Today is R’ Yisrael Salanter’s yahrzeit.

I just want to point you to a biography of Rav Yisrael written in 1899 (16 years after his passing), posted by fellow AishDas-nik R’ Neil Harris on his blog. Translation by Google, with some touch-up by RNH.

Here’s a teaser. Click on the post’s title for the complete blog entry.

Rabbi Israel Lipkin was born on 3 November 1810 at Sagar in the province Samogitia in Russia, the birthplace and birth land of his father. His father, Rabbi Wolf Lipkin, held the office of a rabbi, first in Goldingen (Courland) and afterwards in Telshe in Russia.
From the high learning of his father came his “marginal notes” to the Talmud.  These notes can be found reprinted in the latest edition of the great Vilna Talmud.  He had also been the first teacher of his son, Israel.  In accordance with the custom at that time among the Russian Jews, which was still standing, almost in boyhood Lipkin became engaged to the daughter of one of the religionists named Rabbi Jacob Eisenstein of Salant, called Jacob, who takes over, also according to the fashion, food and drink for the young couple in their home while the young husband is carefree and undisturbed resigns employment with the doctrine….
My previous posts about R’ Yisrael’s yahrzeit:

ו: הַמַּבְעִית אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ, כְּגוֹן שֶׁצָּעַק עָלָיו מֵאֲחֲרָיו אוֹ שֶׁנִּרְאָה לוֹ בַּאֲפֵלָה וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָזֶה, חַיָב בְּדִינֵי ֹשָמָיִם

Someone who frightens his neighbor, such as he yells at him from behind, or appears to him in the dark, or the like, is culpable by the laws [and court] of heaven.

ז: הַחוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵרוֹ, אַף-עַל-פִּי שֶׁנָּתַן אֶת הַמָּמוֹן לְנֶּחְבָּל מָה שֶׁנִּתְחַיֵב לוֹ עֲבוּר הַחֲבָלָה, וְכֵן גַנָּב אוֹ גַזְלָן, אַף-עַל-פִּי שֶׁהֶחֱזִירוּ אוֹ שִׁלְּמוּ, מִכָּל מָקוֹם אֵין מִתְכַּפֵּר לָהֶם עַד שֶׁיְבַקְשוּ מְחִילָה מֵאֵת הַנֶּחְבָּל אוֹ הַנִּגְזָל אוֹ הַנִּגְנָב עַל הַצַּעַר שֶׁהָיָה לָהֶם. וְהֵם יִמְחֲלוּ וְלֹא יִהְיוּ אַכְזָרִים. – עַיֵן לְעֵיל סִימָן קלא סָעִיף ד

Someone who wounds his friend, even though he gave money to the woundered person what he was obligated to because of the wound, and similarly a burglar or a thief even though they returned it [the stolen item] or repaid [its worth], in any case they do not get atonement until they ask forgiveness from the wounded person, or the victim of theft or robbery for the pain that they had. And they should forgive and not be stubborn. See above, 131:4


Siman 131 is about Yom Kippur, so it’s outside the scope of this project. I will instead include the referenced se’if here:

סִימָן קלא סָעִיף ד:
עֲבֵרוֹת ֹשֶבֵּין אָדָם לַחֲבֵרוֹ, אֵין יוֹם-הַכִּפּוּרִים מְכַפֵּר עַד ֹשֶׁיְרַצֶּה אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֶמַר, מִכֹּל חַטֹּאתֵיכֶם לִפְנֵי ה’ תִּטְהָרוּ. כְּלוֹמַר, חַטֹּאתֵיכֶם שֶׁהֵם לִפְנֵי ה’ בִּלְבַד, יוֹם-הַכִּפּוּרִים מְכַפֵּר. אֲבָל מַה שֶּׁבֵּין אָדָם לַחֲבֵרוֹ, אֵין יוֹם-הַכִּפּוּרִים מְכַפֵּר, עַד שֶׁיְרַצֶּה אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ. לָכֵן צָרִיךְ כָּל אָדָם לְדַקְדֵּק, שֶׁאִם יֵשׁ בְּיָדוֹ מָמוֹן ֹשֶל אֲחֵרִים שֶׁלֹּא כַדִּין, יַחֲזִיר לוֹ וִיפַיֵס אוֹתָן. וְאִם יֵשׁ בְּיָדוֹ מָמוֹן ֹשֶהוּא מְסֻפָּק בּוֹ, אִם הוּא שֶׁלוֹ עַל פִּי הַדִּין אוֹ לֹא, יוֹדִיע לַחֲבֵרוֹ שֶׁהוּא רוֹצֶה לַעֲמֹד עִמּוֹ מִיָד לְאַחַר יוֹם-הַכִפּוּרִים לְדִין הַתּוֹרָה הַקְּדוֹשָׁה, וִיקַבֵּל עָלָיו בֶּאֶמֶת לְקַיֵם כַּאֲשֶׁר יֵצֵא מִפִּי בֵּית-הַדִּין. וְגַם אִם לֹא חָטָא כְּנֶגֶד חֲבֵרוֹ אֶלָּא בִּדְבָרִים, צָרִיךְ לְפַיְסוֹ, וּמְחֻיָב לָלֶכֶת בְּעַצְמוֹ לְפַיְסוֹ. אַךְ אִם קָשֶׁה עָלָיו, אוֹ שֶׁהוּא מֵבִין כִּי יוֹתֵר קָרוֹב שֶׁיִתְפַּיֵס עַל יְדֵי אֶמְצָעִי, יַעֲשֶׂה עַל יְדֵי אֶמְצָעִי. וְהָאִישׁ אֲֹשֶר מְבַקְשִֹין מִמֶּנוּ מְחִילָה, יִמְחוֹל בְּלֵב שָׁלֵם וְלֹא יְהֵא אַכְזָרִי, כִּי אֵין זֶה מִמִּדַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל, אֶלָּא מִמִּדַּת עֵשָׂו, שֶׁעָלָיו נֶאֱמַר, וְעֶבְרָתוֹ שְׁמָרָה נֶצַח. וְכֵן הוּא אוֹמֵר עַל הַגִבְעוֹנִים, לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא מָחֲלוּ וְלֹא נִתְפַּיְסוּ, וְהַגִּבְעוֹנִים לֹא מִבְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל הֵמָה. אֲבָל דַרְכָּן ֹשֶל זֶרַע יִשְׂרָאֵל הוּא לִהְיוֹת קָשֶׁה לִכְעֹס וְנוֹחַ לִרְצוֹת. וּכְשֶׁהַחוֹטֵא מְבַקֵּשׁ מִמֶּנּוּ לִמְחוֹל, יִמְחוֹל בְּלֵב שָׁלֵם וּבְנֶפֶשׁ חֲפֵצָה. וַאֲפִלּוּ הֵצֵר לוֹ הַרְבֵּה, לֹא יִקֹּם וְלֹא יִטֹּר. וְאַדְרַבָּה, אִם הַחוֹטֵא אֵינוֹ מִתְעוֹרֵר לָבוֹא אֵלָיו לְבַקֵֹּש מְחִילָה, יֵשׁ לוֹ לְהָאִישׁ הֶעָלוּב לְהַמְצִיא אֶת עַצְמוֹ לְאוֹתוֹ שֶׁחָטָא, כְּדֵי שֶׁיְבַקֵּשׁ מִמֶּנוּ מְחִילָה. וּמִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַעֲבִיר שִׂנְאָה בְּיוֹם-הַכִּפּוּרִים, אֵין תְּפִלָתוֹ נִשְׁמַעַת, חַס וְֹשָלוֹם. וְכָל הַמַּעֲבִיר עַל מִדּותָיו, מַעֲבִירִין לוֹ עַל כָּל פְּשָׁעָיו

Since which are between a person and his friend, Yom Kippur does not atone [for them] until he appeases his friend, as it says, “from all your sins before G-d you shall be purified.” As if to say, “the sins that are before G-d alone Yom Kippur atones.” But that which is between a person and his friend, Yom Kippur does not atone for until he appeases his friend.

Therefore, every person must be exacting, that if he has in his possession any money of other people’s that is not [by him] lawfully, he should return it to him and appease them. And if he has in his possession money which he is unsure about if it is his lawfully or not, he should inform his friend that he wishes to stand with him immediately after Yom Kippur in a court case according to the holy Torah, and will truthfully accept to fulfill whatever comes out of the mouth of the court.

Also if he only sinned against his friend with words, he must appease him, and he is obligated to personally go to appease him. However, if it is hard for him, or if he understands that it is more likely that he will be appeased through the aegis of a middleman, then he should do it through a middleman.

The person who they ask from him forgiveness should forgive [them] wholeheartedly and he should not be stubborn. For that is not a middah of Israel bur rather a middah of Eisav, about whom it is said “and his trespasses are guarded forever”. Similarly it says about the Giv’onim, because they didn’t forgive and they didn’t allow themselves to be appeased, the the Giv’onim are not Jews. [Their attempted conversion was proven to be without a real acceptance of the Torah, and thus rejected.]. However, the way of the offspring of Israel is to be hard to anger and easy to appease. When the sinnes asks him to forgive him, he should forgive wholeheartedly and with a soul that desires to.

Even if he cause him a lot of pain, he should not take revenge and he should not hold a grudge. On the contrary, if the sinner does not wake himself up to go to him to ask forgiveness, it’s proper for the humble person to make himself available to the one who sinned, so that he would ask him forgiveness.

Someone who doesn’t release his hatred by Yom Kippur, his prayer is not listened to, G-d forbid. “And whomever allows his rights to be violated, they [in heaven similarly] pass over his sins.”

ה: יֵשׁ עוֹד הַרְבֵּה דְבָרִים בְּעִנְיַן נִזְקֵי שְׁכֵנִים אוֹ לִבְנֵי רְשׁוּת-הָרַבִּים. וְהַכְּלָל הוּא, שֶׁאָסוּר לַעֲשׂוֹת שׁוּם דָּבָר אֲפִלּוּ בִרְשׁוּתוֹ, וּמִכָּל-שֶׁכֵּן בִּרְשׁוּת-הָרַבִּים, דָּבָר שֶׁיָכוֹל לְהַגִּיעַ מִמֶּנוּ אֵיזֶה הֶזֵּק לִשְׁכֵנוֹ אוֹ לְעוֹבְרִים בִּרְשׁוּת-הָרַבִּים. אִם לֹא בְדָבָר שֶׁפָּשַט הַמִּנְהָג שֶעוֹשֶׂה כֵּן כָּל מִי שֶׁרוֹצֶה, שֶׁהֲרֵי זֶה, כְּאִלּוּ מָחֲלוּ כָּל אַנְשֵׁי הָעִיר, כְּדֵי שֶׁיּוּכַל כָּל אֶחָד לַעֲשׂוֹת כֵּן כְּשֶׁיִצְטָרֵךְ לָזֶה, הוּא אוֹ בָנָיו אַחֲרָיו

There are many more things in the topic of injuring neighbors of people in the public thoroughfare.

The general rule is that it is prohibited to do anything — even within his own property and all the more so on public property — anything that could cause from it some injury to his friend or those who pass in the public domain, if it is not in something that the custom is widespread that anyone who wants to does it. For  in this case [where there is such a widespread custom], it’s as though everyone in the city forgave him so that each of them could do it as well when they need to — them or their children after them.


This explanation reminds me of the social contract theory of law. In Leviathan (written 1651), Thomas Hobbes describes the rise of law as an “occurrence” in which people give up some of their rights in exchange for not being impinged upon by others exercising those same rights. The state exists to enforce that contract.

ב: אֲפִלּוּ מְשָׁרְתוֹ שֶׁאֵינוֹ שׁוֹמֵעַ בְּקוֹלוֹ, אָסוּר לְהַכּוֹתוֹ. אֲבָל מֻתָּר לְהַכּוֹת בָּנָיו הַקְּטַנִּים אוֹ יָתוֹם שֶׁהוּא מְגַדֵּל בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ, כְּדֵי לְהַדְרִיכָם בְּדֶרֶךְ יְשָׁרָה, שֶׁזּוֹהִי טוֹבָתָם

Even if his servants isn’t listening to him, it is prohibited to hit him [the servant]. But it is permissible to hit his children who are minors or an orphan that he is raising in his home in order to teach them the straight path, for this is for their best

ג: צָרִיךְ לִזָּהֵר שֶׁלֹּא לְהַשְלִיךְ שִׁבְרֵי כְּלֵי זְכוּכִית וְכַדּוֹמֶה בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁיּוּכְלוּ לְהַזִּיק

One must be careful not to throw broken glass or the like in a place where they would be likely to injure.

ד: אִם יֵשׁ לִֹשְׁכֵנוֹ חֳלִי הָרֹאשׁ, רַחֲמָנָא לִצְּלָן, וְקוֹל הַהַכָּאָה מַזִּיק לוֹ, לֹא יכְתּוֹשׁ אֲפִלּוּ בְבֵיתוֹ רִיפוֹת וְכַיוֹצֵא בָהֶן, דְּבָרִים שֶׁקּוֹל הַכָּאָתָם מַגִּיעַ לְבֵית שְׁכֵנוֹ וּמַזִּיק לוֹ

If his neighbor has a head illness [migraine?], heaven forbid, and the sound of the banging would harm him, one may not pound medicines and the like even in his house. Anything that the sound of pounding them would reach his neighbors home and harm him.


The halakhah in sei’f 2 implies a requirement to study parenting techniques. Hitting a child is only permissible when it is in their best interest. One has to therefore take all efforts to know when that is.

סִימָן קפד – הִלְכוֹת נִזְקֵי הַגּוּף

184: Laws of Bodily Injury

א: אָסוּר לְאָדָם לְהַכּוֹת אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ. וְאִם הִכָּהוּ, עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר,”וְהָיָ֛ה אִם־בִּ֥ן הַכּ֖וֹת הָרָשָׁ֑ע” וְגוּ’ “אַרְבָּעִ֥ים יַכֶּ֖נּוּ לֹ֣א יֹסִ֑יף פֶּן־יֹסִ֨יף” וְגוֹ’, אִם הִקְפִּידָה הַתּוֹרָה בְּהַכָּאַת הָרָשָׁע שֶׁלֹּא לְהַכּוֹתוֹ יוֹתֵר עַל רִשְׁעוֹ, קַל-וָחֹמֶר בְּהַכָּאַת צַדִּיק. וְכָל הַמֵּרִים יַד עַל חֲבֵרוֹ לְהַכּוֹתוֹ, אַף -עַל-פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הִכָּהוּ, נִקְרָא רָשָׁע, שֶׁנֶאֱמַר,”וַיֹּ֙אמֶר֙ לָֽרָשָׁ֔ע לָ֥מָּה תַכֶּ֖ה רֵעֶֽךָ”, “לָמָּה הִכִּיתָ” לֹא נֶאֱמַר, אֶלָּא “לָמָּה תַכֶּה”, אַף-עַל-פִּי שֶׁעֲדַיִן לֹא הִכָּהוּ, נִקְרָא רָשָׁע. וְכָל מִי שֶׁהִכָּה אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ, הֲרֵי הוּא מָחֳרָם בְּחֵרֶם הַקַּדְמוֹנִים, וְאֵין לְצָרְפוֹ לְמִנְיַן עֲשָׂרָה לְכָל דָּבָר שֶׁבִּקְדֻשָּׁה, עַד שֶׁיַתִּירוּ לוֹ בֵּית-דִּין אֶת הַחֵרֶם, כְּשֶׁמְּקַבֵּל עָלָיו לִשְׁמֹעַ דִּינָם. וְאִם אֶחַד מַכֶּה אוֹתוֹ אוֹ לְישְׂרָאֵל אַחֵר וְאִ אֶפְשָׁר לְהַצִיל אֶת עַצְמוֹ אוֹ אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ מִיַד מַכֵּהוּ אֶלָּא עַל יְדֵי שֶׁיַכֶּה אוֹתוֹ, מֻתָּר לְהַכּוֹתוֹ

A person is prohibited from hitting his friend, and if he does hit him, he violated a prohibition. As it says, “If” the court “must give the wicked person lashes, [the judge will knock him down and whip him before him according to his evil in number." A maximum of under "forty times you shall hit him, no more; [lest you exceed hitting him for these, a great smiting, and your brother will be ashamed before you].” (Devarim 25:2-3) If the Torah was careful with the corporal punishment of someone evil that he should not be hit more than his wickedness [merited], a fortiori with the hitting of a righteous person!

Whomever raises a hand against his friend to hit him, even though he didn’t actually hit him, is called “a wicked person”. As it says, [that Moshe "went out on the 2nd day" from Par'oh's palace "and he saw two men, Hebrews, arguing,] and he said to the wicked one, “Why will you hit your peer?” It does not say, “Why did you hit?” but rather “Why will you hit?” Even though he didn’t hit him yet, he is still called a wicked person.

Whomever hits his friend, he is excommunicated with an excommunication of the ancients. One does not include him to a minyan of ten for any declaration of sanctity until a beis din releases him from the excommunication, when he accepts upon himself to listen to their ruling.

If someone is hitting him or another Jew and there is no way to save himself or his friend from the hand of his attacker accept by hitting him [the attacker], it is permissible to hit him.

ז: אֲפִלּוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת בּרְשׁוּת שֶׁלּוֹ דָּבָר שֶׁהוּא מַזִּיק לִשְׁכֵנוֹ, אָסוּר. לֹא יַנִּיחַ בַּחֲצֵרוֹ סָמוּךְ לְכֹתֶל שֶׁל חֲבֵרוֹ כָּל דָּבָר שֶׁיֵשׁ בּוֹ חֲמִימוּת וּמוֹצִיא הֶבֶל וּמַזִיק אֶת הַחוֹמָה, כְּגוֹן זֶבֶל וְכַדּוֹמֶה, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הִרְחִיק שְׁלשָׁה טְפָחִים. וְכֵן צָרִיךְ לְהַרְחִיק שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁפֹּךְ מַיִם סָמוּךְ לְכֹתֶל חֲבֵרוֹ. וְלָכֵן צִנּוֹר הַמְקַלֵּחַ מִן הַגַּג, צָרִיךְ לְהַרְחִיקוֹ מִכֹּתֶל חֲבֵרוֹ שְׁלשָׁה טְפָחִים. וּמִכָּל-שֶׁכֵּן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁפֹּךְ עָבִיט שֶל מֵי רַגְלַיִם סָמוּךְ לְכֹתֶל חֲבֵרוֹ. וּלְהַשְׁתִּין מַיִם סָמוּךְ לְכֹתֶל חֲבֵרוֹ, אִם הוּא כֹּתֶל שֶׁל אֲבָנִים אוֹ ֹשֶל עֵץ בְּלִי טִיט, דַּי כְשֶׁמַּרְחִיק טֶפַח אֶחָד. וְאִם הָיוּ הָאֲבָנִים צְחִיחַ סֶלַע, אֵינוֹ צָרִיך לְהַרְחִיק כְּלָל, וּמַשְׁתִּין אֲפִלּוּ עַל הַכֹּתֶל. וְאִם הוּא כֹּתֶל ֹשֶל לְבֵנִים אוֹ ֹשֶל עֵץ מְחֻפֶּה בְּטִיט, צָרִיךְ לְהַרְחִיק שְׁלשָׁה טְפָחִים. וְעַיֵן עוֹד בְּסִימָן שֶׁאַחַר זֶה

Even doing something in his own domain something which causes damages to his neighbor is prohibited. He should not place in his courtyard, adjacent to his friend’s wall, anything which has [and gives off] heat, or gives off gases, or would [otherwise] damage the wall, such as manure and the like, unless if he keeps it a distance of 3 tefachim [roughly 9"; enough to keep the heat or fumes from damaging the wall]. Similarly, he has to keep distant so as not to spill water adjacent to his friend’s wall. Therefore, a gutter which drains [water] from the roof, he must distant it[s outlet] 3 tefachim from his friends wall. All the more so not to spill a chamberpot of urine adjacent to his friend’s wall. To urinate adjacent to his friend’s wall, if it is a wall of stone of of wood without tarring [or plaster], it is enough to keep a distance of 1 tefach [3" or so]. If it is of stone fitted into stone, he doesn’t have to keep any distance, and can even urinate against the wall. If it is a brick wall, or of tarred [or plastered] wood, he has to keep a distance of 3 tefachim. See more in the next siman [184, which deals with physical damages; ie injury].


This is for

ה: אָסוּר לִכָּנֵס לְתוֹךְ שְׂדֵה נִיר ֹשֶל חֲבֵרוֹ, מִפְנֵי ֹשֶהוּא דָשׁ נִירוֹ וּמְקַלְקְלוֹ

It is prohibited to enter his friend’s plow-field because you will trample what he plowed and ruin it

ו: אָסוּר לַעֲמֹד עַל שְׂדֵה חֲבֵרוֹ לְהִסְתַּכֵּל בָּה בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁהִיא עוֹמֶדֶת בְּקָמוֹתֶיהָ, שֶׁלֹּא יַזִּיקֶנָּה בְּעַיִן הָרָע. וּמִכָּל-שֶׁכֵּן שֶׁאָסוּר לְהִסְתַּכֵּל בַּחֲבֵרוֹ בְּעִנְיָן שֶׁיֵשׁ לָחוֹּש שֶׁיַזִּיקֶנּוּ בְּעַיִן הָרָע. וַאֲפִלוּ בַּעֲסָקָיו וּבְמַעֲשָׂיו שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶם חֲשַׁשׁ הֶזֵּק עַיִן הָרָע, אִם עוֹשֶׂה בְבֵיתוֹ וּבִרְשׁוּתוֹ, אָסוּר לִרְאוֹת שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעְתּוֹ, כִּי שֶׁמָּא אֵינוֹ חָפֵץ ֹשֶיֵדְעוּ אֲחֵרִים מִמַּעֲשָׂיו וַעֲסָקָיו. וְדֶרֶךְ-אֶרֶץ הוּא כְּשֶׁאֶחָד רוֹאֶה שֶׁחֲבֵרוֹ עוֹסֵק בִּמְלַאכְתּוֹ, יְבָרְכֶנּוּ וְיֹאמַר לוֹ, תַּצְלִיחַ בְּמַעֲשֶׂיךָ

It is prohibited to stand over his friend’s field to look it over while it if standing at full height [ready for harvest], so that ayin hara* does not damage it. All the more so one should not look into [the affairs of] a friend in some matter that one can fear that ayin hara will harm him.

Even in his dealings and actions about which there is no fear of damage through ayin hara, if he does it in his house and his property, it is prohibited to watch without his knowledge, because maybe he doesn’t want others to know of his actions and dealings. [I.e. you are obligated to grant others privacy.]

It is proper conduct that when someone sees his friend busy at his work to bless him and say, “May you succeed in your doings!”


* Ayin hara, litetally “evil eye”, is a term used in the mishnah for jealousy (e.g. Avos 5:19). Since Hashem generally punishes through the means by which the person sinned, a logical punishment for arousing jealousy in others through unnecessary conspicuous consumption is to lose the item in question.

Therefore, even if someone is only somewhat demonstrative about his wealth, and thus you would not grow jealous without taking some effort on your own to look over his success, he is better off if you do not do things to grow jealous of it. This way he will not be punished for his share in causing you that pain.

Talking it over with some friends, it became clear that my posts on this topic required an overview. The explanation got buried among the proofs, and it’s therefore hard to follow the flow of the essential points. It all started with my considering the Leshem. Here we have a mequbal whose works follow the Vilna Ga’on’s approach to Qabbalah and yet also cites the Rambam frequently. This led me to think about the points hared in common between the Rambam’s philosophy, which is usually thought of as Artistotilian Rationaism, and Qabbalah.

  1. According to the Rambam, creation is via a series of angels. First is G-d, the only One who exists without any contingencies, then the highest level of angels, who in turn are the causes of the next level, and so on, down until the Celestial Spheres and finally the physical substances of this world. Each level more contingent than the prior. (Part I)
  2. Angels are both forms without substance and thought independent of matter.(We then explored the identity of form and thought, and how in information theory too, a bit is one aspect of the form, and totally unrelated to the substance or even other aspects of the object’s form.) So, we can equally discuss of a chain of forms down from the most abstract downward into physical substance. And we can also describe this chain of angels as G-d having a thought, who has a thought, who has a thought, etc…
  3. The Rambam also understands events as being initiated by intellects (in consonance with Aristotelian physics). In the case of Divine Will, angels are the intellects that mediate between His Will and physical motion and change. Thus, angels are not only definable as links in the causal chain of the existence of objects, but also in the occurrence of events. (Part III)
  4. Qaballah refers to a Divine Light which is ne’etzal, willfully emanated by G-d (Part II). Unlike forms, Light fills space, thus adding to Qabbalah two concepts not in the Rambam’s discussion:
    1. A hierarchy of olamos, universes that run from concrete physical existence to one step below the Divine.
    2. Tzimtsum, the restriction of that Light. If we view Hashem’s power of creation as  a Light, then the pure white undifferentiated light of G-d must be filtered and differentiated for various things to exist. Creation via tzimtzum is like the projection of a movie in a theater. The film stands between the light and the screen, blocking various parts of the light, narrowing the colors and amount of light that reaches each portion of the screen.
  5. Still, the Leshem identifies this Light with the same concepts as the Rambam’s understanding of existence. The light bridges each world’s forms to those of the world below. The substances of one world are the forms of the world below. The Light actually shines through twice to the next world twice: once as the substances becomes its forms, and a second time as those forms take on substance.
  6. Thus, according to the above, each world contains a set of truths more abstract than the one below. This concept is echoed in Rav Dessler’s explanation of the Maharal’s understanding of miracles. According to the Maharal, the difference between living in a world of natural law or one of miracles depended upon the spirituality of the viewer’s perspective. Even to the extent that two people experience different realities. Rav Dessler elaborates that this is the very difference between worlds. The person for whom the laws of Justice, Morality and Spirituality are more absolute than those of physics will impose that order on the world of his perceptions. And so, miracles will actually violate natural law in conformance with that perception (Mind, Perception, and Metaphysics).
  7. According to the Rambam as well, the prophet is someone who raises his perception to that higher plane. This is the basis of his dispute with the Ramban about the nature of prophecy. According to the Ramban, prophecy is a message relayed via vision. But according to the Rambam, prophecy is a perception of events at a higher plane of reality.Thus, the Rambam says that Avraham’s three visitors came in a prophetic vision and yet actually did save Lot from the real destruction of Sodom. The Abarbanel explains that even though he believes that angels can only be seen through prophetic vision (since they are not physical, and therefore can’t be seen by physical vision), the angels seen in that vision are real, and their actions are real.In contrast, the Ramban has no problem believing that the Man in the throne seen by the elders at Mt Sinai, and by Yirmiyahu and Yechezqeil in their visions of the Divine Chariot actuall was G-d. Because to him, nothing in a vision is real — the Man is simply a symbol in a message, representing G-d. However, to the Rambam’s understanding of prophecy, identifying the Man with G-d would be idolatrous, as it would mean that from the more abstract perspective, G-d had a body. Rather, Maimonides understands the Man as being Kavod Nivra, Created Glory. An entity created to embody G-d’s Kavod, and not Hashem Himself. (Aspaqlaria [title post]).
  8. This distinction — whether the prophet is one who tries to receive G-d’s message or develop his own unity until he himself is on a higher plane, is the root of the “Forks in the Hashkafic Road” category.)
  9. People have this ability to see things at different planes of abstraction. And, if sufficiently holy, to actually lift our perception to that of other worlds. We are unique in this way. Angels are static. Each are on its level, depending upon the type of angel. Each is a slice, one plane along the Divine Light. The physical is the lowest plane of reality. The human soul, however, extends along the entire dimension. We are unique in this way. (Form and InFORMation)
  10. A person’s consiousness is always aware of three things — the plane of abstraction it is focused on, the aspect of the soul on the plane immediately below it, and the aspect of the soul immediately above. This is the root of Naran (see blog category). Since Adam’s expulsion from the garden, people spend most of their existence (barring moments of prophecy or miracle) such that their awareness is from the perspective of the physical world, their lower desires are those of the body, and their loftier ones are those of the Olam haYetzirah, which Rav Dessler (above) defined as the one where the laws of Justice, Kindness and Spirituality operate.
  11. The relationship between soul and brain is therefore NOT as two distinct entities. Rather, the final link in the soul’s chain of forms is embodied in the brain. It is the soul, as it is manifest on the physical plane.
  12. The Nefesh haChaim writes that physical action causes metaphysical change only through people. Only people combine the forces of all the worlds, therefore only through the human soul do changes in one world carry through to others. This is akin to Rav Dessler’s explanation of miracles, a generalization of the idea. Actions change perception, and that’s what changes the underlying metaphysics in how the universe responds. Thus, according to all of the above, in this misnagdic qabbalah, a mezuzah can not protect the home. It’s the act of keeping the mitzvah of mezuzah which impacts the soul and it is that which brings protection to the home. If one does the mitzvah perfectly, checking it as recommended, etc…, and unbeknown to them a letter happened to crack off the parchment, there is no reason to assume the home is any less protected than had the mezuzah been whole.

One more concept not yet raised in this discussion:

  • Somewhere early along this chain of forms/ideas/angels is Chessed. As Hashem lacks nothing, a common observation (made by R’ Saadia Gaon and the Ramchal, to bring two distant examples among many others) is that the only ones to benefit from Creation are the created. Creation occured because “it is the nature of Good to have someone to whom to bestow that good”.
  • However, the ultimate Good would be to share in G-d’s Image, and thus to be able to define ourselves, jusr as G-d Himself is not shaped by external forces (in a more absolute sense).
  • Thus, growing out of Chessed is Gevurah, Divine Restraint, holding back to allow us to make our own mistakes, and also to complete ourselves as we see fit.
  • According to the Malbim (on Dani’el) this is the relationship between Micha’el (Chessed) and Gavriel (Gevurah). But then, we already established that angels are forms (abstractions) / intellects.

(If you see in this the sketching of a pattern that could be carried through to all ten Sephiros as they appear in the Eitz Chaim, that is intentional.)

This shows where the notion of Divine Justice as developed in the first section of my Aseres Yemei Teshuvah reader (where you can find these bullet items developed in far more detail) fits in relation to this larger model. Just as, along the way, I tried to give similar context to the model of the psyche developed on this blog, prophecy, miracles, the split between Chassidim and Misngdim, and a number of my other recurring topics.

ד: אָסוּר לִמְסֹר ישְׂרָאֵל בְּיַד גּוֹיִם, בֵּין גּוּפּוֹ בֵּין מָמוֹנוֹ, בֵּין בְּמַעֲשֶׂה בֵּין בְּדִבּוּר, לְהַלְשִׁין עָלָיו אוֹ לְגַלוֹת מַצְפּוּנָיו. וְכָל הַמּוֹסֵר, אֵין לוֹ חֵלֶק לָעוֹלָם הַבָּא. וַאֲפִלּוּ רָשָׁע וּבַעַל עֲבֵרוֹת, אָסוּר לְמָסְרוֹ לֹא גוּפּוֹ וְלֹא מָמוֹנוֹ, וַאֲפִלּוּ הוּא מֵצֵר לוֹ וּמְצַעֲרוֹ תָמִיד בִּדְבָרִים. אֲבָל אִם חֲבֵרוֹ מוֹסֵר אוֹתוֹ וְאִי-אֶפְֹשָר לְהַצִּיל אֶת עַצְמוֹ אֶלָּא עַל יְדֵי שֶׁיִמְסֹר אוֹתוֹ, מֻתָּר

If it prohibited to surrender on a Jew to the control of non-Jews, whether bodily or with respect to his money, whether through action or speech, to inform on him or to reveal his hiding place. Whomever surrenders [a fellow Jew] has no place in the World to Come. Even someone who is evil and a master of sin, it is prohibited to turn him over, neither his body or his money. Even if he is a troublemaker to him and causes him problems constantly with his words. However, if his friend turns him in, and there is no way to save himself except through turning in [the informer] it is permitted.


None of the above applies to eliminating someone who is dangerous to the community who can not be removed in some other way. In other words, while informing on a fellow Jew to non-Jewish authorities is prohibited, allowing a child molester (for example) to continue posing a danger to our children is a greater prohibition. If someone finds themselves in this situation, one must consult with communal leaders to see if the authorities are a necessary means of getting him off the streets, and if so, speak with rabbis about the permissible way to do so.

ג: וְכֵן חֵיל מֶלֶךְ שֶׁבָּא לְעִיר, וּבְנֵי הָעִיר מְחֻיָּבִים לָתֵת לָהֶם אַכְסַנְיָא, אָסוּר לְאֶחָד לִתֵּן שָׂכָר לְשַֹר הַחַיִל לְפָטְרוֹ, כִּי עַל יְדֵי זֶה יִגְרֹם נֶזֶק לְישְׂרָאֵל אַחֵר. וְכֵן בְּכָל שְׁאָר עִנְיְנֵי מִסִּים, אָסוּר לְהִשְׁתַּדֵּל אֵצֶל הַשַּׂר לְפָטְרוֹ, אִם עַל יְדֵי זֶה יַכְבִּיד עַל אֲחֵרִים . וְהָעוֹשֶׂה כֵּן, נִקְרָא מָסוֹר

Similarly, if the king’s army enters the city and the people of the city are obligated to provide them hospitality, one is prohibited to pay off the general of the troups to get him out of it. Because through this he will cause damage to someone else. Similarly in all other matters of taxes, it is prohibited to make efforts by the general to release him, if through this [the tax] will be heavier on others. And one who does this is called an “informer”.