Avodah Mailing List

Volume 11 : Number 071

Thursday, September 18 2003

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Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2003 09:02:03 -0400
From: "Shinnar, Meir" <Meir.Shinnar@rwjuh.edu>
Subject:
RE:women and kaddish


RMB
> It's equally a problem. However, that's not what's happening
> lema'aseh. The radicals are looking to change gender roles. Not that
> the conservatives are trying to restore an illusory previous state.

Many would strongly dispute that --- and I think that there is very
good evidence that the problem is on both sides - with radicals trying
to change gender roles, and conservatives trying to restore an illusory
previous state.

By the way, with regard to women and kaddish - while most of the poskim
who allow it are just mattir, Rav Ahron Soloveichik goes further -
"it is forbidden to bar women from saying kaddish"

Meir Shinnar


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Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2003 22:04:01 +0200
From: D & E-H Bannett <dbnet@zahav.net.il>
Subject:
Re: Women and KaddisH


1. Re: RHM disagreeing with the content of my quote from R' Avraham ben
Hiyya Hanasi miBarcelona, I did not say that others necessarily agree
with him. His opinion, however, is worthy of consideration.

2. Re: His take on the R' Akiva story. I do not remember whether he
comments on it but I think he would call it aggadta. Even though he lived
in the 11 - 12th century l'misparam, I don't think he would consider
all aggadot to be fact.

3. To forestall a question on my source, I looked at my old notes. They
tell me that it is in his sefer Higyon Nefesh and is quoted by R'
Yaakovson (Jacobson?) in Netiv Bina.

k"t,
David


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Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2003 22:04:04 +0200
From: D & E-H Bannett <dbnet@zahav.net.il>
Subject:
Re: Gender of Shabbos


Re: RGD's question and the comments thereon:

The Rambam in his Mishne Torah speaks of Shabbat Hamelekh. (See Hil.
Shabbat, Perek 30, Halakha 2.)

I remember posting this interesting usage in the past but threads seem
to believe in gilgul n'shamot and keep coming back.

May this posting be a tikkun for the thread's neshama.

k"t,
David


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Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2003 22:43:40 +0300 (IDT)
From: Eli Turkel <turkel@math.tau.ac.il>
Subject:
tehillim


While we discuss the benefits of saying kaddish let me ask what are the
benefits of saying tehillim on behalf of someone else?

With R. Elyashiv in poor health there have been calls for tehillim on
his behalf. I have heard in the past that R. Elyashiv is a big proponent
of saying tehillim.

Nothing against tehillim but it is not clear to me what is the benefit.

1. If one holds that everything is decided on RH then tehillim especially
from others can't help.

2. If one holds that "nature" rules the world except for special
tzaddikim it still seems that only the deeds of the tzaddik can help
but not prayers of outsiders.

3. If one holds that prayer in general is for "oneself" rather than
to change the world then saying tehillim for a sick person can indeed
change us if not the sick person.
However, the saying that prayer changes us and then the gezerot don't
apply since we have changed makes sense only when praying for oneself
not when praying or saying tehillim for another person.

kol tuv,
Eli turkel


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Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2003 12:52:16 GMT
From: Gershon Dubin <gershon.dubin@juno.com>
Subject:
Two questions on nusach hatefila


When we say in Shabbos shacharis, "vechasuv bahem shemiras shabbos",
should that not be in the singular, as this lashon implies that shabbos
is written on both luchos?

Also, why is the pasuk brought in "vechen kasuv besorasecha", veshamru,
shouldn't it be "shamor es yom hashabbos lekadesho"?

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com


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Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2003 12:41:08 -0400
From: David Hojda <dhojda1@juno.com>
Subject:
re: web on shabbat (Jerusalem Post)


As regards to accessing the Jerusalem Post web site from the States
after Shabbos has already begun in EY, I wrote previously (11:63) that,
at least in the case of HAARETZ, I believe that they continue to update
the site on Shabbos.

It would seem that there would not only be an issue of benefitting from
this Chilul Shabbos (forget the hairsplitting about what's technically
considered "hana'ah"), but also of encouraging it: The more Shabbos
traffic they log, the more motivated they will be to do Shabbos updates,
in response to this interest.

It would certainly seem that one should have no part in this.

[Email #2 -mi]

I guess it would be an interesting question as to whether reading the
updated content would be considered a hana'ah and also as to whether an
individual could be considered to be encouraging Chillul Shabbos here,
when the encouragement of Chillul Shabbos comes from the cumulative,
statistical effect of the many rather than in response to the actions
of a single party.

Dovid Hojda


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Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2003 15:46:38 -0500 (CDT)
From: gil@aishdas.org
Subject:
Re: Women and kaddish


David Bannett wrote:
>3. To forestall a question on my source, I looked at my old notes. They
>tell me that it is in his sefer Higyon Nefesh and is quoted by R'
>Yaakovson (Jacobson?) in Netiv Bina.

For anyone interested, the entire book Higyon Nefesh is available online
at <http://www.aishdas.org/torahnet/cgi-bin/jump.cgi?ID=54>

Gil Student


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Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 00:28:29 -0400
From: kennethgmiller@juno.com
Subject:
Re: community approval


We were discussing four hypothetical communities across the spectrum
of ideas. R' Micha Berger and I seem to agree that if one of them moves
right or left, its neighbors will be aware of it, and *tend* to move as
well. For example, if these communities are at positions #1, #2, #3, and
#4, and then #3 moves to position 3.5, then #2 will tend to move towards
2.3 or thereabouts (to maintain an equilibrium between its neighbors),
while #4 may feel a need to become even more extreme.

This tendency towards the extremes can be prevented or minimized if
there would have been a rav who all three (the LOR of #2, the LOR of #3,
and the LOR of #4) would check with and hold by, so as to insure that
the limits of extremism are not overstepped.

RMB asked me: <<< So, then do you agree with my maskanah -- that an LOR
who chooses not to ask that rav is taking into his own hands questions
that affect his kehillah's relationship to other kehillos, and therefore
playing with things outside of his league? >>>

In theory, of course I agree. But in practice, I don't know how realistic
it might be to find such a rav. The whole hashkafic difference between
those communities is one of the important factors which makes people
choose to live in this one or that one. And if they *did* find a posek
they could all agree on, there's no guarantee that he would give a
definitive psak on the sort of issues that we're talking about.

In fact, I'd bet that the only way they'd agree on a single rav is if
that rav had already shown himself to be accepting of a wide range of
views. And in practice, that means a whole set of questions for which
his answer would be along the lines of "It's not a good idea, but not
assur either." And then what have you accomplished? The communities will
go their own way after all.

I think that what I've written applies equally well about four town
within an hour's drive of each other (as in RMB's original post) or
whether we're talking about four shuls in one city, where there's no
other shul for hundreds of miles around. If one of the shuls wanted to
move left or right on some internal matter relating to the davening in
that one shul, of course the other shuls would feel it. But what can they
do about it? If there was a single rav that the several shuls agreed on,
then they'd be pretty similar to start with and the whole thing would
be a non-issue. If the matter was big enough to become a problem, then
where are you going to find a rav willing to step in and take a stand?

Separate comment, same topic:

I pointed out that the dynamics of this whole situation apply equally
well whether the drift is to the left or to the right.

RMB's response was <<< However, that's not what's happening lema'aseh.
The radicals are looking to change gender roles. Not that the
conservatives are trying to restore an illusory previous state. >>>

I'm not sure what the reference to "conservatives" is supposed to mean.
What *I* mean was that just like we might want some sort of mechanism to
make sure that the general community does not slip too far into women's
aliyos, women giving the drasha, women being the rabbi, or wherever one
might choose to put the red line --- so too we might want some sort of
mechanism to make sure that the general community does not slip too
far into denying women the ability to whisper kaddish, denying women
the ability to see/hear the chazan/rabbi, denying aliyos to men whose
wives carry in the eruv, or wherever one might choose to put the red line.

Akiva Miller

PS: I really did once hear of a shul where the LOR did not sanction the
eruv which the other shuls had put up (which is certainly in his right
to do), and that shul would not give an aliyah to a man whose wife would
use that eruv, even if the husband himself did not use it (which sounds
overly extreme to me). On the other hand, I have no personal knowledge
of whether or not that story has any truth to it.


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Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 08:14:51 -0400
From: I Kasdan <Ikasdan@erols.com>
Subject:
[Fwd: kaddish]


Micha Berger  wrote: 
> R I Kasdan wrote:
>> At least in the case of the passing of a parent, it may be that the
>> child assumes, or *inherits* (is yoresh), the sins of the departed...

> Where is the din veDayan in that? I'm reminded of how the rishonim handle
> "poqeid avon avos" bedavka to avoid this concept of inherited guilt and
> punishment for another's sin.

Two answers -- first, the inheritance here may be anaologized to the
inheritance of debts: they should be paid off even if the one "inheriting"
those obligations himself will not be punished if they are not. Second,
the individual can assume the debts willingly. In this reagrd, see Rashi
Kiddushin 31: on "hareini kaparas mishkavoh" where Rashi says "alie yavo
kol ra haraui lavoh al naphsho."


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Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 09:18:33 -0500 (CDT)
From: gil@aishdas.org
Subject:
Re: ze sefer toldot adam


In the back of the edition of Toras Kohanim that I own there are
commentaries by two acharonim, the Maharid (?) and R' Meir Simcha
of Dvinsk.

The latter has a unique explanation of Ben Azzai's view. RMSoD claims
that Ben Azzai was teaching that all of human history can be found in
the Torah (including communism - interesting reference) which means that
history must be guided by HKBH.

The Maharid has another explanation, that he quotes in the name of the
Zayis Ra'anan (written by the Magen Avraham) but I cannot find it in
my Yalkut Shimoni with Zayis Ra'anan. Augh, my mind just went blank.
I'll b"n look it up again and report back what he says.

Gil Student


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Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 10:19:53 -0400
From: David Riceman <dr@insight.att.com>
Subject:
driving


The Torah's example of manslaughter is as a result of chopping wood, yet
I recall no halachic attempt to proscribe woodcutting. Similarly people
die every day after being hit by cars, and I can recall no halachic
proscription of driving.

OTOH the Torah prescribes fencing one's roof, and Chazal extend this
quite a bit, e.g. the Beis Din can order a person to remove a dangerous
wall or tree, or even to move an oven.

There's an obvious chiluk: in the latter case the regulation is of an
object rather than an activity (though of course one could rewrite the
former as well, to ban cars or axes).

  Questions:

1. Is it assur to do something that may prove dangerous to others? What
is the issur? It's not even obvious to me that the person who killed
someone while wielding the axe has violated an issur, he may merely be
in need of kapparah.

2. What differentiates a dangerous act that may be regulated/proscribed
(e.g. placing an oven too near a wall) from a dangerous act which is
not regulated/proscribed (e.g. chopping down trees)?

3. Is there a distinction between endangering one's self (I know psukim
commonly cited to prohibit such behavior, though I don't know if that's
merely derech drush) and endangering others (for which I know of no
issur in the absence of intent)?

David Riceman


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Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 15:37:19 +0000
From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
Subject:
Re: driving


On Wed, Sep 17, 2003 at 10:19:53AM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
: OTOH the Torah prescribes fencing one's roof, and Chazal extend this
: quite a bit, e.g. the Beis Din can order a person to remove a dangerous
: wall or tree, or even to move an oven.

I would suggest that the din of ma'aqeh is not directly to save lives.
If it were, it would be a din cheftzah. However, it's a din gavra -- for
example, the chiyuv doesn't apply to shuls. Of course, the other dinim
of public safety would, but not ma'aqeh. LAD, ma'aqeh is an educational
halakhah about the value of life and the priorities when building,
once removed from actual life saving.

It is therefore different in kind than the other situations (wood
chopping, driving) that RDR proposes.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole
micha@aishdas.org        heart, your entire soul, and all you own."
http://www.aishdas.org   Love is not two who look at each other,
Fax: (413) 403-9905      It is two who look in the same direction.


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Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 11:39:03 -0400
From: "Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <sbechhof@casbah.it.northwestern.edu>
Subject:
Re: ze sefer toldot adam


At 09:18 AM 9/17/2003 -0500, gil@aishdas.org wrote:
>In the back of the edition of Toras Kohanim that I own there are
>commentaries by two acharonim...

>The latter has a unique explanation of Ben Azzai's view.  RMSoD claims
>that Ben Azzai was teaching that all of human history can be found in the
>Torah (including communism - interesting reference) which means that
>history must be guided by HKBH.
...

Wow! Like RMSoD's pshat. I didn't know he wrote on TK, and don't own
it, but I was motivated enough to check the Meshech Chochmo and, lo and
behold, in this week's parasha - Nitzavim 30:11-14 d"h Ki HaMitzvah (in
Rabbi Cooperman's edition p. 285 at the end of the paragrpah that begins
"v'zeh kavonas" he says a pshat that very much resembles RGS and mine;
and in a manner that I think RMS will like as well!

YGBG 


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Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 12:20:31 -0400
From: David Riceman <dr@insight.att.com>
Subject:
Re: driving


Micha Berger wrote:
> I would suggest that the din of ma'aqeh is not directly to save lives.

The pasuk is very explicit: "v'lo sasim damim bveisecha"

DR


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Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 16:57:03 +0000
From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
Subject:
Re: driving


On Wed, Sep 17, 2003 at 12:20:31PM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
:> I would suggest that the din of ma'aqeh is not directly to save lives.

: The pasuk is very explicit: "v'lo sasim damim bveisecha"

Which would be appropriate even if the din is indirectly about saving
lives. Learn to make safety a priority, "and not place blood in your
home".

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole
micha@aishdas.org        heart, your entire soul, and all you own."
http://www.aishdas.org   Love is not two who look at each other,
Fax: (413) 403-9905      It is two who look in the same direction.


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Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 12:24:27 -0400 (EDT)
From: "Micha Berger" <micha@aishdas.org>
Subject:
RE: ze sefer toldot adam


RMS wrote:
> 2) The issue is not hilchot deot and allegorical interpretations -
> about which I have no problem - (quite the reverse, as RMB has
> pointsbut has fundamental practical impact on our understanding of
> our primary obligations. This is more a midrash halacha than an
> aggadic midrash (see eg. malbim).

How? What is the nafqa mina lehalakhah?

> 3) While the notion that our responsibility to better ourselves is
> crucially important has major roots, the notion that it exceeds our
> communal obligations is something that I think is something that is
> a foreign import - foreign to hazal - and (WADR) I find morally
> obnoxious - and therefore the issue of its basis in a drashat chazal
> therefore becomes important.

This is your real objection, and I think it motivated your finding the
other two issues.

AIUI, there are two nequdos in this discussion:
1- Did ben Azzai refer to the significance of the self, or of others?

2- What is the criterion by which R' Aqiva and ben Azzai are measuring
their choice of pesuqim?

R Meir Shinnar later wrote:
> First, the source actually has a completely different text
> (it is curious abouts its origin) - rather than a bifold
> distinction, it has a trifold - and rather than the word
> clal (with several potential different meanings) it talks
> about which mitzva subsumes the most mitzvot - and has
> three options - veahavta le'reacha camocha (understood by
> the author as ben adam lechavero), shma yisrael (yirat
> shamayim), or ze sefer toldot adam - understanding one's
> zelem, and therefore refraining from all rishut.  The
> issue is about subsuming the most mitzvot

As RMS notes, the word in question is ambiguous, and the other girsa
less so. Perhaps this is sufficient to address the 2nd point.

However, li nir'eh the implication is not which subsumes the most mitzvos
as much as which is logically prior to the most mitzvos. The difference is
subtle, but it allows me to rephrase the question as one we have discussed
here at length: RYGB's Fork.

AIUI, we could suggest that ben Azzai was placing centrality in the
search for one's temimus (to address #1). However, with the right
understanding of #2, that would mean that he believes that the search
for temimus /includes/ ahavas rei'im.

RGS on R' Shem Tov ibn Shem Tov:
> I believe that RSTiST is referring to the three-way split of mitzvos
> into bein adam la-makom (Shema), bein adam la-chaveiro (ve-ahavta
> le-rei'acha), and bein adam le-atzmo (ze sefer). As with many
> midrashim, none of the opinions are arguing but, rather, are
> emphasizing different aspects of Torah.

I noticed in here a road not taken.

Basing yahadus on Shema is a deveiqus approach. Zeh seifer (as being
suggested by RYGB and RGS) would be a temimus approach. Who today is
following a ve'ahavta-based derekh?

It's clear from Hillel's words to the prospective geir, an approach to
kol haTorah kulah can be built based on bein adam lachaveiro, but who
has explicated such an approach?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "And you shall love H' your G-d with your
whole micha@aishdas.org        heart, your entire soul, and all you
own." http://www.aishdas.org   Love is not two who look at each
other,
Fax: (413) 403-9905      It is two who look in the same direction.


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Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 10:16:22 -0700 (PDT)
From: Lawrence Teitelman <lteitelman@yahoo.com>
Subject:
Source for expression


Could someone kindly provide the original source for the oft-quoted
"m'at min ha-or docheh harbeh min ha-choshekh".

Thanks in advance,
Larry Teitelman


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Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 23:10:34 EDT
From: Yzkd@aol.com
Subject:
Re: Source for expression


In a message dated 9/17/2003 1:28:27 PM EST, lteitelman@yahoo.com writes:
> Could someone kindly provide the original source for the oft-quoted
> "m'at min ha-or docheh harbeh min ha-choshekh".

According to the Michlol it's source is the Tzidah Laderech 12.

Kol Tuv,
Yitzchok Zirkind


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Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2003 13:17:49 -0400
From: Mlevinmd@aol.com
Subject:
Sefer toldos haadom


>The latter has a unique explanation of Ben Azzai's view. RMSoD claims
>that Ben Azzai was teaching that all of human history can be found in
>the Torah (including communism - interesting reference) which means that
>history must be guided by HKBH.

I beleive that the Netsiv offers the same explanation (but without
communism).

M. Levin


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Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2003 00:00:13 EDT
From: Yzkd@aol.com
Subject:
Re: driving


In a message dated 9/17/2003 11:37:51 AM EST, dr@insight.att.com writes:
> The Torah's example of manslaughter is as a result of chopping wood, yet
> I recall no halachic attempt to proscribe woodcutting. Similarly people
> die every day after being hit by cars, and I can recall no halachic
> proscription of driving.

I enclosed part of the interduction to the Sefer Shmiras haGuf v'haNefesh
who discusses this issue at lentgh. Please point to:
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/shmirasHagufVehanefesh.pdf>.

note on pg. 44 WRT driving, I would like to add that the Torah permits
"Uvilechticha Baderech" which according to the Gemara (Brochos 11a) is
Rishus not for a Mitzva, even though "Kol Hadrochim Bchezkas Sakana"
Yerushalmi Brochos 4:4 (Rashi Breishis 44:29) (note also Yerushalmi
Shabbos 2:4). Also the known issue that a woman who dies in childbirth
is burried in a seperate place because she was Moser Nefesh (see Shabbos
32a) even though the Mitzvah of Pru Urvu is not on the female.

IAN"D it is quite obvious that one is not allowed to endanger someone
else that is Poshut Teitch in Ki Yipol Hanofeil and see C"M 382:1.

Kol Tuv,
Yitzchok Zirkind


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Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2003 15:27:06 -0400
From: "Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <sbechhof@casbah.it.northwestern.edu>
Subject:
Facing the Machashavah Challenge


[Forwarded from Jewish Action. -mi]

			Facing the Machashavah Challenge

		  Facing Current Challenges: Essays on Judaism
			  Rabbi Dr. Yehuda (Leo) Levi
				Jerusalem, 1998

		   Reviewed by Rabbi Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer

I once asked the principal of a yeshiva high school why the standard
curriculum does not include the study of Jewish thought - excerpts from
the Kuzari, Derech Hashem, Michtav Mei'Eliyahu - anything? He answered
me quite candidly, saying that the study of such works and issues would
likely provoke students to raise significant questions, and there was
a real concern that the teachers would not be equipped to answer the
questions satisfactorily. Better, he contended, not to raise questions
in students. minds than to raise questions that would remain unanswered.

While we may be disappointed with the principal's response, we cannot
deny the reality of his concern. A standard yeshiva education generally
does not equip a teacher with familiarity - let alone mastery - of Jewish
thought. Systematic study of the "great works" (such as those cited above)
is a rarity. Often, the sum total of a yeshiva alumnus' exposure to musar
or machashavah is the collective wisdom contained in whatever shmuessen
or sichot he has haphazardly attended over the years.[1]

So, indeed, if the educator is not educated, how can he or she educate
others? On the other hand, can we consider a yeshiva alumnus adequately
equipped to face the challenges of life without a solid grounding in
Jewish thought? Situations pose questions, experiences pose questions,
others pose questions to us - and, sooner or later, we may well pose
questions to ourselves. How can one be a fully functioning Oved Hashem
without a solid grounding in Jewish thought? Indeed, it is the pursuit of
such grounding that the Mesillas Yesharim demands of us when he opens his
work with those immortal words: Yesod ha'chassidus v'shoresh ha'avodah
ha'temimah she'yisbarer v'yisames eitzel he'adam mah chovaso b'olamo -
the foundation of piety and the root of complete [divine] service is
that it should become clear and [understood as] true to an individual
what his responsibility is in his world.

Clearly, both teacher and student need a curriculum. Prof. Yehuda
(Leo) Levi's book, Facing Current Challenges provides just such a
curriculum. Rabbi Dr. Levi is ideally, perhaps uniquely, suited to provide
a framework for thoughtful analysis of the great issues that a Jew faces
in the world in which Hashem has placed us. Heir to the Torah im Derech
Eretz traditions of his German-Jewish forbears, educated to the profound
approach to both Talmud and Jewish thought that was the hallmark of Rabbi
Yitzchok Hutner zt"l's Mesivta Rabbi Chaim Berlin, and an accomplished
scientist and academician as well, his works possess a remarkable scope
of breadth and depth. (I personally make extensive and constant use of his
wonderful works on the times of day in Halacha and on Talmud Yerushalmi.)

Prof. Levi has taught for many years, also serving for some time as
rector, at the Jerusalem College of Technology, popularly known as
Machon Lev. Facing Current Challenges consists of lectures that the
author gave to students at Machon Lev. Prof. Levi obviously did a great
deal of research and prepared extensively for each of these lectures,
as they are all rich in varied sources and extensively footnoted.

Other important compilations of Jewish thought[2] that are helpful in
learning and teaching perspectives consist of excerpted material from
classic sources or summations with extensive references. Facing Current
Challenges, however, preserves the flavor of the lectures that served as
its basis. This format allows the inquiring reader to follow Prof. Levi's
logical and methodical development of each piece's theme.[3]

Occasionally, a nugget of information is so novel an idea that you
momentarily doubt the author is being accurate, but there is an endnote,
and you look to the back of the book and find, lo and behold, the
precise reference for the statement. For example, upon reading (p. 225)
that the Chazon Ish zt"l said: "History and world events do much to
instruct the wise man on his way, and on the basis of the chronicles
of the past he establishes the foundation of his wisdom" - a statement
that we might not quite expect to find emanating from the Chazon Ish -
we might want to double check the source - readily given in the endnote
(Emunah u'Bitachon 1:8).

More often, however, a reader will read straight through an essay,
and come out the wiser, educated in a broad array of issues, from:
"Zionism: A Torah Perspective" and "Kahanism" to "Organ Transplants" and
"Ecological Problems". The gamut of issues spanned by Prof. Levi in this
work is, indeed, vast: issues concerning the land of Israel and the State;
the relationship between Jews and and gentiles; family issues and issues
surrounding sexuality; the interface of Torah, medicine and science;
the role of Agadah and Kabalah in Judaism - and more.

It will be evident to any reader that Prof. Levi believes that the
perspectives he presents are the authentic views of Chazal, the Rishonim
and great Acharonim. To be sure, he admits that there are other views, but
explains - respectfully and politely - why those views do not reflect the
mainstream Jewish though the ages. Not surprisingly, Prof. Levi's views
are closely aligned with Hirschian Torah im Derech Eretz, influenced by
his experience in the Lithuanian yeshiva world and by his training as
a scientist.

For example, in the second essay (in a series of three essays), on
Zionism, Prof. Levi first inquires (p. 9):

    What is Zionism? Some define Zionism as a love of Zion - on first
    sight quite a reasonable definition. It does not, however, fit
    the normal use of the word. If love of Zion made one a Zionist,
    the extreme anti-Zionist Neturei Karta, who loved Zion to the
    point that they refused to leave Jerusalem even during the War of
    Independence, would be the greatest Zionists of all. Few, however,
    would classify them as such. It follows that this is not the accepted
    use of the word.

Prof. Levi then establishes the link between "Zionism" to
nationalism. Prof. Levi explores the topic of nationalism at length in
the previous essay. As he noted there (p. 7):

    Nationalism, in general, is evil because it turns the nation into
    an end in itself. Judaism, however, is different; it has a higher
    purpose - to bring redemption to the world and actually rid it
    of nationalism. The nationalism called for by the Torah - Torah
    nationalism - is secondary. While the Torah confirms the importance
    of Jewish nationhood, it values it not for its own sake, but because
    of Israel's exalted mission.

Secular Zionism, on the other hand, in a resolution adopted at the tenth
Zionist congress (Basel, 1911) divorced itself from Torah, proclaiming:
"Zionism has nothing to do with religion." It is, therefore, a nationalism
that is not rooted in Torah. What then, is religious Zionism? Is the
term an oxymoron? Prof. Levi continues (p. 10):

    What about religious Zionism? There are many views as to what
    it signifies. Based on the simple meaning of the words, it
    is Zionism... that favors religion and sees in it an important
    supplement to Zionism. It follows that the religious Zionist will
    wish to strengthen religion in the nation, because he sees this
    as being of benefit, even great benefit, to the nation. Even so,
    as long as he is a Zionist according to the meaning of the term as
    analyzed above, he will view the nation as the supreme value.

After noting the incompatibility of this stance with Torah-true Judaism,
Prof. Levi writes (p. 11):

    In the religious Zionist camp there are also many who view the
    Torah, rather than the nation, as the supreme value. When they see
    themselves as Zionists, they use the term Zionism to mean something
    entirely different from the accepted meaning. Such usage turns the
    term into an obstruction to effective communication; beyond this,
    it may compromise the clarity of thought of those who use it.

Prof. Levi surmises that this need for clarity led Rabbi Joseph
B. Soloveitchik to say (p. 12):

    "We do not believe in 'Zionism plus religion' or 'religious
    Zionism'. For us there is only one special noun - Torah."

Prof. Levi then surveys the ramifications of the inherent contradiction
between Zionism and Torah, such as the correct attitudes towards
the "heroes" of secular Zionism, separation from the World Zionist
Organization, the relationship between religious Zionists and religious
anti-Zionists, and concludes (p. 14):

    I believe every Torah-true Jew must take pains to free himself
    of these errors. Then, he will no longer be a Zionist - not a
    general Zionist, nor even a religious Zionist. He will be a lover
    of Israel, of the Land of Israel, even an excellent citizen of the
    State of Israel. He will be engaged in the state's advancement and
    in straightening its path, involved with its economy and politics,
    and will take pains to awaken it to its purpose. A "Zionist," however,
    he will not be.

These assertions, of course, will not sit well with those who identify
themselves with Religious Zionism on the one hand; nor with those who
reject engagement "in the state's advancement" on the other. But the
book's greatest strength is precisely that "irritation" it will accomplish
- in challenging the preconceived positions of the reader.[4] Prof. Levi
did not make that statement in a declarative, bombastic fashion. In the
course of the three essays in which he formulates his perspective on the
Land, State and society of Israel and He carefully musters evidence, like
the good scientist that he is, from Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak HaKohen Kook
to Rabbi Yosef Chaim Sonnefeld; from Rabbi Moshe Avigdor Amiel to Rabbi
Eliyahu Meir Bloch - and from Achad Ha'am - to prove his thesis. While
you may very much want to disagree with Prof. Levi, you will have to do
a lot of thinking and careful consideration in order to do so. In thus
"facing current challenges," Prof. Levi challenges the reader.

Similarly, Prof. Levi's treatment of secular studies will certainly
provoke those who feel that they should be afforded less significance
and those who feel they should be accorded greater weight. Again, his
conclusion in one of a series of essays on the topic may be controversial
(p. 221):

    To sum up our findings on the Torah's attitude toward secular
    studies, we must first be aware that a simplistic approach will not
    suffice. We cannot dispose of the whole issue with a simple "yes"
    or "no"; instead, we must ascertain precisely what is in question in
    each case. Generally speaking, the Torah's attitude toward the study
    of natural science is definitely positive. On the other hand it is
    negative, or at least reserved, toward study of the humanities based
    on non-Torah sources. As we have seen, this distinction is based on
    the difference in the methods used to formulate principles in these
    disciplines: whereas man was given senses to help him reveal the
    laws of nature and to test his findings, he has no equivalent faculty
    enabling him to test his conclusions in the area of the humanities.[5]
    Thus there is no reliable source of knowledge in this area other
    than that which God reveals to man - the Torah given on Mount Sinai.

Again, however, this statement is backed by cogent arguments and copious
references. If the reader feels irritated enough to take issue - he will
have to engage in some research and careful analysis to do so![6]

A flaw in the book, is Prof. Levi's tendency on occasion to advance
resolutions in areas in which we may not have the right to advance
a resolution. A good example of such an area is the issue of Divine
Providence. A scholar of Chassidus, Rabbi J. Immanuel Schochet, once
said to me that the greatest revolution that the Baal Shem Tov succeeded
in accomplishing was in the area of Hashgachah Pratis (specific or
special Divine providence). As Prof. Levi notes (p. 304, backed by a long
endnote): "...We find in the writings of the early authorities that only
righteous individuals, each according to his degree of righteousness,
merit special Divine Providence." As we know, this is not the current
perspective on Divine Providence. Although Prof. Levi chooses to raise
the contrary position on the basis of some seemingly contradictory
remarks in Chazal, as Rabbi Schochet noted, the progenitors of today's
perception are the fathers of Chassidism.[7] As the Rebbe Reb Bunim of
Parshischah put it, anyone who does not believe that when a person draws
a stick out of the sand, that God dictates where each particle of sand
falls into the hole, denies Divine Providence.

Prof. Levi proposes to reconcile the two schools of thought (ibid.):

    ...This contradiction is readily resolvable. Everything that
    happens is, in fact, an act of God, but God's course of action is
    also governed by His desire to rule the world according to the
    deterministic and statistical laws of nature. Generally, these
    laws, rather than an individual's rights and needs, determine
    these acts of God. However, occasionally such rights and needs
    do influence the course of events; when they do, this is referred
    to as hashgachah peratith. Divine Providence does in fact control
    everything. "Every blade of grass has an angel standing over it,
    telling it 'Grow.'" However, the special providence, hashgachah
    peratith in the narrow sense, is reserved for righteous people;
    only they merit a personal relationship on the part of God.

I do not dispute the rational character of Prof. Levi's suggestion. I
think it has much merit. But I do not know mi ya'aleh lanu ha'shomyma -
who will go up for us to Heaven to ascertain if God acts accordingly! By
contrast, in Rabbi Yisraeli's work (see note 1 above), on this topic as on
all others, he presents sources are presented to speak for themselves -
from Tanach and Chazal to the Rambam to the Baal HaTanya - and provides
explanations and a succinct and lucid summation. While extensive
quoatation from sources is really not possible in a work such as that
of Prof. Levi, it would, perhaps, have been better to acknowledge the
great debate and leave it unresolved. Rabbi Yisraeli does not attempt
to reconcile a theological conundrum which may be beyond human resolution.

But this is a relatively minor quibble with a major contribution
to machashavah and machashavah education.[8] Prof. Levi's work is,
potentially, a wonderful addition to a curriculum; a powerful tool for
teachers, educators and rabbis; and a good way for anyone to broaden
the horizons of their thought - and thoughtful Avodas Hashem.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Although beyond the scope of this review, there was a fascinating
correspondence and debate between Rabbi Yitzchak Isaac Halevi,
the renowned historian, and Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak HaKohen Kook, in
1908, concerning the advisability of the incorporation of the study of
machashavah in the curriculum of a new yeshiva that Rav Kook intended to
found in Jaffa. Rabbi Halevi was stridently opposed to any adulteration
of the "traditional" Shas and Poskim based course of studies, while Rav
Kook felt that the times made an expanded focus essential. See Igros
R. Yitzchak Isaac Halevi 80-80a and Igros HaRa'ayah 1:146 and 149.

[2] Including Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli's Perakim b'Machasheves Yisrael and
Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan's Handbook of Jewish Thought. I shall return to the
differences between these works below.

[3] There is a slight, yet perceptible, stiltedness in the flow of the
language that, I believe, is explained by the fact that Facing Current
Challenges is translated from the Hebrew version of the book (which bears
the haskomos of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef and Rabbi Zalman Nechemiah Goldberg).

[4] It is worthwhile remembering that a pearl is formed in response to an
irritation. An oyster secretes a thing of beauty around a piece of sand
that irritates it! Often, it is irritation that gets us thinkings - and
producing "pearls of wisdom". The irritation that challenges enough to
provoke thought and thinking should be the hallmark of good machashavah
education.

[5] Prof. Levi is generally skeptical concerning the humanities and leery
of the social sciences, including, particularly, psychology (which he
treats, tellingly, not in the section on Torah im Derech Eretz but in his
powerful section on "The Individual and His Soul" - which focuses on the
drives and inclinations with which human beings must contend. He makes
a specific exception for the study history, including a pearl from the
Chazon Ish , Emunah U'Bitachon 1:8 (p. 225): "History and world events
do much to instruct the wise man on his way, and on the basis of the
chronicles of the past he establishes the foundation of his wisdom."

[6] Of course, not everyone may agree with Prof. Levi's perspective. In
a recent essay published in Judaism's Encounter with Other Cultures:
Rejection or Integration?, Rabbi Aaron Lichtenstein, Rosh Yeshiva of
Yeshivat Har Etzion takes a very different view (see also Avodah Mailing
List 3:107 at www.aishdas.org).

In his essay, Torah and General Culture: Confluence and Conflict, Rabbi
Lichtenstein argues that the madda that complements Torah includes the
humanities as well: "And yet at bottom, the notion that Shakespeare is
less meaningful than Boyle, Racine irrelevant but Lavoisier invaluable,
remains very strange doctrine indeed." Rabbi Lichtenstein writes:

    To those who extol chemistry because it bespeaks the glory of
    the Ribbono Shel Olam but dismiss Shakespeare because he only
    ushers us into the Globe Theater, one must answer, first, that
    great literature often offers us a truer and richer view of the
    essence -- the "inscape," to use Hopkins' word -- of even physical
    reality... Can anyone doubt that appreciation of God's flora is
    enhanced by Wordsworth's description of "a crowd/ a host, of golden
    daffodils;/ Beside the lake, beneath the trees,/ Fluttering and
    dancing in the breeze?"

Rabbi Lichtenstein continues to assert:

    Whether impelled by demonic force or incandescent aspiration,
    great literature, from the fairy tale to the epic, plumbs uncharted
    existential and experiential depths which are both its wellsprings
    and its subjects... Hence, far from diverting attention from
    the contemplation of God's majestic cosmos, the study of great
    literature focuses upon a manifestation, albeit indirect, of His
    wondrous creation at its apex... To the extent that the humanities
    focus upon man, they deal not only with a segment of divine creation,
    but with its pinnacle... In reading great writers, we can confront
    the human spirit doubly, as creation and as creator.

But how does this approach complement Torah?

    The dignity of man is not the exclusive legacy of Cicero and Pico
    della Mirandola. It is a central theme in Jewish thought, past and
    present. Deeply rooted in Scripture, copiously asserted by Chazal,
    unequivocally assumed by rishonim, religious humanism is a primary and
    persistent mark of a Torah weltanschauung. Man's inherent dignity and
    sanctity, so radically asserted through the concept of tzelem Elokim;
    his hegemony and stewardship with respect to nature, concern for his
    spiritual and physical well-being; faith in his metaphysical freedom
    and potential -- all are cardinal components of traditional Jewish
    thought... How then can one question the value of precisely those
    fields which are directly concerned with probing humanity?

But cannot sources for religious inspiration be found in Torah?

    An account of Rabbi Akiva's spiritual odyssey could no doubt eclipse
    Augustine's. But his confessions have been discreetly muted. The
    rigors of John Sturat Mill's education - and possibly, their
    repercussions - are not without parallel in our history. But what
    corresponds to his fascinating Autobiography? Or to the passionate
    Apologia Vita Sue of his contemporary, John Henry Cardinal Newman? Our
    Johnsons have no Boswells.

To be sure, Rabbi Lichtenstein's arguments are impassioned and eloquent. I
cannot speak for Prof. Levi, but I imagine that he would argue that in
the absence of solid and conclusive evidence from Chazal and other classic
sources, Rabbi Lichtenstein's position cannot be considered normative.

It is well beyond the scope of this review to contrast Rabbi
Lichtenstein's Torah u-Madda with Prof. Levi's Torah 'im derekh eretz. It
is tantalyzing to reflect on the different statements with which they
approach the gap between the perspectives they champion and the dominant
"Torah-only" school.

Rabbi Lichtenstein:

    Advocates of Torah u-Madda can certainly stake no exclusive claims. It
    would not only be impudent but foolish to impugn a course which has
    produced most gedolei Yisrael and has in turn been championed by
    them. Neither, however, should exclusionary contentions be made by
    its opponents. While Torah u-Madda is not every one's cup of tea, it
    certainly deserves a place as part of our collective spiritual fare.

Prof. Levi (p. 251):

    I cannot conclude without addressing the sharp contrast between what
    we have learned here, concerning the centrality of the Torah 'im
    derekh eretz principle, and what we see in the yeshiva world... I
    have heard from several great Torah scholars that this opposition
    is a temporary injunction (hora'ath sha'ah). In time of emergency,
    it is indeed sometimes necessary to deviate from the Torah's demands
    in order to save the Torah itself... This was especially important
    after the terrible Holocaust that visited European Jewry.

To Rabbi Lichtenstein his approach is an available option. Prof. Levi,
on the other hand, sees his approach as normative. The phenomenon of
mass deviation from must thus be explained.

[7] Prof. Levi, in this book, for the most part, does not deal with
Chassidism or Chassidic philosophy as distinct from general Jewish
thought.

[8] It might interest readers to know that this book was adopted as
required reading towards the Israeli matriculation (bagrut) exam in
Machashevet Yisrael - despite its essentially anti-Zionist position.


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