Avodah Mailing List

Volume 26: Number 166

Thu, 13 Aug 2009

• 1. (no subject) (Joseph Kaplan)
• 2. Tz'nius (rabbirichwol...@gmail.com)
• 3. Kashrus of a Restaurant Under the Supervision of its Owner (Cantor Wolberg)
• 4. Re: Kashrus of a Restaurant Under the Supervision of its Owner (I. Balbin)
• 5. Re: Kashrus of a Restaurant Under the Supervision of its Owne r (kennethgmiller@juno.com)
• 6. Re: Kashrus of a Restaurant Under the Supervision of its Owner (David Riceman)
• 7. Re: Kashrus of a Restaurant Under the Supervision of its Owne r (Gershon Dubin)
• 8. Re: Tzeni'us and gender roles (Chana Luntz)
• 9. inconceivable-- Ben Sorer uMoreh (Rabbi Y. H. Henkin)
• 10. Re: Avodah] Classical Academia, Deconstruction, and Mesorah (Meir Shinnar)
• 11. Classical Academia, Deconstruction, and Mesorah (Michael Makovi)
• 12. Kashrus of a Restaurant Under the Supervision of its Owner (Prof. Levine)
• 13. Re: Kashrus of a Restaurant Under the Supervision of its Owner (David Riceman)
• 14. Re: Kashrus of a Restaurant Under the Supervision of its Owner (Micha Berger)
• 15. Kashrus of a Restaurant Under the Supervision of its Owner (Michael Makovi)
• 16. Re: R Akiva (Micha Berger)
• 17. Re: Classical Academia, Deconstruction, and Mesorah (Rich, Joel)

RRW: "I think RY don't turn this down to honor the chassan and kallah by
their acceptance

IOW it's not necessarily about their own Kavod."

If the RHS/RMB definition of tzni'ut were truly a jewish ideal (and I  
believe it is not), then RY would have taught this to their talmidim  
who would then be understanding why their rebbe did not take the  
kibud.  And, of course, I did not say, nor did I mean to imply, that  
RY were concerned about their kavod.  But if taking the, let's call  
it a public role and not an honor or a kibud, truly conflicted with  
tzni'ut, they'd act on it.  I haven't seen, nor have I heard of our  
poskim and other leaders, including those advocating this definition,  
acting on it.

Joseph Kaplan

Joseph Kaplan:
> If the RHS/RMB definition of tzni'ut were truly a jewish ideal (and I  
> believe it is not), then RY would have taught this to their talmidim  
> who would then be understanding why their rebbe did not take the  
> kibud.  And, of course, I did not say, nor did I mean to imply, that  
> RY were concerned about their kavod.  But if taking the, let's call  
> it a public role and not an honor or a kibud, truly conflicted with  
> tzni'ut, they'd act on it.  I haven't seen, nor have I heard of our  
> poskim and other leaders, including those advocating this definition,  
> acting on it.

Ein hachi nami
BUT
I will echo Micha. There are indeed NO legal bounds being crossed here

Thus:
> I haven't seen, nor have I heard of our poskim and other leaders,

Is in this context a red herring 

Rather - this is an issue of machshava, Mussar and Dei'os (Rambam's term)

And what do sifrei mussar say?  Some seriously object!!

EG
R Chaim Vital Shaarei Qedusha Part 1 shaar 5 (p. 24 in my edition)

"V'sivrach b'chol kochacha min haserarah (BTW it's a sin not a shin)
haqoveres es b'aleha!"
Tr;
"Escape with all your might from office-holding (or perhaps from
officiating)- that buries its masters or owners."

How about "us'na es harrabanus". 


Again a RY who Honors a Chassan by reading his Kesubbah is not violating
this, because his office bestows honor on the Chassan-kallah

Similarly - bar minan - when a RY gives a hesped.

-------------------------



Reb Shraga Feivel hated the title rabbi, and I know it cost K'vod hattorah
when a young rabbi dismissed him as a mere "baleboss". Halevai I should
be such a mere baleboss.

His talmid - R. Charles Batt AH - is more responsible for my Hinuch than
anyone in the world aside from my parents AH - who worshipped Charlie
Batt and also knew about Reb Shraga Feivel and Dr. Joe Kamnetsky, too!

_______________

Digression 2 
R Tukachinsky (Gesher Hachayim) said not to place the title "Rav" on his
Tzuyyun, but caveated that since today the title is so meaningless it's
probably no big deal anymore! :-)

KT
RRW
Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

> Years ago someone told me that there is a teshuva of the Chasam Sofer
> that says that such supervision is not valid, but I do not know which
> teshuva this is

I definitely agree.
The owner is a nogea b'davar. It seems pretty obvious. Regarding  
someone's private home, there is no monetary interest involved.
I don't see how the two can be equated. 

>
> Message: 8
> Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2009 16:20:52 -0400
> From: "Prof. Levine" <llev...@stevens.edu>
> Subject: [Avodah] Kashrus of a Restaurant Under the Supervision of its
>    Owner
> To: avo...@aishdas.org
> Message-ID: <0KOA00HDU5V3Y...@mta3.srv.hcvlny.cv.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; Format="flowed"
>
>
> Years ago someone told me that there is a teshuva of the Chasam Sofer
> that says that such supervision is not valid, but I do not know which
> teshuva this is.
>
> I am personally uncomfortable with a private hashgocha, because the  
> idea
> of the person who is being supervised paying the supervisor directly
> does not sit well with me. (I am not saying there is any problem with
> such hashgachas from a halachic standpoint.) However, here the "payee"
> and the supervisor are one and the same!

There are certainly opinions that permit it. I can recall learning a  
long Aruch Hashulchan on this about 20 years ago.

R' Yitzchok Levine asked:

> Is a person giving supervision on an establishment
> that he owns a problem from a halachic standpoint?
> Is this indeed a valid hashgacha, given that the
> owner and kashrus supervisor are one and the same?
>
> IMO, this is not the same as someone saying that his
> or her home is kosher. In one's home there is
> presumably no profit motive involved.
>
> Years ago someone told me that there is a teshuva of
> the Chasam Sofer that says that such supervision is not
> valid, but I do not know which teshuva this is.

According to my notes, about five years ago we had a discussion about how
to apply "eid echad ne'eman" to modern real-world kashrus situations. R'
Josh Backon suggested looking at the Aruch Hashulchan Yoreh Deah 119,
specifically paragraphs #3, 9, and 11 there.

I was amazed at what he wrote there, over a hundred years ago. In
particular, he shows big differences between the eidus one gives about his
kitchen at home vs. the kitchen in his store. My suggestion is to start at
the beginning of that siman, and go for a dozen or so seifim. It's an
eye-opener.

Akiva Miller

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R' Yitzchok Levine:
>> Is a person giving supervision on an establishment
>> that he owns a problem from a halachic standpoint?
>> Is this indeed a valid hashgacha, given that the
>> owner and kashrus supervisor are one and the same?
>>     
RAM:
>> According to my notes, about five years ago we had a discussion
>> about how to apply "eid echad ne'eman" to modern real-world
>> kashrus situations. R' Josh Backon suggested looking at the Aruch
>> Hashulchan Yoreh Deah 119, specifically paragraphs #3, 9, and 11
>> there.
>>     
It depends, as RAM points out, on whether he has a hezkat kashrut.  It 
also may depend on whether there's ithazek issura (e.g. meat) or not.  
See AhSh YD 188:22 and follow the sources back.  I was brought up to be 
lenient like the AhSH, but I've known respectable people who are 
stringent like the Hayyei Adam.

If you are worried about financial interest, however, why not also worry 
that a paid mashgiah has a financial interest in the success of the 
business (or, as RAM worries, that his ne'emanus is questionable)? 
Someone who occasinally posts on this list, and who knows far more than 
I, has argued that at least one major Kashrut agency keeps its staff on 
salary to avoid this problem.

I think that's correct (I have a vague recollection that correct 
practice is to pay shochtim even for treifos to avoid this problem).  
Nonetheless it raises two concerns.  The first is that if an agency 
loses clients it loses revenue.  So being on salary may not make him 
worry about tomorrow's paycheck if he finds problems, but he may worry 
about next month's paycheck.

The second is more abstract.  Laws of agency (shlichus) in the US are 
very different than those in halacha.  So, for example, the firm of 
plumbers I employ is bonded, and I don't need to check each plumber 
individually for expertise and capacity to reimburse me for drastic 
errors.  But in halacha if he makes a mistake the head of the firm can 
simply shrug off the problem by saying to his employee "litkuni 
shdartich v'lo l'avtuni".  There is no practical way in halacha to run a 
large firm.  So the major kashrus agencies, with dozens of employees we 
don't know personally, can run only in a non-halachic legal system.

Anything that concerns you about an owner you don't know personally 
should also concern you about a mashgiah you don't know personally.  
I've known some prominent rabbis who eat meat only if they know the 
shohet personally (I'd guess only meat because of ithazek issura).

David Riceman

From: "kennethgmil...@juno.com" kennethgmil...@juno.com

<<I was amazed at what he wrote there, over a hundred years ago. In
particular, he shows big differences between the eidus one gives about his
kitchen at home vs. the kitchen in his store>>
All of this discussion implies that if the person is ne'eman, that's the
end of the story.  In fact, in our times, the complexity (both
technological and logistical) of the operation of even a restaurant, kal
vachomer a factory, is such that someone who is not a mumche should not be
a mashgiach.  Certainly operating without a mashgiach is asking for the
trouble, despite the best of intentions.

Gershon
gershon.du...@juno.com


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RMB writes:

> See the Keli Yaqar Shemos 30:
>     ... ein kaparah zu meshameshes ki im bizman shekol echad yosheiv
>     besokh ami kemo she'amerah haShunamis...
> Or the Tzitz Eliezer XVI:35, who uses besokh ami to argue 
> that it's better (yeish to'eles yoseir) to make one tefillah 
> for numerous neshamos rather than single out one at a time.

The Tzitz Eliezer is clearly talking about a different value than the one
you are arguing for.  It is indeed a common feature in yehadus that we link
our suffering to that of other Jews.  Hence we console aveilim amongst the
mourners of Zion and Jerusalem and we daven for the sick amongst the sick of
Israel. The idea that it would be better to make one tefillah for numerous
neshamos rather than single out one at a time fits squarely within this
model.   It is also at one with the idea that tephilos are always heard in a
congregation, when they may not be heard if prayed by an individual.
Indeed, while I am no Zohar scholar, that seems to me to be what the Zohar
that the Tzitz Eliezer quotes is specifically referring to - at the time
that HKBH is called HaMelech HaMishpat, and there is judgment hanging over
the world, a person should not separate himself and try and go it alone -
and it is this aspect that it finds a remez in the pasuk besoch ami (I can
understand that reading of besoch ami, although while this idea of not
separating oneself from the community is one that is not uncommon in the
halachic literature, for some reason eg the gemora does not seem to use
bsoch ami to illustrate this point - perhaps because, as you will no doubt
point out, it does not seem to be the pshat in what the Shunamis was saying,
as there seemed to be no question of prishus in what was on offer).  What is
not being discussed here is any idea about the taking or not taking of
public roles in front of a community, rather the motif is the joining
together with, rather than the separating oneself from, the community when
faced with HaShem's judgment.

But you are arguing for something else.  If we took a similar scenario to
that discussed by the Tzitz Eliezer, ie a group of chollim (where the same
discussion about having one prayer for numerous cholim, or having separate
tefillos could be made), your argument as a consequence would seem to go as
follows:  If one cholleh had the opportunity to be cured, he or she ought to
refuse that opportunity, unless all of the community of chollim could be so
cured.  Because, according to you, being besoch ami is both an ideal and it
means that a person should not seek to differentiate themselves from others
in the community.  Of course that is absolutely not what the Tzitz Eliezer
or the Zohar is saying, not about chollim, or about the neshamos that we are
davening should be elevated, or about people facing the yom hadin.   I am
fully confident that the Tzitz Eliezer would expect the person davening to
be truly grateful if even one of the neshamos being davenned for were
elevated to greater heights in olam haba, even if some of the others were
left behind.

Regards

Chana

       
     
      The Sages said ?a wayward and rebellious son never was and never will
      be,? but R. Yehonatan said, ?I saw one, and sat on his grave.? As a
      rule, Talmudic controversies center on questions of law and not of
      fact. R. Yehonatan?s first-hand testimony was certainly reliable; on
      what basis, then, did the other Sages dispute him?
      The answer is that they referred to the juridical aspects of the
      rebellious son, while R. Yehonatan testified as to the reality of the
      phenomenon: ?I saw one, and sat on his grave!? He had seen a child
      who matched the Torah?s description, although G-d killed him and not
      a court.
      This explains the identical disagreement, ibid., concerning the
      apostasized city described in Devarim 13:13-19: the Sages said it
      ?never was and never will be,? while R. Yehonatan said, ?I saw it,
      and sat on its ruins.? It is impossible that the destruction of such
      a city by Jewish force of arms could have escaped the notice of
      everyone except R. Yehonatan, just as it is inconceivable that the
      Roman authorities would have allowed such an action to take place.
      Rather, R. Yehonatan testified as to the phenomenon: there indeed had
      been such a city, which was subsequently destroyed in whatever
      manner. 

      (From New Interpretations on the Parsha--Ktav, 2001)
      Rabbi Y.H.Henkin 


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>
>
> In general, post-modernism is incompatible with mesorah. Here's one
> definition of post-modernism:
> ? ?Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity
> ? ?toward metanarratives.
> ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?- Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition
>
> Where a metanarrative is "global or totalizing cultural narrative schema
> which orders and explains knowledge and experience." (John Stephans)
> A metanarrative could be the underlying unity of all fairy tales that
> leads us to a particular expectation and understanding of them.
>
> One can see a central theme of Yahadus, or almost any religion, is to
> bedavka impart a metanarrative. Questioning the metanarrative means
> never really encountering the narrative.
>
> Postmodernism bedavka asks one not to follow naaseh venishmah, to let
> the framework of halachic life speak for itself. And without "ta'amu",
> one will never get to "ure'u ki tTov H'".
>
While postmodernism may be problematic,, someone like rav shagar zt"l
did not at al find it incomatible with mesora (see his kelim shvurim)
-the question is the version of postmodernism.
Yes, there are problematic versions of postmodernism - but let's not be hasty...
Meir Shinnar

> The classical academic approaches a text looking to see what the author's
> original intent was.
> ...
> The post-modern approach is not to look for the meaning the text had to
> the author, but the meaning the text has to the reader. A hyper-correction
> to the opposite extreme.
> ...
> Mesorah, however, is a living tradition of a development of ideas. More
> important to us than what R' Yochanan's original intent is what R' Ashi
> thought that intent was, which in turn can only be understood through
> the eyes of what the Rosh and the Rambam understood R' Ashi's meaning to
> be, which in turn can only be understood through the eyes of the Shaagas
> Aryeh and R' Chaim Brisker. It's not what the text meant to the author,
> tied to understanding the historical context and weltenschaung of the
> tanna. Nor is it what it means to me from a clean slate, an open field
> defined only by my encounter with the text, and thus shaped in part by
> personal desire and ignorance. It's entering the stream of mesorah and
> following how the idea is developed.
>
> R' Micha

Granted there are limitations; the academic approach involves a bit of
hutzpah and is probably impossible to perfectly fulfill, while the
post-modern approach is egotistically self-centered and ahistorical,
and makes a mockery of the original text. But I think we can salvage
them if we use them in moderation. We don't have to slavishly adhere
to one approach alone.

I don't claim to have all the answers, or to have all the details
worked out, but my basic solution is two-fold:
1) Whether to use academic historicism, post-modernism, or mesorah,
depends on our given goal at the given point in time;
2) These three choices should be used in tandem, to different degrees,
in moderation, with common sense.

Rabbi David bar Hayim, following Rav Kook's distinction between perush
(explanation of the author's intent) and biur (expository drash), says
that biur is legitimate, as long as one realizes that he's not
explaining the author's own intent. Similarly, Professor Shapiro,
Rabbi Yehiel Weinberg, and Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein all say that
Brisker lomdus cannot claim to have the Rambam's own authority behind
it. Professor Shapiro notes that sometimes, we follow the Rambam or
the Shulhan Arukh even when later teshuva of the Rambam or R' Karo
disputes the book; we are following the book itself, not the human
authority behind the book.

Sometimes Rambam said something difficult, and so later authorities
found justification. Even if we later find that the girsa was wrong,
the fact remains that the wrong girsa has been given justification,
and has its own halakhic validity. The question is: do we want to
follow Rambam himself, or the mesorah of interpretation? One must
honestly ask himself what his goal is.

The common thread in all of those is that one must ask himself what
his goal is. Is one's goal to pasken like the Rambam himself, or to
pasken according to how the halakhah organically evolved over time in
the historical interpretation of Rambam?

Therefore, different approaches should be used, in different degrees,
in tandem. Professor Haim Kreisel, for example, says that in his work
as a scholar of Medieval Jewish philosophy, he tries to use the
academic approach to narrow down the interpretation to only those with
historical legitimacy. But even after that, several possible
historical readings remain, without a possibility of limiting the
choices to only one (because we are too far removed from the original
time, and we cannot hope to understand the Tanaim as well as the
Amoraim did, etc.), so he subsequently uses the post-modern approach
to make the text meaningful to him. An ahistorical post-modernism, he
says, makes the text relevant to oneself but totally divorces it from
the original work. A cold academic approach, however, he says, makes
the work dead from the aspect of edification. The combination of these
two approaches, he says, makes the reading both historically accurate
and spiritually edifying. So if he has narrowed down a given passage
of the Kuzari to two or three possible readings, based on what R'
Halevi's Muslim philosopher contemporaries said, etc., then one may
choose the particular reading that is most personally meaningful.

In short:
1) Different tasks call for different tools
2) Using only one tool without the other leads to an extreme; all the
tools should be used in tandem, according to the present need.

A personal example: the Meiri never dealt with moral secular
individuals such as we have today; he assumes that a non-Jew must be
G-d fearing to be availed of the "nations bound by religion" thesis.
Nevertheless, Professor Moshe Halbertal, followed by Rabbi David
Berger, both say that the general tenor of Meiri's thesis seems to be
that if someone fears G-d, therefore he is moral, and therefore the
halakhah is such-and-such. We can extrapolate that if someone is moral
alone, even without fear of G-d, this is just as well for Meiri, since
Meiri's concern was not with belief in G-d per se as a metaphysical
notion, but rather with the practical consequences of fear of G-d. The
Meiri never said all this, but it is consistent with what he said.
From a purely academic standpoint, all this is rubbish (the Meiri
technically demands fear of G-d, end of story), but it all works if we
mix the academic and post-modernist approaches. The Meiri seems to
equate fear of G-d with morality, and he apparently is more concerned
with the results of fear of G-d than he is with the fear of G-d
itself, and so, for our own personal purposes, we can adapt Meiri's
own view, tweak it a bit but stay mostly but not totally within the
historical bounds of what Meiri himself said, and come up with
something that works for us personally.

What I have said is more of a general guideline. This is all very
subjective, and I cannot say anything quantitative. My point is that
halakhists and theologians should use all these methods in tandem,
according to the goal and the case at hand, according to what their
common sense dictates.

I agree we shouldn't
a) Coldly analyze the text historically for only what the author meant, nor
b) Discard all baggage and all previous interpretations and interpret
the text with no background whatsoever, nor
c) Naively trust the words of the chain of transmission, without
questioning these interpretations at all
I think the best approach is to combine all three; combine the
historical data, with what one's own mind and heart say personally,
with what the chain of transmission says. All three of this should be
combined, in various degrees.

Michael Makovi

At 07:18 PM 8/12/2009, Zev Sero wrote:
> > Years ago someone told me that there is a teshuva of the Chasam Sofer
> > that says that such supervision is not valid, but I do not know which
> > teshuva this is.
>
>If so, it would have been a chumrah or takanah specific to the
>circumstances of his place and time.  The CS surely did not have
>the authority to change the basic halacha in the SA and Rama,
>for all times and places!

Here is what I was told.

There was once a reliable shochet who decided to open a butcher shop. 
He argued the following: Since he was considered reliable when it 
came to his shechita, he therefore should not be required to have 
supervision on his butcher shop.

This case was brought to the Chasam Sofer who paskened that this 
fellow did indeed need supervision on his butcher shop. The reasoning 
was that when it came to shechita, the shochet received the same 
amount of compensation, no matter if an animal were found to be 
kosher or not. However, when it came to his butcher shop, there 
definitely were financial considerations. In short, in his butcher 
shop he was nogeah b'davar, and hence needed supervision.

I repeat that I have not seen the actual teshuva.

YL
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David Riceman wrote:
>> It depends, as RAM points out, on whether he has a hezkat kashrut.  
>> It also may depend on whether there's ithazek issura (e.g. meat) or not.

I was unclear here.  The passage RAM cited is concerned in general about 
whether a person has a hezkat kashrut.  The passage I cited deals 
specifically with when a person's self interest invalidates his hezkat 
kashrut.

I wonder, however, whether the AhSH would still deem his solution (a 
letter from a local rabbi) adequate if he had read in his newspaper 
about local rabbis being arrested after being accused of money laundering.

David Riceman

On Thu, Aug 13, 2009 at 11:38:21AM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
: I wonder, however, whether the AhSH would still deem his solution (a 
: letter from a local rabbi) adequate if he had read in his newspaper 
: about local rabbis being arrested after being accused of money laundering.

For a similar reason, I think I would have an easier time trusting a
restaurateur who never tried being his own mashgiach, and all I have is
his chezqas kashrus. It just seems like a rei'usah in his chezaqah to
present a "we have a hechsher" when it's really "you can trust me".

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

Isn't everyone's own kitchen table under their own supervision? If
we're going to invalidate self-supervision from a technical formal
halakhic standpoint, where does this put hakhnasat orhim?

Now, granted, in practice, one might be wary of self-supervision by
anyone whom he doesn't know personally, especially when the
self-supervisor will make money, and has a material incentive to be
fradulent (or at least might unintentionally delude himself in
justifying himself - as R' Micha says, the brain is a wonderful tool
for justifying that which the heart has already arrived at). But this
is not a technical halakhic factor; one may or may not personally
trust someone's hashgaha, and I don't think there is a solid iron-clad
rule on when one should and should not trust.

Incidentally, my rabbi told me that he once went to a restaurant, and
the heksher was a signed letter from one of the "gedolim" (I forget
who), saying that the proprietor was a personal friend of this given
gadol. This gadol said that he had never inspected the restaurant
personally, but he said he personally knew the proprietor to G-d
fearing, plain as that. As far as I can tell, my rabbi seems have
believed this letter was authentic, and he said this letter was better
than any hekhsher the Rabbinut can proffer.

I'm reminded of another story, of Rabbi Yehuda Herzl Henkin eating at
a wedding. Some pipsqueak little yeshiva bahur (my own rabbi's
wording) came up to Rabbi Henkin and asked what the hekhsher was.
Rabbi Henkin took a bite of food and after swallowing, said he didn't
know. My rabbi, sitting next to Rabbi Henkin, asked him why he wasn't
concerned, and Rabbi Henkin, livid with anger, threw his fork down and
said that the hatan and kallah were frum Jews and were surely serving
kosher, end of discussion.

Professor Menachem Friedman, in his ?The Market Model and Religious
Radicalism? and his ?Life Tradition and Book Tradition?
(http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/so/mfriedman.html), cites the case of Rabbi
Jacob Reischer facing the situation of village shokhtim; these
shokhtim were generally frum, but were not the most outstanding
scholars, and moreover, since they were also the ones to sell their
own meat, they had an incentive to declare their own shekhita to be
kosher. Could they be trusted? To quote Professor Friedman:
"A good example of this [solicitude for and accomodation of the
less-observant by traditional pre-modern communities, in contrast to
modern Haredi voluntary communities] is the incident cited by R. Jacob
Reischer (1719, Yoreh De'ah, cap. 58). In one of the communities, the
rabbis ruled that meat brought from the smaller communities of the
surrounding villages was not kosher because the slaughterers in those
places were thought not to know enough and/or not to be careful
enough, by the stricter standards of the Jewish community. R. Reischer
unequivocally rejects this approach, but not because he considered
those slaughterers to be outstanding scholars. He admits that his
position might be considered "lenient," but he defends it on the basis
of the principle of the cohesion of the traditionally religious
community, which might be adversely affected by the disqualification
of the village slaughterers. "It is fitting that all the Jewish people
be unified in the matter of eating and drinking so as not to cause in
their own midst a rift like that which separates them from the others
[the Gentiles]; we should not multiply separate groups." There is no
doubt that R. Reischer's approach represents a deeply rooted Jewish
tradition."

Now, granted that the fact that today, not all Jews are frum as they
were for Rabbi Reischer, and granted that restaurants have a financial
incentive to have their own food declared kosher. So we should be
careful with self-supervision. But I don't think we can categorically
declare it to be invalid. It might not be wise to rely on it, but I
don't think we can stamp it as unequivocally treif.

Michael Makovi

On Wed, Aug 12, 2009 at 10:25:41AM +0300, Eli Turkel wrote:
: The problem is that many of these legends are contradictory.
: According to this story he had a son and then went (returned) to learning
: at the age of 40. According to the other story with Rachel (BTW her
: name isnt mentioned)

R' Marcus Lehmann does a good job at weaving together these stories
without having a contradiction. So I don't see this question as so
muchrach.

But the question isn't a "problem", since the point of the stories isn't
biographical, but metaphoric. Whether they are biographical or not is
off topic.

E.g. RML has R' Aqiva learn with Nachum Ish Gamzu before leaving his
wife. In fact, if he only left his wife for a total of 12+12 years,
returning then to tell his talmidim "sheli veslakhem..." and one takes
the 3 x 40 year patter literally, he lived with his wife 16 years before
needing to leave to study under the generation's leaders. Plenty of time
to raise chldren.

You ask what happened to his children. By 14, in those days, R' Yehoshua

: More generally it is unclear when he lived. He dies about 135 during
: the Bar Kochba revolt.
: Accepting the standard calendar (which is too exact 40+40+40 just like
: R. Yochanan Ben Zakai), he was born about 15 CE. He started learning
: (or relearning) at age 40 in

... and Moshe. And it's not the only way R' Aqiva is compared to MRAH,
such as when Moshe visits his class. As I said, medrash is about our
learning values, not history.

:                                            Why did he go to R. Yehoshua and
: R. Eliezer and not R. Yochanan ben Zakai or R. Shimon ben Gamliel?

At that time, he was still a non-name learning with Nachum Ish Gamzu.

But again, I don't think it's likely to be historical any more than you
do. However, I don't see these questions as major ones -- neither in
topic, not in proving ahistoricity. More may be historical than you
appear in your post willing to accept, even if not 40+40+40.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             A life of reaction is a life of slavery,
mi...@aishdas.org        intellectually and spiritually. One must
http://www.aishdas.org   fight for a life of action, not reaction.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            -Rita Mae Brown

 

I agree we shouldn't
a) Coldly analyze the text historically for only what the author meant, nor
b) Discard all baggage and all previous interpretations and interpret the text with no background whatsoever, nor
c) Naively trust the words of the chain of transmission, without
questioning these interpretations at all I think the best approach is to
combine all three; combine the historical data, with what one's own mind
and heart say personally, with what the chain of transmission says. All
three of this should be combined, in various degrees.

Michael Makovi
_______________________________________________
So Again I ask - is our goal to know the original dvar hashem or to follow the "process hashem" ?
KT
Joel Rich
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