[San 6a.1. We begin 11 lines from the top of the page.]
Rav Safra said to R. Abba [referring to a case in which a judge who erred in held personally liable to make restitution]: How did he err? If he erred in something explicit in a mishna, didn't Rav Sheshet say in the name of R. Ami that if he made a mistake in an explicit mishna, he can reverse the ruling? [In such a case, if the judge ruled that A must pay B, the ruling is reversed and B must return the payment to A. So why is the judge liable?]
Instead, [it must refer to a case in which] he erred considering conflcting opinions. What is considering conflicting opinions? Rav Papa said: If two tanna'im or two amora'im disgree with one another, and the halakha was not established according to either one, but the consensus follows one and he [the judge] ruled according to the other -- that is an error in the considering of conflicting opinions.
[The gemara again raises the question of the number of judges. Shmuel held that a decision by two judges was insolent but binding. R. Abbahu said that such a decision was not binding.]
Let us say [that the dispute between Shmuel and R. Abbahu is] tanna'itic. [A b'raita:] A compromise must be by three judges -- these are the words of R. Meir. But the Sages say that a compromise can be by one judge. We assume that everyone agrees that a compromise is like a legal decision, and what is the dispute? -- One (R. Meir, and presumably R. Abbahu) holds that a legal decision required three, and the other (the Sages, and presumably R. Abbahu) holds that even two are acceptable.
[The gemara rejects this parallel between compromise and judgement.] No. Everyone may agree that a legal decision must be by a court of three. But one says that we compare compromise to legal judgement [and need three judges], and one says that we do not compare compromise to legal judgement [so that compromises may be established by one or two judges].
Let us say that there are three tanna'itic positions on compromise: One (R. Meir) requires three, one (R. Shimon b. Gamliel, in our previous installment) requires two, and one (the Sages in the b'raita now under consideration) requires only one.
R. Acha b. Rav Ika, and other say R. Yeimar b. Shelmia said: The one (R. Shimon b. Gamliel) who said that two judges were sufficient also holds that one is sufficient. But he said that two were required so that there would be witnesses [since two witnesses are required by rabbinic law for monetary cases].
Rav Ashi said: We can learn from this that a compromise does not require a kinyan [a formal transfer of ownership]. Because if it did require a kinyan, why would [R. Meir] require three judges? Two should be enough, and let the litigants make a kinyan? [The kinyan would irrevocably seal the agreement. If there was a kinyan, only two judges would be required. The requirement of three judges implies that a kinyan was not done, and the binding aspect of the judgment came about because of the judicial power or the three judges.]
The halakha is that a compromise _does_ require a kinyan.
[We end on the last line of 6a.]
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