Shabbat and Gentile Lives
by Gil Student
I
The recent passing of Dr. Israel Shahak[*] marks the end of a very controversial career.
Dr. Shahak, a chemistry professor and human rights activist who spent a lifetime criticizing
Israel's treatment of Palestinians, will probably be best remembered for his theories about
the basis of the treatment he so denounced. He proposed that Israel's relations with Palestinians
are based on a history of religious racism. Jews, Shahak claims, have been so conditioned by
their religion to hate Gentiles that even the anti-religious Zionists have retained this aspect
of their Jewish heritage. Through scholarship with which an average Yeshiva student can find
fault, Shahak culled source after source from Talmud and halakhah that he claimed demonstrated
that Judaism is a fundamentally racist and hateful religion[1]. While his scholarship may have been less than
rigorous, some of his points hit close to mark. It behooves us, as sensitive Jews devoted to
halakhah, to examine his work and attempt to wade through the mistakes and evaluate whether,
indeed, he may have raised issues of concern. This is certainly not an attempt to redeem the
legacy of a man who has caused so much anti-Jewish hatred and violence. It is an effort to learn
from one of our critics.
This author is not arrogant enough to try to judge Judaism based on
whatever artificial values are currently popular. However, the attempt to understand Judaism based
on the ideals of our contemporary society serves a number of purposes. The first is to note
contradictions between these ideals and those of the Torah as we understand it. As Jews committed
to Torah, we need to know when our values are not the same as those of the society around us, if
not for our own understanding then to know what to reject from the outside world. Second, if one
particular aspect of Torah seems to contradict a value that emanates from another part of Torah
then we need to resolve this conflict. And third, this effort can help us arrive at a deeper
understanding of Torah. We hope that this essay will fulfill all three goals on its chosen topic.
More than anything, the episode that propelled Dr. Shahak into the
international spotlight was his claim to have witnessed in 1965 an injured Gentile left to die
because an Orthodox Jew would not allow his telephone to be used on Shabbat to call for help[2]. While it is certainly difficult to understand exactly
what prohibition is involved in allowing someone else to use one's telephone on Shabbat[3], Shahak claims that he contacted a rabbinic court
that confirmed that this Orthodox Jew's actions were appropriate and even pious. Subsequent to this,
Shahak alerted the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz which reported his story and thrust this episode into
the public view. Attempts to verify Shahak's story have failed and no deceased Gentile or rabbinic
court could be identified as having taken part in this tale[4].
However, this did not deter the story from spreading and creating controversy.
The details of the story, or whether it even happened, are not relevant
right now. What is important is the idea that Shahak so maliciously tried to demonstrate. Let us,
therefore, examine this issue. May we violate Shabbat in order to save someone's life and, if so, why
and for whose life?
II
It has become ingrained within
the Jewish psyche, and rightly so, that Shabbat must be violated to save a
life. The proverbial "man on the
street" will not hesitate to report that pikuah nefesh overrides
Shabbat considerations. However, while the practical rule is well known,
the halakhic reasoning behind it is probably not as famous. Many will likely
explain that human life is more important than Shabbat, and, as we shall see,
there is basis for this explanation[5]. Is this reason correct? Let us examine it. (To avoid confusion,
let us state at the outset that we will conclude that this reason is incorrect.)
This explanation requires
immediate qualification when it is noted that, at least theoretically, Shabbat
may not be violated for a Gentile[6]. While the ruling that allows violating
Shabbat to save the life of a Gentile has been generally accepted[7], it is for an ancillary reason
and does not contradict the theoretical premise that Shabbat should not be violated to save a Gentile.
Therefore, the reasoning behind pikuah nefesh must be amended to state
that a Jewish life is more important than Shabbat.
From this theoretical stance, Dr.
Shahak inferred that Gentile lives are unimportant to Judaism.
But is this true? Does the evidence support this explanation?
Evidently not, when it is noted
that, theoretically, Shabbat may not be violated to save the life of a
non-observant Jew[8]. While again, for an ancillary reason,
Shabbat is violated[9], the common
explanation for pikuah nefesh must be
modified to state that only the life of an observant Jew is more important than
Shabbat. This alone disproves Shahak’s
inference. The permission to violate
Shabbat is not dependent on race or religion because non-observant Jews are
included with Gentiles.
To complicate matters even more,
Ramban[10]
writes that we violate Shabbat to save a Ger Toshav, a Gentile who has
officially accepted on himself to live a righteous life.
It now seems that some Gentile lives and
some Jewish lives are more important than Shabbat and some not.
The logic that pikuah nefesh is about
the importance of lives is no longer as compelling as it once was.
Indeed, we would be remiss if we did not search for a more viable
explanation.
As we shall see, a close
reading of the sources shows that there is no evaluation that some lives are
more important than Shabbat while others are not.
There is no implicit message that Gentile lives are less
significant than Jewish lives. No life
is more important than Shabbat. What
are more important are the future commandments that a person will observe.
In other words, the one commandment of
Shabbat may be violated to allow someone to fulfill many commandments in the
future. No life, whether Jewish,
Gentile, observant, or non-observant, is more important than following the G-d-given
laws of Shabbat. However, many
commandments are more important than one commandment and only they can override
the Shabbat regulations.
The locus classicus for
the source of why saving a life overrides Shabbat is a passage in Yoma (85a-b)
in which six Tannaitic and one Amoraic reasons are given.
The last Tannaitic reason is as follows:
R. Shimon ben
Menasia said: "The Children of Israel shall observe the Shabbat [to make
the Shabbat an eternal covenant for generations]" (Exodus 31:16) The Torah
said to violate one Shabbat for him so that he may observe many future
Shabbatot.
According to R. Shimon ben
Menasia, part of observing any given Shabbat is the making of Shabbat into an
eternal covenant. In the case of saving
someone's life, violating Shabbat to save the endangered and allow him to
observe future Shabbatot serves more to make Shabbat an eternal covenant than
observing Shabbat and allowing the person to die[11].
However, the Talmud notes that this only
applies to someone who will definitely observe many future Shabbatot.
The Scriptural exegesis only permits
violation of one Shabbat when there is a certainty that this will lead to the
observance of many future Shabbatot.
When there is a doubt, for example a terminally ill patient who may not
live until the next Shabbat, the verse gives no permission to violate Shabbat
regulations. Therefore, the conclusion
of the Talmudic passage is that only the Amoraic reason of Shmuel satisfies all
of the questions. Shmuel is quoted by
R. Yehudah as saying:
"And live
by them" (Leviticus 18:5) and not that one should die by them.
The implication is unclear but
seems to be that one's observance of Torah commandments should not lead to
one's death. How this leads to the
conclusion that one person can violate Shabbat to save another person is not
explained[12]. However, the Talmud assumes that this
applies even to a case of doubt.
III
1) It appears from the passage
that all of the Tannaitic reasons are rejected, including R. Shimon ben
Menasia's, because they do not apply to cases of doubt[13].
Shmuel's reason is accepted as authoritative
and is the one most familiar to the average Jew.
With this in mind, the following passage from Shabbat (151b) is
quite surprising.
It is taught: R.
Shimon ben Gamliel said, "We violate Shabbat for a one day old baby.
The Torah said to violate one Shabbat for
him so that he may observe many Shabbatot."
If this reason has been rejected,
why is it brought again? Why does the
Talmud not note that it is rejected and bring Shmuel's reason?
While it can be argued that this entire
passage disagrees with that in Yoma or was composed prior to it, the following
post-Talmudic statements cannot be dismissed in that way.
2) The author of Halakhot
Gedolot[14] says that
Shabbat may be violated even to save a fetus.
Ramban[15] explains
that even though a fetus is not a person and someone who kills it is not
executed[16],
we still say “Violate one Shabbat for him so that he may observe many
Shabbatot."Surely Ramban knew
that this reason was rejected in Yoma.
3) While discussing the emergency
powers of the high court, Rambam[17]
writes that the court can temporarily suspend a commandment or prohibition if
this action will serve to keep many in the fold or assist many to return to
Judaism. Rambam concludes with the
following:
Just like a
doctor will cut off someone's arm or leg so that his totality will live, so too
the court can rule at certain times to temporarily violate some commandments in
order that they will all [eventually] be fulfilled.
It is like the early sages said, “Violate one Shabbat for him so
that he may observe many Shabbatot."
Again, we see this rejected
opinion quoted. Here, it is cited not
because of its exegetical merit but because of its compelling logic.
This will prove to be significant.
4) R. Menahem Meiri, in his
commentary to the Mishnah in Yoma (83a), writes that we violate Shabbat to
extend a dying person’s life, even minimally, because in that short time he may
repent and confess his sins (to G-d).
This seems to imply that the reason for violating Shabbat is not that
the temporary life is more important.
Rather, the potential mitzvah[18]
Yet, that seems to
be R. Shimon ben Menasia’s reject view.
5) R. Yosef Karo in his Beit
Yosef[19] deals with
the unfortunate case of a young girl who is kidnapped by Christians, a not
uncommon occurrence in Medieval Europe.
May Shabbat be violated to rescue this girl even though her life is not
in danger?R. Karo concludes that one
may violate Shabbat to rescue this girl and rules that way in his Shulhan
Arukh[20]. While his precise logic will be dealt with
shortly, it is noteworthy that R. Avraham Gombiner in his Magen Avraham[21]
explains this ruling by invoking the rule “Violate one Shabbat for him so that
he may observe many Shabbatot."
Since only through violation of Shabbat will this girl remain an
observant Jew, the potential of many future observed Shabbatot overrides the
prohibitions of this one Shabbat. Yet,
how can this rule be invoked if it is rejected in Yoma?
6) While we have already quoted
the talmudic passage that discusses life threatening situations on Shabbat,
there is another passage that discusses in general what to do when the
observance of a commandment poses a threat to one's life.
In Sanhedrin (74a) there is a majority
opinion that a person can never violate adultery, forbidden sexual union, and
murder even if he must be martyred for this stance.
However, any other commandment may be violated rather than
sacrifice his life.This is derived from
the verse (Leviticus 18:5) "And live by them."
There is also a differentiation between
public and private actions and times of peace versus times of oppression[22].
On the following column (74b),
the Talmud debates whether a Gentile must sacrifice his life before violating
one of his seven commandments[23]. Tosafot[24]
record the following question. How it
is possible to suggest that a Gentile is not obligated to give up his
life? The source for the permission to
violate the law is from "And live by them" which only applies to Jews[25].
Gentiles do not have this latitude and
therefore must accept martyrdom.
Rather, it is explained in Tosafot, "And live by them" is not
the basis of saving one's life by violating a commandment.
We already know that we should do that.
However, once we derive that we cannot
violate idolatry, forbidden sexual union, and murder perhaps we will compare
all commandments to those three. It is
for this that we need "And live by them."
This verse teaches us not to extend the stricture from those
three prohibitions to all commandments.
However, the basic underlying reasoning, before we arrive at "And
live by them," is that we violate commandments to save our lives and this
applies to both Jews and Gentiles. What
is this reasoning? R. Reuven Margoliyot[26]
suggests that it is “Violate one Shabbat for him so that he may observe many
Shabbatot." Here, too, we use the
logic of violating one commandment so that many will be fulfilled[27].
It is now much harder to say that
this reason has been rejected in favor of "And live by them."<
While that dismissal seems to be clear in
Yoma, Tosafot imply that the two reasons coexist.
However, if they are complementary, why does the Gemara in Yoma
reject the reason of “Violate one Shabbat…"[28]?
IV
Let us return to the passage in
Yoma (85a-b) and, this time, analyze it more carefully.
While the source for this passage is the
Mekhilta on Exodus 31:13, we shall focus on the more familiar passage in the
Gemara and note differences in notes[29]
For the sake of presentation, we will divide
the passage into a number of sections and discuss each section individually.
R. Yishmael, R.
Akiva, and R. Elazar ben Azariah[30]
were once walking and Levi HaSadar and R. Yishmael the son of R. Elazar ben
Azariah were walking behind them. The
following question was asked to them: From where do we know that saving
someone's life -- pikuah nefesh --
overrides Shabbat?
These three great sages of the
Mishnah were walking and two of their students were following.
The students asked a question and put their
teachers on the spot. As an aside, it
is interesting to note that the assumption of the question is that saving a
life overrides Shabbat observance.
Evidently, this was a pre-existing tradition and the students requested
halakhic justification of this permission.
As with so much of the Talmudic material, this was part of the oral
Torah transmitted through the ages.
These sages were only interested in relating this tradition to sources.
As we shall see, each of these
three sages answered in a technical fashion.
Rather than offering a conceptual reason why saving a life should
override Shabbat, they tried to prove logically that it did.
However, from their proofs we can deduce an
underlying reason for this halakhah.
R. Yishmael
answered: It says, "If the thief is discovered while tunneling in[, and he
is struck and dies, there is no blood-guilt on his account]" (Exodus
22:1). If there, where this thief may
be coming for money or may be coming to kill, and bloodshed renders the land
impure and causes the divine presence to leave Israel, one is still permitted
to kill him to save one's life kal va-homer (a
fortiori) that saving someone's life should override Shabbat.
R. Yishmael derives the
permission to violate Shabbat from the verse regarding someone whose house is
invaded by an intruder. Unsure whether
this intruder is merely a thief or is a murderer, this person has Biblical
permission to defend himself even if that means killing the intruder.
Even though bloodshed is a terrible sin, it
is permitted for this person to commit bloodshed in defense of himself.
Saving his own life overrides the
prohibition of bloodshed.
R. Yishmael argues that if when
there is a doubt whether one's life is in danger one can still override a prohibition,
and this prohibition is a very serious one, then certainly a definite danger to
one's life overrides the lesser prohibition of Shabbat.
In other words, if possibly saving my life
is more important than murder then certainly a definite saving of my life is
more important than Shabbat. According
to R. Yishmael, life, as we suggested earlier, is more important than Shabbat
observance.
R. Akiva
answered[31]:
"If a man acts intentionally against his fellow [to kill him with guile,
from My altar shall you take him to die]" (Exodus 21:14) -- From My altar
but not from on top of My altar. Rabbah
bar Bar Hanah said in the name of R. Yohanan: This was taught only regarding to
kill but to let live, even from on top of My altar.
If there, where there is a doubt whether his words are
substantive and the worship overrides Shabbat kal va-homer that saving a
life should override Shabbat.
This requires a bit of
explanation. The verse tells us that a
murderer may be taken away from the altar.
However, the implication of the verse is that only someone who is next
to the altar may be taken away. Someone
who is on top of the altar, i.e. in the middle of the sacrificial service,
cannot be taken away. The court's
officers must wait for the worship to finish before taking away the
suspect. R. Akiva implies, and R.
Yohanan explains, that this is only regarding someone wanted for committing a
crime. If the officers wish to take him
away to punish him, they must wait until after he is finished.
However, if there is someone else on trial
and this person's testimony is required to acquit him, then saving the
accused's life overrides the service and the witness is taken away from on top
of the altar.
R. Akiva then argues that since
life overrides the sacrificial worship and the worship overrides Shabbat, logic
dictates that saving a life should also override Shabbat.
Here, however, we are unable to detect an
underlying reason for this permission.
All that we know is that saving someone's life overrides the sacrificial
services and Shabbat. While we can
speculate as to R. Akiva's reason, the texts do not give us an indication.[32]
R. Elazar
answered: If circumcision, which affects only one of the 248 limbs[33]
in a human, overrides Shabbat kal
va-homer that an entire body should override Shabbat.
R. Elazar offers what, at first,
seems like a very straightforward answer based on the accepted rule that
circumcision of an eight-day old baby is performed on Shabbat[34].
If we will violate Shabbat for only one
limb, certainly we will violate Shabbat to save a life.
However, on closer examination
the logic is somewhat elusive.
Circumcision and saving a life are not comparable.
The former is fulfilling the Biblical
mandate to circumcise a child. The
latter is about saving someone's life.
Just because we perform a mitzvah
on a limb on Shabbat does not imply that we will save someone's life.
R. Hananel[35]
suggests that an uncircumcised child is, in fact, in a life-threatening danger[36].
>From the fact that we will override Shabbat to
perform the life-saving circumcision we can infer that we will override Shabbat
for any life-saving activity. Yet, the kal va-homer is then lost.
Since both circumcision and saving a life
are equivalent, there is no lesser case that implies the circumstance in a
greater case. The language used by R.
Elazar ben Azariah makes R. Hananel's explanation difficult.
Additionally, only circumcision of an
eight-day old baby overrides Shabbat. A
nine-day old baby who, for whatever reasons, is still uncircumcised cannot be
circumcised on Shabbat[37].He must wait until Sunday.
However, according to R. Hananel this child
is also in danger and his circumcision should also override Shabbat[38].
Rashba[39]
offers another explanation that alleviates all of these concerns.
As he explains in the name of Tosafot[40],
circumcision is a mitzvah. If performing this one mitzvah overrides
Shabbat, then certainly we can save a life that will perform many
mitzvot. It is not danger to someone's life that overrides Shabbat
observance. Rather, it is the
fulfillment, or potential fulfillment, of commandments.
We are permitted to save someone's life on
Shabbat because this person will observe commandments in the future.
According to R. Elazar ben Azariah,
commandments, not life, override Shabbat observance.
Thus in the earliest discussion
of why saving someone's life overrides Shabbat we find a basic
disagreement. According to R. Yishmael,
life overrides Shabbat. According to R.
Elazar ben Azariah, commandments override Shabbat.
Alas, R. Akiva's view remains undetermined.
This is the end of the discussion
from the walk in which the students asked their teachers from where we know
that saving a life overrides Shabbat.
However, appended to this story are answers given by later generations.
Unlike the earlier answers, which were
attempts to derive an answer from logic, these answers are based on biblical
exegesis.
R. Yossi ben R.
Yehudah[41]
said: "However (akh), you must
observe My Sabbaths" (Exodus 31:13) -- It could have been for everything
but we learn from "however (akh)"
to distinguish[42].
Here we see an example of
rabbinic examination of the precise language of Scripture.
What purpose does the word "akh" serve in this verse?
English translations may render it
"however" or "nevertheless" but these translations do not
necessarily represent the precise Hebrew meaning.
The Talmud[43]
has many cases in which the word "akh"
is shown to separate out an exceptional case44].
Its purpose in a biblical sentence is to
limit the statement much like "however" can do.
For example, "Walk slowly; however,
while playing sports run quickly."
Here, "however" limits the previous statement.
In Hebrew, "rak" serves that purpose.
Akh"
similarly limits a statement. However,
rather than limiting a previous statement it implies that the current statement
is a limit."Run specifically
while playing sports." Here,
"specifically" shows that the current statement that one should run
while playing sports is an exception.
>From that sentence, we know that most times one should not run.
In our verse, we are told that we
must observe Shabbat. "Akh" shows that this statement
is limited and teaches us that this is an exception to the rule.
How can observing Shabbat be an exception to
the rule?The key to answering this
question is to note that "Sabbaths" is in plural.
We are told that we must observe many
Shabbatot and that this is an exception to the rule. R. Yossi ben Yehudah made
the connection between this grammatical analysis and the already existing
halakhah that saving a life overrides
Shabbat observance. If someone's life
is in danger, and should he perish he would obviously not be able to observe
any further Shabbatot, one Shabbat may be violated in order to enable him to
observe many future Shabbatot. In other
words, observing many Shabbatot is the exception to the rule of observing one
Shabbat. The exception that "akh"
implies is that Shabbat can be set aside in order to facilitate the observance
of many Shabbatot[45].
In relation to the dispute between
R. Yishmael and R. Elazar ben Azariah over whether life overrides Shabbat or
commandments override Shabbat, it seems that R. Yossi ben Yehudah would side
with R. Elazar ben Azariah. R. Yossi
ben Yehudah sees commandments, observance of future Shabbatot, as overriding
the prohibitions of Shabbat.
R. Yonatan ben
Yosef[46]
said: "For it is holy to you" (Exodus 31:14) -- It is given to your
hands and not you to its hands.
This is a very simple and
straightforward reason. Shabbat is
given to people and not vice versa.
Therefore, a person's life takes precedence over Shabbat.
Within the dispute between R. Yishmael and
R. Elazar ben Azariah, R. Yonatan ben Yosef is clearly on R. Yishmael's side
that life overrides Shabbat.
R. Shimon ben
Menasia[47]
said: "The Children of Israel shall observe the Shabbat [to make the
Shabbat an eternal covenant for generations]" (Exodus 31:16) The Torah
said to violate one Shabbat for him so that he may observe many future
Shabbatot.
This is the explanation that was
discussed towards the beginning of this essay.
R. Shimon ben Menasia clearly states that one may violate Shabbat if
that violation leads to the observance of future Shabbatot.
He agrees with R. Elazar ben Azariah that
commandments override Shabbat and not life[48].
After these six Tannaitic answers
to the question of from where do we know that saving a life overrides Shabbat,
the Talmud gives us one Amoraic answer[49].
R. Yehudah said
in the name of Shmuel: If I was there,
I would have said that my reason is better than all of yours. "And live by
them" (Leviticus 18:5) and not that one should die by them.
As we have already explained,
Shmuel's answer, which is accepted by this Talmudic passage as final, is
explained by Tosafot as presuming that one may violate Shabbat in order to
facilitate future observance of Shabbat.
"And live by them" only teaches us not to draw the wrong
inference and assume that since with regard to idolatry, forbidden sexual
union, and murder one must give up one's life, so too by every mitzvah.
To prevent that incorrect comparison, the
Torah tells us "And live by them."
However, the underlying reason why we may violate a precept to save
someone's life is that he will thereby be able to fulfill future commandments.
Thus we see that aside from the
seven-way dispute over the Scriptural/logical basis for this
halakhah, there is a more fundamental
dispute over its nature. According to
R. Yishmael and R. Yonatan ben Yosef, saving a life overrides Shabbat because a
life is more important than Shabbat observance.
However, according to R. Elazar ben Azariah, R. Yossi ben
Yehudah, R. Shimon ben Menasia, and Shmuel, only future observance of
commandments overrides current prohibitions and allows the saving of a life on
Shabbat. It is not worldly concerns
that override the spirituality of Shabbat.
Rather the spiritual value of future observance overrides the current
Shabbat. This is the view that is
accepted by the Talmud.
V
What we have seen is that while
the Talmud rejects the many different derivations of the permission to violate
Shabbat in order to save a life, it does not necessarily reject the underlying
logics. Indeed, many of the different
derivations agree regarding the logic.
We can say that R. Shimon ben Menasia’s phrase “Violate one Shabbat for
him so that he may observe many future Shabbatot” is not unique to his
derivation. It is a statement to which
two other Tannaim and Shmuel would agree.
Thus, when the Talmud accepts Shmuel’s derivation, it is implicitly
accepting R. Shimon ben Menasia’s reason (but not his derivation) because,
conceptually, he agrees with Shmuel.
Given that, when the Talmud in
Shabbat (151b) cites R. Shimon ben Menasia’s logic of
“Violate one Shabbat for him so that he may observe many future
Shabbatot” it is not siding with R. Shimon ben Menasia in the argument over the
derivation of this rule. Rather, it is
using his eloquent phrasing to represent the majority and final opinion
regarding the logic of the permission.
Ramban, too, utilizes this phrasing to explain why Shabbat may be
violated to save a fetus. Similarly,
Meiri used this logic, which is accepted by the Talmud, to explain the
underlying Mishnah.
This logic, to which Shmuel
agrees, is, according to Tosafot, the underlying reason of saving one's life by
violating a commandment. This also
explains why the Rambam, whose passion for noting Biblical sources of laws is
well documented, only cited the logic of “Violate one Shabbat…" and not
its Scriptural derivation. According to
Shmuel, there is no Biblical source for this permission.
Let us return to R. Yosef Karo's
discussion. He ruled that Shabbat may
be violated to save a young girl from apostasy and R. Avraham Gombiner cited
“Violate one Shabbat…" as a basis for this ruling.
Not unbeknownst to R. Gombiner, R. Karo
cited as his basis the language used in Shabbat (4a) "Sin so that your
friend will benefit." Evidently,
that rule is logically equivalent to that of “Violate one Shabbat…"
However, the circumstances in which it
appears is not appropriate to the language of “Violate one Shabbat…"[50]
This equivalence should not be surprising
because both rules share the same underlying logic -- sometimes it is necessary
to violate a commandment in order to further greater observance.
Indeed, given this understanding,
we can gain greater insight into a passage on Avodah Zarah (26a).
Regarding a midwife treating a Gentile
pregnant woman, R. Yosef suggested that the midwife should perform her services
because of evah, which can perhaps be translated as “bad feelings”.
Gentiles would certainly resent this action
so, rather than risk the consequences of refraining, the midwife should violate
Shabbat and treat the woman. Abaye says
that the midwife should refrain and say “For us, who observe Shabbat, I can
violate Shabbat to treat. For you, who
do not observe Shabbat, I cannot violate it.”
Based on our understanding, Abaye
is suggesting that Gentiles will accept a cogent and reasonable
explanation. If we are to clarify to
them that we can only violate Shabbat for commandments, including those
observed by a non-Jewish Ger Toshav according to the ruling of Ramban, they
will not bear any “bad feelings” over this religious obligation.
In Abaye’s time, Gentiles understood and
were respectful of religious obligations and would not have taken offense when
these restrictions were adhered to.
What
we have seen is that the laws about for whom Shabbat may be violated are not a
definition of whose life is important and whose is unimportant.
There is no implicit message that Jewish
lives are more important than Shabbat while Gentile lives are not.
No life is more important than following
G-d's word. Rather, these rules are
qualifications of how to follow the laws.
The main goal is to maximize observance and, with regard to Shabbat,
that means only violating it if this will lead to greater observance in the
future. An observant Jew or a Ger Toshav will observe many future commandments
and, therefore, violating one law today will lead to the observance of many
future laws in the future.
VI
The question that still
needs to be asked is how a religious system can give precedence to rules over
life. How can observance of Shabbat be
more important than saving a person? It
seems like these rules are the product of a stale bureaucracy and not a system
that has been called a “tree of life” whose “ways are ways of pleasantness.[51]”
This impression, however, is
based on a limited focus. One has to
look beyond the apparent to understand this issue.
As we see life, it begins at birth and ends at death.
However, Judaism teaches that there is more
to life than worldly existence and more to man than his physical self.
Conventional wisdom has it
that Judaism is a this-worldly religion while, in contrast, Christianity is
next-worldly. Conveniently, this
aphorism glosses over the ascetic and pietistic strains of Judaism.
More crucially, however, is that all
segments of traditional Judaism affirm a certain degree of
next-worldliness. Even Maimonides, who
is frequently cited as the paragon of this-worldliness, agrees that man must be
concerned regarding his place in eternity.
Every person is imbued with a soul that can remain forever[52].
Man’s actions and intellectual attainments
in this world define how he will spend the eternity of the next world[53].
A focus on the spiritual, on the one thing
that will last forever, is critical in Maimonides’ thought.
How does man perfect his
soul, his own piece of eternity? This
crucial question is not one that lends itself to a human answer.
How can a finite person know what is best
for an infinite soul? However, G-d has
given us detailed instructions on how to refine our souls – through
mitzvot. Every commandment we fulfill
makes an indelible mark on our soul[54]. Whether it be by following in G-d’s ways and
thereby making a soul more divine-like, or by acknowledging G-d’s immanent
presence and thereby drawing a soul closer to G-d, following mitzvot has
tremendous spiritual effects[55].
In contrast, man’s physical
life is fleeting. Pleasures are temporary;
joys are short-lived. Physical
existence in itself lasts only approximately eighty years.
After that, one spends an eternity in the
spiritual[56]. While there are many important things man
can do in this world, his ultimate goal is to prepare his soul for the rest of
time. There is a disagreement among
Jewish philosophers over the focus in this world.
According to some, this world must be spent focused on the next[57]. As the Mishnah[58]
says, “This world is like a corridor before the world-to-come.”
The other view is that man has an opportunity
in this world to rise to great spiritual heights, to bring a measure of the
eternal into this ephemeral world[59]. However, all agree that the eternal is our
focus. Refining souls, mending worlds,
fulfilling commandments – these are man’s duty in this world.
R. Yisrael Salanter[60]
asked why a righteous person should not want to die.
Granted, suicide is forbidden, but if he happens to die we should
be happy for him. In this world there
is always the possibility that he may sin but in the next world he is on the
highest plane. While the average person
needs to remain in this world to refine his soul, the righteous have already
done so. Why should he not want to die? There are a number of possible
answers to this. However, the question
alone brings into sharp focus what man’s duty is in this world.
This is not meant to
minimize the importance of this world.
It is only here that man has the ability to choose his destiny and it is
only here that man can improve his lot.
Mitzvot, perfecting the soul, are only for this world[61].
In this sense, man’s existence in this
physical world is more divine-like that in the spiritual world.
Here, man, like G-d, can create[62]!
Here, man can finish his soul by perfecting
it. It is in this world that man
retains this aspect of the divine image.
Yet, as we said before, man
must remain focused. The Talmud
concludes, “It would have been better for man had he not been born but now that
he has been he should examine (some read: improve) his ways.”[63]
It is our effect on the eternal that is
crucial. Granted, physical pleasures
are acceptable and even encouraged in moderation[64]
– hence Judaism’s alleged this-worldliness.
However, this is only to strengthen us in our mission to make permanent
and everlasting changes.
With this said, it is
therefore crucial to evaluate the world from this broad, eternal
perspective. When making choices and
determining what is right, we must look at the long-term ramifications.
In our case of violating Shabbat to save a
life, we are dealing with Shabbat violation – an occurrence that has eternal
ramifications – and someone’s fleeting physical life.
Regardless of what happens, this person’s soul will remain forever.
The only question is about his temporary,
physical life. Looking at this with our
broad perspective, temporary life cannot take precedence over a permanent
change. This-worldly life cannot trump
next-worldly life. Only commandments
themselves, many eternal changes, can override one eternal change.
It is the greatest eternal effect that must
determine what takes precedence.
When Dr. Shahak criticized
Judaism of being racist by denying medical treatment to Gentiles on Shabbat, he
was wrong on many counts. First, this
is not practiced today[65],
as can be evidenced by the treatment of Gentiles by Jewish doctors in Sha’arei
Tzedek Hospital in Jerusalem or by Hatzoloh volunteers in New York.
Second, the determination is not
race-driven. In theory, it applies to
both non-religious Jews and Gentiles. It
also does not apply to all Gentiles.
As we have seen from Ramban, we are allowed to violate Shabbat to save
Gentiles who have officially accepted on themselves to live righteous
lives. Third, and perhaps most
importantly, the permission, or lack thereof, to violate Shabbat to save
someone’s life is not in any way a valuation of that person’s life because no
life, whether Jewish or Gentile, is more important than Shabbat.
* This
article was written shortly after Dr. Shahak’s death on July 2, 2001.
I would like to thank Yisrael
Dubitsky and Micha Berger for their help in preparing this article. They bear no responsibility for its final
content.
[1]
His treatments of this topic have become so popular that there are hundreds of
websites containing summaries or quotations of his work.
At least one of his books, Jewish
History, Jewish Religion - The Weight of Three Thousand Years, has been
placed entirely on the internet.
[2]
Israel Shahak, Jewish History, Jewish Religion - The Weight of Three
Thousand Years, ch. 1
[3]
Cf. Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayim 246:1; R. Yehezkel Landau, Dagul
Mervavah, Yoreh Deah 151 on Shakh 6.
[4]
R. Immanuel Jakobovits, “A Modern Blood Libel – L’Affaire Shahak,” Tradition,
vol. 8 no. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 58-65.
[5]
Cf. Rashi, Sanhedrin 74a sv sevara; R. Yisrael Meir Kagan, Mishnah Berurah
329:4 Biur Halakhah sv ela.
[7]
R. Moshe Sofer, Responsa Hatam Sofer, Yoreh Deah 131, Hoshen Mishpat
194; R. Yisrael Lifschitz, Tiferet Yisrael, Avodah Zarah 2:6; R. Hayim
Halberstam, Responsa Divrei Hayim vol. 2 Orah Hayim 25; R. Shalom David
Ungvar, Responsa Yad Shalom 57; R. Mordekhai Ya'akov Breisch, Responsa
Helkat Ya'akov vol. 2 54; R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Moshe vol. 4,
49; R. Yitzhak Ya'akov Weiss, Responsa Minhat Yitzhak, vol. 1 53, vol. 3
20, vol. 10 31:14; R. Eliezer Yehudah Waldenburg, Responsa Tzitz Eliezer,
vol. 8 15:6; R. Ovadia Yosef, Responsa Yabia Omer, vol. 8 Orah Hayim 38;
R. Shlomo Zalman Braun, She'arim Metzuyanim Bahalakhah, 92:1; R. Zvi
Hirsch Shapira, Darkhei Teshuvah, 158:3; R. Yehoshua Yishayahu Neuwirth,
Shemirat Shabbat Kehilkhatah ch. 40 n. 42; R. Simhah Benzion Rabinowitz,
Piskei Teshuvot, 390:2
[8]
R. Yosef Teomim, Pri Megadim, Orah Hayim 328 MZ 6
[9]
R. Mordekhai Ya'akov Breisch, Responsa Helkat Ya'akov vol. 1 45; R.
Shmuel Wosner, Responsa Shevet HaLevi, vol. 3 36, vol. 5 48; R. Yitzhak
Ya'akov Weiss, Responsa Minhat Yitzhak, vol. 3 20, vol. 10 31:14; R.
Eliezer Yehudah Waldenburg, Responsa Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 8 15:5-6; R.
Ovadia Yosef, Responsa Yabia Omer, vol. 8 Orah Hayim 38:8; R. Yehoshua
Yishayahu Neuwirth, Shemirat Shabbat Kehilkhatah ch. 32 n. 1; R. Simhah Benzion
Rabinowitz, Piskei Teshuvot, 329:2
[10]
Additions to Sefer Hamitzvot, Positive Commandments that the Rambam
Neglected, 16. Cf. R. Shimon ben Zemah
Duran, Zohar HaRakia, 81 n. 39.
Cf. however, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Shabbat, 2:12.
[11]
Cf. Rashi, Yoma 85b sv veshamru
[12]
Cf. R. Meir Ibn Habib, Tosefot Yom HaKippurim, ad loc. sv amar
[13]
We will later conclude that the tannaitic derivations, but not
necessarily the reasons, have been rejected.
[14]
End of Hilkhot Yom HaKippurim
[15]
Torat Ha'Adam, Kitvei HaRamban, vol. 2 pp. 28-29; cited in R.
Nissim ben Reuven's commentary to Rif, Yoma 3b sv vekatuv; cf. Hiddushei
HaRamban, Nidah 44b sv veha; Beit Yosef, Orah Hayim 390
[16]
This does not imply that abortion is permissible.
See R. David M. Feldman, Birth Control in Jewish Law, part
5.
[17]
Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Mamrim 2:4
[18]
Cf. Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Teshuvah 1:1
[19]
Orah Hayim, end of 306
[22]
Cf. Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 157 where the detailed laws are discussed
[23]
The conclusion is no. Cf. Mishneh
Torah, Hilkhot Melakhim 10:2
[25]
Cf. R. Shmuel Eliezer Eidels, Hiddushei Maharsha, ad. loc.
[26]
Margoliyot HaYam 74b:29
[28]
For some later examples, see R. Avraham ben Mordekhai, Responsa Ginat
Veradim, 3:1 sv. hineh; R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes, Glosses to Shabbat 30a sv ha;
R. Yosef Engel, Gilyonei HaShas, Yoma 85b sv. lo; R. Shmuel Engel, Responsa
Maharash Engel, 4:72; R. David Zvi Hoffman, Melamed Leho’il; 2:32
sv. ule’inyan.
[29]
Cf. also Mekhilta on Exodus 31:16; Tosefta Shabbat 16:13-14; Tanhuma Yitro 8,
(ed. Buber) Vayeshev 8; Yalkut Shimoni, Mishpatim 327, Ki Tisa 391; Torah
Shelemah, Exodus ch. 21 no. 273, ch. 22 no. 7, ch. 31 no. 30, 31, 87.
[30]
In Mekhilta, R. Elazar ben Azariah is mentioned before R. Akiva.
[31]
Mekhilta has it simply "R. Akiva said: If bloodshed overrides the service
which overrides Shabbat a fortiori
that saving a life overrides Shabbat."
Also, in the Mekhilta R. Akiva's explanation comes after R. Elazar ben
Azariah's.
[32]
Cf. R. Alexander Shor, Bekhor Shor, Yoma ad loc.
[33]
Mekhilta does not have the number of limbs in a person.
Regarding the commandments of the Torah
corresponding to the limbs of a person, see Makkot 23b.
[34]
Shabbat 132a; Tanhuma, Lekh Lekha 16, Masei 1; Yalkut Shimoni,
Tazria 547, Emor 643
[35]
Commentary to Shabbat 132a
[37]
Shabbat 132b; Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayim 331:4
[38]
Cf. R. Shmuel Strashun (Rashash), Glosses to Yoma 85b, sv Rashi
[39]
Novellae to Shabbat, 132a sv umah
[40]
Cf. Tosafot HaRosh, ad loc. sv k"v
[41]
Mekhilta has R. Yossi HaGelili
[42]
Mekhilta adds: There are some Shabbatot which you override and some Shabbatot
which you observe.
[43]
Pesahim 5a, 71a; Eruvin 105a; Sukkah 48a; Bava Kama 11b; Shevuot 13a; Menahot
37b; Bekhorot 15a; Keritot 7a; Temurah 25a
[44]
Cf. Yerushalmi Berakhot 9:5 (67b); R. Meir Leibush Malbim, HaTorah VeHamitzvah, Ayelet
HaShahar 591.
[45]
Malbim, HaTorah VeHamitzvah, Exodus
31:13 n. 3. This formulation of
akh's function would explain Rashi's
commentary on this verse in light of Ramban's questions.
[47]
Mekhilta has R. Natan
[48]
It has been argued by some, e.g. R. Yosef Babad, Minhat Hinukh 32 (ed.
Makhon Yerushalayim vol. 1 p. 178), that according to R. Shimon ben Menasia
only future observance of Shabbat, as opposed to any other commandment, can
override a current Shabbat. However,
the wording of the Talmudic passage does not seem to leave room for this
limitation. Cf. R. Moshe Ibn Habib, Tosefot
Yom HaKippurim, Yoma 85b sv R”Sh; R. Hayim Elazar Shapira, Minhat Elazar,
1:9.
[49]
Surprisingly, this answer can also be found anonymously in Tosefta, Shabbat
16:14. R. David Pardo, Hasdei David, ad loc. suggests that
Shmuel never saw this Tosefta and arrived at the same reasoning on his
own. Efraim Urbach, Hazal, ch. 13 n. 28 suggests that this
is an Amoraic addition to the Tosefta.
[50]
On the subject of "Sin so that your friend will benefit," see
Tosafot, Shabbat 4a sv vekhi; R. Hershel Schachter, Be'ikvei Hatzon pp.
14-18.
[52]
Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah 4:8-9
[53]
Ibid.; Hilkhot Teshuvah 8:3
[54]
R. Saadia Gaon, Emunot VeDe’ot, 5:1 (ed. Kaffih,) pp. 168-171; Ramban, Sha’ar
HaGemul in Kitvei HaRamban, vol. 2 p. 270.
Cf. R. Elhanan Wasserman, Kovetz Ma’amarim, pp. 19-20.
[55]
Cf. R. Natan Tzvi Finkel, Or HaTzafun, pp. 7-10
[56]
Cf. R. Moshe Hayim Luzzatto (Ramhal), Messilat Yesharim, ch. 1
[59]
R. Yehudah HaLevi, Kuzari, 1:109, 3:1
[61]
Eruvin 22a; Shabbat 30a
[62]
Cf. R. Hayim of Volozhin, Nefesh HaHayim, 1:3-4
[64]
Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot De’ot ch. 4; R. Yehudah HaLevi, Kuzari,
2:50.
[65]
See note 7.
© 2001 Gil Student
|