Avodah Mailing List

Volume 24: Number 109

Sun, 30 Dec 2007

• 1. Re: Abiogenesis (Michael Makovi)
• 2. Re: Abiogenesis (Micha Berger)
• 3. "VaYakom Melekh Hadash al Mitzrayim..." Self-hatred (Richard Wolberg)
• 4. Re: Abiogenesis (Michael Makovi)
• 5. Re: Abiogenesis (Micha Berger)
• 6. Re: "VaYakom Melekh Hadash al Mitzrayim..." Self-hatred (Michael Makovi)
• 7. Re: dvar tora (Michael Makovi)
• 8. Re: Ashkenazim and Sephardim (Richard Wolpoe)
• 9. Re: Abiogenesis (Michael Makovi)
• 10. Re: dvar tora (Zev Sero)
• 11. Sometimes Chutzpah is Praiseworthy (Meir Rabi)
• 12. Fwd: Lashon Hara about non-Jews (Doron Beckerman)
• 13. Re: Ashkenazim and Sephardim (Shoshana L. Boublil)
• 14. Ashkenazim and Sephardim (Arie Folger)
• 15. "VaYakom Melekh Hadash al Mitzrayim..." Self-hatred (Richard Wolberg)
• 16. Re: Lashon Hara about non-Jews (Doron Beckerman)
• 17. Re: Fwd: Lashon Hara about non-Jews (Michael Makovi)
• 18. Re: Sometimes Chutzpah is Praiseworthy (Michael Makovi)
• 19. Re: Ashkenazim and Sephardim (Michael Makovi)
• 20. Re: Lashon Hara about non-Jews (Moshe Y. Gluck)
• 21. Re: "VaYakom Melekh Hadash al Mitzrayim..." Self-hatred (Zev Sero)
• 22. Re: "VaYakom Melekh Hadash al Mitzrayim..." Self-hatred (Michael Makovi)
• 23. Re: Lashon Hara about non-Jews (Michael Makovi)
• 24. Re: Apikores? (Elazar M. Teitz)
• 25. Re: Ashkenazim and Sephardim (Richard Wolpoe)
• 26. Re: Xmas and easter (Richard Wolpoe)
• 27. Re: Ashkenazim and Sephardim (Richard Wolpoe)
• 28. Re: Tefillin on Rosh Chodesh (Richard Wolpoe)
• 29. irrational anti-Semites? (T613K@aol.com)
• 30. Lashon Hara about non-Jews (Kelmar, Michael J.)
• 31. New king (Kelmar, Michael J.)
• 32. Q on qinyanei m'shichah o hagbahah re 29Dec2007 RYReisman shiur (Michael Poppers)
• 33. Re: Lashon Hara about non-Jews (Micha Berger)
• 34. Re: dvar tora (Micha Berger)
• 35. Re: Ashkenazim and Sephardim (Micha Berger)
• 36. Re: Who he could have been (Micha Berger)
• 37. Re: Nittelnacht (Micha Berger)
• 38. Va'eira "Too Much Dust Clouds The Mind With Lust" (Richard Wolberg)

>>> In response to a quote of my understanding of RDLifshitz's shitaL
>>>Rav Dovid taught that the halachic ruling is still applicable, because
>>>the microscopic eggs and maggot larvae are not visible, and therefore
>>> ... lack mamashus. The only cause for the current presence
>>> of maggots that we can see is the meat. Viewing the question in terms of
>>> human experience, the meat is the only source of the maggots....

>> I've never seen this argument as viable. It makes sense to say that if the
>> creature cannot be seen, it is mutar - thus bacteria are kosher.

>> But since when should the creature be mutar because its reproduction cannot
>> be seen? I see absolutely no logic in saying that since we cannot see it
>> reproduce (but we davka can see the adult), we pretend it spontaneously
>> generates....

> You're thinking ontologically, determining wht actually exists, and
> deciding halakhah accordingly.

> I argued that halakhah's notion of metzi'us is not ontological but
> existential. Halakhah deals with how we experience reality, regardless
> of what actually exists. The microscopic mite in your water is kosher
> because it is outside the realm of experience. Not because halakhah said
> such things are okay, but because halakhah doesn't bother addressing
> them altogether.

I would agree that halakha deals only with what we can see - thus
bacteria are kosher.

My point is that I don't see why our ability to see the animal's
reproduction makes a difference. If lice were invisible, then it'd
make sense to say they are kosher. But lice are completely visible -
it is only their reproduction that is invisible. And I see no logical
reason why invisible reproduction should translate into
as-if-spontaneous gneeration.

Plus, as I said, if Chazal saw lice eggs, then it means the eggs are
NOT invisible. And if Chazal did not see the eggs, then probably
Chazal honestly thought there were no eggs, and that spontaneous
generation does in fact happen. Either way, the invisibility argument
fails, and we are left with mamash true spontaneous generation.

>> Besides, if all the scientists of the day believed in spontaneous
>> generation, how much sense does it make to say that Chazal say almost the
>> same exact thing but mean something totally different? ...

>Rather, Chazal weren't discussing the biological question altogether.
>They were speaking of the experience, which happened to match the
>then-contemporary biological theory.

>>I'll strengthen this: Rabbi Slifkin asks, what sense does it make to have an
>> expression "eggs of lice" if they aren't really eggs of lice? Answer:
>> according to Greek science (Aristotle I think), lice DID lay eggs, but they
>> believed no lice hatched from them! ...

> Simpler answer: Different bugs are born different ways. Even if they are
> similar enough to share a name. (Which I don't think is true here,
> anyway beitzei kinim vs tola'im).

> Tir'u baTov!
> -Micha

Simpler? How? To assume they meant two different things, even though
they both said the same thing, is simpler? The Greek scientists held
that lice lay eggs but nevertheless spontaneously generate. Chazal
said that there are "eggs of lice", but lice don't hatch from them.
(Not seeing them makes no sense, because then what are these "eggs of
lice" is we can't see them and thus ignore them as if they don't
exist?) Chazal and the Greeks clearly say the same thing. Why bend
logic and p'shat all out of shape? Just say that both believed in
spontaneous generation (= the science of the day), and all
difficulties disappear. And as Rabbi Slifkin has shown, what Chazal
says fits VERY VERY well with the science of the day.

And again, if Chazal saw the eggs, they weren't invisible (and so we
have to answer mamash spontaneous generation), and if they didn't see
the eggs, they would have believe in mamash true spontaneous
generation, not as-if.

Mikha'el Makovi

On Fri, Dec 28, 2007 at 04:20:50AM +0200, Michael Makovi wrote:
: My point is that I don't see why our ability to see the animal's
: reproduction makes a difference. If lice were invisible, then it'd
: make sense to say they are kosher. But lice are completely visible -
: it is only their reproduction that is invisible. And I see no logical
: reason why invisible reproduction should translate into
: as-if-spontaneous gneeration.

This is just a repetition of what you said earlier. I would need an
explanation of what you disagree with in my subsequent post.

I'm arguing that anything you can't see, doesn't count. Errors in the
squareness of your tefillin that are below our threshold. The theory
has nothing to do with biology in particular, this is just one instance.

: Plus, as I said, if Chazal saw lice eggs, then it means the eggs are
: NOT invisible...

Again, I see a repetion and no explanation of why you reject my response.

We have no indication they saw the eggs of tola'im; kinim are a different
thing. As for kinim, which comes up in hilkhos Shabbos and combing,
not kashrus of maggots, we have no reason to believe that they believed
all kinim were born the same way.

: Chazal honestly thought there were no eggs, and that spontaneous
: generation does in fact happen. Either way, the invisibility argument
: fails, and we are left with mamash true spontaneous generation.

Chazal's scientific belief is irrelevent if we are only using their
description of the observable reality regardless of their beliefs about
its truth. The science of invisible things is simply off topic; it's
only the experience, not the science. Drop all interest in ontological
truth and get on with life.

If no one ever saw a maggot egg with the naked eye, how do magots emerging
from meat have any different impact on my quest to perfect my soul and
come close to G-d whether the eggs are considered or not? My gut tells
me they come from the meat, and my brain knowing otherwise doesn't change
me nearly as much.

:> Simpler answer: Different bugs are born different ways. Even if they are
:> similar enough to share a name. (Which I don't think is true here,
:> anyway beitzei kinim vs tola'im).

: Simpler? How? To assume they meant two different things, even though
: they both said the same thing, is simpler? ...

Of course it is. If one speaks of "fish", "shellfish", "plankton",
or even "copepods", does one mean a single species?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             A sick person never rejects a healing procedure
micha@aishdas.org        as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what
http://www.aishdas.org   other people think when dealing with spiritual
Fax: (270) 514-1507      matters?              - Rav Yisrael Salanter

Interestingly, "VaYakom Melekh Hadash al Mitzrayim..." could be  
translated as "A new king arose against Egypt..."  In other words  
Pharaoh was his and his people's own worst enemy.

Regarding the famous machlokess between Rav and Shmuel: Was it mamesh  
a new king or was it the old one who made as if he didn't know Yosef?   
The fact that the Torah doesn't mention the king died, would indicate  
that it was the same king. 
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>>My point is that I don't see why our ability to see the animal's
>>reproduction makes a difference. If lice were invisible, then it'd
>>make sense to say they are kosher. But lice are completely visible -
>>it is only their reproduction that is invisible. And I see no logical
>>reason why invisible reproduction should translate into
>>as-if-spontaneous gneeration.

> This is just a repetition of what you said earlier. I would need an
> explanation of what you disagree with in my subsequent post.

> I'm arguing that anything you can't see, doesn't count. Errors in the
> squareness of your tefillin that are below our threshold. The theory
> has nothing to do with biology in particular, this is just one instance.

Sorry about the repetition, but what you are arguing, still makes no
sense to me. Just because they couldn't see the eggs, you pretend they
spontaneously generate? Couldn't I argue that since I didn't see the
guy touch a sheretz, he isn't tamei? Or what if I touch a sheretz with
my eyes closed?

Invisible creatures being kosher seems to me to be a chok, perhaps the
reason being because God can't expect you to magically filter the
bacteria out of your water - it's a feasibility thing. I don't think
it's because my not seeing them per se matters.

But in any case, I simply fail to understand why not seeing their mode
of reproduction = as-if spontaneous generation. The logic is simply
beyond me.

>>Plus, as I said, if Chazal saw lice eggs, then it means the eggs are
>>NOT invisible...

> Again, I see a repetion and no explanation of why you reject my response.

> We have no indication they saw the eggs of tola'im; kinim are a different
> thing. As for kinim, which comes up in hilkhos Shabbos and combing,
> not kashrus of maggots, we have no reason to believe that they believed
> all kinim were born the same way.

Sorry, I don't remember which daf of Shabbat this is in, so I can't
check - which are tola'im and which are kinim?

Pending your response, I repeated myself because you didn't answer my
objection yet:

If Chazal could see the eggs (but nevertheless said spontaneous
generation), the invisibility argument fails altogether.
If Chazal could NOT see the eggs, it seems logical they would have
believed there were in fact no eggs to begin with (not invisible eggs;
I'm saying no eggs whatsoever on the planet), and concluded that
mamash spontaneous generation is the truth, in keeping with the
science of the day.
And even if they COULD see the eggs, it seems logical they would have
kept with the science of the day, as they did with so many other
things. Rabbi Slifkin has shown how b'shlama it is to say this sugya
is according to Greek science.

>>Chazal honestly thought there were no eggs, and that spontaneous
>>generation does in fact happen. Either way, the invisibility argument
>>fails, and we are left with mamash true spontaneous generation.

> Chazal's scientific belief is irrelevent if we are only using their
> description of the observable reality regardless of their beliefs about
> its truth. The science of invisible things is simply off topic; it's
> only the experience, not the science. Drop all interest in ontological
> truth and get on with life.

By the same token, their description of observable reality is
irrelevant if we go by scientific belief. It seems to me that it is
more logical to go by what we know, than what we see. If I touch a
sheretz with my eyes closed and my hands numbed with anesthetic, then
drop the sheretz and open my eyes and see the dead sheretz on the
ground, shouldn't I conclude I am in fact tamei?

> If no one ever saw a maggot egg with the naked eye, how do magots emerging
> from meat have any different impact on my quest to perfect my soul and
> come close to G-d whether the eggs are considered or not? My gut tells
> me they come from the meat, and my brain knowing otherwise doesn't change
> me nearly as much.

I'd say, they honestly thought the maggots spontaneously arose from
the meat, just like the gentiles thought! It's not a matter of what
they saw vs. what they knew. The two are the same! They saw maggots
spontaneously arise from meat, so they "knew" maggots do the same!
Knowledge = sight in this case.

>>> Simpler answer: Different bugs are born different ways. Even if they are
>>> similar enough to share a name. (Which I don't think is true here,
>>> anyway beitzei kinim vs tola'im).

>>Simpler? How? To assume they meant two different things, even though
>>they both said the same thing, is simpler? ...

> Of course it is. If one speaks of "fish", "shellfish", "plankton",
> or even "copepods", does one mean a single species?

I'm sorry, I fail to understand your point. True, "fish" and
"shellfish" encompass more than one species. But if I say "scaled
finned fish are kosher" and you say "scaled finned fish are kosher",
does it make sense to say that I mean "fish with fins and scales are
kosher" and you mean "fish that you know don't have fins and scales,
but that by optical illusion look like they have fins and scales, are
kosher". This is absurd. If we both say the same thing, we both mean
the same thing. If Chazal and Greek scientists both seem to believe in
spontaneous generation, why pilpul and say Chazal meant something
else? It's much easier to say they both meant the same thing.

Mikha'el Makovi

On Fri, Dec 28, 2007 at 05:08:56AM +0200, Michael Makovi wrote:
: Sorry about the repetition, but what you are arguing, still makes no
: sense to me. Just because they couldn't see the eggs, you pretend they
: spontaneously generate? Couldn't I argue that since I didn't see the
: guy touch a sheretz, he isn't tamei? Or what if I touch a sheretz with
: my eyes closed?

Something you can't experience doesn't touch your psyche the same.
Something you could have experienced but didn't leaves you with
uncertainty, and therefore we can talk about how to pasqen about the
state of meat whose reality is uncertain. But something that I can't
experience has very little impact on who I become. In the task of
his-haleikh lefanai veheyei tamim, knowing the eggs exist or thinking
they don't doesn't change things much.

It's not "pretending" to ignore something that doesn't matter. What
matters is what hits me on the gut level. Not what I know from microscopes
or books. Ha'adam nif'al lefi pe'ulosav is true of how I perceive what
I'm doing.

If you feel the sheretz, your eyes being closed is irrelevent.

If you could have felt the sheretz but didn't, you are culpable for
criminal negligence. Knowing I should have been careful enough to be
sure is enough to change who I am.

As for the existential attitude WRT uncertainty.... If a person confuses
2 chatichos shuman with one of cheilev in a manner such that the cheilev
isn't qavu'ah, he can eat all three pieces of fat. The rishonim argue
about whether he could eat a stew containing all three, but if were to
eat one after the other, hakol modim it is permitted.

Once he ate all the fat we /know/ he must have eaten something that was
ontologically cheilev. However, it's irrelevent. What matters is that when
eating each peice, he ate something he related to as probably shuman. The
halachic state is in how he thinks about the fat, not determining what
the fat is.

Give up this assumption that it's ontology, that what's really out there
that is relevent rather than how we experience what's there and thus how
it changes us and thus how we accomplish our life's goal. Then it's not
about "pretending" anything.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             A person lives with himself for seventy years,
micha@aishdas.org        and after it is all over, he still does not
http://www.aishdas.org   know himself.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter

> Interestingly, "VaYakom Melekh Hadash al Mitzrayim..." could be translated
> as "A new king arose against Egypt..."  In other words Pharaoh was his and
> his people's own worst enemy.

> Regarding the famous machlokess between Rav and Shmuel: Was it mamesh a new
> king or was it the old one who made as if he didn't know Yosef?  The fact
> that the Torah doesn't mention the king died, would indicate that it was the
> same king.

I personally think it was a new king. I see no way to explain how the
old king suddenly rose against Yosef like this. Even evil gentile
kings, don't usually have a Jew put in second-in-command and then turn
on his people a year later. Sometimes they'll tolerate us and then
turn on us, but lavish such love and goodwill and affection, and then
turn into Hitler? That's just bizarre. No, it'd have to be mental
illness, seriously.

It makes more sense to say that over the generations, the Jews
proliferated, and the Egyptians grew afraid of a fifth column. And the
memory of what Yosef had done faded.

The Torah doesn't need to say that the old king died. Just saying a
new king arose, implies he died. Plus, it may have been quite some
time later, generations even. If so, not only Yosef's king, but many
other kings too, all died. But the Torah didn't want to give a
chronology of kings dying and succeeding as king. So it just said, "A
new king arose".

Rabbi Joseph Telushkin asks, how on earth could this new pharaoh not
know Yosef? He compares it to if a president of the US arose who
didn't know George Washington. Whether not knowing is literal or
figurative, either way it implies a dramatic catastrophic shift in the
ruling power.

And according to a widely-held historical theory (see the Hertz
chumash for example), Yosef entered Egypt at the time of the Hyksos,
foreign Semitic rulers in Egypt (Rav Hertz shows for example many
distinctly Hyksos practices by Yosef's Pharaoh). Shortly thereafter,
the native Egyptians took back power, and naturally, they wanted to
get rid of any remnants of the Hyksos, especially cultural ones (which
would involve destroying any records or artifacts - indeed, we have
very few records of the Hyksos period, but the few records we have
indicate that materially, Egypt did not suffer - this implies the
records were destroyed deliberately, not by cataclysm). And
furthermore, anyone who was a friend of the Hyksos ( = the Jews) would
be very much despised and feared. And our being foreign Semites like
the Hyksos, well...oy vey.

Mikha'el Makovi

> Malbim, OTOH, understands that *Par'oh* made houses for the midwives,
> not as a reward but in order to frustrate their defiance.  By having
> official midwife stations from which all midwives must be dispatched
> Par'oh would know when they were dispatched, and could make sure that
> they obeyed his orders.
>Zev Sero

>As for Malbim, I haven't read him, but I don't understand this
>interpretation. It clearly says that the batim was a reward, no? Why would
>God reward Shifra and Puah, whoever they are, by making it more difficult to
>save children in the future?
>Mikha'el Makovi

Oh wait, I missed that you said *Pharaoh* built the houses. Okay,
Malbim makes sense now. Still, it doesn't convince me. But at least it
makes sense now.

Mikha'el Makovi

On Dec 27, 2007 7:09 PM, Michael Makovi <mikewinddale@gmail.com> wrote:

> >From: "Michael Elzufon" <Michael@arnon.co.il>
> >Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2007 12:18:41 +0200

> >What is the source for the claim that Ashkenazi practice came from Eretz
> >Israel and Sephardi practice came from Bavel? My impression has always
> >been the opposite.

> I read somewhere (I forget where) that the Sepharadim got their practice
> from the Geonim - just look at the Rif and the Rambam. Whereas the
> Ashkenazim got their practice from Israel through Italy. Where did you see
> this claim? Because I forgot where I saw it (but it's a nice thing to say to
> Sepharadim in Israel when they claim to be minhag Eretz Yisrael :)

> Of course, if this were the case, the Ashkenazim would follow the Talmud
> Yerushalmi, I would think

Problem the yersuhalmi was redacted circa 350 CE

It would be better to state that Italy and Ashkenaz follow Kallir
et.c[circa 580 CE] clsoer in time to the Bavli

> . So there must be more to it. But I don't know any more.

> I just took a look at
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ashkenazim#Background_in_the_Roman_Empire.
> Very interesting. B'kitzur, it says that the Jews of Israel and the
> Mediterranean lasted a few centuries, and it is possible the Germanic
> invasion of Western Europe in the 5th century opened that area up to Jews.
> So this confirms what I say above. But the question that remains is, why
> don't Ashkenazim follow the Yerushalmi?

Micha:

The notion that Sepharadim come almost entirely from Bavel whereas
> Ashkenazim are primarily from EY, but a mix of both, is from Prof Agus.
> Search Avodah's archives for the name "Agus", this has been discussed
> repeatedly in the past.

This is hardly Agus's notion alone. Most of the major litrugicists subscribe
to it

If you follow bavli you cannot have piyyutim as per kallir.

See Tur 68 all of the nos'ei Keillim and SA taz
See Taz on SA 46:6

Kallir of EY and Meshullam ben Kalonymos of Lucca Italy wer major
cotnributors to ahsk. liturgy. This shows the link

EY [viz. Kallir v'sayaso] === [northern] Italy [the Kalonymos family] to
Ashkenaz

While Agus taught this to me it is not exclusively his idea. It is accepted

See the Sefer Minhag avoseinu beyadienu for examples of how Ahskenazim often
DO follow Yerushlami over Bavli

Look this one up. Se how Hasiba is treated in yerushalmi, then in Bavli and
then see Raabiyah's suspension of hasiaba altogehter!  If you follow the
sugyos then it makes sense for Raabiya to be simply relying upon Yerushalmi

Rabbinu Tam makes a statment in Sefer hayashr quoted by israel TA sham in
Minhag Ashknaz hakadomon [in the hkadamah]

if you do not accpet the Minhag of the kadmonim then don't accept the Bavli
becasue they BOTH STEM from the same source - namely the  Torah of EY.

In a footnote, he quotes the Or Zarua who is even more virulent in showing
how Minhag Ashkenaz often over-rode Bavli.

It is also clear that Rashi was loyal to the Ga'onim of Bavel and di not
quite feel this way on every issue [e.g. brach on hallel on rosh chodesh]

-- 

Kol Tuv / Best Regards,
RabbiRichWolpoe@Gmail.com
see: http://nishmablog.blogspot.com/
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> As for the existential attitude WRT uncertainty.... If a person confuses
> 2 chatichos shuman with one of cheilev in a manner such that the cheilev
> isn't qavu'ah, he can eat all three pieces of fat. The rishonim argue
> about whether he could eat a stew containing all three, but if were to
> eat one after the other, hakol modim it is permitted.

> Once he ate all the fat we /know/ he must have eaten something that was
> ontologically cheilev. However, it's irrelevent. What matters is that when
> eating each peice, he ate something he related to as probably shuman. The
> halachic state is in how he thinks about the fat, not determining what
> the fat is.

> Give up this assumption that it's ontology, that what's really out there
> that is relevent rather than how we experience what's there and thus how
> it changes us and thus how we accomplish our life's goal. Then it's not
> about "pretending" anything.

> Tir'u baTov!
> -Micha

Hmm, I'll have to think of a way to rationalize the fat halacha to fit
with my preconceived notion...where is this brought? I've only gotten
as far as a person who eats three pieces of chelev in two he'elems and
brings a chatat; grira d'grira says only one chatat.

Anyway though, Drashot haRan number five comes to mind, when he says
that he follows the opinion that tumah has a concrete effect. Now, I
disagree with him, because Bamidbar Rabbah on Chukat seems to clearly
show that tumah is not a concrete reality (spiritual or physical), but
rather a symbolism with a lesson to impart. But I'd agree with him
that it's ontological, whether the reality is physical/spiritual or
symbolic.

And I'd say that if I kill a louse, I was NOT "feeling" in my gut at
the time that it was okay because I can't see it reproduce even though
my mind knew it reproduces. Rather, I was feeling, egad, I just killed
a louse! Yes, I know that l'fi ha halacha it is mutar, but I still
feel that it was wrong! I still feel like I did shechita on Shabbat,
even if I know intellectually that I didn't.

In other words, you said that according to my knowledge the louse
reproduces, but we go by feeling, that it doesn't.

But it is just the opposite. I know intellectually that it doesn't
reproduce halachically, but I feel like it is asur.

So even according to your own shita, it ought to be asur. As for me,
everything's b'shlama. <grin>

Mikha'el Makovi

Michael Makovi wrote:

>  I think that Rashi understanding batim as batei kehuna, is part of the fact
> that Rashi is simply quoting Chazal, which includes both Shifra and Puah =
> Yocheved and Miriam, and batim = batei kehuna. As I said in my reply a
> minute ago, the question isn't how Rashi understood Shifra and Puah, but
> rather how Chazal quoted by Rashi understood Shifra and Puah.

But Rashi doesn't bring midrashim unless he thinks they're necessary
to understand pshat.  There must be something in the text that makes
him choose to quote this maamar chazal.

> As for Malbim, I haven't read him, but I don't understand this
> interpretation. It clearly says that the batim was a reward, no?

It says nothing of the kind.

> Why would God reward Shifra and Puah, whoever they are, by making it
> more difficult to save children in the future?

Not Hashem, Par'oh.  "Because the midwives feared Hashem" and defied
his orders, "he made them houses" so they couldn't do that any more.

-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                       	                          - Clarence Thomas

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PuAh was so named according to one Peshat, since she acted with brazenness
towards her father - Hofio PaneHa Kenneged AviHa. This refers probably to
her remarking to her father that his decree was worse than Pharo's. It is
likely that she is attributed with this name on this particular occasion
since without her Chutzpah she would not have had a job; no Jewish babies
would have been born.

But why is this acceptable? Why is the Medrash praising her for this
temerity and insubordination? Is this the way for a daughter to speak to her
father? Especially if he is the Gadol Hador? [I believe the Medrash uses
that expression about Amrom]

One wonders if the answer is that without this Chutzpah, without this
stinging rebuke the message would not have penetrated. 

meir

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---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Doron Beckerman <beck072@gmail.com>
Date: Dec 28, 2007 12:34 AM
Subject: Re: Lashon Hara about non-Jews
To: avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org

>> I would personally say that it seems like the kind of loophole in a d'oraita
that is often plugged by a d'rabanan.  <<

Source?

>> Perhaps because in a normal situation, we're a nation living in our own
land, and the only non-Jews around are gerei toshav, which I'm not sure, but
going to assume, about whom it is forbidden to speak lashon hara <<

He isn't included in Amecha or Amisecha in Mitzvos, so it isn't forbidden.

>> (I do know
that it is a command to love them - Mesechet Gerim chapter 3 says "love the
ger" includes the ger toshav). <<

I didn't see it there.

>> And perhaps a Jew who speaks lashon hara of a gentile, we can say the
same
thing about a Jew who takes advantage of a loophole in a monetary matter -
G-d knows how to settle the score. You didn't break the law per se, but so
what? It's like the guy who went psak-shopping for the heter, and so when he
got to Olam haBa, he was given a derelict shack - "according to some
opinions, this IS olam haba". <<

Ain HaNidon Domeh LaRaayah. There isn't one Posek who says its forbidden to
speak LH about non-Jews.
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> Michael Makovi wrote:

>> I read somewhere (I forget where) that the Sepharadim got their practice
>> from the Geonim - just look at the Rif and the Rambam. Whereas the
>> Ashkenazim got their practice from Israel through Italy. Where did you 
>> see
>> this claim? Because I forgot where I saw it (but it's a nice thing to say 
>> to
>> Sepharadim in Israel when they claim to be minhag Eretz Yisrael :)

When Sephardim in Israel say that they are following Minhag Eretz Yisrael, 
they are NOT referring to the G'mara.

They are referring to MARAN, R' Yosef Karo and his psika in Eretz Yisrael. 
He is considered by many Sephardim to be THE poseik in Eretz Yisrael.

Shoshana L. Boublil

Reb Mikha'el Makovi asked:
> why don't Ashkenazim follow the Yerushalmi?

Says who? Rabbenu Tam and Rabbenu Yits'haq Or Zaru'a both state that we do 
base ourselves on sources other than the Bavli, such as Yerushalmi, Pessiqta, 
Tosefta and more. This is cited towards the beginning of Ta Shma's Minhag 
Ashkenaz haQadmon.
-- 
Arie Folger
http://www.ariefolger.googlepages.com

Michael Makovi wrote:
"I personally think it was a new king. I see no way to explain how the
old king suddenly rose against Yosef like this. Even evil gentile
kings, don't usually have a Jew put in second-in-command and then turn
on his people a year later."

If you look at history, you'll see that's not true.  Also, some of the  
m'forshim explain that the Egyptian people pressured the king and said  
that he would be deposed if he didn't turn against the Jews so he  
bowed to pressure, which could also explain the seemingly incongruity.

"Rabbi Joseph Telushkin asks, how on earth could this new pharaoh not
know Yosef? He compares it to if a president of the US arose who
didn't know George Washington."

The comparison of the then Egypt and the U.S. is an invalid  
comparison. The two forms of government are like night and day.

"The Torah doesn't need to say that the old king died."

You're correct; it doesn't need to. But the fact that this king was  
such a friend to the Jews would have been derech eretz and kovod  
habriyos to mention his death. 

Perhaps the answer is that the Middos issue is not really what the Torah is
concerned with here. It is more about the Pirud Levavos which is caused by
it.
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>>I would personally say that it seems like the kind of loophole in a
>> d'oraita
>>that is often plugged by a d'rabanan.

> Source?

My supposition. No source.

>>Perhaps because in a normal situation, we're a nation living in our own
>>land, and the only non-Jews around are gerei toshav, which I'm not sure, but
>>going to assume, about whom it is forbidden to speak lashon hara <<

> He isn't included in Amecha or Amisecha in Mitzvos, so it isn't forbidden.

That's my point. If he's a ger toshav, we have to love him. But if
he's not a ger toshav, but rather just a stam gentile in chutz
la'aretz, we have no command to love him, but I'm arguing it is a
technicality of the law. Surely God wants us to love them and not
speak LH, I'm figuring. After all, Avot 3:something says beloved is
man, Bereshit 1:x and 2:x say tzelem elokim, etc. Sanhedrin 4:x says
whoever saves nefesh achat m'bnei *adam*, etc.

> >> (I do know
> that it is a command to love them - Mesechet Gerim chapter 3 says "love the
> ger" includes the ger toshav). <<

> I didn't see it there.

It asks, what pasuk pertains to a ger toshav? It answers, Vayikra
something. That pasuk is one of the "love the ger" pesukim. There's
also Vayikra 25:35 (I think), about lending money, and it refers to
the ger toshav (according to Rashi) as "your brother".

>>And perhaps a Jew who speaks lashon hara of a gentile, we can say the
>>same
>>thing about a Jew who takes advantage of a loophole in a monetary matter -
>>G-d knows how to settle the score. You didn't break the law per se, but so
>>what? It's like the guy who went psak-shopping for the heter, and so when he
>>got to Olam haBa, he was given a derelict shack - "according to some
>>opinions, this IS olam haba".

>>Ain HaNidon Domeh LaRaayah. There isn't one Posek who says its forbidden to
>>speak LH about non-Jews.

I know. I never said there was a poske - that's my entire point. We
ARE forbidden (I think) to speak lashon hara about a ger toshav (since
we have to love him), and so I'm saying, LH about a stam gentile is
simply not forbidden, due to a technicality. But one cannot read
Bereshit 1 and 2 and still think it is okay to speak LH about a
gentile, strictly forbidden or not.

True, there's no source. One could just as well argue that the
permission to avoid trumah and maaser by taking your produce through
the window, is NOT a technicality, and is rather a perfectly good
thing that Hashem wants you to do. I can't prove you wrong on that.
But I still personally think it is a technicality that God doesn't
want you to do, to take it through your window.

And there's the thing about a person who shadily takes advantage of
monetary loopholes, that God will requite him in His own way. I
figure, He'll do the same thing to a person who disregards the tzelem
elokim of a gentile and speaks LH with abandon. And check Sforno on
Shemot 19:15-16 - all men are beloved to God, and the difference
between Jew and gentile is one of degree not kind.

Mikha'el Makovi

> PuAh was so named according to one Peshat, since she acted with brazenness
> towards her father ? Hofio PaneHa Kenneged AviHa. This refers probably to
> her remarking to her father that his decree was worse than Pharo's. It is
> likely that she is attributed with this name on this particular occasion
> since without her Chutzpah she would not have had a job; no Jewish babies
> would have been born.

> But why is this acceptable? Why is the Medrash praising her for this
> temerity and insubordination? Is this the way for a daughter to speak to her
> father? Especially if he is the Gadol Hador? [I believe the Medrash uses
> that expression about Amrom]

> One wonders if the answer is that without this Chutzpah, without this
> stinging rebuke the message would not have penetrated.

> meir

That seems likely. Also, what else could she say? "Father, doesn't it
say in this book we we're going to get at Sinai, that...?" And it'd
sound a bit weird, "Father, is it not the case that your decree is
worse than Pharaoh's?"

Mikha'el Makovi

> >> I read somewhere (I forget where) that the Sepharadim got their practice
> >> from the Geonim - just look at the Rif and the Rambam. Whereas the
> >> Ashkenazim got their practice from Israel through Italy. Where did you
> >> see
> >> this claim? Because I forgot where I saw it (but it's a nice thing to say
> >> to
> >> Sepharadim in Israel when they claim to be minhag Eretz Yisrael :)
> >>Mikha'el Makovi

> When Sephardim in Israel say that they are following Minhag Eretz Yisrael,
> they are NOT referring to the G'mara.

> They are referring to MARAN, R' Yosef Karo and his psika in Eretz Yisrael.
> He is considered by many Sephardim to be THE poseik in Eretz Yisrael.

> Shoshana L. Boublil

I always figured that Sefaradim meant that they were Middle-Eastern
and closer to Israel than the Ashkenazim. Maran being in Israel is an
interesting interpretation. Regardless of what they mean, I know they
don't mean the Bavli. But I'm saying, you can retort that the
Ashkenazim got many of their minhagim from EY through Italy.

Mikha'el Makovi

R' Doron Beckerman:
>I understand that there is no prohibition involved in telling Lashon Hara 
>about non-Jews, but someone asked me a question today. Assuming Lashon Hara
>causes a Hashchasas HaMiddos, (or, alternatively, stems from a Hashchasah
of
>needing to feel superior to Ploni by putting him down), why would the Torah

>allow us to spread Lashon Hara about non-Jews?

Maybe the Middos aspect would be Mechayev that one not do it for L'lo
To'eles, but when there is a To'eles one need not worry about all the
T'na'im the Chofetz Chaim would otherwise require.

KT,
MYG 

Michael Makovi wrote:

> I personally think it was a new king. I see no way to explain how the
> old king suddenly rose against Yosef like this. Even evil gentile
> kings, don't usually have a Jew put in second-in-command and then turn
> on his people a year later.

Sure they do.  See Stalin.   But in any case, even if this "melech
chadash" was not a newly-crowned king but an old one with new policies,
it can't possibly have been the king who first appointed Yosef.  Yosef
lived 80 years after his appointment; the king who appointed him might
have been slightly younger than him, but not that much younger (if he
was younger than 15 or so he'd surely have had a regent), and is very
unlikely to have outlived him.  So if the "melech chadash" was an old
king with new policies, he must still have come to the throne during
the 63 years between Yaacov's death and Yosef's.

-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                       	                          - Clarence Thomas

>> "I personally think it was a new king. I see no way to explain how the
>> old king suddenly rose against Yosef like this. Even evil gentile
>> kings, don't usually have a Jew put in second-in-command and then turn
>> on his people a year later."

> If you look at history, you'll see that's not true.  Also, some of the
> m'forshim explain that the Egyptian people pressured the king and said
> that he would be deposed if he didn't turn against the Jews so he
> bowed to pressure, which could also explain the seemingly incongruity.

To take an example: Abarbanel was offered a personal exemption from
the Expulsion. Apparently, even gentile rulers are not so liable to
un-friend a beloved Jew. The rest of the Jews, maybe. But Yosef
himself? No.

>> "Rabbi Joseph Telushkin asks, how on earth could this new pharaoh not
>> know Yosef? He compares it to if a president of the US arose who
>> didn't know George Washington."

>The comparison of the then Egypt and the U.S. is an invalid
>comparison. The two forms of government are like night and day.

It's not davka US. The point is, for Yosef to be unknown to the king,
implies a dramatic shift in rule. Whether "did not know" is literal or
figurative, the point is that for the new pharaoh to not appreciate
Yosef, implies a dramatic change.

>> "The Torah doesn't need to say that the old king died."

> You're correct; it doesn't need to. But the fact that this king was
> such a friend to the Jews would have been derech eretz and kovod
> habriyos to mention his death.

Maybe. But I think it is implied in the fact that a new king arose.

Mikha'el Makovi

> Maybe the Middos aspect would be Mechayev that one not do it for L'lo
> To'eles, but when there is a To'eles one need not worry about all the
> T'na'im the Chofetz Chaim would otherwise require.

> KT,
> MYG

This is what my rabbi (learned under Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook) said. He
said, one should not even want to speak lashon hara about a gentile.
But if there is a need to do so, then the lack of a strict prohibition
allows one to do so.

Mikha'el Makovi

I wrote:
<First, there is no mention whatever of corporal punishment, and indeed
the ability to administer corporal punishment is not curtailed by
the absence of the Beis Din Hagadol from the Lishkas Hagazis. It is
capital punishment -- dinei n'fashos -- and capital punishment alone
whose administration requires the presence in Lishkas Hagazis....>

RMicha Berger responded:
<The Smag (Lav 213) says malkos does as well.>

True, but as RMB subsequently quoted, the Smag also says that malkos
requires a beis din of 23, completely equating it with dinei n'fashos.
The Rambam states explicitly (Sanhedrin 16:2) that a BD of smuchim can
administer malkos even bizman hazeh, b'chol makom.

RMB: 
<But first let me explain my meandering mind's take.

As I wrote in my earlier post, I understood "dinei nefashos" to mean
corporal punishment in addition to misas beis din. The mishnah on
Sanhedrin 34a divides the world of eidus into memonos and nefashos,
forcing us to place malqos into the dinei nefashos bucket.>

The Mishna (which is 32a) does not discuss malkos. It is actually in
neither "bucket" fully. For the number of dayanim, it is like dinei
mammon; for the din that if BD found him patur the case can not be
re-opened, it is like n'fashos. For the other distinctions between mammon
and n'fashos mentioned in the mishna, there is no clear statement in
the g'mara to which "bucket" malkos belongs, but see below.

RMB:
<On Sanhedrin 10a, Abayei says "malqos bimqom misah omedes" (from a g"sh
rasha-rasha) and then Rava uses this to derive that they require a BD shel
23, eidim vehasra'ah. Even the Rambam (Sanhedrin 16:1), who allows a DB
shel 3 to perform malkos, makes a point of affirming Abayei's equation.>

Not quite. Abayei does _not_ say "malkos bimkom misah omedes," but quotes
the g'zeira shava of "rasha, rasha." It is only Rava who says that malkos
bimkom misah omedes. Neither is stating his own opinion lahalacha. They
are using their respective sources to explain Rabbi Yishmael's opinion
that malkos requires a BD of 23.

RMB:
<LAD, the machloqes between the tana qama (BD of 3) and Rava (BD of 23)
is reiterated. The Rambam (Hil Sanhedrin 16:1) holds like Abayei (that
malqos is a derivative of misas BD) but also against Rava (we only need
a BD of 3 semuchin).>

There is no machlokes of the tanna kamma and Rava (which would be an
impossibility, Rava being an amora.) Nowhere does Rava state that he
requires a BD of 23 for malkos.

The Rambam paskens that a BD of only 3 is needed, as is to be expected,
since the requirement of 23 is the da'as yachid of R. Yishma'el.
He mentions that malkos is in place of misa (which is Rava's expression,
not Abaye's), but derives no dinim from it. In point of fact, that
malkos shares a din with misa is derived in the g'mara (33b) from the
g'zeira shava cited on 10a by Abaye (and Tosafos on 33b asks that this
should be a question on Rava, since the g'mara quotes a b'raisa that
derives the dinim for malkos from that g'zeira shava, while Rava (who
uses the reasoning of malkos bimkom misa omedes) seems not to hold of the
g'zeira shava). The Rambam interprets this as referring to all matters
(other than number of dayanim) mentioned in the mishna -- poschin min
hatzad, et al.; Rashi on 33b seems to say that the reference is only to
not re-opening a case after a verdict of patur.

RMB:
<On this issue, the aforementioned Smag disagrees, and requires 23
semuchin as well as the Sanhedrin must be in lishkas hagazis.

But it is even possible the Rambam would require the Sanhedrin in the
lishkah as well, depending whether the Rambam does would depend on whether
it's part of "bimqom misah" or part of the exception of only requiring
3 dayanim. It would also depend on his usage of dinei nefashos, is it
like the mishnah in Sanhedrin?>

As above, the Rambam explicitly does not consider the presence of
Sanhedrin in Lishkas Hagazis a prerequisite for the administration
of malkos.

EMT

On Dec 28, 2007 5:53 AM, Arie Folger <afolger@aishdas.org> wrote:
> Reb Mikha'el Makovi asked:
> > why don't Ashkenazim follow the Yerushalmi?

> Says who? Rabbenu Tam and Rabbenu Yits'haq Or Zaru'a both state that we do
> base ourselves on sources other than the Bavli, such as Yerushalmi,
> Pessiqta,
> Tosefta and more. This is cited towards the beginning of Ta Shma's Minhag
> Ashkenaz haQadmon.

and it therefore this concept is not just a "theory" of Professor Agus

Just 1 caveat.  The Yershalmi was redacted about 350 CE.  The minhag EY that
Ashkanzim follow is about 200-300 years later.  That is how Kallir is more
of an influence on Ashknea [circa 580] than the Yershalmi per se

Also Siddur Rav Amram Gaon is a major source as per Rabbeinu Tam via Ta
Shma....

Kol Tuv / Best Regards,
RabbiRichWolpoe@Gmail.com
see: http://nishmablog.blogspot.com/
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On Dec 25, 2007 5:45 PM, Eli Turkel <eliturkel@gmail.com> wrote:

> > Does anyone have an answer for:  If one of the reasons for this minhag
> > was the danger of getting beaten up outside, then why isn't there a such
> > minhag for Easter?>>

> Having just spent nittel nacht in Madrid it was a nice for revelry
> and drunkedness (good to stay at home). From what I read this
> is not unusual. Easter is more solemn. Hence, I assume that
> anti-Jewish riots occurred when the peasants got drunk
> --
> Eli Turkel

The 'traditional" day for pogroms etc. was Good Friday when passion plays
and self-enegation led the mobs into a frenzy. But what kind of g'zeira can
be made for Friday nights? People usually stayed home anyway.  Nittel
floated and could be any night, etc. so it was not a good time fto go to a
Beis Midrash

Easter was not a big deal AFAIK.
-- 
Kol Tuv / Best Regards,
RabbiRichWolpoe@Gmail.com
see: http://nishmablog.blogspot.com/
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On Dec 28, 2007 4:09 AM, Shoshana L. Boublil <toramada@bezeqint.net> wrote:

> > Michael Makovi wrote:

> >> I read somewhere (I forget where) that the Sepharadim got their
> practice
> >> from the Geonim - just look at the Rif and the Rambam. Whereas the
> >> Ashkenazim got their practice from Israel through Italy. Where did you
> >> see
> >> this claim? Because I forgot where I saw it (but it's a nice thing to
> say
> >> to
> >> Sepharadim in Israel when they claim to be minhag Eretz Yisrael :)

> When Sephardim in Israel say that they are following Minhag Eretz Yisrael,
> they are NOT referring to the G'mara.

> They are referring to MARAN, R' Yosef Karo and his psika in Eretz Yisrael.
> He is considered by many Sephardim to be THE poseik in Eretz Yisrael.

> Shoshana L. Boublil

I posted this irony MANY years ago on Avodah.
EY morhped from minhag EY to minhag Harif etc. sometimes after 1100 CE or
so.
The process might have begun earlier.
There is a Gaonic work delineating about 80 differences in Minhag between
Bavel and EY
circa 800-900.

Rema's hakdamah to the Mappah apparnetly refeernces either this work or this
concept because he notes that the Disparaity between East and West is VERY
old.

Popular Belief, Convntional Widsom orr Myth:  All halachah and Minhag
devolves from Bavli
Reality: This was never 100% true but was mostly true for Rif/Rambam.
Ashknazim never  adhered to this principle - albeit Rashi did so more than
did Tosafos.

I will start a new thread BEH on this.

-- 
Kol Tuv / Best Regards,
RabbiRichWolpoe@Gmail.com
see: http://nishmablog.blogspot.com/
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On Dec 24, 2007 10:16 AM, David Riceman <driceman@att.net> wrote:

> I
> Back on track.  What is the minimum shiur for tefillin? I could try to
> trace this our historically as well, but out of sheer laziness I will
> merely quote the Levush, and leave the search for sources to the more
> diligent among us.  The Levush (OH 37:2) says that even though the
> mitzva is to wear them all day, one fulfills the mitzva even by donning
> them and removing them instantly.

> So on the one hand we want to wear tefillin for the minimum possible
> time, and on the other hand we want to wear tefillin during kriath shma
> and shmoneh esraih.

> I hope two more posts will do it: one about when we can take them off on
> regular weekdays, and the other about rosh hodesh and hol hamoed,

> David Riceman

I onced researched as to why women should not wear Tefillin and I posted
many of them on Avodah [I believe I found 17 sources all who disagreed with
each other was to precisely why --smile--]
The Aruch Hashulchan stated that Tefilllin should be worn for the absolute
minimum time

   1. Ergo for women not at all
   2. For men only for Shema/Amidah

I even suggested this would explain an old yekke custom of putting on
Tefillin just before Baruch she'amar instead of before Birchos Hashachar

But then again why not take off tefilin right after tachanun?
See MB for possible connection to the phrase "shemnishmor chukehca" at the
end of uva letzion
-- 
Kol Tuv / Best Regards,
RabbiRichWolpoe@Gmail.com
see: http://nishmablog.blogspot.com/
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Pharaoh has two worries about the Jews, in the same sentence, that
seem to contradict each other: " the Jews are multiplying too rapidly,
there are too many of them" AND "they might go up out of Egypt." Well
duh if there are too many of them, LET them leave, wouldn't that be
the solution? So it's hard to understand exactly what his point is.
"There are too darn many of them and they might leave!" Makes no sense.
(Reminds me of that joke, "I won't eat at that restaurant, the food is
terrible, and such small portions!")

Rashi says Pharaoh was speaking euphemistically, not wanting to curse
himself, but his real fear was not that the Jews might go up and leave
Egypt, but that the EGYPTIANS might be forced to leave their own country!

Hirsch says that the Egyptians -- like all anti-Semites -- wanted a few
Jews around, because they knew they were good for the country, but not
/too/ many -- like there's some optimum number of Jews an anti-Semite
would want in his country, not too few and not too many.

The contradictory nature of Pharaoh's anxiety ("There are too many Jews
but I don't want them to leave") reminds me of how the Soviets used to
treat Jews -- hated them, persecuted them, but wouldn't let them leave.
It's like, "We all know this stinking country is a hellhole, one vast
Gulag. Why should you Jews be able to escape this prison-country?"
Like letting them leave would be a privilege, a reward for being such
impossible people.

There is also an additional phrase in there, "they might /join our
enemies and fight us/, and then leave." It still doesn't make clear
exactly what Pharaoh's concern was. I'm not totally satisfied with Rashi
or with Hirsch but maybe somebody else came across another commentary
on this question that sheds more light on it? Or do we just say, you
can't expect anti-Semitism to make sense, and that IS the message?

--Toby  Katz
=============

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There was some suggestion that perhaps the Torah forbids us to speak
lashon hara about non-Jews because of hashchasas middos.  Bad middos are
already forbidden by the Torah.  If the lashon hara about the non-Jew is
an expression of those bad middos, so it is assur.  But not because of
L"H, just because of bad middos.  The Torah forbids lending money to a
Yid on interest, but allows it for a goy.  The Torah is m'chaiv hashavas
aveidah for a Yid but not for a goy.  Why aren't we worried about the
effect on middos in those cases?  Charging interest from a goy might
result in (or come from) feelings of cruelty, selfishness etc.  The same
for hashavas aveida.  But the Torah says we can keep it.  So obviously
the Torah knows better than us and has kavanos that take in to account
our nature and purpose in the world.  Sometimes b'davka speaking ill of
a goy could be very beneficial.  It helps us stress in our own minds
that a Yid is not a goy and that our first obligation is to love all the
Yidden and then the rest of the world.  

Michoel Kelmar

R' Mikha'el Makovi wrote:
"I personally think it was a new king."

It seems that this is a machlokes in Chazal.  I'm not so sure we are
entitled to personal opinions.

Michoel Kelmar

In a shiur which dealt with many issues related to fishing, one issue was
whether someone could go fishing in an area where someone else had
previously laid a baited trap for [the same type of] fish.  As per RYR
(AIUH), Rabbeinu Meir (father of Rabbeinu Tam) held that there was an issue
of hasagas g'vul, while Rabbeinu Tam didn't see any problem, as fish are
hefqeir, but the Q'tzos haChoshen tried to demonstrate that the issue was
actual g'zeilah because an animal can be acquired via [g'ram] m'shichah or
hagbahah by attracting it to food.  What bothered me about the paradigm
cases of the Q'tzos was that the animal in question (e.g. re hagbahah, an
elephant) was visible both to the maqneh and to others who theoretically
could be qoneh it -- fish in a body of water (or, for that matter, the
baited trap of the previous fisherman) may not be visible, so how is
fisherman Z'vulun supposed to know that someone else is already being qoneh
the object of Z'vulun's activities?  Moreover, even if we assume that man
has authority over land (even, say, a sea-like r'shus, at least l'gabei
hilchos Shabbos, like a desert) such that he can be qoneh animals neither
he nor others can currently see, does this apply to the seas or to the
heavens?  Thanks.

Gut Voch and all the best from
--Michael Poppers via RIM pager
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An aside on an earlier post of mine... 

I wrote something about the 7 mitzvos BN plus our additional 606. I wasn't
thinking technically. Beris milah after Sinai is a different mitzvah than
that given Yaaqov. I would assume the same is true of the 7MBN. But even
more... the 7MBN are broad -- they include 66 of the 613, not just 7.

On Fri, Dec 28, 2007 at 02:34:34AM +0200, Michael Makovi wrote:
:From: "Doron Beckerman" <beck072@gmail.com>
:>I understand that there is no prohibition involved in telling Lashon Hara
:>about non-Jews, but someone asked me a question today. Assuming Lashon Hara
:>causes a Hashchasas HaMiddos, (or, alternatively, stems from a Hashchasah of
: >needing to feel superior to Ploni by putting him down), why would the Torah
: >allow us to spread Lashon Hara about non-Jews?

: My rabbi said that though it's permitted, it doesn't mean you want to do it.

That's a general issue. There are many things that are mutar, but clearly
not a good idea.

: I would personally say that it seems like the kind of loophole in a d'oraita
: that is often plugged by a d'rabanan...

And many of them aren't even derabbanan. That's the reason for many
chumros; to avoid something that is technically mutar but raises
challenges that in my case, personally I know I can't handle. Or even,
in the case of most people who are products of today's mileau.

: Here too, I'd say that here, it seems to me that for some technical reason,
: lashon hara is allowed about non-Jews.

First, to spell out what should be obvious, when speaking about shemiras
halashon, saying that LH is mutar doesn't mean motzi sheim ra is. LH
isn't geneivas da'as.

WRT ribis, the pasuq implies what the difference is when taking ribis
from a Jew vs taking it from a non-Jew. It uses the word "achikha". It's
not that ribis is inherently immoral, it's that brothers don't charge
brothers interest.

I would suggest that even if LH is personally destructive when speaking
of a stranger, and thus a good realm for chumrah, it is only univerally
problematic in all times and places to needlessly tell true but derogatory
information about "achikha". And thus the issur is limited in scope.

...
: I am reminded of Rabbi Yehuda heChassid saying that gentiles will be called
: to task for every violation of "love your neighbor". But where is "love your
: neighbor" in the Noachide laws? I suppose it's a sevara.

Particularly since "rei`akha" doesn't even include all Jews!

I think derekh eretz qodmah laTorah applies to BN too. (Which isn't a
fully different answer.)

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             One who kills his inclination is as though he
micha@aishdas.org        brought an offering. But to bring an offering,
http://www.aishdas.org   you must know where to slaughter and what
Fax: (270) 514-1507      parts to offer.        - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv

On Fri, Dec 28, 2007 at 01:08:31AM +0200, Michael Makovi wrote:
:              And we know that Shifra and Puah are Semitic names, so Rabbi
: Telushkin suggests they are non-Jewish Semites, in a position similar to the
: Jews in Egypt.

We do know they're semitic names? How? Even according to Chazal, who
make them job titles based on Hebrew etymologies, needn't imply the
name is semitic. Moshe's name is blatantly Egyptian. The Muse (son of)
root appears in many Eyptian names praising their gods: Thoth inspired a
number of Phraoahs named Tutmose. And yet Bisyah named Moshe because of
what seems to be a semitic play on the name "min hamayim meshisihu". Kind
of neat: Bisyah called him "son" because she was the one who took him /
had her maid take him out of the water. But back to the point...

Shifra and Pu'ah have consonants that would give them an Egyptian sound.
Perhaps it's like the frequency with which Korean Americans name their
girls "Kim" -- the name happens to be present in both cultures.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             It is a glorious thing to be indifferent to
micha@aishdas.org        suffering, but only to one's own suffering.
http://www.aishdas.org                 -Robert Lynd, writer (1879-1949)
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On Thu, Dec 27, 2007 at 10:35:00PM -0500, Richard Wolpoe wrote:
: Micha:
:> The notion that Sepharadim come almost entirely from Bavel whereas
:> Ashkenazim are primarily from EY, but a mix of both, is from Prof Agus.
:> Search Avodah's archives for the name "Agus", this has been discussed
:> repeatedly in the past.

: This is hardly Agus's notion alone. Most of the major litrugicists subscribe
: to it
...

I wrote the above under the impression that it was distinctly Prof
Agus's notion to take this notion and extend it beyond liturgy into a
discussion of the role of Bavli in Ashkenaz vs its role in Sepharad and
the evolution of its acceptance in a special role in halachic development
even in Ashkenaz.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Our greatest fear is not that we're inadequate,
micha@aishdas.org        Our greatest fear is that we're powerful
http://www.aishdas.org   beyond measure
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Anonymous

On Tue, Dec 25, 2007 at 10:02:35AM -0500, Rich, Joel wrote:
: As I argued lshutatam on the blog, one could argue that even such an
: individual as under discussion had a greater tafkid (learning, teaching
: torah) and had he completed that alternative tafkid HKB"H would have
: sent the refuah quicker, more expansive through other sources...

I was justg saying that any option that didn't enter the person's nequdas
bechirah (in REED-speak) couldn't have been an alternative tafqid.

And, while I can't comprehend Izhbitzer concepts of bechirah, it would
seem that if the person didn't do it, then it obviously wasn't his
tafqid. This is a logical extension of the notion that if A harms B,
it was because HQBH set things up for B to get harmed. Thus bechirah
becomes about intent, not the consequences of ones actions -- and in
the Beis Yaaqov and Mei haShiloach (R Mordekhai Yoseif Leiner) and as
elaborated repeated by R' Tzadoq, even one's actions themselves.

Still thinking out loud... Victor Frankl (who gets a z"l for having gone
through the camps, in addition to the number of people helped by his
Logotherapy) would actually include our thoughts in man's tafqid. As
he notes, the Nazis could take away almost everything but how the
person responds to their suffering. And that response could make all
the difference. A universe in which that person accepts his suffering
with internal dignity is a different one; even if that's all one can
contribute.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             I slept and dreamt that life was joy.
micha@aishdas.org        I awoke and found that life was duty.
http://www.aishdas.org   I worked and, behold -- duty is joy.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Rabindranath Tagore

On Tue, Dec 25, 2007 at 09:07:39PM -0500, Richard Wolberg wrote:
: Why this omission? In the case of the Church fathers, the reason is  
: that, during the three centuries after his life on earth, the event  
: considered most worthy of commemoration was the date of his death...

In Judaism too. Birthdays are probably chuqas aku"m, whereas yahrtzeits
are minhag Yisrael. Comes from Shelomo haMelekh, "Tov yom hamaves miyom
holadto".

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

Rabbenu Bachya explains why the monarch of Egypt was called "Pharaoh."  
He says that the letters spelling "afar" (dust/earth) are contained in  
the name "Pharaoh." Meaning that the Egyptians only believed in the  
earthiness of existence. For the Egyptians, spirituality did not  
exist. Pharaoh believed that the magicians in his court were able to  
perform wonders only by manipulating physicality within the context of  
nature. The natural order could not be overcome, overridden, or  
transcended in any way.

Pharaoh is described as a great crocodile, which fits with what the  
staff turned into when cast before Pharaoh by Aharon, at Moshe's  
instruction (from God).

[It is interesting to note that the Gemara tells us that one is only  
permitted to give tithes to the Kohen only if he is a Torah scholar.  
If he is classified as an "aam ha'aretz -- then one is not permitted  
to give him the tithes. The basis for giving the tithes and gifts to  
the Kohen is to facilitate his Torah study. Therefore, if he is not  
engaged in that pursuit, then there is not reason to provide for his  
other needs].

Adapted from Rabbi Yosef Kalatsky and Torah Tidbits
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