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Volume 16 : Number 087

Friday, January 13 2006

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Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2006 11:56:12 -0500
From: arnold.lustiger@exxonmobil.com
Subject:
1000 sacrificed for one Gadol


Is there not a stira minei u'bei between Shem Tov's/ R. Dessler's
formulation and the Gemara in Brachos 17a? --

A common saying among the Rabbis of Yavneh: I am a creature and my
colleague is a creature. My work is in the city, and his is in the field.
Just as I don't involve myself in his work, so does he not involve
himself in mine. And if you were to say that I accomplish much and that
he accomplishes little, we learn that it does not matter whether one
accomplishes much or little, as long as he does his work for the sake
of Heaven.

RJBS expanded as follows:

The Rabbis of Yavneh had a sacred mission. They guaranteed the eternity of
Israel with every page of the Jerusalem and Babylonian Talmud. Yet these
same rabbis stated that their mission was of equal value to their brothers
in Galilee and Judea who work in the fields, who provide food to their
brothers in the cities. But what did these anonymous farmers accomplish
of historical significance on behalf of the nation of Israel? We know
well of Rabban Gamliel, Rabbi Elazar, and Rabbi Akiva, but of what
lasting import is the work of these unknown tillers of the soil?

Level of accomplishment is not what sanctifies an individual. It is
the faithfulness in which one engages in the assignment. Holiness is
associated not with perceived success, but rather with the effort. Man
is not judged by his accomplishments, but rather by the devotion through
which he pursues his mission.

I personally believe that the 1000:1 formulation is the key idea driving
RW Yeshiva education today. Parents must be at least informed of this
emphasis before making a commitment to send their kids to these schools.

Arnie Lustiger


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Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2006 12:08:17 -0800 (PST)
From: Harry Maryles <hmaryles@yahoo.com>
Subject:
Re: MBP


Zev Sero <zev@sero.name> wrote:
> On Areivim, RHM wrote:
> > You can't have it both ways. If a Posek Paskins that MBP is Me'akev
> > the Mila than ACCORDING TO THAT POSEK, all those who didn't, require
> > Hatafas Dam Bris. 

> To what purpose? The person is not an orel, and there has already been
> dam bris shed. Taking another drop of blood won't make up for the lack
> of metzitzah - nobody does metzitza at a hatofas dam. So what would
> the hatofas dam achieve?

That kind of prooves my point. That there is no MBP at a Hatafa Dam
Bris shows that it s not an Ikuv. And if you should argue that HDB is
only required at the full Milah proccedure, that does not prove it is
Ikuv. It only proves Chiuv.

> However, there are serious poskim, every bit as great as the ones you
> cite, who hold that if MBP can't be done on the day, then the bris
> should be delayed until it can be done properly. 

That isn't surprising. Sakanta Chamira MeIsura. If MBP isn't done it
would be a Sakana for the Nimol.

> That's how serious
> the requirement is. And, of course, MBP is done on shabbos, which
> wouldn't be allowed if it wasn't required; 

Same answer: Sakanta Chamira MeIsura. If MBP isn't done it would be a
Sakana for the Nimol.

> this further proves that
> those who do it do not regard it as a mere minhag but as a fundamental
> halachic requirement. 

I never argued with that. I just argued that it is not considered to
be a part of the actual Mila as per the Gemarah in Shabbos.

> After all, according to the poskim you prefer,
> all those who do metzitza on Shabbos are mechalel shabbos.

Where did you get that from?

HM


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Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2006 15:46:09 -0500
From: Shaya Potter <spotter@yucs.org>
Subject:
Re: MBP


On Thu, 2006-01-12 at 11:47 -0500, Zev Sero wrote:
> However, there are serious poskim, every bit as great as the ones you
> cite, who hold that if MBP can't be done on the day, then the bris
> should be delayed until it can be done properly. That's how serious
> the requirement is. And, of course, MBP is done on shabbos, which
> wouldn't be allowed if it wasn't required; this further proves that
> those who do it do not regard it as a mere minhag but as a fundamental
> halachic requirement. After all, according to the poskim you prefer,
> all those who do metzitza on Shabbos are mechalel shabbos.

what melacha would one be doing when one does metzitza?

for example, it's assur for a parent to kiss a cut their child gets? (I
would guess many parents have done this over the years on shabbos).


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Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2006 15:58:10 -0500
From: Shaya Potter <spotter@yucs.org>
Subject:
Re: MBP


On Thu, 2006-01-12 at 11:47 -0500, Zev Sero wrote:
> On Areivim, RHM wrote:
> > You can't have it both ways. If a Posek Paskins that MBP is Me'akev
> > the Mila than ACCORDING TO THAT POSEK, all those who didn't, require
> > Hatafas Dam Bris. 
> 
> To what purpose? The person is not an orel, and there has already been
> dam bris shed. Taking another drop of blood won't make up for the lack
> of metzitzah - nobody does metzitza at a hatofas dam. So what would
> the hatofas dam achieve?

so what exactly is a bris?

I always thought "hatofas dam bris" was the bris, i.e. even if the
person was circumcised before, he didn't have a bris, and hence since we
can't recircumcise someone, we do the bris through hatofas dam bris.

now for some crazy and possibly stupid logic.

If one says one needs metziza w/ circumcision, but not with ha'tofas dam
bris, it would seem to me that metziza and bris are seperate entities..
metziza seems to have something to do with the act of circumcision, but
not with the bris itself.  

so could one say that the chiyuv of metziza has nothing to do with bris
mila, but is something chazal required for the act of circumcision?

now for a little stupid/crazy question.

if the halacha is that when one circumcises someone, there has to be
metziza, then couldn't it be that if a jewish doctor would circumcise a
non jewish child, halacha would say he'd have to peform metziza?


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Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2006 16:44:47 -0500
From: Jacob Farkas <jfarkas@compufar.com>
Subject:
Re: MBP


From: Zev Sero <zev@sero.name>
> To what purpose? The person is not an orel, and there has already been
> dam bris shed. Taking another drop of blood won't make up for the lack
> of metzitzah - nobody does metzitza at a hatofas dam. So what would
> the hatofas dam achieve?

> However, there are serious poskim, every bit as great as the ones you
> cite, who hold that if MBP can't be done on the day, then the bris
> should be delayed until it can be done properly. That's how serious
> the requirement is. And, of course, MBP is done on shabbos, which
> wouldn't be allowed if it wasn't required...

Isn't the reason that Metzitzah is done on Shabbos because of presumed 
Pikuakh Nefesh? And if so, wouldn't any other form of Metzitzah, not 
B'Peh qualify?

Those who would argue that B'Peh introduces other forms of potential 
Sakanah still perform Metzitzah on Shabbos, and may find ironic that 
those who practice MBP do so on Shabbos because of Sofek PN.

Jacob Farkas


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Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2006 16:15:08 -0500
From: Jacob Farkas <jfarkas@compufar.com>
Subject:
Re: BOREI' PERI HAGAFEN


From: Steg Belsky <draqonfayir@juno.com>
> From the footnotes of SIDDUR EIZOR EILIYAHU, keminhag Ashkenaz (Polin)
>Hayashan, `al pi da`at haGR"A...
> BOREI' PERI HAGAFEN.
> With _qomatz_ -- so emended R' Shabtai Sofeir [5370s] (according to the
> rules of a sof-pasuq)...
> But in all the older siddurim before RSh"S it was vocalized _borei' peri
> hagEfen_ with a _segol_, like the nusahh of the Sefaradim until today...

The question still remains for those who end the B'rakha in a Segol 
whether they have a grammatical justification, as those who do K'minhag 
Sefarad.

I have great difficulty accepting that Amen is part of the B'rakha, and 
even if convinced that it is part of the B'rakha, why should we assume 
it to be in the same sentence, particularly when those not reciting the 
B'rakha are the ones who say Amen. Furthermore, if the purpose of the 
pausal form is to indicate the completion of the sentence, presumably 
for those listening, wouldn't it follow that HaGafen should be with a 
qomatz so those responding Amen would now know that the B'rakha has been 
completed?

Jacob


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Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2006 22:41:36 +0200
From: Marty Bluke <marty.bluke@gmail.com>
Subject:
Timtum Halev


R' Micha Berger wrote:
> What is timtum haleiv? How can it be anything but the effect of avirah on
> the self and still fit within the notion of "hakol biydei Shamayim chutz
> miyir'as Shamayim"?

The Shulchan Aruch in Yoreh Deah Siman 81 paskens that a Jewish baby is
allowed to have a non-Jewish wet nurse, however the Shulchan Aruch says
that you shouldn't do it because the non-kosher food will harm the baby
spiritually. Likewise the Rama there states that a Jewish woman who
needs to eat non-kosher food for health reasons should not nurse her
baby because the non-kosher food will harm him. The Gra comments that 1
of the sources of this din is the Medrash in Parshas Shemos. The pasuk
says they brought a nursing woman from the Jews, the Medrash brought
down by Rashi comments that Moshe refused to nurse from an Egyptian
woman because he was going to grow up and be a Navi so how could he eat
non-kosher food. In other words, the non-kosher food would have affected
his soul and made it impossible for him to be the Navi that he became.

We see from the above, that non-kosher is intrinsically harmful for a
person's soul even if they eat it b'heter.

The Ran in his Drashos says this explicitly. In the 11th drasha he
discusses why Halacha is decided by Chachamim and not Neviim. He asks
the following question. He says that if a Chacham makes a mistake and
permits a forbidden food it is like a doctor who makes a mistake and
gives a patient poison instead of medicine. In both cases the person is
harmed. If so, why don't we have Neviim decide halacha with nevua and
there would be no mistakes? He answers that nevua is not always available
(see the drasha for more details). He then explains that even though
eating non-kosher food is harmful the mitzva of listening to Chachamim
may counterbalance the harmful effects. In any case, we see clearly from
the Ran that non-kosher is objectively poison and harmful even if you
eat it b'heter.

The Abarbanel (Devarim 17,4) disagress with the Ran. He holds that
a person is never harmed by following the Chachamim. If it is mutar
then it cannot be harmful. It would seem that the Abarbanel holds that
non-kosher is not objectively harmful, rather it is harmful because it
is prohibited. If for you there is no prohibition then it is not harmful.

Rashi in Chullin(5a) seems to agree with the Abarbanel. The gemara there
is discussing whether a mumar l'avoda zara can do shechita. The gemara
tries to bring a proof from Eliyahu Hanavi. At 1 point Hashem tells
Eliyahu to go live by himself and the Orvim (birds) brought him meat to
eat from Achav's place and (almost)everyone in Achav's palace worshipped
Avoda Zara. How could Eliyahu eat the meat if meat slaughtered by a mumar
is not kosher? It must be that a mumar is allowed to slaughter. The Gemara
answers that al pid dibur shayni Rashi explains that Hashem permitted
him to eat non-kosher meat (a Navi is allowed to violate the Torah based
on his nevua). The obvious question is how could Eliyahu Hanavi eat
non-kosher food if it is spiritually harmful? It didn't seem to affect
him as he continued being a Navi. The answer would seem to be like the
Abarbanel that because he ate it b'heter it was not spiritually harmful.

In fact, the Ritva in Chullin as well as the Maharsha understand the
gemara's answer differently. They understand that the Gemara answered
that Eliyahu Hanavi knew b'nevua that the meat was kosher, that it had
been slaughtered by Ovadia who did not worship Avoda Zara. According to
them, Eliyahu Hanavi did not end up eating non-kosher food.

To sum up, we have a major dispute whether non-kosher food is objectively
harmful to a person (even if he eats it b'heter like a nursing baby)
or not.

R' Moshe (Orach Chaim 2:88) quotes a teshuva of the Chasam Sofer where
he discusses a handicapped girl in the following situation. If she
stayed at home she would never develop and remain an ayno bar daas.
However, if the parents sent her to a special school they claimed that
she would reach the potential of a 13-14 year old. However, the school
was in a non-Jewish area and there was no possibility of providing
kosher food. The Chassam Sofer said that al pi din it is muttar,
however he recommends against sending her for the following reason. If
they send her she will become a bar daas and be chayav in mitzvos.
However, the non-kosher food will affect her lev and she will probably
violate torah and mitzvos and therefore it is better for her to remain
an ayno bar daas.

We see clearly that this idea that any non-kosher food is metamtem
halev, even if eaten b'heter (the girl was a ketan and an ayno bar
daas so there was no issur), is brought down l'halacha.


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Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2006 17:15:20 -0500
From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
Subject:
Re: Timtum Halev


On Thu, Jan 12, 2006 at 10:41:36PM +0200, Marty Bluke wrote:
:> What is timtum haleiv? How can it be anything but the effect of avirah on
:> the self and still fit within the notion of "hakol biydei Shamayim chutz
:> miyir'as Shamayim"?

...
: To sum up, we have a major dispute whether non-kosher food is objectively
: harmful to a person (even if he eats it b'heter like a nursing baby)
: or not.
...

Nu? So do any of the opinions that hold simple peshat, that the food is
metamteim even when eaten beheter, address my question?

: R' Moshe (Orach Chaim 2:88) quotes a teshuva of the Chasam Sofer where
: he discusses a handicapped girl in the following situation.... If
: they send her she will become a bar daas and be chayav in mitzvos.
: However, the non-kosher food will affect her lev and she will probably
: violate torah and mitzvos and therefore it is better for her to remain
: an ayno bar daas.

Lo zachisi lehavin this teshuvah. Not being able to become a bar/s da'as
is a din piqu'ach nefesh. (As per teshuvos on abortion for a rape victim
being mutar mishum "hashkeim vehargo".) How can one place one's nefesh
in danger to avoid something that isn't even assur?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             I slept and dreamt that life was joy.
micha@aishdas.org        I awoke and found that life was duty.
http://www.aishdas.org   I worked and, behold -- duty is joy.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Rabindranath Tagore


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Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2006 00:54:19 +0200
From: Simon Montagu <simon.montagu@gmail.com>
Subject:
Re: Three steps forward


On 1/12/06, Steg Belsky <draqonfayir@juno.com> wrote beshem the
footnotes of SIDDUR EIZOR EILIYAHU, keminhag Ashkenaz (Polin)
> But in all the older siddurim before RSh"S it was vocalized _borei' peri
> hagEfen_ with a _segol_, like the nusahh of the Sefaradim until today
> (even though in Birkot Hashahhar it had _yadayim_, _`aved_, _gaver_ --
> all of them with _qomatz_, and more research is necessary).

Sefaradi siddurim also have yadayim, aved and gaver. As I understand it,
the difference is that these forms occur in the bible, but hagafen never
does (since hagefen never appears at the end of a verse or atnahh)


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Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2006 23:52:22 -0500
From: "S & R Coffer" <rivkyc@sympatico.ca>
Subject:
RE: Subject: RE: Xmax and Assimilation


On January 12, 2006, myb@yeshivanet.com wrote:
> R' Zvi Lampel wrote:
> <<<Where was it that I read that the right perspective of things would
> be that the children, in hakaros hatov to their parents for all they
> did to bring them into the world and raise them<>>>>

> Why? Wasn't the conclusion that noach lo l'adam SHELO nivro?...

Would you rather have not been created? And if not, then RZL's attitude
is adayin omedes bimkoma.

As far as the maamar Chazal you quote, pshat can't be the way you imply
because then Bais Shammai would be questioning Hashem's judgement. Pshat
is that if we were to consider our standing in the beria vis-a-vis the
likelihood of us being able to succeed in ruchnius, we would have to
say noach lo liadam shelo nivra because of the abundance of spiritual
pitfalls that exist and the nature of man in general. However, Hashem
knows better than us and he felt noach lo liadam li'hee'ba'ri'os. The
machlokes BS and BH was merely one of human perspective and the attending
attitude that would have to be engendered by this perspective. BS held
we should focus on the negative so that we will always be on guard and
BH felt we should focus on the positive etc.

Simcha Coffer


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Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2006 23:59:43 -0500
From: "Moshe & Ilana Sober" <sober@pathcom.com>
Subject:
veset kavua nowadays


RnSB:
>Sometimes the haflaga is more complex
>-- the haflaga isn't a single time but a period of, for example, always
>28-30 days (never earlier and never later) that can be determined by
>observation over a period of years.

RnCL:
>I was taught ....that certainly a range of dates did not qualify.

ReMA YD 184:2 says that if her period always falls within a 2-3 day
range, she needs to separate for the entire range. There are different
interpretations and a machloket haposkim about this, but some poskim
understand this as a requirement to keep the entire range as veset days
(Rav Forst explains this in vol 1, 408-413). However, that does not
mean this is a veset kavua. As RnCL points out, a veset kavua needs to
be much more specific - a precise date and onah, not a 3-day range.

OTOH, this woman can rely halachically on the fact that she NEVER
menstruates before day 28 - this is called a veset chatzi kavua. Again,
the original context of this discussion on Avodah was determining wedding
dates, so even if such a range does not qualify as a veset kavua, it can
enable a kallah to plan her wedding for a time when shi will be tehorah.

RnSB:
>She had a veset haflaga that was built of cycles of 30 days
>-- 26 days -- 30 days -- 26 days. We marked the calendar and saw that
>this repeated again and again and again.

This sort of thing would work for a veset hachodesh; it is called kova'at
veset b'toch veset. YD 189:32. A woman can be kova'at more than one veset
hachodesh (e.g., she menstruates twice a month, on the 1st and 20th.) She
can also be kova'at a veset haseirug (e.g., 1st of every other month -
189:9). She can do both these things at once, and menstruate the 15th
of Nisan, 20th of Iyar, 15th of Sivan, 20th of Tammuz, etc.

Rav Forst is pretty clear that this would NOT work for a veset haflagah,
as in RnSB's example - he explicitly rejects the possibility in ftnt
21, pp. 316-17. But RnSB was talking about relying on this consistency
to plan a wedding date, not for the halachot of vesatot, and that seems
reasonable enough.

 - Ilana


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Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2006 01:21:06 -0500
From: "S & R Coffer" <rivkyc@sympatico.ca>
Subject:
RE: citations & g'neivas da'as


On January 12, 2006, R' Micha Berger wrote:
> What is timtum haleiv? How can it be anything but the effect of avirah on
> the self and still fit within the notion of "hakol biydei Shamayim chutz
> miyir'as Shamayim"?
> So, I'd like to see this Ramban inerveinig.

Also, Rich, Joel wrote:
> Source for this chiluk?

He means to ask, what is my source for the chiluk I am making between the
timtum halev of chazir and the lack thereof as pertains to inadvertent
gineyvas daas.

I'll start with R' Micha. 

The concept of timtum halev (TH) is introduced by the Gemara in Yuma
39. The Gemara learns it from a pasuk associated with eating tarfus. This
is why TH is most often associated with ma'achalos assuros although
personally I believe TH is not necessarily limited to tarfus. Tarfus
just happens to be one of the worst kinds of TH because the issur is
physically assimilated by you and becomes a part of your body (Mesilas
Yesharim 13). Ramban discusses this issue too in Toras HaAdam.

As far as the definition of TH, it means the capacity of certain aveiros
to interfere with the ability of one's mind and heart to internalize
the chochmas haTorah (based on Rashi in Yuma).

As far as R' Micha's question of yiras shamayim, the answer the Ramban
gives (same place in Toras haAdam) is that all aveiros done bishogeg
have an element of mayzid to them because had the person been more
"chareid el divar Hashem" (my lashon :-), he would have made sure
that whatever he was doing was in line with the ratzon Hashem. Thus,
there is an element, even in an aveira bishogeg, of a lack of yiras
shamayim. However, in addition to this element, there is an intrinsic
timtum associated with certain aveiros such as tarfus. It's a spiritual
fact of life. However, if one is careful (i.e. yiras shamayim) he
will never have to be subjected to this additional element of timtum. I
remember reading a story about the Chofetz Chaim that he once ingested
some food that he subsequently considered questionable. Now, he already
had hanaas garon so technically the deed was already done. However,
he went to the bathroom and threw up the food because he didn't want it
to be assimilated into his body. I don't know if the story is true but
I think it is representative of valid halachic/hashkafic ideas.

Just to respond to RMB's last question before moving on to R' Joel,
the Ramban can be found in Toras haAdam, Shaar haGemul about three
or four pages in. If you have Shevel's copy, it is on page 270 (start
from the bottom of pg. 269 dibbur hamashcil v'od matzinu to obtain the
full flavour)

As far as R' Joel's question, here are my thoughts.

The issur of gineyvas daas is brought down in the Gemara in Chulin
94. The Gemara says that it is assur to send a thigh of an animal to a
nachri (as a present) that is cut open and looks like the gid hanasheh
was removed when in fact it was not removed. The reason is because the
nachri will assume that you are honouring him by sending him only food
fit to be eaten by Jews when in fact you are being gonev his daas.

Now, is their anything intrinsically wrong with any of the physical
actions this man has done? Is it assur to send presents to nachrim? Is it
assur for a Jew to have hana'ah from a gid hanasheh? (there's actually a
machlokes but the Tana in our mishna holds it is mutar) Is it assur for
a goy to eat the gid hanasheh? The answer is no to all of the above. What
makes this gift problematic is merely the intention of the sender, nothing
more. Gineyvas daas is not like gineyvas mamon. The issur of gineyvas daas
is an extension of the requirement to be echad bipeh v'echad bi'leiv (see
Rambam Hilchos Deos 2:7). It is only when a person's external actions
are in conflict with his internal motives that a person can possibly
be oiver gineyvas daas. Thus, I wish to propose that it is impossible,
by definition, to be oiver gineyvas daas inadvertently.

Simcha Coffer 


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Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2006 00:07:42 -0500
From: "Aryeh Englander" <iarwain1@earthlink.net>
Subject:
Miderech hatov l'heitiv


The Ramchal states in many places that the purpose of this world is so
that Hashem can be maitiv to others, which he further clarifies (Derech
Hashem 2:1) as being "mehaneh l'zulaso batov" - to provide "hana'ah" to
another being through goodness. The Ramchal also states in Da'as Tevunos
that the reason why Hashem wanted to be maitiv is because Hashem is tov,
and "miderech hatov l'haitiv" - it is the way of the good to be maitiv.

There are a lot of things to discuss on this, but I think it would
be most constructive to discuss them one at a time so the discussion
doesn't just get sidetracked into one point and ignore the others. So
first things first: One question that is often asked here is, if we're
saying that it is the derech of tov to do good and that is why Hashem
decided to be maitiv, then is that saying that there was a rule - miderech
hatov l'haitiv - that Hashem had no choice but to follow? I have heard
or thought of a few possible answers to this, but I would appreciate
discussion on them as well as suggestions for other possibilities:

1) "Miderech hatov l'heitiv" is a rule that is part of the essence of
Hashem, not separate from Him. And as the Ramchal explains, the essence
of Hashem is a single Unity, even if we cannot comprehend that or anything
else about the essence of Hashem.
2) Hashem decided that there should be such a rule, and then He decided
to apply it to Himself.
3) There is nothing wrong with certain "rules" being outside of Hashem,
as long as they have no real existence (an example would be the rules
of logic). [I don't know if I heard this or thought of it myself, but
it sounds like it might be kefirah or just philosophically untenable,
so please correct me if it is!]

I have a few questions on these answers, but I'd like to hear your
comments/questions first. Also, please try to keep this thread on topic,
so we can come to some sort of conclusion. If you want to respond to a
side point, please start another thread.

AL Englander


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