Avodah Mailing List

Volume 38: Number 55

Mon, 06 Jul 2020

• 1. Re: : Re: free public transport on Shabbos/Yomtov (Micha Berger)
• 2. Re: Induction stovetop halachic status (Simon Montagu)
• 3. Fwd: Induction stovetop halachic status (Simon Montagu)
• 4. [Bais haVaad] Police Protection: Are Officers Liable for Injuries They Inflict? (Micha Berger)
• 5. Re: Induction stovetop halachic status (Micha Berger)
• 6. Re: Induction stovetop halachic status (Zev Sero)
• 7. Realities of Times Past (Was: Latecomers to shul on Friday night) (Joseph Kaplan)
• 8. Re: Induction stovetop (Marty Bluke)
• 9. Re: Induction stovetop (Micha Berger)

On Wed, Jun 17, 2020 at 08:20:35PM +0100, Chana Luntz via Avodah wrote:
> There are a fair number of shops, but there are a fair number of houses too
> (and some blocks of flats, definitely majority Jewish).  We know people who
> live in a couple of the houses right on Golders Green road...

A balebatishe comment:

It needn't be people right on the road, though. Bus lines are routed to
serve neighborhoods. Even if it were a street entirely of shops and other
commercial enterprises, a route would take into account any residential
areas that are in easy walking distance to any stops.

Which is certainly true of what I remember from Golder's Green Road.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger                 In the days of our sages, man didn't sin unless
http://www.aishdas.org/asp   he was overcome with a spirit of foolishness.
Author: Widen Your Tent      Today, we don't do a mitzvah unless we receive
- https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF    a spirit of purity.      - Rav Yisrael Salanter

On Fri, 3 Jul 2020, 00:29 Zev Sero via Avodah, <avo...@lists.aishdas.org>
wrote:

> On 2/7/20 6:43 am, Simon Montagu via Avodah wrote:
> >
> > I don't think this is what the Ramo means. The context is that smoking
> > and pickling are not considered BA, and I think when he says "bishul
> > shel esh" it includes any form of cooking by heat. Otherwise cooking
> > with an electric hob or deep-fryer wouldn't be BA either.
>
> Glowing hot metal is included in "fire".  Here there is no fire at all.
> The pot simply gets hot of its own accord, just as in a microwave the
> food gets hot of its own accord.
>

What is the difference between metal heated by an electric current and
metal heated by a magnetic field?
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---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: Simon Montagu <simon.mont...@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2020, 01:44
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Induction stovetop halachic status
To: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>




On Thu, 2 Jul 2020, 17:14 Micha Berger, <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote:

>
> The reason for the gezeira against playing music on Shabbos doesn't
> apply to pianos, but the gezeira does. In theory, the same is true for
> refu'ah beShabbos.
>
> Both of the points you make revolve around deciding the limits of the
> gezeira by its function. But it could be chazal, regardless of their
> motive, framed the law to only include cooking via fire and all cooking
> via fir
>

Lo p'log is not a universal. There are plenty of cases where hazal and the
pos'kim explore in which scenarios gezeirot are or are not relevant (as
opposed to implementation details in what is essentially the same
situation, such as pianos or violins on shabbat).
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I think this topic has crossed all of our minds lately.

From https://www.baishavaad.org/police-protection-are-officers-liable-for-injuries-they-inflict/

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

The Bais HaVaad Halacha Center
Police Protection: Are Officers Liable for Injuries They Inflict?
Adapted from the writings of Dayan Yitzhak Grossman
July 2, 2020

On June 12, Atlanta Police Department officers Garrett Rolfe and Devin
Brosnan were attempting to handcuff Rayshard Brooks and arrest him for
driving while under the influence of alcohol. Brooks wrestled with the
officers, seized Brosnan's Taser, and attempted to flee. With Rolfe
pursuing him, Brooks turned and fired the Taser toward Rolfe. Rolfe
then shot at Brooks three times, striking him twice in the back and
killing him. Rolfe was subsequently charged with felony murder and ten
other offenses.

In considering Rolfe's possible culpability for killing Brooks, the first
issue is whether the shooting was justified as self-defense. We do not
consider here this specific question, but only the general question of
the liability of a duly authorized agent of the state for the use of
force resulting in injury or death.

Agents of the court

In the Mishnah, Abba Sha'ul rules that a father who strikes his son,
a teacher who disciplines his student, and an agent of the court, who
accidentally kill, are not subject to the law of exile (galus).[1]

The Tosefta rules similarly with regard to civil liability for nonlethal
injury: The father, the teacher, and the agent of the court are all
exempt, unless the force used is "more than is appropriate," in which
case they are liable.[2] An alternate formulation appears elsewhere in
the Tosefta: The agent is exempt if he injures inadvertently (b'shogeg),
but liable if he injures deliberately (b'meizid), "out of concern
for tikun olam."[3] R' Shimon ben Tzemach Duran explains that these
two formulations are equivalent: If the force used is "appropriate"
but nevertheless results in injury, the agent is considered shogeg,
but if it is "more than is appropriate," he is considered meizid. He
also explains that the liability in the case of meizid is in accordance
with the normal laws of torts, and the concern for tikun olam is the
rationale for the exemption of shogeg, i.e., Chazal absolved a shogeg
from liability despite the principle of adam muad l'olam, by which people
are usually held liable for torts committed b'shogeg.[4]

It would seem that according to this approach, "shogeg" here has its
general meaning of an act that while inadvertent, nevertheless has an
element of negligence to it, and so would engender liability were it not
for the concern for tikun olam, since it would seem absurd for an agent
of the court who carried out his duty entirely properly to be liable
for its consequences (were it not for tikun olam), any more than the
court itself and its agents would be liable as tortfeasors for the very
imposition of punishment such as lashes or execution upon a miscreant![5]

In apparent contradiction to the assumption of the Tosefta that an
agent of the court is not authorized to use more force than necessary
to carry out his duty stands a ruling of Rabbeinu Yerucham ben Meshulam,
accepted by some poskim, that an agent of the court who strikes the body
or damages the property of a recalcitrant person is exempt even if he
was able to accomplish his goal by other means.[6]

It seems that this opinion understands that the availability of nonviolent
means does not automatically render the use of violence "more than is
appropriate." Thus in Rabbeinu Yerucham's case, although alternative
nonviolent means were available, once the agent chose to utilize violence,
the level of force he used was the minimum necessary to accomplish his
goal, whereas in the case of the Tosefta, the level of force utilized was
gratuitously high. Alternatively, some contemporary writers consider it
self-evident that Rabbeinu Yerucham concedes that the authorities have
no right to use "excessive" and "unreasonable" force relative to the
goal of preserving the rule of law.[7] Perhaps, then, when the Tosefta
assigns liability where the force used was "more than is appropriate,"
it is referring to just such "excessive" and "unreasonable" force.

In any event, other poskim disagree with Rabbeinu Yerucham's ruling and
maintain that an agent of the court is only exempt from liability for
the use of force if he had no other means to achieve his goal.[8]

The exemption of an agent of the court only applies provided force was
used in order to compel compliance with the court's directives, but not
when motivated by anger.[9]

Some contemporary writers assume that a police officer would have the same
status as the "agent of the court" discussed by Chazal and would therefore
be exempt from liability insofar as his use of force was appropriate.

__________________________________________________________________

[1]Makkos 2:2. Cf. Rambam and Ra'avad Hilchos Rotzeiach Ushmiras
Hanefesh 5:6, and Bnei V'lechem Yehudah, Bnei Shmuel, Gur Aryeh,
Hamei'ir La'aretz, Kruv Mimshach, Ma'asei Rokeach, Mirkeves Hamishneh,
Ein Tarshish, and Shufrei D'Yaakov ibid.; Shu"t Shevus Yaakov cheilek
3 siman 140; R. Yehuda Zoldan, Tzidkas Yehuda V'Yisrael, siman 6 os 1;
R. Moshe Taragin, Shliach Bais Din Sheharag Beshogeg.

One version of the Tosefta contains a position contrary to that of
Abba Sha'ul; see Or Sameiach Hilchos Rotzeiach 5:6 and Tzidkas Yehuda
V'Yisrael ibid.

[2]Tosefta Bava Kama 9:3.

[3]Ibid. Gittin 3:13.

[4]Shu"t Tashbatz cheilek 3 siman 82.

[5]This is certainly true according to the poskim that maintain that the
principle of adam muad l'olam does not apply to oness gamur (see Tosafos
Bava Kama 27b s.v. uShmuel amar; Shulchan Aruch C.M. 378:1-3 and Shach
ibid. s.k. 1).

[6]Sefer Maysharim Nesiv 31 cheilek 2 p. 92 second column, cited by Sema
C.M. siman 8 s.k. 25 and Ba'er Heitev ibid. s.k. 8.

[7]Adv. Yaakov Shapiro and Dr. Michael Vigoda, Shimush B'choach al Yedei
Hamishtarah, n. 33.

[8]Toras Chaim Bava Kama end of daf 28; Shevus Yaakov cheilek 1 siman 180,
cited in Pis'chei Teshuvah ibid. s.k. 6; Sha'ar Mishpat ibid. s.k. 2;
Aruch Hashulchan ibid. se'if 6; Yeshuos Yisrael ibid. Ein Mishpat s.k. 2
and Chukas Hamishpat s.k. 6. Erech Shai ibid. se'if 5 concludes that
the matter is a s'feika d'dina. Cf. Halacha Pesukah ibid. p. 86 n. 214.

[9]Shu"t Ra'anach (Yerushalayim 5720) siman 111 p. 475. Cf. Shevus Ya'akov
cheilek 3 end of siman 140 and Shimush B'choach al Yedei Hamishtarah.

On Fri, Jul 03, 2020 at 01:23:32AM +0300, Simon Montagu via Avodah wrote:
>> Glowing hot metal is included in "fire".  Here there is no fire at all.
>> The pot simply gets hot of its own accord, just as in a microwave the
>> food gets hot of its own accord.

> What is the difference between metal heated by an electric current and
> metal heated by a magnetic field?

I believe Zev is saying that the induction cooker doesn't cause any metal
to glow.

However, when you cook on an old-school electric stove, the coil will glow.
And glowing is included in "eish".

(I'm not sure about the last part. I think it would depend on whether
causing a gachales shel mateches is bishul or havarah.)

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger                 Life isn't about finding yourself.
http://www.aishdas.org/asp   Life is about creating yourself.
Author: Widen Your Tent               - George Bernard Shaw
- https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF

On 2/7/20 6:23 pm, Simon Montagu via Avodah wrote:
> 
>     Glowing hot metal is included in "fire".? Here there is no fire at all.
>     The pot simply gets hot of its own accord, just as in a microwave the
>     food gets hot of its own accord.
> 
> 
> What is the difference between metal heated by an electric current and 
> metal heated by a magnetic field?

The pot or pan doesn't get nearly hot enough to qualify as fire.  It 
doesn't have to, since it's heating the food directly, rather than 
heating a pot sitting on top of it, which will then heat the food it 
contains.

-- 
Zev Sero            Wishing everyone a *healthy* and happy summer
z...@sero.name       Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper

R?Akiva Miller asks (38/54) a typically thoughtful question about adding
Magen Avot on Friday night. The reasoning and realities are difficult to
understand, he notes, and so he asks, ?There's something that I'm missing
about the realities of how those
minyanim were organized, the speed they davened at, and/or the dangers
lurking about. Can anyone explain the story better??

I don?t have any answers for him but I have similar questions about reasons
given for other changes in halacha. For example, we don?t blow shofar on RH
that falls on Shabbat (thus missing out on a Biblical commandment) because
of three maybes: (a) maybe someone will be blowing who doesn?t know how to
do do properly, (b) maybe that will happen on a Shabbat RH, and (c) maybe
that person will carry the shofar in a reshut harabim to an expert for
instruction. 

Well, how often would that occur? Was this common in those days? And if so,
why? It?s not common today for shofar blowers to go to experts on RH to
give them instruction. And equally difficult fir me to understand, wasn?t
there some other way to prevent the triple maybe sin of carrying other than
making all the Jewish people for generations on end miss out on a once a
year biblical commandment.? Was society so different that this was really
an otherwise unmanageable problem at the time the ruling was put into
effect? To paraphrase Akiva, there?s something that I'm missing about the
realities of that time; can anyone explain the reasoning better?

Joseph
Sent from my iPhone

R? Simon Montagu asked:
> That said, I really don't understand why BA is an issue at all in a
> Jewish-owned restaurant with kosher supervision. None of the reasons for
> the gezeira seem to apply....

This would seem to be a classic case of davar shebminyan tzorich minyan
acher lhatiro which we don?t have. There are many gezeras that we observe
today even though the reason behind the gezera no longer applies. For
example, taking medicine on shabbos is prohibited because you may grind the
ingredients. In today?s world of pills the reason no longer applies yet
most poskim still prohibit taking pills for something like a headache.
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Someone pointed me to https://www.torahbase.org/%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%99-%D7%A0%D7%9B%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D

See section 6. R' Asher Weid isn't comfortable have a nakhri cook for
you by microwave. Something I had thought was pretty commonly accepted.

In this case, he allws, but only because the situation that required
getting a housekeeper to cook is a she'as hadechaq, and because hiring
a Jewish housekeeper would be a hotza'ah merubah. Only adding the lack
of aish as a yeish le'ayein and is willing to use it as an additional
"chazi le'itztarufei".


Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger                 One who kills his inclination is as though he
http://www.aishdas.org/asp   brought an offering. But to bring an offering,
Author: Widen Your Tent      you must know where to slaughter and what
- https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF    parts to offer.        - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv


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