

A person eats three pieces of meat a day, one of which causes timtum and
he knows which one it is. Another person eats three pieces of meat daily,
and he doesn't know which is assur. The first is a mumar, the second
didn't do a single issur. They both ate the same amount of cheilev,
so I presume the D4 would say that they incur the same timtum. So, how does
this explanation resolve my question:
> I already cited the problem of 2 chatichos shuman, 1 cheilev, if we
> understand timtum haleiv as a causal consequence of eating cheilev,
> we can't play rov -- and certainly not of all three pieces at three
> different times. And yet, it's mutar AFAIK without a warning from
> anyone.

 --

There are two possible causal connections between the cheit and the
timtum (and by parallel between hanging a mezuzah and the shemirah,
and so on for our other examples) -- assuming that they are connected,
IOW, that timtum is a kind of onesh:
Treif food is dangerous, therefore Hashem prohibited it.
Because Hashem prohibited it, the act of being an avaryan is dangerous.

In general, I think that people today find the concepts of mitzvah,
sechar va'onesh more appealing in the first way. Hashem gives us
"tarya"g itin" (eitzos) as the Zohar puts it in order to protect us
from soul-damaging activity. The onesh is the damage we were warned to
avoid.

Would the D4 say there's a causal connection between the cheit (as
opposed to the cheftzah in-and-of itself) and the timtum? At first,
I thought he couldn't possibly. However, either would work with what
RDG (the D7?) summarized -- if we presume that the danger is not in
the issur but in being a mumar ledavar zeh. And thus it's like being
prohibited from smoking the first cigarette lest it becomes a habit,
which causes measurable damage.

 --

Chamira saqanta mei'issura: is it invoked on non-physical sakanos?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole
micha@aishdas.org        heart, your entire soul, and all you own."
http://www.aishdas.org   Love is not two who look at each other,
Fax: (270) 514-1507      It is two who look in the same direction.



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Message: 9
From: Zev Sero <zev@sero.name>
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 15:16:47 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Did Tziporah say Lashon Hara?


David Riceman wrote:

> OTOH Tzippora could have prevented him from taking the job of 24/7 navi 
> if she objected.  See EH 76:5.

Since when is nevu'ah a job that one can accept or decline?

-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas



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Message: 10
From: "Glasner, David" <DGLASNER@ftc.gov>
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 15:52:49 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] D'rabanan vs. D'oraita


The assumption of the Dor Revi'i is that God does not prohibit anything
just so that He can punish someone for violating the prohibition. You may
disagree, but that is what he says. So, if there is a prohibition, it is
because at a physical level or a spiritual level (or at some inersection
of the two levels) the prohibited act causes damage to the person doing
the act or damage to others. However, the prohibition applies only in
the normal course of business, so ha-okhel she-lo ke-derekh hana'ato has
not violated the prohibition, because the Torah assumes that people will
not perform prohibited acts in this way often enough to cause damage to
themselves (damage to others is not an issue in this context). Similarly,
the situation in which a person eats a prohibited substance because
it was halakhically nullified in a rov is too remote for the Torah
to have worried that the cumulative damage resulting from ingesting
the prohbited substance would cause damage to the person eating the
prohibited substance. So your hypothetical is simply not one that the
Dor Revi'I would entertain. Can you suggest any set of circumstances
in which it would be a practical as opposed to a concepual possibility?

The point of sakanta hamira is that if you eat poison it may kill you
because the damage done has an immediate effect. The damage associated
with issur does not happen immediately but only over time as a result
of repeated, independent, actions. So there is no danger with allowing
a person to eat issur that was nullified halakhically in a rov, but the
physical danger of eating poison is not nullified by rov and therefore
eating it remains halakhically prohibited despite the rov. Presumably
any non-physical sakana does not have an immediate catastrophic effect,
so rov can nullify it. If you can specify a case where the non-physical
sakana could have an immediate catastrophic effect, then I would assume
that it is not halakhically nullified by the rov.

-----Original Message-----
From: Micha Berger [mailto:micha@aishdas.org] 
Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 3:15 PM
...

A bunch of disjoint thoughts:

A person eats three pieces of meat a day, one of which causes timtum and
he knows which one it is. Another person eats three pieces of meat daily,
and he doesn't know which is assur. The first is a mumar, the second
didn't do a single issur. They both ate the same amount of cheilev,
so I presume the D4 would say that they incur the same timtum. So, how does
this explanation resolve my question:
> I already cited the problem of 2 chatichos shuman, 1 cheilev, if we
> understand timtum haleiv as a causal consequence of eating cheilev,
> we can't play rov -- and certainly not of all three pieces at three
> different times. And yet, it's mutar AFAIK without a warning from
> anyone.

 --

There are two possible causal connections between the cheit and the
timtum (and by parallel between hanging a mezuzah and the shemirah,
and so on for our other examples) -- assuming that they are connected,
IOW, that timtum is a kind of onesh:
Treif food is dangerous, therefore Hashem prohibited it.
Because Hashem prohibited it, the act of being an avaryan is dangerous.

In general, I think that people today find the concepts of mitzvah,
sechar va'onesh more appealing in the first way. Hashem gives us
"tarya"g itin" (eitzos) as the Zohar puts it in order to protect us
from soul-damaging activity. The onesh is the damage we were warned to
avoid.

Would the D4 say there's a causal connection between the cheit (as
opposed to the cheftzah in-and-of itself) and the timtum? At first,
I thought he couldn't possibly. However, either would work with what
RDG (the D7?) summarized -- if we presume that the danger is not in
the issur but in being a mumar ledavar zeh. And thus it's like being
prohibited from smoking the first cigarette lest it becomes a habit,
which causes measurable damage.

 --

Chamira saqanta mei'issura: is it invoked on non-physical sakanos?



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Message: 11
From: Henry Topas <htopas@canpro.ca>
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 22:58:47 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Rambam on Agunah


 
I recall hearing a shiur tape many years ago which I believe was from Rabbi
Berel Wein Shlita.

Again, if my memory serves me correctly, he was discussing the Rambam's
position on Aganah.

I believe he quotes the Rambam as stating something to the effect that it
would take great courage to find Kulos to "unchain" agunos.

Does anyone in the Avodah family recall either the Rambam or the Shiur or
better yet, the correct location of such a citation and direct me to it?

Thank you,

Cantor Henry Topas
Montreal



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