[bm 30a.1: We begin at the top of the page.]

[Our mishna said: If one found a garment] "he should spread it out for its needs, but not for his own honor."

The rabbis asked: What about for its needs _and_ for his own honor? [Tosafot points out that this is a problem only for garments, which might be spread out long enough to cause damage. This is not the case with a scroll, where there are such limiting fact ors as once every thirty days, and not for studying unfamiliar subject matter.]

[The gemara attempts an answer based on the language of the mishna:] Come learn: "He should spread it out for its needs" -- he may do so for _its_ needs, but not for its needs and his needs.

[But there is a counter-argument:] Note the latter part of the mishna: "but not for his own honor" -- he may not spread it for his own needs. but he may spread it for his own needs _and_ its needs.

Thus, there is no proof from [a textual analysis of] our mishna.

[Another attempt at ruling on "its needs and his needs":] Come learn (from a b'raita): He should not spread it over a couch or over a frame (for spreading clothes) for his needs, but he should spread it for its needs. If guests come, he should not spread it over a couch or over a frame, whether for his needs or for its needs.

[The gemara rejects this b'raita as the source for a general ruling:] It is different there (in the case of the guests), for by displaying it he burns it (i.e., he risks damage), either because of the evil eye [fear that the guests will become envious, an d that such envy might be harmful to the garment] or because of thieves [who might be tempted to steal it].

[The gemara will try to bring proof from another b'raita. Deut 21:1-9 outlines the ritual of eglah arufah, the "decapitated calf." If a person is murdered between two cities, the elders of the nearest city perform a ritual that includes decapitating a cal f that has never worked or been under a yoke. According to Rashi, the b'raita is addressing the precise definition of "work" for such a calf.

Come learn: "If he yoked his calf in a multiple yoke [so that its mother can care for it while threshing] and it (the calf) threshed incidentally), it is kasher (still acceptable as an eglah arufah). But if he yoked it (the calf) so that it could suckle a nd thresh at the same time (i.e., the threshing was not incidental), it is unfit (and cannot be used as an eglah arufah." Here (in the latter case), it is for its needs (suckling) and his needs (threshing), and we learned that is is "unfit" (suggesting th at "dual-needs" is equivalent to its own need).

[The gemara rejects the analogy:] Here (in the case of the calf) it is different, because the Torah says (Deut 21:3) "that was not worked with" -under _any circumstances (even if only incidental). If so, (the calf should be unfit) even in the first clause of the b'raita (where the owner did not intend for the calf to thresh at all)!

[The gemara responds:] The b'raita is analogous only to the mishna Parah 2:4, dealing with the Red Heifer [that is burnt and it ashes used for ritual purification (Numbers 19:1-10). Like the the eglah arufa, the Red Heifer must be an animal that has never been under a yoke.]

If a bird rested on a cow, it is fit [to serve as a Red Heifer. Because the owner doesn't care about the bird, it cannot be regarded as having been "under a yoke". However, if a bull mounted the cow, it is unfit [to serve as a Red Heifer, since the owner _does_ benefit from the mating].

[Presumably, just as a bird resting on the cow does not disqualify it from beicoming a Red Heifer, so the incidental threshing does not disqualify the calf from becoming an eglah arufah.]

Why? It is as Rav Papa said: If the Torah had written (in Deut. 21:3) [`ayin-_vav_-bet-dalet] "ubad" and we pronounced the word "ubad, (has been worked with, even passively or incidentally), I would have said (the calf is unfit) even if it works on its ow n. And if the Torah had written [`ayin-bet-dalet, which can be read as] "avad" and we pronounced it "avad" ("he worked it," i.e., actively), I would have said (that the calf is fit) unless the owner actively worked it for his own benefit. Now that it is w ritten "avad" (active form) and pronounced "ubad" (passive form), we require that "ubad" be similar to "avad" -- just as "avad" (active work) is pleasing to the owner, so "ubad" (passive work) must be pleasing to the owner (in order to disqualify the anim al).

[Compare Rav Pappa's similar exegesis on BM 22b in the matter of the adventitious moistening of grain left on the roof.)]

[Therefore, although the passive mating of the cow disqualifies it from being used as an Red Heifer, because the mating benefits the owner, passive work of the yoked calf is of no more benefit to him than a bird resting on the cow's back, and does not dis qualify it from becoming an eglah arufah.]

[Thus the ruling for the eglah arufah is based on textual exegesis of a biblical verse, and cannot serve as proof for our own case of "its needs" and "his needs". The gemara leaves the issue unresolved.]

[Our mishna said: If a person found] silver or copper utensils, he should use them (for their own purposes, but not wear them out).

The rabbis learned (in a b'raita): If a person found wooden utensils, he should use them so that they do not decay. He should use copper utensils for hot foods, but should not put them on the fire, because a fire wears them out. He should use silver utens ils for cold foods, but not hot foods, because heat blackens them. He should use shovels and hatchets on soft items, but not on hard items, because they damage them. He should not touch gold or glass utensils until Elijah comes [when, according to traditi on, all fiscal questions will be resolved]. Just as the rabbis stated rules for the care of lost objects, so they stated rules for the care of items deposited (for safekeeping).

[The rules concerning deposited items are dealt with in detail in Chapter 3 of this tractate.]

[What right does the custodian have to use] a deposited item?! [Why shouldn't the owner be responsible for its care?]

Rav Ada bar Chama said in the name of Rav Sheshet: A deposited item whose owners have gone overseas (and thus cannot take care of it).

[Our mishna again:] If one found a sack or a box or any item that he would not pick up (under other circumstances), he need not pick it up.

Where do we learn this? From what the rabbis taught in a b'raita: ["You should not see your brother's ox or sheep wandering] And ignore (literally "hide from") them" (Deut 22:1). There are times you may ignore and there are times you may not ignore. [The exegetical problem is that two verses later, the Torah explicitly says "you may not ignore." The rabbinical exegetical principle is that there are no needless repetitions in the Torah, and every phrase carries meaning.]

How so [i.e., when can you ignore, and when can't you]? A kohen (who sees a lost item) in a cemetery (ignores the item, i.e., may not enter the cemetery even to retrieve a lost item). An elderly man and it is inconsistent with his honor [also does not ret rieve a lost item]. Or a finder engaged in work more valuable than the lost item [e.g., a person earning $100 per hour does not spend 30 minutes retrieving a $5 lost item].

Why do we need the bibical verse (i.e., do we need it to teach the case of the kohen, the old man, or the well-paid finder)?

If you say for the case of the kohen (seeing a lost item in a cemetery), it's obvious (and we certainly do not need a biblical verse) -- This (returning a lost item) is a positive commandment (Deut 22:1), and this (that a kohen may not enter a cemetery) i s a negative commandment (Lev 21:1) _and_ a positive commandment (Lev 21:6).

[Generally, we fulfil a positive commandment even if it conflicts with a negative one, but a positive commandment does _not_ take precedence over a combined positive _and_ negative commandment. So we do not need the verse to teach us that a kohen should n ot enter a cemetery to retrieve a lost item.]

Instead, (we need the verse to teach the case of) the finder's "value" is greater than his fellow Jew's object. But this can be learned from what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, for Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: [The Torah says {Deut 15:4}] "But there shall be nobody poor among you" -- your financial needs take precedence over everyone else's. [Again, the rabbinical exegesis is forced by the principle that there are no extra phrases or inconsistencies in the Torah. Deut 15:11 says that "the poor will never cease from the land." Because of that, the exegesis of Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav focused on the phrase "among you" to give special significance to Deut 15:4.]

Instead, (we need the verse to teach the case of) an elderly man (for whom picking up a lost item is) inconsistent with his honor.

Rabbah said: If he (an elderly man) prodded [a lost animal, i.e., the elderly man began the process of returning a lost animal even if it _was_ beneath his dignity], he is responsible for it [i.e., he must complete the task of returning it].

Abbaye was sitting before Rabbah and saw some goats standing (and apparently lost), and he threw a clod of dirt at them (to chase them towards their owner). Rabbah said to him: "You are (now) responsible for them -- get up and return them.

The rabbis asked: [If an elderly man finds an item in a field, and the owner lives in the city], and his practice was to return an item in the field [where few people would see him, and his honor would not be compromised] and it was _not_ his practice to return items in the city [where he would be seen, and where his dignity would be compromised], what is the law? Do we say that we require a full return, and since it is not his practice to return an item in the city, he is not required to return it at all [even in the field]? Or do we say that he is required to return it in the field, and once he is required to return it in the field, he is also obligated to return it in the city? The question stands (i.e., the rabbis did not render a decision).

[We end on bm 30b, 11 lines from the top.]

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