Avodah Mailing List

Volume 13 : Number 104

Wednesday, September 15 2004

• RE: Non-Literal explanations
• Admitting question is unanswered vs apologetics
• Re: Avodah V13 #101
• Re: Torah as Allegory
• Re: Torah as Allegory
• Re: Torah as Allegory
• Re: Torah as Allegory
• Re: Torah as Allegory
• Re: Torah as Allegory
• Re: Torah as Allegory
• Torah as Allegory
• Re: Torah as Allegory
• Re: Torah as Allegory
• Re: Torah as Allegory

Zoo Torah <zoorabbi@zootorah.com> wrote:
> R' Harry Maryles writes:
>>R. Nosson Slifkin's opinion is that Metzius trumps the lack of
>>corroborative Rishonim and that every time science concludes that
>>something is a fact and contradicts the Torah narrative, we have
>>permission to allegorize. But that, too, is problematic for me because
>>that can undermine belief in Judaism itself. According to RNS we can in
>>this way theoretically allegorize the entire narrative of the Torah.... I
>>[cannot] accept the approach that we can simply wash away any Torah
>>narrative that is challlenged by new scientific discovery, because of
>>the slippery slope argument of ultimately needing to allegorize the
>>entirety of the Torah narrative.

> I must disagree with this characterization of my position, and I must
> appeal once again for people to stop presuming my views; please cite my
> posts instead.

> I do not recall saying "every time" or "any Torah narrative" and I
> certainly do not believe that theoretically one can allegorize the
> entire narrative of the Torah, chas ve'shalom! 

I never said you, personally, did... although I can understand why
you are defensive. What I said, or at least what I meant, is that if
one accepts the thesis that when Metzius contradicts Torah narrative,
then Metzius wins... you ultimately have a problem.

IIRC your view is that Metzius is the trumpcard of the Mabul. If it works
for the Mabul it should work in any other instance. Otherwise Metzius
does not always trump narrative in which case you cannot say that Metzius
necessarily overrides a literal view of the Mabul either. Why there and
not somewhere else? IOW as a principle, reality either supercedes literal
narrative forcing allegory all the time, or it doesn't. If, OTOH you have
hard data contradicting a literal certain cases, the entire principle
falls apart.

HM

The issue of apologetic explanations - whose purpose is to destroy the
challenge to faith rather than to understand the issue - is problematic
in our times when it is fairly easy to find out that the explanation
is slipshod. Here are some classic sources which condemn explanations
which are perceived as false.

Berachos(4a): Both Moshe and Dovid knew the exact time of midnight.
Dovid needed the harp to wake him up and not to inform him of the time.
Moshe announced the redemption from Egypt at "about midnight" because he
was afraid that the Egyptian astrologers might make a mistake about the
time and accuse him of being a liar. This concern is expressed by the
saying: You should teach your tongue the habit of saying "I don't know"
so avoid being caught in a trap of your own words.

Maharal(Nesivos Olam 1 Nesiv Emes 2): The issue of training yourself to
say that you don't know is an example of the extreme degree one must go
in order to avoid the attribute of falsehood. Lies are disgusting as we
see the degree that Moshe went to avoid being perceived as lying. Even
though at the end it would be revealed to the Egyptian astrologers that
Moshe had been right, nevertheless it would have caused them to believe
for half an hour that Moshe was a liar....

R' S. R. Hirsch (Letter on Agada [from Light Magazine]): I wish to add
one more point - in my opinion an essential rule for every person who
teaches our holy Torah, whether Tanach or Halachah or Agadah. That is: Get
into the habit of saying, "I don't know. " It is not within a teacher's
power nor is it his obligation - to know everything and to resolve every
difficulty. Even Chazal left a number of matters unresolved, all the
more so lesser people like ourselves. Let us admit unashamedly before
our pupils, "This is something we do not know." We must be extremely
cautious not to create a forced explanation for a verse or a statement
in Agadah or a statement in the Talmud simply in order to cover our
ignorance. When we admit that we do not know, our pupils learn to humble
themselves before the wisdom of Chazal and all the more so before the
statements of G-d and the expressions of His holy spirit. They will
learn from us to regard Chazal upon a lofty pedestal and to sit in the
dust at their feet. Let them learn from us that there is nothing wrong
with our faith if we fail to understand everything Chazal said. Let
them learn from us to take great laborious pains to penetrate to the
depths of their words and to draw wisdom and understanding, knowledge
and mussor from their wellsprings using straight reasoning which may
hopefully be true or at least close to their intent. That, however,
which our intelligence can only understand by employing distortions -
let us leave that for minds greater than ours and not lay nonsense on
Chazal's doorstep. Every distorted explanation, which we instinctively
recognize as impossible to be true, perverts the pupils' thinking and
denigrates the glory of Chazal. It makes them arrogantly certain that
there is nothing they are incapable of understanding, leads them away
from the straightforward way of study, and teaches them our foolish
opinions instead of the wisdom of Chazal.

R' Shimon Schwab (Jewish Chronology): It is because of all these gnawing
doubts that I have decided to put a big question mark after the words
"Jewish Chronology." Let somebody with greater knowledge come and pick up
the threads where I left off. Our traditional, universally accepted Jewish
way of counting the years [from creation] is sacred territory which only
fools do not fear to tread upon. This may be a disappointment to some,
but on the other hand I muster the courage to belong to those who rather
wish to be honest to themselves than to be "right". I would rather leave a
good question open than risk giving a wrong answer...Just as I was awarded
for the research, so shall I be awarded for the retraction." The historic
material which I have assembled may still be somehow useful, even for
those who will doubt whether there can ever be a Jewish chronology which
would satisfy the non believer in the wisdom of our Sages...And to me
"from Creation" means what it meant to our fathers. It is as simple as
that. And while we may keep on searching for the answers, we pray that
Hashem may enlighten our eyes.

Daniel Eidensohn

On Mon, 13 Sep 2004, Jonathan Ostroff wrote:
> I asked Rabbi Sholom Kamenetsky Shlita whether his letter in the sefer
> could be taken as expressing agreement with Rabbi Slifkin's approach.

>> Thank you for the note. My name does appear in his book and a
>> careful reading of the haskomo will show that I gave no haskomo on the
>> content. What impressed me about the book is its science. The uninitiated
>> unlettered Jew often finds that the responses he gets when he questions
>> the seeming incompatibility between science and Torah (l'havdil) are
>> lacking. The science in the book is impressive, but I do not agree
>> with the positions he takes in the Torah. True, he has "unconventional"
>> sources that would lend some credibility to the theories he proposes, but
>> I see these as "suggestions" (based on somewhat spurious understandings
>> of unconventional sources) that are to allow the uninitiated to feel
>> that he can begin learning Torah, and see for himself that the issues
>> are irrelevant.

Am I the only one who doesn't have the vaguest idea what Rav Kamenetsky
means by this? How can it be considered irrelevant whether the Torah
is factually true or not? I don't know what kind of darga of learning
Rav Kamenetsky is talking about, but I can't see that there is any such
level at which one can transcend the rules of logic. Whether he likes
it or not, it remains at least a logical possibility that the Torah
is a man-made document containing false information, and to give no
answer whatsoever to the problems is to leave this logical possibility
as the only one. I got the impression when I read the haskomo itself
last year that he was taking this kind of condescending attitude, that
"B'nei Torah aren't supposed to think about this kind of stuff", and I
can't see how anyone intelligent can take this seriously.

> I agree
> with Rabbi Bechofer and there is no such thing as scientific evidence
> which is "incontrovertible".

I don't remember exactly what Rabbi Bechofer said about this, but in any
case, this seems to be a different approach, that of being skeptical of
the scientists, and it would seem to require at least some scientific
knowledge to use this approach. Does anyone know what (if any) scientific
background Rav Kamenetsky has?

Mlevinmd@aol.com wrote:
> I don't think that accepting something that there are arguments
> agaisnt is intellectually dishonest. Let's introduce teh concept of
> interetation to this discussion.

> It quite clear to every person who has lived a while that we never
> have all the facts. We always, always generalize from the partial
> infromation avalable to piece together a coherent picture based on
> out previous background, inclinations, patterns of thought and time
> available. It is not wrong to piece a story together based on
> partial evidence because a full picture of such complex subjects is
> never available. It is neither faith nor reason but a set of
> operational assumptions.

Operational assumptions? IOW you are saying that since we do not have
all the facts let us use what we have to try and determine the Truth. I
think that is precisely what science does.

One can counter, however, that w/o all having all the facts we may
never know the Truth so why bother with facts at all? Let us just rely
on our Mesorah for the Truth. Well, that indeed is a Mehalech and a
very propular one at that. It is a basis for saying that the universe
was created to look old and that all Torah narrative should be taken
literally. I have no problem with such a view as a legitimate one
for Torah Judaism. But for those of us who look at accumulated data
that... as it is accumulated tends to increasingly steer us away from
literal interpretation, it becomes increasingly difficult to take this
approach. We live our entire modern day lives based on the "assumtions"
of science as it accumulates data, interpret it, and refine the knowledge
through continuous accumulation and analysis of data.

Science may not have ALL the facts but it has enough to formulate
assumptions about the past, and the future. Can one imagine what present
day life would be like without the advance of science and technology? Were
scientists for example to say let us not make the internal combustion
engine because we do not have all the scientific facts to know for a
certainty that it will work, we would still be in the horse and buggy era.

The same is true for the study of accumulated data that tends to
contradict Torah narratives. What is credible in the laboratory in
terms of modern day scientific advances in all fields should be given
the same degree of credibilty in terms of theories about literal versus
allegorical interpretations. And in certain cases, as scientific facts
continue contradicting literal interpretaions of Torah narrative it
becomes increasingly difficult to accept the literal interpretations.

HM

[In reply to the previous email, I think. -mi]

That is not quite what I wrote. What you consider ascertainment of fact
I see as an act of interpretation. IOW, we never have all the facts. We
are beset and surrounded by contradictions and attempts at resolutions.
We filter the information that assails us from all sides to construct
some kind of a coherent picture of reality. It is therefore false to
ask that we not use the same process in considering scientific arguments
that we use in daily life.

Science itself does claim a special status for what its proponents
termed "fact', as opposed to theory or hypothesis. Outside of science,
scientific claims have no more special status than other facts. We
have contradictions all around u. There are contradictions between
culture, religion, sentiment, science, intuition, etc,etc. All of
tehma re authoritative and compelling. To choose to weigh some of the
contradictory information more heavily in order to create a particular
picture of reality is not, in essence, different than weighing other
facts heavier to construct a diffferent sense of reality.

If you believe in Torah and weigh some scientific facts lower or you
believe in materialism and weigh evidence of spirituality lower is a
matter of choice how to process information. Categories of belief versus
reason are archaic in our tiem and place; what matters is how you choose
to order your reasoning. This preserves the freedom of choice and solves
the kind of conundrums that we constantly run into here on avodah. This
is essentially a restatement of a Fideistic position.

M.Levin

MlMlevinmdoaolom wrote:
>  What you consider ascertainment of
> fact I see as an act of interpretation.

I guess we need to define terms. If we don't get too far afield in the
metaphysical, facts are things that are known with certainty that have
been objectively verified. They are things that have been dedemonstratedo
have real and indisputable existence. As such one cannot ascertain a
fact through interpretation. Interpretation of facts is not the same as
facts. One can only use facts to interpret the nature of reality. When I
speak of scientific fact, I define it these very concrete terms. If one
wants to delve into the metaphysical one can dispute the very nature of
what is fact and what isn't. But if you limit the term to the physical
nature of the universe the above definition stands.

> IOIOWwe never have all the
> facts. We are beset and surrounded by contradictions and attempts
> at resolutions.  We filter the information that assails us from all
> sides to construct some kind of a coherent picture of reality.

Agreed.

> It
> is therefore false to ask that we not use the same process in
> considering scientific arguments that we use in daily life.

I do not give scientific arguments any more credence than any other
building block of my beliefs.

> Science itself does claim a special status for what its proponents
> termed "fact', as opposed to theory or hypothesis. Outside of
> science, scientific claims have no more special status than other
> facts. 

This is where I believe you are wrong. Facts as defined above DO have
special status in all areas as defined above. It is fact that determines
theory. It is fact that scientists use to make an argument. The argument
itself may be dedebatableut the fact is not. The theory itself can be
debated but facts cannot be debated by anyone... by definition.

> We have contradictions all around u. There are
> contradictions between culture, religion, sentiment, science,
> intuition, etc,etc. All of tetehmae authoritative and compelling.

No not all. We need to weight everything properly in accordance with
our perception, conceptualizations, rational thinking, and our beliefs.

> To choose to weigh some of the contradictory information more
> heavily in order to create a particular picture of reality is not,
> in essence, different than weighing other facts heavier to
> construct a didiffferentense of reality.

There-in lies the problem.

> If you believe in Torah and weigh some scientific facts lower or
> you believe in materialism and weigh evidence of spirituality lower
> is a matter of choice how to process information. Categories of
> belief versus reason are archaic in our titiemnd place; what
> matters is how you choose to order your reasoning. This preserves
> the freedom of choice and solves the kind of conundrums that we
> constantly run into here on avavodahThis is essentially a
> restatement of a FiFideisticosition.

I don't think it is a question of choosing how much weight to give one
parameter over another. Facts are in a category all by themselves. It
is impossible for me to deny a prprovenact. Can You? If someone told you
not to believe that the sun rises on the east, would you stop believing
that it does? Who knows, maybe we do not have all the information about
the sun yet. Maybe it's all an optical illusion. But I dare say with
factual certainty that you bebelieve'B'EmunahhShleimahat the sun rises
in the east. It is indisputable.

Belief may in fact be a srstrongernfluence on an individual than fact,
but that does not take one iota away from the ininviolabilityf a
prprovenact. Personally, I cannot ignore a fact.

If science provides a fact that disputes a literal ininterpretationf
a narrative in the Torah, would you deny it, or would you wonder about
whether you could now interpret the narrative allegorically?

This is my didilemmaI have not encountered such facts yet. But the
question remains and the current HaHashkaficcacceptabilityf a 15 billion
year old universe underscores my didilemmas it shows that when facts
come in conflict, alallegorizationuch as not considering the "days"
of creation literal days, is permissible.

HM

RDR quoted me (MYG):
>> To which I respond: Eino inyan - the Rambam is talking about an 
>> inadvertant lack of seichel in the context of doing aveiros. We are 
>> talking about an overt constraining of seichel in the service of doing
>> mitzvos.

To which he (RDR) responded:
> No the Rambam is not talking about mitzvos or aveiros. He is talking
> very specifically about abusing one's intellect, and deliberately choosing
> to believe something one suspects is false falls into that category.

Here is my (not word-for-word literal, but nevertheless (in my opinion)
correct) translation of the Rambam that RDR cites (PHM Chagiga 2:1, S.V.
V'rasoy (in MHK's edition - v'ro'oy in other's) lo, and s.v. Kol she'lo
chas):

And it would be appropriate to him as if he had not come to this world:
The explanation is: It would have been better for the universe had he
been another species and not a man, because he wants to know something
which does not accord with his way of life or nature. Because, only
a fool in the ways of the universe will envision, "What's above?" or,
"What's below?" When a person who is empty of all knowledge wants to
understand - in order to know what is above the heaven, and what is
below the earth - with his flawed imagination (that imagines them as
two floors of a house), or what was before heaven was created and what
will be after it is removed, it will certainly bring him to insanity and
desolation. Delve into the wondrous statement that was said with G-dly
assistance, "Anyone who is not protective of the honor of his creator,"
(from the mishna - MYG) which means one who was not protective of his
thoughts (MYG - the word used is sichlo, which connotates thinking. Can
anyone think of a better translation?) because thoughts are honor to
G-d. And since he doesn't know the worth of this that was given to him
(i.e. the ability to think - MYG) he is at the mercy of his temptations
(ta'avos - MYG) and becomes like an animal. This is what they meant
by saying, (in the gemara - MYG) "What is meant by 'Anyone who is
not protective of the honor of his creator?' This refers to one who
transgresses privately." Additionally, they said in a different place,
"Fornicators don't sin until a spirit of stupidity enters them." And this
is true - for at the time of the temptation (whatever temptation it may
be) - the thought process (seichel - MYG) is not complete... (The rest
of the piece discusses why this topic is discussed in this mishna - MYG.)

I stand by my contention that the Rambam is, "talking about an inadvertant
lack of seichel in the context of doing aveiros." I'll add now that he is
also talking about coming to false beliefs as a result of flawed seichel
- not about coming to TRUE beliefs through flawed seichel, or choosing
to continue believing those things although one now has an awareness of
the flaws inherent in their proofs.

RDR continued:
> I have a more general comment. I have met a few followers of Rabbi
> Miller, and one thing they have in common is a tendency towards humra.
> That is, given a halachic issue they will try to follow all opinions, or,
> if that is impossible, will pick a more difficult position. You in your
> post advocate picking a position you suspect to be incorrect becuase it
> is easier to do. Do you really think Rabbi Miller would have done that?

I certainly don't know very many disciples/followers of R' Miller, and
I don't think I know any well. My connection with R' Miller was simply
that I read most of his books in my pre- and early teen years. I credit
him with being a major force in my spiritual life, to the degree that I
felt obligated to attend his levaya. Therefore, I can't generalize about
his followers, and I suspect that WADR you shouldn't either. (That's not
to say your contention is incorrect - can anyone else enlighten us?) I,
certainly am not described by your statement. In fact, from what I
understand, R' Miller was a big believer in listening to one's Rov,
and belongng to a kehilla, so it seems to me that you may have been
influenced by too small of a sample group.

As far as your characterization of me as, "Picking a position you suspect
to be incorrect becuase it is easier to do," I must say that I said,
"On the other hand, it is so much easier to deal with RAMM than it
is to deal with the religioscientific establishment's mehalech, they
will continue to believe in RAMM." If you are referring to that quote,
I believe you are taking it out of context. Please reread sections III
and IV of my original post, and please see the commentary that I've been
writing on my original post :-) in my last few posts.

As to what R' Miller would have done - I can't tell you. However, I can
assure you that never in 16 billion years would R' Avigdor Miller have
agreed to RNS.

I want to throw a question back at you, and our fellow Avodites: In
the mishna you quoted (Chagiga 2:1) the mishna places restrictions on
studying Ma'ase Be'raishis in public. What are we doing, if not that?

K'siva v'chasima tova,
Moshe Yehuda Gluck
mslatfatf@access4less.net  

RDE wrote:
> I don't understand your chidush. If a person's emuna is not based on
> the proofs and he keeps his emuna after the proofs have been seriously
> questioned I see no problem. As I stated previously - not everyone's
> emuna is based on proofs. In fact the Seridei Aish in his hesped for
> the Alter of Slabodka asserts that the emuna of the tzadikim is based
> upon intuition and not proofs.

Then we agree! 

RDE wrote:
> However if the emuna is based on these proofs and he now finds the
> proofs unsatisfactory - why shouldn't be bothered?  It sounds like
> someone who wants to deny reality as he understands it because he is
> concerned with having to alter his world. I would not label what he has
> as emuna - but rather fear of loss.

I understand what you are saying, but I disagree with your analysis.

K'siva v'chasima tova,
Moshe Yehuda Gluck
mslatfatf@access4less.net

In Avodah V13 #103 dated 9/14/2004 RJR writes:
>> ... what would you rather your teachers offered you -  happiness and
>> kiyum hatorah, or honesty and the possibility of p'rikas  oyl? [--R' Moshe 
>Yehuda Gluck]

> .... I can't
> conceive of a world  where HKB"H would allow lack of honesty to yield a
> better result than  honesty. 

Certainly HKBH allows a world to function in which darkness and light,
truth and falsehood, aveira and mitzva, are commingled in a confusing
fashion. That IS the world we live in. For example, a person who is not
frum at all may be "mekareved" by someone who tells him that Moshiach has
come already. That person may become frum based on this mistaken belief,
and may then proceed to do numerous mitzvos that he did not do previously.
Maaseh bechol yom.

I won't say that honesty wouldn't have worked even BETTER in mekareving
this individual, but lack of honesty did and does "work" as well, if by
"work" we mean--it inspires a person to become frum.

At one time I feared that people who had been mekareved this way would
fall out of frum life again when they discovered that Moshiach had
not come after all, that they had been misled. But in fact, I have yet
to meet anyone who stopped being frum for this reason. It seems to me
that the mekarevers do get tremendous zechus for their kiruv work even
if part of what they taught was dishonest or to be more charitable,
was mistaken.

KVCT
 -Toby  Katz
=============

Harry Maryles wrote:
>If Rav Sternbuch said in any context that the traditional Jewish position
>did not need to be defended against science than I submit he doesn't
>understand the nature of science. 

Rav Yosef Ber Soloveitich - who without a doubt understood science -
held the same position as Rav Sternbuch. [As the Seridei Aish stated
- the big people do not base their emuna on empirical evidence or
philosophic proofs.]

Sources:

1) Rav Shurkin told me

2) Van Leer Jerusalem Institute - Seminar on Rabbi
Soloveitchik's Influence on Culture, Education and Jewish Thought
<http://www.vanleer.org.il/conf/0312_soloveitchik/Main.htm>

His daughter's presentation at the end

3)

Rav Yosef Ber Soloveitchik[1] (The Halakhic Mind p118 note 58)
concluded: ... the problem of evidence in religion will never be solved.
The believer does not miss philosophic legitimation; the skeptic will
never be satisfied with any cognitive demonstration. This ticklish problem
became the Gordian knot of many theological endeavors. Philosophers of
religion would have achieved more had they dedicated themselves to the
task of interpreting concrete reality in terms and concepts that fit
into the framework of a religious world perspective.

Rav Yosef Ber Soloveitchik[2](Lonely Man of Faith): I have not been
perplexed by the impossibility of fitting the mystery of revelation into
the framework of historical empiricism. Moreover, I have not even been
troubled by the theories of Biblical criticism which contradict the very
foundations upon which the sanctity and integrity of Scriptures rest.

Daniel Eidensohn
Kesiva v'chasima tova

On  Mon, 13 Sep 2004 11:51:40 +0200 Daniel Eidensohn <yadmoshe@012.net.il>
Wrote:
                            .  .  .
>I think there are a number of approaches that are legitimate within the
>committed Orthodox world. 1) Totally accepting the mesora as it has
>always been understood and rejecting out of hand any outside sources
>which conflict. This was clearly the approach of Rav Soloveitchik
>who viewed it as ridiculus to even be bothered by the questions. 2)
>Being aware of outside sources and attempting to reconcile them to the
>degree possible without distorting either and living with the tension
>of not reaching a resolution - Rav Schwab. 3) Acknowledging that there
>are times when something has to give and broadly rejectioning of the
>validity of empircal based evidence. 4) Accepting the existence of
>empircal based reality and reinterpreting the traditional sources - as
>long as it doesn't undermine the validity of the Torah or impact halacha
>(Delicate judgment call which requires broad shoulders).

My netiah is towards 2 as I shall explain.

IIUC the Rambam's opinion is that there can not be an argument on any
principles of the mesorah and if there is a machloket among the baalei
meshorah such is a proof that those particulars of the issue under debate
are not part of the mesorah and are open to analysis. Given the areas of
disagreement among Chazal as to particulars of haskafah, notwithstanding
that a significant majority might tend towards a particular opinion,
there is still much possible theoretical leeway.

So someone can then take choice 2 above on many issues: that it is
possible that the current secular scholarship is correct but if so it
such would still accord with an opinion of among some of chazal, albeit
a minority opinion. However, secular scholarship is not conclusive of
anything. The tension of not having a certain answer to some problem
means that we must learn to live with our intellectual imperfection.

KT
Eliyahu

On Tue, Sep 14, 2004 at 08:32:44PM -0400, Allen Gerstl wrote:
: IIUC the Rambam's opinion is that there can not be an argument on any
: principles of the mesorah and if there is a machloket among the baalei
: meshorah such is a proof that those particulars of the issue under debate
: are not part of the mesorah and are open to analysis....
: So someone can then take choice 2 above on many issues: that it is
: possible that the current secular scholarship is correct but if so it
: such would still accord with an opinion of among some of chazal, albeit
: a minority opinion. However, secular scholarship is not conclusive of
: anything. The tension of not having a certain answer to some problem
: means that we must learn to live with our intellectual imperfection.

I've read so far in this thread someone write that the Rambam would
not allow allegorization on any issue, and someone else write that the
Rambam would allow it on any issue where secular scholarship's argument
is compelling.

Finally! Someone else who understands the Rambam as I did. And explained
it so much better than I did, as well.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org        you don't chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org   You light a candle.
Fax: (270) 514-1507        - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

Daniel EiEidensohnyayadmoshe12.net.ililwrote:
>> If RaRavtSternbuchaid in any context that the traditional Jewish position
>> did not need to be defended against science than I submit he doesn't
>> understand the nature of science. 

> RaRavoYosefer SoSoloveitich who without a doubt understood science - 
> held the same position as RaRavtSternbuch [As the SeSerideiiAish stated - 
> the big people do not base their ememunan empirical evidence or 
> philosophic proofs.]

I have absolutely no problem with that concept. Belief is not
dedependent on scientific fact. However if scientific fact
corroborates a belief it enhances that belief. By the same token if
it contradicts a belief it helps to undermine it. As you stated in a
previous post, belief can be based on various different factors such
as trust in one's foforbears that they were not lying when they were
transmitting Mesorah...or intuitiveness ...or respect of individuals
of great stature who transmit these beliefs to you. 

The point I was trying to make is that science by it's very nature
cannot contradict Torah.  That obviates R. Sternbuch'statement about
the traditional Jewish position not needing to be defended against
science. It is a non starter. The only thing that could contradict
the traditional Jewish position is the atheistic scientist's attempt
to discredit religion by misusing facts or misinterpreting them.

> RavoYosef Ber Soloveitchik] (The Halakhic mind p118 note 58) 
> concluded: ... the problem of evidence in religion will never be
> solved. 

This is in essence the same position as Stephen J Gould's.

> The believer does not miss philosophic legitimation; the skeptic will 
> never be satisfied with any cognitive demonstration. 

I spoke not of philosophic legitimation. I spoke of belief and fact.
Man is both the "believer" who deals in belief... and the "scientist"
who deals in facts. AIUI RYBS held that cognitive man as rerepresentedy
the scientist, and the believer (which he terms homo-rereligiosus.. are
to be synthesized into a HaHalachican. In RYBS'siew there is no need and
Halachic Man has no desire to speculate about anything other than "What"
the physical world is, and "How" to interact with it. His answer is to
become a Halachic Man... to accurately distill the truth of nature and to
utilize the dictates of the Torah in order to properly interact with it.

> RavoYosef Ber Soloveitchik](Lonely Man of Faith): I have not been
> perplexed by the impossibility of fitting the mystery of revelation into 
> the framework of historical empiricism. 

Well, I have... and still am.

> Moreover, I have not even been 
> troubled by the theories of Biblical criticism which contradict the very 
> foundations upon which the sanctity and integrity of Scriptures
> rest.

Biblical crcriticisms a problem for anyone who coconsidersimself
a believer in Torah MiSinaiTo give any credence to it can undermine
Judaism itself and consider it as a made up religion (in Bavel

RYBS is the ultimate believer, himself. If I had to guess I would say
that RYBS had no problem at all with contradictions between science and
Torah narrative and probably took the more liliteralistpproach. I know
that RAS certainly did. He believed that the geGemmarahas never wrong
even in matters of science. I do not have that view.

HM

From: "MYG" <mslatfatf@access4less.net>
> "Anyone who is not protective of the honor of his creator,"
> (from the mishna - MYG) which means one who was not protective of his
> thoughts (MYG - the word used is sichlo, which connotates thinking. Can
> anyone think of a better translation?)

The usual translation is "intellect"

> I stand by my contention that the Rambam is, "talking about an
> inadvertant lack of seichel in the context of doing aveiros."

You have made the error (surprising in a Talmudist) of confusing a
din with the motivation for the din. The prohibition in the Mishnah is
abusing one's intellect. The reasons for the prohibition may be to reduce
your chance of doing aveiros or aquiring false beliefs. Nonetheless the
prohibition, as formulated by the Mishna and explained by the Rambam,
does not qualify itself by context: it is a prohibition of the "slippery
slope" type: don't abuse your intellect, since abuse of the intellect
may lead to ....

> As far as your characterization of me as, "Picking a position you
> suspect to be incorrect becuase it is easier to do," I must say that I
> said, "On the other hand, it is so much easier to deal with RAMM than it
> is to deal with the religioscientific establishment's mehalech, they
> will continue to believe in RAMM."

I was referring to two other passages, e.g., "Does it matter if my
beliefs are based upon erroneous foundations? The Torah requires me to
believe; I do. I personally am not bothered by these questions - because
I want to believe!". You have since explained that they were imprecisely
formulated, so I'm not bothered nearly so much now - - at first I though
you claimed to have adopted beliefs you knew were probably wrong, now I
understand you to have adopted beliefs you cannot justify to outsiders
(i.e., scientists).
  I am puzzled, however, why you need any arguments at all? Why not say
"What Hazal said is good enough for me," and avoid any argument rather
than adopt one you suspect of being erronous?

> I want to throw a question back at you, and our fellow Avodites: In the
> mishna you quoted (Chagiga 2:1) the mishna places restrictions on
> studying Ma'ase Be'raishis in public. What are we doing, if not that?

See Yerushalmi ad. loc., cited l'halacha in Rabbi Kaplan's "B'Ikvuth
HaYirah" pp 27-28.

> K'siva v'chasima tova,

Ditto,
David Riceman

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