Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 114

Tuesday, March 9 2004

• Sending water for Mishloach Monos?
• Havdala before/after Maariv
• Re: omek pshuto shel mikra
• Matanos l'evyonim
• Re: havdala for women on motzei shabbos purim
• Re: purim questions
• purim questions
• Re: purim questions
• Re: Toras Purim 5764: DAR-DAR, noch a kneitch
• MIshna Brura and Meiri
• kedushah
• Re: Essay - parshat zakhor from R Klapper
• Re: omek pshuto shel mikra
• Re: Learning as much as possible
• Re: G-d's existence
• Re: MIshna Brura and Meiri
• Re: MIshna Brura and Meiri
• Re: MIshna Brura and Meiri
• Re: purim questions
• Re: G-d's existence
• Re: Essay - parshat zakhor from R Klapper

Going through the piles of Mishloach Manos received yesterday, I noticed
a small bottle of spring [or filtered] water.

Do any of the poskim speak of the possibility of being mekayem the Mitzva
of MM with water? And if not, would a fancyly packaged bottle count more
than water from the tap?

SBA

On Shabbos, someone told me that it is the general minhag (that might
not have been his exact words) not to make Havdala Al HaKos until after
davening Maariv. This surprised me, and I'd like to know if anyone has
any has any citations which might support or argue against this.

Of course, this *is* the way we do it, but for purely practical reasons,
especially in areas which are not privileged to have a minyan factory
where one might daven maariv at any of several times. Other communities
generally have a minyan immediately as Shabbos ends, and that's it.

One example where this would be a practical question happened to me a
couple of years ago, I was moderately ill, and confined to bed for most
of Shabbos. I davened mincha on Shabbos afternoon b'y'chidus, and took
a nap. I woke up shortly after Shabbos, and was faced with a choice:
Should I first make havdala for my family so that they get on with their
activities, or should I daven maariv first? I could not think of any
reason to make them wait for havdala, and in fact I felt that if they've
already said "Baruch Hamavdil" and are doing melacha, then it would be
better for them to be *totally* yotzay on Havdala before they continue
to do any more melacha.

I looked in Vol. 2 of the Shmiras Shabbos K'Hilchasa, and could not find
anything which addresses this question directly, though there are two
indirect references:

(1) In 58:9, he writes that *if* one said Havdala Al HaKos or Baruch
HaMavdil prior to davening maariv, he still has to include Ata Chonantanu
in the Shmoneh Esreh.

(2) In 60:25, he writes that if ones Seudah Shlishis stretches past
Tzeis, he can say Havdalah Al Hakos during the meal. He adds two points
that sound a bit contradictory - one, that this can be done "even
l'chatchilah", and two, that this should be done only "l'ays hatzorech"
because it will force him to omit "Retzeh" from Birkas HaMazon.

In either of those cases, the SSK could have mentioned that these acts
are to be avoided because he has not yet davened Maariv. But I could
not find any such reference. Given the great detail with which the SSK
goes into these matter, I'm led to suspect that no *published* source
suggests that there's any such problem. Thus, I'm asking the chevrah
whether there might be any *mimetic* source, or possibly a published
source or svara that the SSK omitted.

Akiva Miller

Back in Avodah #94, RMLevin posted on his disagreement with the academic
differentiation between pshat and drash, and claimed that "there truly is
a Semitic way of experiencing the world. Jews perceive the world as coming
out of the word of Hashem and, therefore, full of complexities and shading
and echoes. To a Greek and also a Westerner, the Logos gave birth to the
world of sight. We aim to understand by seeing, unambigously. Therefore,
the text is either what it says or an allegory. We, in contrast, see
different ways of interpreting as co-existent".

My reaction:
While this view really exists among Jewish authorities, and while it, in
some way, does underly a Jewish slant of metaphysics, I fail to see what
important role it plays among the leading commentators in understanding
the biblical text.

Take Ramban, for example. He often rejects an interpretation (Rashi,
Rambam, Ibn Ezra or even 'Hazal) because of a conviction that the pshat
is different (whatever that may be). Note that he doesn't say that he
has an additional interpretation (actually, he does sometimes say that,
but more often than not he rejects something), but rejects something
offered by an earlier authority.

How do you explain that if there is *no* Jewish notion of an objective
reading of a text (although we may disagree what that objective notion
is)?

Arie Folger
-- 
If an important person, out of humility, does not want to rely on [the Law, as 
applicable to his case], let him behave as an ascetic. However, permission 
was not granted to record this in a book, to rule this way for the future 
generations, and to be stringent of one's own accord, unless he shall bring 
clear proofs from the Talmud [to support his argument].
	paraphrase of Rabbi Asher ben Ye'hiel, as quoted by Rabbi Yoel
	Sirkis, Ba'h, Yoreh De'ah 187:9, s.v. Umah shekatav.

Reb Aryeh Stein wrote:
> As for matanos l'evyonim, you have the same problem - when you give
> the money (on Purim morning) to the people making the collections,
> you also don't know when your money will actually be given to the
> ani

IIRC, from the Gemara in Bava Metzia 11, it appears that one is mekayem
the chiyuv of giving maaser oni from the time that one gives the maaser
to a gabai tzedoko (in that case, IIRC, Rabbi Akiva), not when the oni
actually receives the maaser. In that case, Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Akiva
were on board a ship, where presumably there were no oni'im at hand.
However, perhaps with respect to matanos l'evyonim, the mitzva is only
fulfilled when the oni actually receives the matana.

Kol tuv,
Dov Kay

At my shul, we all went home to say havdalah and then returned for
Megillah. I asked my rav about this and he said that havdalah was
tadir. Although I'm not sure why this makes sense, given siman 687 in
Orach Chaim. But it was extremely convenient in other ways also, including
taking children and their paraphernalia to shul after Shabbos was over.

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

Saul Newman wrote:
>1- what determines yerushalayim for shushan purim
>purposes? municiple boundaries? if new shchunot are
>added they get the same halacha? if it urban-sprawled
>out to suburbs, would they take on the halacha by
>contiguity?

Big machlokes. The general rule is "samuch ve-nireh" but exactly how to
apply it is unclear. Some apply a general radius, others a "can you see
the walls" test, etc. R' Tzvi Pesach Frank discusses this in his Mikra'ei
Kodesh as do many others. IIRC, the middle of Har Nof falls under one
of the boundaries and many of its residents fall under a safek. I'm not
sure what people there do.

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

From: "Carl and Adina Sherer" sherer@actcom.co.il
<<IIRC, Lifneihem - Bifneihem is repeated, but be'omram - ke'omram is
ksiv u'kri. You omitted l'hashmid (v)'la'harog ul'abeid. Ask me these
questions after I read the Megillah (for my wife) tonight :-)>>

Correct, at least the way I was taught and do.

<<I think that everyone here is noheig the whole pasuk, although yesterday
the ba'al korei only repeated the phrase timche es zeicher/zecher
Amaleik.>>

Fairly widespread in yeshivos here, as well, repeating the entire pasuk.

Gershon <gershon.dubin@juno.com>

Newman,Saul Z" <Saul.Z.Newman@kp.org> wrote :
>2- looking to find a list of all the psuking that there are minhagim to
>repeat phrases-- lifnehem-bifnehem, be'omram-k'omram . i saw in a sefer
>sorer-shorer but have never heard that done 

>3-- in regard to these repeats i have seen in practice 3 customs -
>just the word, a whole phrase repeated [v ish lo amd lifneihem], and
>the whole pasuk ...

If you are researching these so-called "repeats" it is very important
to get hold of Rav Mordechai Breuer's articles on the subject. R Breuer
is probably the Talmid Chacham in our generation who is most expert in
questions of Massora and Nusch of the Tanach. He traces the "origin and
development" of this "minhag" which he feels in error. And it is mainly
due to the "error filed" Second Mikra'ot Gedolot edited by Yaacov ben
Hayyim ibn Adoniyahu. He points out the the authoratative tanachim/codexes
are clear here . See also the Minhat Shai, who is the major source that
Achronim pasken like in questions of Nusach. I cannot locate Breuer's
article that he devoted to this subject, but he also mentions it in "keter
Aram Tzova VeHanusah Hamekubal shel HaMikra" in the introduction. I will
quote from the English translation of his Introduction: the whole book
is in Hebrew and has not been translated as far as I know. (I will not
try and transliterate even though Rav Breuer's Hebrew is better than the
translation's English - because various list-members will jump down my
throat for faulty transliteration).

"There is no doubt that these two terms are incorrect. They have no
source other than the wrong edition of Jacob benHayyim. Moreover, for
one of them, (laharog) MInhat Shai also decided unequivocally against
the wrong orthography. For the other (bifneihem) too, Minhat Shai hinted
that the orthography does not follow the Masorah... The superiority of the
traditions of other communities is ...seen...The entire custom is unknown
- both among the Sefardic community and among the Yemenites. The scribe
just writes the version which coincides with the Masorah (ve'laharog,
lifneihem) and that is the only version the reader has. " ad kan leshon
Rav Breuer.

lifneihem and ve'laharog are the correct readings: The following are
proofs from the Massora as I can find them without having Breuers article
in front of me.

for ve'laharog: (Esther 8:11) in the final Massora maarechet ot "vav"
number 31 there is a list of 62 pairs of words both of which begin
with a vav and the pair never recurs: "velaharog u'leabeid" is one
of them. So the reading is ve'laharog. The final Massora maarechet ot
"lamed" number 12 is a list of 118 words which appear only once in the
tanach and begin with vav lamed - this list includes "ve'laharog" in
the pasuk "asher natan hamelech" - our pasuk, so the reading according
to the Massora is ve'laharog.

proofs for lifneihem (Esther 9:2) in the mesora ktana of the Keter on
Yehoshua 21:42 the word bifneihem is marked as occuring two times, also in
Yehezkel 6:9 the word bifneihem is likewise marked in another important
codex (leningrad) . This means that there are only two occurances of
"bif'neihem" , as you could also see from your friendly neighborhood
Concordance, so there is no such third occurance of bifneihem in Esther
9. So Esther 9 is lifneihem.

Dov A Bloom
dovb@netvision.net.il

From: "Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" rygb@aishdas.org
> There are two big letters in the Megilla

Check the aseres benei Haman
Gershon

In hilchot purim the mishna brura (in the shaar hatziyun) cites the Meiri.
Given the known position of the CI about the authority of recently
found rishonim, with the Meiri being a prime example, and the CI's known
respect for the Mishna brura, the following question:

1) How often does the mishna brura cite the meiri? Is this the only place.
2) is the meiri cited one of the previously known (eg, from shitta
mekubetzet), or when was it republished so that the chofetz chaim could
cite it?

Meir Shinnar

RADK:
>Maimonides understands the disjunction between Eden and tov/ra along
>something resembling the following lines; Tov/Ra are not abstractions,
>but relate to particular situations. In other words, ...

>Kedushah, by contrast, can be understood as a purely abstract quality that
>inheres in objects or persons regardless of their context. The kedushah
>of kohanim, for example, is independent of their actions generally,
>and never dependent on their ethics. Kedushah-centered commandments,
>i.e. commandments whose telos is the maximization of kedushah in this
>world, must seek to replace the non-kadosh elements of this world with
>new kadosh elements rather than raising the kedushah level of the
>existing elements.

A big assignment to try to pin down the meaning of "kedusha". Maimonides
in Yad has a sefer "Kedushah". There he has three sections of halachos:
ofrbidden relations, forbidden foods and laws of shechita. It seems that
the Rambam sees that kedusha relates to people's actions in particular
situations in the real world. This seems to be the exact opposite of
what was proposed. In this it seems I agree with the rebbetzin as quoted.

Kol tuv,
Shlomo Goldstein

R' Klapper builds an axiology based upon two independent values: tov
and qedushah.

Unlike RSG, I am not bothered by the difficulty in defining qedushah.
Perhaps it's choq. (I don't think it is,see below. But it wouldn't bother
me to learn that qedushah is transrational.)

However, RADK makes Euthyphro's dilemma intractable. In one of his
dialogues, Plato has Socrates show Euthyphro (a newbie who only appears
in this one dialogue) that he really had no idea what piety is. The
dilemma reads: "Is what is righteous righteous because the gods love it,
or do the gods love it because it is righteous?"

The Jewish spin would be to ask whether an act is good because HKBH
commanded it, or is it a mitzvah because it is good?

To repeat my words from v7n44:
> What is the Source of morality?

> The problem is that if you say the former, then HKBH arbitrarily told us
> to do one set of things and not another. Can mitzvos be the product of
> Divine whim?

Or, as I later wrote in v11n23:
> [It] would make piety an arbitrary whim of the deity, and therefore
> not really of value.

Back to v7n44:
> OTOH, if there is an overarching definition of good and evil that Hashem
> conformed to, then we placed something "over" Him, something that He is
> subject to.

See <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol07/v07n044.shtml#04>.

Belief in a purposeful Creator allows one an axiological basis that
is neither arbitrary nor prior to G-d. We can define tov as that which
fits the purpose of creation. Defining moral good in terms of functional
good. Deep down a good person is good in the same sense that a stereo
is good. Both are fulfilling their function better than a "bad" one.

But then how does one get out of the whole WRT qedushah? If qedushah
has to do with the tachlis of creation, then it's not independent of
tov; and if it doesn't, you're stuch with E's dilemma in defining
qedushah. Even without trying to find an exact definition, there are
problems asserting a definition, even one beyond human ken, exists.

Also of interest is Rabbi Binyamin Hecht's (www.nishma.org) discussion
of the aqeidah, "In the name of religion" (which I posted under
the subject line "Morality and following the Will of G-d") at
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n002.shtml#23>.


FWIW, I would define qedushah as "separated for a purpose". Thus the
use of the preposition "le-" in Qadosh Lashem. As well as the usage
"harei at mequdeshas li".

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes
micha@aishdas.org        exactly the right measure of himself,  and
http://www.aishdas.org   holds a just balance between what he can
Fax: (413) 403-9905      acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham

Posted by: afolger@aishdas.org
Posted on: Mar 8, 2004, 4:05 PM

Back in Avodah #94, RMLevin posted on his disagreement with the academic
differentiation between pshat and drash, and claimed that "there truly is
a Semitic way of experiencing the world. Jews perceive the world as coming
out of the word of Hashem and, therefore, full of complexities and shading
and echoes. To a Greek and also a Westerner, the Logos gave birth to the
world of sight. We aim to understand by seeing, unambigously. Therefore,
the text is either what it says or an allegory. We, in contrast, see
different ways of interpreting as co-existent".

My reaction:
While this view really exists among Jewish authorities, and while it, in
some way, does underly a Jewish slant of metaphysics, I fail to see what
important role it plays among the leading commentators in understanding
the biblical text.

Take Ramban, for example. He often rejects an interpretation (Rashi,
Rambam, Ibn Ezra or even 'Hazal) because of a conviction that the pshat
is different (whatever that may be). Note that he doesn't say that he
has an additional interpretation (actually, he does sometimes say that,
but more often than not he rejects something), but rejects something
offered by an earlier authority.

How do you explain that if there is *no* Jewish notion of an objective
reading of a text (although we may disagree what that objective notion
is)?


ML replie:
You are right but only if you restrictyour survey of Jewish interpretation
to a narrow slice of commentators. If you include midrash, chssidic
lterature and kabbalistic commentaries, you will find no focus on Pshat
and, in fact, the sensibility that I described. That is the rule, not
the exception. The question then is: Why did some focus on pshat and
made distinctions between it and drash. The Academic answer to that is
that this approach represents a paticualr school ofthought that arose
in response to other movements or intellectual processes. My answer is
that methodological rigor is important so that you understand on what
level you operate; once you learn what is pshat and what is drash, both
are truth. I think that all these commentators will agree to that and
they all quote and use desrash.

M. Levin

On Thu, Mar 04, 2004 at 10:30:19PM -0500, Michael Frankel wrote:
: Briefly r Carl is proclaiming the radical faith of the litvak as developed
: by R. Chaim Voloshiner and his successors, which today surely encompasses
: much (all?) of the "yeshiva velt". But there is an alternative perspective
: best expressed in m'qoros from Chasidic sources...

First, I would say all of the yeshiva velt, sans question mark.
Definitionally, the *yeshiva* velt is that community based on RCV's
philosophy of the role of learning, as described in the 4th sha'ar of
Nefesh haChaim. Thus the community's name.

It's not only chassidus vs RCV. Within Litta, the split of Slabodka and
the rebellion at Telzh were over taking time away from talmud Torah
from mussar. Which was not seen as TT -- RYS writes that nashim are
mechuyavos in limud mussar. (I'd love to know what went on in the mind
of a RY whose talmidim were rebelling for more shas... The conviction
in the importance of tiqun hamiddus that goes into someone who is their
rebbe fighting for less...)

But when I originally wrote, I was just thinking in terms of the
importance of being a well-rounded Jew. I have a hard time with the
notion that one of the amudei olam is more central than another.

MO's position in this is difficult to ascertain. OT1H, Torah-and-...
implies borders beyond the dalet amos -- a broader focus. Further from the
tighter focus of primarily Torah and then other mitzvos propounded in NhC.

OTOH, Ish haHalakhah is about not only fulfilling halakhah, but halakhah
as creative partnership between G-d and Israel. His archetypal ideal Jew
isn't of that derekh, nor does RYBS offer any other positive archetypes.
It's very much a Vilozhiner, R' Chaim's Grandson's approach.

RYBS blames the rebellion in Slabodka not on talmidim who believe NhC's
hashkafah, but on talmidim who had enough of tochachah anf frightening
people into improving. RYBS believes this later changed. In sifrei
mussar, you only find what he described in the earlier chapters of Or
Yisrael. This approach died in the early years of Kovno, and are such
a far cry from the Alter of Slabodka's approach of gadlus ha'adam....

RYBS's unfamiliarity with tenu'as hamussar aside, he clearly thought
that a more positive approach to mussar would be a valid reason -- for
people of that derekh -- to cut down on the time spent on gemara for
tikkun hamiddos. (And not simply to limit other mitzvos to those times
when the person isn't able to learn.) However, RYBS left it for others
to explore that derekh, as it wasn't R' Chaim Brisker's, or his.

Going further off on this tangent.... I sometimes wonder what would MO
have become had RYBS's melamed been a mussarnik rather than a Chabad
chassid. RYBS's existentialist bent already had him focusing on the
world as experienced and the human condition.

To a very real extent, American MO is a variant of the yeshiva movement
in particular because of the background of our mentor. The Israeli RZ
community not so, because RAYHK wasn't.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes
micha@aishdas.org        exactly the right measure of himself,  and
http://www.aishdas.org   holds a just balance between what he can
Fax: (413) 403-9905      acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham

On Thu, Mar 04, 2004 at 10:42:19PM -0500, Jonathan S. Ostroff wrote:
: If the "random" event of life was not too improbable, then you do not
: need the auxiliary hypothesis of a Creator. This is what materialists
: hope to achieve with evolution -- in that case religion is just the
: opiate of the people.

Occam's Razor would have you select the theory that requires the fewest
assumptions. Honing that a bit: It's a tad strange to give preference
to a theory based on one assumption over a theory that requires two far
more likely ones. From there it's a tiny step to Bayesian reasoning --
believing the most likely cause of the measured results.

...
: The theory of evolution (and other materialistic explanations) perforce
: accept an undirected non-teleological explanation of life.

A major flaw in scientific thiking is that the absence of teleological
explanations is a given. That's why Occam's Razor can be applied to assess
causes. When Bayes would have you think in terms of probabilities, it's
presumed that the processes aren't purposeful, and therefore statistical
modeling might have meaning.

As already asked on this thread -- how can one speak of the odds of
G-d's existance or of His choosing creating us over not doing so? These
aren't random events; you end up presuming your conclusions in how you
arbitrarily assign odds.

Since science pre-narrows the field of possible hypotheses to
non-teleological ones, the results are presumed in the assumptions.
In simple English: the latest scientific theory will always show who the
most reasonable explanation doesn't include G-d because their definition
of theory requires they ignore explanations that involve G-d.

...
: I believe it is better not to trade on ambiguity. Leave materialists
: with their word "evolution" (undirected and non-teleological), and let
: us argue for the Creator and "Creation".

In private email RJSO suggested that directed evolution has an unnecessary
assumnption; once you invoke G-d, the evolutionary process becomes
redundant and Occam would have you drop it.

The problem is that simply suggesting creation doesn't explain the
presence of the fossil record. Nor does it explain the reason for
background radiation that matches big-bang predictions, the distribution
of stars as expected by cosmological theories, etc...

So, a lema'alah min hateva answer is also a theory involving assumptions
beyond assuming ther'es a Borei. The competing theories to assess are
therefore whether one accepts an explanation of that sort, or one says
creation was more bederekh hatevah (albeit not necessarily totally).

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes
micha@aishdas.org        exactly the right measure of himself,  and
http://www.aishdas.org   holds a just balance between what he can
Fax: (413) 403-9905      acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham

Shinnar, Meir wrote:
>In hilchot purim the mishna brura (in the shaar hatziyun) cites the Meiri.
>Given the known position of the CI about the authority of recently
>found rishonim, with the Meiri being a prime example, and the CI's known
>respect for the Mishna brura, the following question:
>1) How often does the mishna brura cite the meiri? Is this the only place.

DBS version 10 produced 405 hits

    Daniel Eidensohn

In a message dated 03/09/2004 5:06:16 PM EST, Meir.Shinnar@rwjuh.edu writes:
> 1) How often does the mishna brura cite the meiri? Is this the only place. 

A quick cd search shows 5 in M"B and 6 in biur halacha

KT
Joel

Shinnar, Meir wrote:
...
>2) is the meiri cited one of the previously known (eg, from shitta
>mekubetzet), or when was it republished so that the chofetz chaim could
>cite it?

The Shaar HaTziyun 633:3 states that the Chofetz Chaim had a ksav yad
of the Meiri

I have a listing of such comments in the Hebrew Yad Yisroel pp 339-341

Daniel Eidensohn

Saul Newman wrote:
>2- looking to find a list of all the psuking that there are minhagim to
>repeat phrases-- lifnehem-bifnehem, be'omram-k'omram . i saw in a sefer
>sorer-shorer but have never heard that done.

BeOmram-K'Omram is a kri uktiv. There are numerous kri-u-ktivs in
the Tora, Neviim and Ketuvim and they are all uniformly read like the
kri. lifnehem is a different story, for another post.

I cannot imagine anyone reading beTzibur the ktiv on a kri-u-ktiv, unless
perhaps some Baal Koreh mistakenly read the k'tiv, and was corrected to
read the kri.

For a significant posek who dealt with this issue, see Keset HaSofer of R
Shlomo Ganzfried (of Kitzur SA fame). This sefer includes Messorah type
comments on Chumash and Esther on all words he sees a reason to comment
on. (It is largely based on the Ramah [the Ramah with a heh and not with
an aleph] the rishon, who wrote Massoret Syag LaTora). The Keset Sofer ,
on Megillat Esther 3:4 clearly states that it is a kri-u-ktiv and is
read KeAmram. See any good Tanach such as Breuer's or Koren to help
establish that this is a kri-U-ktiv.

Dov Bloom 

I know that I am going to sound like an agnostic but... here goes:

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> Occam's Razor would have you select the theory that requires the fewest
> assumptions. 

That is no proof of the validity of the theory. I believe the Halachic
concept of Chazaka is based on this type of reasoning but a Halachic
device that leans toward the fewest assumptions does not make it a fact
in reality.

> Honing that a bit: It's a tad strange to give preference
> to a theory based on one assumption over a theory that requires two far
> more likely ones. From there it's a tiny step to Bayesian reasoning --
> believing the most likely cause of the measured results.

The key word there is "belief". Once you rely on belief you have removed
yourself from fact. Without fact, you have no proof. Hence one can believe
anything. One approach would be Bayesian reasoning... believing the most
likely cause of the measured results. But a likelihood is not a fact
and belief can be based on things other than the most likely result,
such as intuition or unquestioned Mesorah. Once you leave the realm of
science anything goes. Why not believe in multiple gods?

> A major flaw in scientific thiking is that the absence of teleological
> explanations is a given. 

I don't think scientists look at it as a given. L'Hephech. It is an
assumption based NOT on non-scientific evidence but on rationally
based speculation... to believe in a teleologiocal explanation of
extistence. Why believe in something that has no basis in fact? Why not
wait and see? Why not experiment and test the teleologocal hypothesis? If
it cannot be tested, it cannot be proven. If so, then why bother believing
in something that cannot be proven? I think scientists would ask, "Why
not simply believe in observable data and not speculate about probable
answers?" Scientists might then add, if there is truth to be discovered
in explaining the universe, let the scientific method lead the way and
leave speculation out of it.

HM

[Micha:]
> Belief in a purposeful Creator allows one an axiological basis that
> is neither arbitrary nor prior to G-d. We can define tov as that which
> fits the purpose of creation. Defining moral good in terms of functional
> good. Deep down a good person is good in the same sense that a stereo
> is good. Both are fulfilling their function better than a "bad" one.

> But then how does one get out of the whole WRT qedushah? If qedushah
> has to do with the tachlis of creation, then it's not independent of
> tov;

The Rambam in MN (in a slightly different context) distinguishes between
the good of the body (which in context means the community) and the good
of the soul. That distinction might work here as well.

David Riceman

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