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Volume 37: Number 37

Tue, 07 May 2019

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Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Message: 1
From: Zvi Lampel
Date: Mon, 06 May 2019 09:22:40 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Multivalent truth


On Sun, 05 May 2019 19:55:19 -0400, <avodah-requ...@lists.aishdas.org>  
wrote:

On Wed, 1 May 2019 Micha Berger wrote:
> The Law of Contradiction -- something and its inverse cannot
> both be true at the same time -- is more relevant to eilu va'eilu divrei
> E-lokim Chaim.
... Rambam bought into Aristotilian logic, and
> (therefore?) doesn't believe both sides of a machloqes are equally
> true. To the Rambam, ... one side is indeed in error. We just do our  
> best to
> minimize the chance that we're following that side. And since Briskers so
> heavily lean on the Rambam, maybe R Chaim accepts the Rambam's position
> on this too. And so if there is a conflict between the ideas multiple
> truths and Brisker derekh, it wouldn't be a problem. Brisker derekh
> might not accept a literal eilu va'eilu anyway.

Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel ibn  
Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not accept that  
eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can both be true in the  
same situation, at the same time and place. Look at Rashi on "All [the  
variant opinions] were given from one Shepherd, one Almighty gave them,  
one leader said them from the Adon of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." This  
adage is a primary source for Recanti and ibn Gabbai, but Rashi dislodges  
it from its apparent, literal sense. Rashi writes,

     "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the bnei  
hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god besides the  
Torah of our G d.

     "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a prophet  
who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu.

  The legitimacy that both opinions of a machlokess have, according to  
Rashi, is not that they are both correct. The legitimacy is in the sense  
that they both are the results of sincere, loyal to Hashem and Moshe,  
attempts to correctly gauge what Hashem and Moshe meant to teach:

   "Make you ear act as a funnel": Since  all of them [the baalei  
machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your  
ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And  
when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will  
prove kosher, establish that as the halacha.

Zvi Lampel
-- 
Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/



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Message: 2
From: Micha Berger
Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 11:00:47 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Multivalent truth


On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:22:40AM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote:
: Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel
: ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not
: accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can
: both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look
: at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one
: Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon
: of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." ...
: 
:     "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the
: bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god
: besides the Torah of our G d.
: 
:     "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a
: prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu.

Not sure how that denies plurality of truths. He just says that eilu
va'eilu must both stand on Toras Moshe.

But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in
a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a
tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit
which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case
"terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora".

The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah
could indeed mean both.

And  then we have the Ran's haqdamah to haMafteiach leMenulei haTalmud
(tr. R/Dr Moshe Halbertal):
    It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral,
    was transm itted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah,
    R. Hiyya bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and
    on them was written according to all the words.." teaches that the
    Holy One blessed be He showed Moses the details prescribed by the
    Torah and by the Sages, including the innovations they would later
    enact. And what are those? the reading of Meggila. The 'details'
    provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and conflicting views
    held by the sa ges of Israel. Moses learned them all by divine
    word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet [God]
    also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the
    majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for
    the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written:
    'And you shall come to the priest the Levites, and to the judge that
    shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....".

And the Ran, derashah #7:
   We have been commanded to obey their decision whether it represents the
   truth or its opposite ...for the power of decision-making has been
   entrusted to the halakhic authorities for each generation. Whatever
   they decide is what God has commanded.

The Ritva on eilu va'eilu https://www.sefaria.org/Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2
endorses an understanding of Rabanei Tzarfat (who I think are Baalei
Tosafos) that HQBH gave Moshe both, saying that it was up to chakhmei
Yisrael bekhol dor vador... uvderekh ha'emes yeish ta'am sod bedavar

In short, your position is contrary to both R' Michel Rosenseig and
RMH's takes, and I've posted source like these in the past.

See my blog post at <http://www.aishdas.org/asp/eilu-vaeilu-part-i>
which includes links to articles each had published in early 2005.

All this goes back to our debate about whether the Rambam has a daas
yachid about many of the kelalei pesaq because of an a different belief
about what machloqes is and what pesaq accomplished.

I think that much is provable, regardless of my fear that the Rambam's
divergance is most easily explained by his Aristotilianism.

Chodesh Tov!
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 16th day, which is
mi...@aishdas.org        2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline
Fax: (270) 514-1507                             does harmony promote?



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Message: 3
From: Zvi Lampel
Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 14:09:19 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Multivalent truth


On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 11:00 AM Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote:

> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:22:40AM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote:
> : Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel
> : ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not
> : accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can
> : both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look
> : at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one
> : Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon
> : of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." ...
> :
> :     "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the
> : bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god
> : besides the Torah of our G d.
> :
> :     "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a
> : prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu.
>
> Not sure how that denies plurality of truths. He just says that eilu
> va'eilu must both stand on Toras Moshe.
>

You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is
dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason.
Rashi is telling you the way to understand the adage whose naive meaning
would teach a concept of contradictory truths. The way is not the naive
way. He doesn't have to spell it out for you that he denies the naive way.

The last Rashi I quoted, which is omitted in your response, was

 "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since  all of them [the baalei
machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your
ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And
when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will
succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha.

The phrase, "Aysehua yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. ''In the morning,
sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so
again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or
this, or if both of them are equally good.''

In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's ''yichshar'' to mean
''yatzliach''--succeed.

In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of
contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, but
about determining pesak, and that (since the possibilities under
consideration are all sincere attempts to know G d's Will, and not anyone
else's) through sincere analysis one can decide which side if a machlokess
is correct. According to Rashi this adage is not at all talking about some
suggested truth outside of halacha l'ma'aseh. So according to Rashi, this
adage, used to promote the contradictory truths concept, is not at all
meant to teach that concept, which leaves us without that adage as a source
for that concept.


But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in
> a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a
> tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit
> which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case
> "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora".
>
> The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah
> could indeed mean both.
>

Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not saying
he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him.

But if he held it, here is where he would say so. The fact he's going out
of his way to take a statement that would apparently support the concept,
yet explains it to mean something else, indicates he does not support the
apparent concept. Otherwise, he should give that as an explanation ("in G
d's mind, opposites can be true, so both sides of a machlokess are truths")
or say nothing, and let the reader read it naively.

Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a
machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same
time and place and situations.



> And  then we have the Ran's haqdamah to haMafteiach leMenulei haTalmud
> (tr. R/Dr Moshe Halbertal):
>     It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral,
>     was transm itted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah,
>     R. Hiyya bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and
>     on them was written according to all the words.." teaches that the
>     Holy One blessed be He showed Moses the details prescribed by the
>     Torah and by the Sages, including the innovations they would later
>     enact. And what are those? the reading of Meggila. The 'details'
>     provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and conflicting views
>     held by the sa ges of Israel. Moses learned them all by divine
>     word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet [God]
>     also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the
>     majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for
>     the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written:
>     'And you shall come to the priest the Levites, and to the judge that
>     shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....".
>

The sentence translated  "Yet [God]
    also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the
    majority opinion'..." is crucial and mistranslated. The sentence
actually reads, "Umassar bo klal asher bo yodea ha-emmess, v'hu: acharei
rabim l-hatos. The correct translation, as I've pointed out before, is "G d
gave him a rule through which one knows the truth." Because between the
opinions, one is the truth and the other is not. Why did the author create
a distorted translation? And what in the world does "a rule whose truth is
manifest" supposed to mean, anyway??


> And the Ran, derashah #7:
>    We have been commanded to obey their decision whether it represents the
>    truth or its opposite ...for the power of decision-making has been
>    entrusted to the halakhic authorities for each generation. Whatever
>    they decide is what God has commanded.
>

Exactly. There is a a truth and its opposite. Not two contradictory truths.
And the Ran goes on to explain that in very rare instances the Sages may
err and reach the opposite of the truth, but the negative effects of our
following a false halacha are mitigated by the overriding positive effects
of our being loyal to the Torah's rule of following the majority.

>
> The Ritva on eilu va'eilu https://www.sefaria.org/Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2
> endorses an understanding of Rabanei Tzarfat (who I think are Baalei
> Tosafos) that HQBH gave Moshe both, saying that it was up to chakhmei
> Yisrael bekhol dor vador... uvderekh ha'emes yeish ta'am sod bedavar
>


> In short, your position is contrary to both R' Michel Rosenseig and
> RMH's takes, and I've posted source like these in the past.
>

 The Avodas HaKodesh (Cheilek HaTachlis and chap.23), a rishon, contra
these contemporaries, dismisses the Rabanie Tzarfat in favor of what is as
close to a multi-truths concept you can find (and even he may be speaking
only  hyperbolically). He doesn't understand them to be saying there are
multiple truths. Rabanei Tzarfat are saying HKBH revelaled to Moshe all the
legitimate pros and cons (the various panim, not the various shittos)
involved in situations which are to be weighed by the Sages in each
situation to arrive at the correct pesak.

Zvi Lampel





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Message: 4
From: Micha Berger
Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 19:24:59 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Multivalent truth


On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote:
: You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is
: dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason.

Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth,
because in Kesuvos 57a, he embraces the idea. More later.

Skipping ahead to another comment you make on this first Rashi:
: In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of
: contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, but
: about determining pesak...

Actually, Rashi says that while there are complementary truths,
that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the
contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah.

Now, the Rashi I didn't bother with last time, because it's another
repeat from previous years:

:  "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since  all of them [the baalei
: machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your
: ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And
: when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will
: succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha.

Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in
the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim",
multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..."

: The phrase, "Aysehua yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning,
: sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so
: again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or
: this, or if both of them are equally good."

: In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's "yichshar" to mean
: "yatzliach"--succeed.

This *reinforces* how I read the Rashi on the gemara in prior iterations.
Rashi's measure is not truth-vs-falsehood but success-vs-failure. He is
talking about what is usable for halakhah lemaaseh.

Now, on to the third Rashi:
:> But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in
:> a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a
:> tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit
:> which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case
:> "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora".

: > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah
: > could indeed mean both.

: Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not saying
: he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him.

He makes a chiluq between aliba dechad amora and ata'amei denafshei. The
first part of the Rashi says that terei amora'ei alibe dechad amora alone
one is right and the other erred. And then he closes by saying that
when they argue ata'amei denafshei "eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim".

Kind of more than just "not saying he doesn't" -- Rashi pretty explicitly
denies plurality ONLY in a minority of machloqesin, those where the debate
is over what an earlier amora (or a tanna) said.

See https://www.sefaria.org/Rashi_on_Ketubot.57a.9.1 again, because I don't
see any way of saying it's less than muchrach.

: Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a
: machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same
: time and place and situations.

Each is true and therefore each can be used halakhah lemaaseh in different
situations. Or to use Rashi's words, each is "shayakh" in different
circumstances. Shayakh, relevant. Not limiting when it "holds true".

In this email I'm sticking just to Rashi, because I don't know how many
arguments I can retread at once.

Chodesh Tov!
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 16th day, which is
mi...@aishdas.org        2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline
Fax: (270) 514-1507                             does harmony promote?



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Message: 5
From: Zvi Lampel
Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 21:51:48 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Multivalent truth


On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 7:25 PM Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote:

> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote:
> : You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is
> : dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a
> reason.
>
> Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth,
>

We're not discussing multifaceted truths. We're discussing the concept of
something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and
place.

because in Kesuvos 57a, he embraces the idea.


He does not.


> More later.
>
> Skipping ahead to another comment you make on this first Rashi:
> : In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of
> : contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that,
> but
> : about determining pesak...
>
> Actually, Rashi says that while there are complementary truths,
>

We are are not discussing complementary truths.  We're discussing the
concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation,
tiime and place.

that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the
> contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah.
>

I cannot decipher this statement.


> Now, the Rashi I didn't bother with last time, because it's another
> repeat from previous years:
>
> :  "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since  all of them [the baalei
> : machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your
> : ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And
> : when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will
> : succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha.
>
> Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in
> the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim",
> multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..."
>



>
> : The phrase, "Ayzehu yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning,
> : sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing
> so
> : again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or
> : this, or if both of them are equally good."
>

So you are agreeing with my point that Rashi is dislodging the adage of
"kulan me-Adon echad" from meaning eilu va-eilu as you take it.

>
> : In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's "yichshar" to mean
> : "yatzliach"--succeed.
>
> This *reinforces* how I read the Rashi on the gemara in prior iterations.
> Rashi's measure is not truth-vs-falsehood but success-vs-failure. He is
> talking about what is usable for halakhah lemaaseh.
>

And not talking about  a notion that despite what the halacha l.maaseh is,
there is really truth to both one thing and its inverse in the same
situation at the same time and pace.

>
> Now, on to the third Rashi:
> :> But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in
> :> a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a
> :> tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A
> limit
> :> which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case
> :> "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora".
>
> : > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah
> : > could indeed mean both.
>
> : Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not
> saying
> : he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him.
>
> He makes a chiluq between aliba dechad amora and ata'amei denafshei. The
> first part of the Rashi says that terei amora'ei alibe dechad amora alone
> one is right and the other erred. And then he closes by saying that
> when they argue ata'amei denafshei "eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim".
>
> Kind of more than just "not saying he doesn't" -- Rashi pretty explicitly
> denies plurality ONLY in a minority of machloqesin, those where the debate
> is over what an earlier amora (or a tanna) said.
>

First of all, I don't know where you get the idea that the debates over
what  an ealier Amora or Tanna said are in the minority. It seems to me to
be otherwise. All the more so since Rashi and Tosefos' stand, that when
there is such a debate, one of the sides is sayimg sheker, logically
applies not only to what the previous authority said, but what he meant and
held. ("V'ee michlalah, lama li?")

Secondly, I reiterate that Rashi explains himself that in those cases where
the debaters are not deliberating over what former authorities held/said,
but promoting their own sevaros, each one atamei d'nafshei, this is where
the concept of eilu va-eilu applies. Why? Not because eilu va-eilu means
that one thing and its inverse can both be true in the same situation and
the same time and place. But because on the contrary, Rashi explains that
eilu va-eilu means that each of the sevaros are shayyach (applicable,
appropriate, fitting) in DIFFERENT circumstances.

>
>
> : Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a
> : machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same
> : time and place and situations.
>
>

> Each is true and therefore each can be used halakhah lemaaseh in different
> situations. Or to use Rashi's words, each is "shayakh" in different
> circumstances. Shayakh, relevant. Not limiting when it "holds true".
>

He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one
sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the
other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that
particluar situation.)

>
> In this email I'm sticking just to Rashi, because I don't know how many
> arguments I can retread at once.
>

I know the feeling....

...But I did introduce new data--the Avodas HaKodesh (and Recanti).

>
> Chodesh Tov!
> Tir'u baTov!
>
> Amen!

Zvi Lampel
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Message: 6
From: Zvi Lampel
Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 00:23:55 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Multivalent truth


On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 9:51 PM Zvi Lampel <zvilam...@gmail.com> wrote:

>
>
>
>
> He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one
>> sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the
>> other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that
>> particluar situation.)
>>
>
>> Meaning, that the disputants are disagreeing over whether it is sevara
"A'  that applies to and determines the halacha a certain way in
scenario"X," or that it is sevarah "B" that applies and determines the
halacha otherwise, *in that same scenario*. If the disputants are each
talking about a different scenario, they are talking past each other. They
would not be demonstrating much wisdom in arguing and bringing evidence for
their opinions. If you say it's daytime and I say it's nighttime, but you
are talking about  one side of the earth and I'm talking about the other
side of the earth, we would be foolish to argue.

Zvi Lampel
>

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