Avodah Mailing List

Volume 27: Number 137

Thu, 08 Jul 2010

• 1. Re: Pilegesh (T6...@aol.com)
• 2. The Rav on the Ordination of Women (Esther and Aryeh Frimer)
• 3. Re: Pilegesh (Daniel Eidensohn)
• 4. Re: Error in baby naming (Arie Folger)
• 5. Tzedaka & middot Q (Arie Folger)
• 6. Re: [Areivim] biography of R. Elyashiv (Zev Sero)
• 7. Rav Lau (eli neuberger)
• 8. Re: Rav Lau (Zev Sero)
• 9. Serrarah (Joseph Kaplan)
• 10. Re: Serrarah (Zev Sero)
• 11. Camel milk coming to Europe (martin brody)
• 12. Re: The Cult of Pe'or and Darwinism (Micha Berger)
• 13. Chalev Yisroel (Dov Kaiser)
• 14. sevara vs. psak (David Riceman)
• 15. Bilvavi Mishkan Evneh, hashgacha pratit, and free will (Chanoch (Ken) Bloom)

The question arose today at the Shabbos table as to what is the definition  
of a pilegesh, and how does it differ from a regular wife?  I said I had  
heard that a pilegesh is a wife with no kesubah but then someone asked how 
could  that be -- if a man is not allowed to live with a woman without a 
kesubah?   Somebody please fill me in here,  thank you!
 

--Toby Katz
==========


--------------------  

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I was very pleased to see that Chana Luntz has taken out time to study my 
piece.  My goal was to get people to discuss the view of the Rav, pro and 
con.  It looks like I've succeeded to some extent - though I had hoped that 
more of the senior Talmidim of the Rav would do so.  I viewed my role as 
bringing the Rav's shita to the forefront - but now people are expecting me 
to defend him; I wish the Rav were here to do so himself!

    My personal life has been very busy, but I'll try to respond to some of 
her comments briefly. As always her comments are wise and informative and a 
pleasure to read.


Chana Luntz (Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2010 22:41:24 +0100) wrote:



". whether RYBS held that the Rema was ruling like the Rambam in the face of 
the majority of the rishonim."



I'm not sure Briskers were ever terribly concerned whether the majority of 
Poskim agreed with the Rambam or not. The Rambam was a Giant, and that was 
that.



"One other thing in the above piece puzzles me.  RAF writes that Rav Moshe 
was "unaware that we indeed find the Rambam's formulation in the Finkelstein 
edition of the Sifrei".  Given that Rav Uziel writing in 1920 in his psak on 
women voting (Mishpatei Uziel 44) knew of this addition to the Sifri, it 
seems rather surprising to suggest that Rav Moshe, writing fifty years 
later, was ignorant of it."



IMHO Rav Moshe Feinstein was obviously unaware of the alternate Girsa in the 
Sifrei since he wonders where the Rambam got the idea that women were 
excluded from all minuyei serara.  He concludes that there is indeed no 
source and it was Rambam's own logical extension -  presumably extrapolated 
from ger.  Clearly, RMF was unaware of an alternate girsa which comes out 
just like the Rambam.



-----------------------------



Chana Luntz (Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2010 22:13:17 +0100) Wrote



"Just to note that Rav Hertzog used precisely the same argument from 
Shlomozion to say that this proves that a woman can validly be a queen where 
necessary."



I really don't know what the Netsiv would have answered regarding Shlomzion 
haMalkah. He may have responded that she was allowed to remain as queen 
because of pikuach Nefesh. Furthermore, there was no one her equal in piety 
who could rule, and allow Torah to flourish.  But this does no detract from 
the fact that the Netziv saw a distinction between gerim and women.



-------------------------



Chana Lintz (Date: Fri, 2 Jul 2010 09:12:19 +0100) wrote:



"I cannot see anywhere where RYBS addresses the question of the Levush's 
reason (ie that women faint)"



Chana is correct.  I responded from memory and erred.  The Rav does not 
relate to the Levush and Fainting - only to the claim that lo rainu ra'aya.



"The assumption behind RAF's writings, as far as I can see, is that, if 
forced to choose, RYBS would have poskened like the second reason rather 
than the first,"



It would seem to me that the Rav proposes the second approach because he is 
fundamentally unhappy with the proposal that inaction can create a minhag! 
This leads him to suggest what he thinks is a more satisfying answer.

*Ramban(Teshuva #2) or  Rashba (Teshuva #284): *I do not know why there 
is any cause for doubt in the first place, for of course is this woman 
permitted to this man [without marriage] since she lives with him, and 
non-marital sex was prohibited to Is?rael only by the teaching' of Rabbi 
Eliezer ben Yaakov who taught; "One should not live with a woman in this 
land and with another woman in a second land, lest their offspring 
unknowingly marry one another, and brother will  then marry sister" 
(Babylonian Talmud" Y/oma /18b}. However, if she comes into his house 
and lives with him and is known to him .. , she is permitted to be with 
him sexually, ., . and we have not found in either Scriptures or the 
Talmud that there is any difference between a king or a commoner in this 
regard, and we find that the foremost spiritual leaders of Israel lived 
so .... And lest you, claim that the Scriptures permitted this but that 
the rabbis later prohibited it, pray tell, then, in what. place is it 
written that such a decree was ever pronounced? And which rabbinic court 
proclaimed it? And in what period of our his?tory? //

T6...@aol.com wrote:
> The question arose today at the Shabbos table as to what is the 
> definition of a pilegesh, and how does it differ from a regular wife?  
> I said I had heard that a pilegesh is a wife with no kesubah but then 
> someone asked how could that be -- if a man is not allowed to live 
> with a woman without a kesubah?  Somebody please fill me in here,  
> thank you!
>  
>
> *--Toby Katz
> ==========
>
> *--------------------
>  
>  
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Avodah mailing list
> Avo...@lists.aishdas.org
> http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org
>   

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RJR asked:
> Anyone know of any sources on implications/what to do if a
> baby girl's announced name was incorrect and it wasn't
> realized until after davening was over?

Let's make it even more interesting. Any sources in the
implications/what to do if the parents desire a different name than
the one given in shul?

Answer for both, based on an oral conversation with R' Bleich: Min
hadin, the ritual baby naming in shul carries almost no weight. As
long as 30 days have not passed since the baby naming, the name is not
mu'hzaq, and can be changed by simply announcing that the name is
<insert the new name>, either in the paper, in another mi sheberakh,
in a letter [or a mass email, why not]. However, if this be a whim of
the parents, that they want to change the name, it is to be
discouraged. Names are not things to play around with.

Kol tuv,
-- 
Arie Folger,
Recent blog posts on http://ariefolger.wordpress.com/
* The New Face of Jewish Studitainment
* Should Humanity Call it Quits
* Sollten wir alle Kohanim sein?
* Videovortrag: Wer hat die Psalmen verfasst?
* Die Gaza-Hilfsflotte kritisch betrachtet

Moraj verbaussaj,

The Sfer ha'Hinukh in 679 and 66 gives the rationale for the mitzva of
tsedaqa. Remarkably, he does not speak of any mutual obligations to
fellow Jews, nor of a moral obligation to help those in need or those
less fortunate. Yes, he does explain - once we accept the mitzva -
that the mitzva applies both to poor and even rich unfortunates, but
he doesn't stress any covenantal or lovingkindness aspect for the
ba'al tsedaqa. I would have expected a reference to mah Hu ra'hum af
ata ra'hum, for example, but came up empty-handed.

Do the august members of Avodah have any recommendations for sources
that may discuss the mitzvot of tsedaqa and 'hessed from this angle? I
would also be interested in sources that may reject this reasoning.

--
Arie Folger,
Recent blog posts on http://ariefolger.wordpress.com/
* The New Face of Jewish Studitainment
* Should Humanity Call it Quits
* Sollten wir alle Kohanim sein?
* Videovortrag: Wer hat die Psalmen verfasst?
* Die Gaza-Hilfsflotte kritisch betrachtet

On Areivim, Ben Waxman wrote:
> The Gra writes in his perush on Pirke Avot that if someone hears his baby
> cry at night, he should ignore him and let his wife take care of the baby.
> Either the man is learning or sleeping in order to learn. Either way, the
> baby's problems are not his concern.

http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=25039&;pgnum=174


-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                    - Margaret Thatcher

http://matzav.com/rav-lau-i-am-willing-to-trade-places-with-gilad

While I appreciate Rav Laus "neshiyas ol" and his populist message,
does anybody know if he gave a Halachic psak about the feasibility of
such exchanges?

--
KT,
Eli Neuberger

eli neuberger wrote:
> While I appreciate Rav Laus "neshiyas ol" and his populist
> message,does anybody know if he gave a Halachic psak about the
> feasibility of such exchanges?

If you meant to ask about the *permissibility* of such exchanges,
it seems clear to me that it is permitted. The first example is that
of Yehudah. In general, while one is not required to be moser nefesh
to save someone else, one is permitted to do so; why should this sort
of case be an exception to that rule?

-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                    - Margaret Thatcher

The discussion back and forth on this issue has my head spinning. So I would
find it very helpful (and perhaps others as well), if we could go back a
step or two and someone could present the elements of serrarah; that is, to
have serrarah there must be a, b c, & d.  Of course, if there is a dispute
on the elements, it would be helpful if that were pointed out as well.  With
those elements, it might be easier to apply them to particular cases (shul
president, school principal, rabbi, shochet etc.) and see which have all of
the elements and which do not.  My sense (and it's not much more than a
sense) is that some part of our discussion of this issue involves differing
understandings of the powers of those in certain of the positions (president
etc.) being considered as opposed to halachic disagreements.

 

Joseph Kaplan 

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Joseph Kaplan wrote:
> The discussion back and forth on this issue has my head spinning. So I 
> would find it very helpful (and perhaps others as well), if we could go 
> back a step or two and someone could present the elements of serrarah; 
> that is, to have serrarah there must be a, b c, & d. 

RMF seems to define it as the authority, in ones own right rather than
delegated from someone else, to give someone orders.   Specifically, he
discusses the case of a mashgiach at a restaurant, who must by the nature
of the job have the authority to override the owner's decisions, and
order him not to serve something, or to throw something out, or even to
close down.  Therefore, he says, if the mashgiach is working directly for
the owner, then he has serarah over that owner (because if he doesn't
then he's no use at all), and therefore a woman may not be in this position.
But if the mashgiach is working for a rav or agency, which in turn contracts
with the owner, so that the mashgiach is responsible to the rav or to a
supervisor who can override his decisions, then it's not serarah, and a
woman can be hired for this position.

-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                     - Margaret Thatcher

A pre-expulsion Tosafist in England( I forgot which one) wrote a tschuva
permitting milk saying round here nobody adds anything treif to cow's milk.


Martin Brody
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On Wed, Jun 30, 2010 at 06:15:44AM -0400, Prof. Levine wrote:
> At 06:16 AM 6/30/2010, Yitzchok Schaffer wrote:
>> ... which is why we need a different type of Darwinism, that which does
>> not limit its world to the material, and sees man as a higher species of
>> animal *plus* a Divine soul.

> Two questions come to mind.

> 1. Why do we need any type of Darwinism?

The halachic process can be seen as Darwinian. Many sitos exist, the
fittest for survival is the one that is nispasheit to the community and
thus survives.

But I think RAYK also holds our spiritual progress over time is Darwinian,
or at least evolutionary in a more general sense. And thus he felt that
the science of evolution confirmed the basic thrust of the Torah. To him,
it was one spiritual process, and one can't separate the origin of the
species from the path of religious history. The following translation
from Orot haQodesh 2:537 can be found on numerous web pages:
    The theory of evolution (hitpattehut) is increasingly conquering
    the world at this time, and, more so than all other philosophical
    theories, conforms to the kabbalistic secrets of the world. Evolution,
    which proceeds on a path of ascendancy, provides an optimistic
    foundation for the world. How is it possible to despair at a time
    when we see that everything evolves and ascends? When we penetrate
    the inner meaning of ascending evolution, we find in it the divine
    element shining with absolute brilliance. It is precisely the Ein
    Sof in actu which manages to bring to realization that which is Ein
    Sof in potentia.

> 2. Would this "different type of Darwinism" be science? After all,  
> science is interested in explaining how things occur, not the underlying 
> why....

I never understood why "is it science?" was such an important question.
In practice, it pushes scientists to rule out a hypothesis without
consideration for reasons other than "is it truth?"

It's like the famous mashal of the drunk who drops a quarter in the
middle of the block, but looks for it on the street corner because
that's where the streetlight is and it's easier to look there. Yes,
the scientific method works quite well, but only works in the domain of
science -- repeatable empirical events (or an event that left mutiple
effects that each can be used to confirm eachother). By insisting that
the answer be scientific, one is ruling out the rest ofthe block for
one's search based on one's tools of reason, not where the truth may lie.

In this case, such a Darwinism as the one RYSchaffer describes would be
more likely to be emes because it accomodates both science and Torah.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             One who kills his inclination is as though he
mi...@aishdas.org        brought an offering. But to bring an offering,
http://www.aishdas.org   you must know where to slaughter and what
Fax: (270) 514-1507      parts to offer.        - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv

R.Harry Maryles asked:

<<Are?Poskim in the UK?Mekil on Chalav Stam using RMF's Sevara? What about Poskim in other countries?>>

 

The minhag among non-Charedim in England is to be meikil, and I am sure
that this minhag predated RMF's teshuvos on the matter.  Indeed, if the
only basis for the kula was RMF, I am not sure whether it would have been
accepted in England, as the poskim of England tend to look more to Europe
and Israel than to America.  When I moved from the Lakewood Kollel
community in Melbourne to Manchester, I noticed that quite a few kulos
which I had picked up in Melbourne were simply unknown in Manchester (e.g.
allowing my wife to do melacha after I had brought in Shabbos early).  The
shul luchos in Manchester would state *candlelighting between 6:10 [i.e.
plag hamincha] and 6:21 [i.e. the time we would get to bo'i khala in
shul]*.  RMF is lenient on this point, and I never observed this chumra
until I got to England.

 

Getting back to the milk issue, I presume that the minhag l'kula in England
was based on the Peri Chadash, who held (IIRC) that if there is no genuine
chashash of mixing chalav tameh, there is no reason to forbid unsupervised
milk.  I seem to remember R. Gil Student once writing on Hirhurim that this
is also the real basis for the minhag in America , but I couldn't find the
post.

 

If the reason for the kulah is the Peri Chadash, then perhaps the
prevalence of camels' milk in Europe could have halachic implications for
the kashrus of unsupervised milk.

 

I should point out, on a purely sociological note, that unlike in America,
card-carrying Charedim in England do not drink non-supervised milk. 
Indeed, the use of unsupervised milk is one of those differences between
charedim and what they call Englisher Yidden.

 

Kol tuv

Dov Kaiser

                                          
_________________________________________________________________
http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/195013117/direct/01/
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I've posted about this previously, but my post was very confusing and no 
one responded.  Here's the same problem expounded very clearly in the 
context of American constitutional law:

http://volokh.com/2010/07/07/mcdonald-and-the-voting-paradox/

It happens all the time in psak halacha.  Anyone know of any general 
discussions about the problem?

David Riceman

I'm reading sefer Bilvavi Mishkan Evneh (in English), and I'm puzzled
by the author's (Rav Itamar Schwartz) conception of hashgacha pratit.
In chapter 4 of volume 1, and also chapter 11 of volume 2, the author
presents a very expansive conception of Hashem's hashgacha, that seems
to leave very little to a person's free will. His primary example is:

"Let's say that we ask a person who is about to buy a table, a set of
chairs, or something similar, 'Do you think you really have control
over what kind of table you will buy, or do you believe you cannot
determine this at all, and it is Hashem Who decrees exactly what you
will buy?' Most people, apparently, know the truth that a person
doesn't really have the ability to determine which table he will buy."
(vol 1 p 98) He continues the chapter to explain how to develop
in one's heart the understanding that it is Hashem who makes these
decisions, and how you have no control over these things.

He justifies this based on (Berachot 32b) "Everything is in the hands
of Heaven, except for the fear of Heaven" (see vol 1 p 100), and
the statement (Chullin 7b) "No one bruises (or even lifts) a finger
down below unless a proclamation is issued from above."

I find his approach hard to accept intellectually, becuase it strips
humans of almost all free will. I'm hoping someone can better explain
his position to me, or present sources that make this more
understandable.

First off, the emendation he makes to the statement from Chullin 7b is
not in the gemara -- there it only says "No one bruises a finger down
below..."

Secondly, he appears to be in conflict with what the Ramchal  says in
Derech Hashem (2:3:4) that a person decides what they want to do, and
Hashem decides what level of help to give that person, or what kinds of
obstacles to put in a that person's way. Elsewhere (I forget where),
the Ramchal explains that Hashem has free will to affect the whole
series of angels and forces that interact this world from the top
down, and that man has the free will to affect the whole series of
angels and forces from the bottom up.

(It does seem to be appropriate to ask from the Ramchal, since the
way he quotes the Ramchal seems to suggest that that he bases his work
off the derech in the Ramchal gives in Mesliat Yesharim)

Lastly, though I suppose Rav Schwartz is not required to accept it,
REED explains "Everything is in the hands of Heaven, except for the
fear of Heaven" differently (as talking about the nikudat habechira),
in a way that allows humans much more free will.

How am I to understand Rav Schwartz in light of these issues with his
conception of free will and hashgacha? (And how does he understand the
Ramchal, and REED?)

--Ken

-- 
Chanoch (Ken) Bloom. PhD candidate. Linguistic Cognition Laboratory.
Department of Computer Science. Illinois Institute of Technology.
http://www.iit.edu/~kbloom1/


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