Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 102

Wednesday, February 25 2004

• RE: S'char for a BT vs. FFB
• Re: Waving at Candles
• Re: what makes a posek
• Re: Eye Surgery (d'Oraysa) on Shabbos
• Yom HaShishi in Kiddush
• Re: What makes a posek
• Kashrus of eggs from Leghorn chickens
• Re: e-tzniut issues
• e-tznius issues
• Re: e-tzniut issues
• RE: Necessity of G-d's Existence
• Re: Necessity of G-d's Existence
• Re: Necessity of G-d's Existence
• Re: Eye Surgery (d'Oraysa) on Shabbos
• Re: Eye Surgery (d'Oraysa) on Shabbos
• RE: Eye Surgery (d'Oraysa) on Shabbos
• Re: Eye Surgery (d'Oraysa) on Shabbos
• RE: Eye Surgery (d'Oraysa) on Shabbos
• Re: Eye Surgery (d'Oraysa) on Shabbos
• Re: Eye Surgery (d'Oraysa) on Shabbos
• a fire on shabbos
• Re: Yom HaShishi in Kiddush
• Re: Necessity of G-d's Existence

"Stein, Aryeh" <AStein@wtplaw.com> wrote:
> There is a well-known (Gemara?) that in a place where a baal teshuva
> stands, a tzadik gamur cannot stand....My understanding of this has been
> that the baal teshuva knows why he is avoiding treif, and he remembers its
> taste, so he is not merely avoiding it passively the way a frum-from-birth
> does. Rather, his avoidance has a positive aspect to it which the FFB's
> avoidance lacks. This is closely related to the concept of "z'donos
> naaseh zechuyos", when sufficient teshuva occurs.

> My b'chor challenged all of the above. His point is that the BT has a
> clear understanding of right and wrong, and has deliberately chosen to
> keep the Torah. He has defeated his yetzer hara for these things. The
> FFB should therefore get more s'char than the BT, because the FFB has
> to keep fighting his yetzer hara.

While both perspectives are accurate (in my opinion) I believe that the
exalted status given to Baalei Teshuva goes beyond the specifics you
mention. It isn't only about being Misgaber over Taavos although that
might be part of it.

For the newly Frum, it is about the journey. Such individuals should be
compared to Avraham Avenu himself. They come to see the light on their
own. Without the benefit of any Mesorah or education they seek truth
and find it in the Torah. How many of us would come to this conclusion
were we to come from no background? Most people do not find God this
way at all and are content to live their lives in accordance with
their upbringing. But the struggle to find truth that is part of the
Baal Teshuva's search for meaning in life, is far greater than anyone
who comes from a Frum background with everything handed to him on a
platter. This does not mean that a given BT is greater than the Gadol
Hador in Knowledge or Yiras Shamayim. But he is greater than a Gadol
in the length and breath of his search and struggle bringd him to the
right conclusions.

Remember also that a Baal Teshuva does not necessarily mean one who wasn't
raised Frum. It is perhaps more so about someone having succumbed to
Taavah and then doing Teshuva. To people who are by nature Baalei Taavah
to overcome those Taavos and do Teshuvah Gemurrah is perhaps greater
than an Adam Gadol who is by nature not a Baal Taavah and never succumbed.

This is how I understand it.

HM

>>"im einan nevi'ot, benei nevi'ot hen."

>Shouldn't that be 'benot neviot hen'???

Good question. The Raaviya quotes this and has it as benot. I want to say
the pashute guess would be that the manuscript of Sefer hayashar read BN'
[= benot] and the apostrophe was mistakenly read as a yod and hence was
printed: benei. But then I see the Tsits Eliezer eg uses the phrase as
well, so I dont know. I would defer to someone with better access to
mss of sefer hayashar [ve-dai le-mevin].

But I am also open to grammatical acrobatics.

Yisrael Dubitsky

There is no clear answer to your question - just as there is no clear
answer to what is the source of rabbinic authority today. The issues
of authority ultimately come down to Reb Moshe's answer - a posek is
someone who people accept as a posek. This also seems to be the Ramban's
understanding of rabbinic authority according to Rav Elchonon Wasserman.
The authority of the gemora - according to the Kesef Mishna - was
also because it was accepted. It is not clear why these people are
accepted as authorities. There is one statement in Chazal [Eiruvin
13b] that deals with your question - we posken like Hillel over Shammai
because of their personality traits. Maharal has a major discussion of
this in Baer haGolah 1:6 page 94 in R' Hartman's edition. He says they
had seichel pashut. Regarding classic sources - look at volume I of
Maharetz Chajes "Darchei Hora'ah page 207- 280. You might also want to
look at the Chavas Ya'ir #94. You also need to differentiate between a
posek who knows the standard answers that most authorities accept and
the gadol who comes up with a new answer for a new situation.

Daniel Eidensohn

On Wed, 25 Feb 2004 03:11:36 +0200 Daniel Eidensohn
<yadmoshe@012.net.il> writes:
> Rabbi Bleich (Contempoary Halachic Problems II page 234-235): 
> "Since, at present, medical science recognizes little or no hazard in
> physiologic jaundice, physicians routinely advise their patients that
> circumcision may be performed on the eighth day 

Right.
And here we had the case of Poskim not permitting what Chazal permitted,
at the cost of a man's eye!
In other words, the fact that Chazal considered it to be vaday pikuach
nefesh would not be sufficient to even give it the status of safek
pikuach nefesh, in light of Modern Science!!!

That would seem to indicate that 
a)the Poskim were certain that Nature had changed or 
b)They were certain that the previous knowledge was wrong. 

If they were not certain, then there would have at least been a safek
and they would have allowed the surgery!

Why not ask Rav ------- (Names of both Rabbonim supplied to Rabbi
Eidenson)? This case occurred a month ago).

Dovid Hojda

A poster wrote:
> Most Poskim say that we should start Veyhi Erev which is the beginning of
> that Pasuk because of the Halacha of Kol D'Lo Pasik Moshe, Anan Lo
> Paskinan.

I don't know what "most" of the poskim have to say about where to start
the shabbat kiddush. I do know that va'yehi erev is not the start of the
pasuk. It is merely the start of the second phrase (after the etnachta)
Look it up. I have therefore become accustomed to starting kiddush with
"Va'ya'ar Elokim et kal asher asah..." (despite Rabbe Meir's derash).
Whether one agrees with my position or not, the above error illustrates
another ma'amar of Chazal about "Devorim shebiktav i ata resho'i l'omron
ba'al peh".

Yitzchok Zlochower

R S Peters , in part, asked:
> Does anyone talk about how the posek arrives

Look at the Hakdamah to IM by RMF in which RMF explains the processs
whereby the Posek of any generation has the right and the obligation
to dissagree with the Psak of a prior Gadol, despite the fact that the
prior Gadol is closer to Sinai.

Steve Brizel
Zeliglaw@aol.com

I heard that there might perhaps be a question about the kashrus of
eggs from Leghorn chickens. Apparently leghorns have two and two toes
rather than the normal three and one, and hence the question is whether
that makes the Leghorn a min tamei. Apparently a large part of current
production is from the Leghorn.

How did Leghorns (apparently from Leghorn, Italy) originate? Was there
any genetic engineering?

Jonathan

R'n Sara Eisen asked <<< While clearly certain types of e-mail content
are off limits, what about e-mail/chat friendships between members of the
opposite gender? Are there concepts of virtual yichud in chatroom or in
an inbox ... seeing as it is a private place, even if there is no danger
of actual yichud outcome? ... Are there limits to this type of "qirva"?
... To what extent is tzniut (esp. regarding matters of gilui arayot)
and its gedarim a matter of imagination / exclusivity, in which case the
(innocuous but private) contact itself might be the problem, and to what
extent are they only intended to prevent further sin?>>>

It is noteworthy that this question includes the phrase "especially
regarding matters of gilui arayot", because that shows that other matters
are included as well.

In other words, even if the subject matter of the conversation has nothing
to do with any sort of ervah whatsoever, it can still be a source of
mental and emotional kirva. And that can be a real minefield.

When people look for alternatives to the shidduch system, one of the
ideas mentioned is to become active in some kind of organization, and
meet the people there. I have often wondered if posting to a list such
as Avodah might be virtually (yeah, pun intended) the same thing.

Consider the scenario: Person A is a reasonably frequent poster, and
others get to learn A's personality. Person B writes to A -- either
offlist or onlist -- about a topic currently being discussed. Everything
is totally non-sexual, but A and B end up appreciating the other's
comments, and admiring each other's learning, and developing a
friendship. Now what happens if A and B are of opposite genders?

I'm *NOT* saying that such posts and emails should be assur. I'm only
pointing out the dangers. Some may be tempted to say that such interaction
is no worse than the occasional words that might be exchanged at a kiddush
or wedding (for those of us who attend such functions even when the sexes
are mixed). But R"n Eisen is pointing out that these interactions might
very well be worse, especially if it moves from the public posts to a
personal offlist exchange. At that point, one must be especially careful
to keep everything intellectual and platonic. The danger of "opening up"
emotionally is real.

Akiva Miller

IIRC, Rav Yuval Sherlow, a prominent DL RY in Eretz Yisroel, put out
a whole sefer on cyberspace and halacha / Torah not that long ago. I
recall seeing it (sc) in a seforim store and contemplating purchasing
it. I didn't however, and haven't seen it around lately.

An fine article he wrote a while ago entitled "Introduction to Internet
Chatting" (which was a precursor to his sefer) covers some inyonim the
query brought up,and can be seen at
<http://koltorah.org/ravj/Introduction%20to%20Internet%20Chatting.htm>

There is also some discussion of interest at 
<http://www.ifla.org/IV/ifla66/papers/020-160e.htm>

Mordechai

RHM wrote:
> So what are the parameters and Gedorim that need to be employed by
> the participants on this forum to prevent Michshol? I'm not sure. I
> suppose this problem is just another facet of the general problem
> with the internet and all of its associated dangers. The potential
> for abuse is exponentially great and the slippery slope is extremely
> steep.

To my mind, the question of slippery slope / outcome is almost beside
the point - we are all aware that there are certain types of e-mail
relationships which are clearly problematic and which must be avoided.

However, one of my main interests / concerns is much more subtle
and relates to "being friendly" or "engaging wits" on e-mail, a
digital version of a fun, social (not professional or tachlis driven)
conversation. If such exchanges are exclusive - ie: no one is cc-ed - is
this in and of itself problematic (even given the fact that no hirhurim
are present)? Because I assume that many or most of us would consider
it a breach of gedarim (and in itself problematic) to stand alone in
a room (kamuvan unlocked and accessible) having a conversation with
a playful tone... Intrinsically, can these same gedarim be breached
in cyberspace? ie: Is e-space, for tzniut / gedarim purposes, the same
thing as an empty room? Are gedarim for the actual only? Or are gedarim
for the virtual as well, esp. in areas of G.A. (which may have further
implications than just cyberspace, vis a vis the mind)?

(I am aware that this sounds more like a question for Stanley Kubrick than
a forum of halakhic thinkers, on the other hand, seeing as Torah has,
with great success, crossed over to the virtual world, I'm asking if we
can consider the realm of the virtual in practical, Torah terms...??)

SKE

[R Yitzchok Zirkind:\
> In a message dated 2/24/04 5:40:36 PM EST, gil@aishdas.org writes:
>> I am learning Ramchal's Derech Hashem with someone and we were discussing
>> the end of the first chapter where, among other things, the Ramchal writes
>> that G-d must exist. Not only does G-d exist but he MUST exist, presumably
>> because a perfect being's perfection necessitates His existence.

>> I cannot, al regel achas, recall seeing this anywhere in the rishonim. If
>> anywhere, it would probably be somewhere in the depths of Moreh
>> Nevuchim. Has anyone seen this in an earlier work? ...

> See Pirush on the Rambam Hil. Yesodei Hatorah 1:1 "Motzui Pirush Mchuyov 
> Hametzius"

See also the Ramban to Shemos 3.14 "Ekyeh asher Ekyeh" who quotes R.
Yitzchak in the MR3.6, Rav Saadya Gaon, and the MN 1.57 as stating that
G-d is eternal and "mechuyav hametzios". See also Seforno and meforshim on
"ayn od milvado".

IIRC the Ramchal says that G-d's existence and necessity can be proved.
There is now an updated argument for the Cosmological proof that does not
need the principle of sufficient reason. The conclusion of the argument is
that His necessity is the best explanation for our contingent existence.
Hawkings and the like have done a particularly poor job of trying to
wiggle out of this one.

In the beginning of the Daas Tevunos, I see the Ramchal as making Hashem's
necessity as His most fundamental property, with His Unity and Perfection
an aspect of His necessity.

In the Choker Umekubal, the Ramchal is probably using Hashem's necessity
to state why we cannot undertand His "atzmus" only "retzono". As a
necessary Being, G-d's essence is totally Other, and our existence in
no way compares to His.

Perhaps this is why Moshe, the adon haniviim is "anav mekol adam". Gaava
is the complete opposite of understanding our contingent existence,
as the Gemora in Sota 5 says that a "gaas ruach" and Hashem cannot
simultaneously exist in this world. Mishkan (this week's parsha),
the feeling and preception of Shechina, would then be based on an
understanding and cognition of G-d's necessity.

Kol tuv ... Jonathan

"Gil Student" <gil@aishdas.org> wrote:
> I am learning Ramchal's Derech Hashem with someone and we were discussing
> the end of the first chapter where, among other things, the Ramchal writes
> that G-d must exist. Not only does G-d exist but he MUST exist, presumably
> because a perfect being's perfection necessitates His existence.
> I cannot, al regel achas, recall seeing this anywhere in the rishonim....

It seems to me that he's saying exactly the same as the Rambam in YHT
1:1, i.e. that it is impossible to conceive of a universe in which there
is no Creator (because in that case who made it?), but it is perfectly
possible to conceive of a 'universe' in which there is a G-d and nothing
else (because He didn't choose to make anything).

In other terminology, he is 'muchrach hametziut' - a necessary Existent,
i.e. He must exist in any conceivable scenario, while everything else
exists because He happens to have created it, but He could just as easily
not have.

-- 
Zev Sero               I must say, I actually think what we learned during
zev@sero.name          the inspections made Iraq a more dangerous place
                        potentially than in fact we thought it was even
                        before the war.                         - David Kay

> I am learning Ramchal's Derech Hashem ... the Ramchal writes
> that G-d must exist. Not only does G-d exist but he MUST exist, presumably
> because a perfect being's perfection necessitates His existence.

> I cannot, al regel achas, recall seeing this anywhere in the rishonim.

This sounds like the ontological proof. IIRC Harry Wolfson published a
paper claiming that, indeed, it does not exist in rishonim and discussing
why not. I'll try to find details when I have more time.

David Riceman

R' David Hojda wrote <<< The man's brother called two major poskim and
they both said that he may not have the surgery, even though it would lead
to loss of vision in that eye, as modern medicine would not consider an
eye injury to be a situation of sakkanas nefashos. Dr Avraham related that
he was extremely disturbed by this pesaq and ultimately found someone
(Rav Laizerson) who recalled Rav SZA having paskened such a case --
and being matir.>>>

It is totally UNclear to me what the point of dispute is here.

The way the post is phrased ("modern medicine would not") it seems that
ancient medicine *did* consider an eye injury to be a sakanas nefashos.
The "two major poskim" ruled that this person may *not* have the surgery,
so they obviously were not following the opinion of ancient medicine,
but were relying on the opinion of modern medicine.

The other side of the machlokes is Dr. Avraham. One possibility is that
he felt that we should follow the rules of ancient medicine. Another
possiblity is that he disagreed with the "modern" doctors who those two
poskim based themselves on. Without knowing Dr. Avraham's reasoning, I
think that it is not productive to compare this case to other differences
between ancient and modern medicine.

Akiva Miller

"Gil Student" <gil@aishdas.org> wrote:
> Would Dr. Avraham also permit killing a louse on Shabbos? It could be
> argued that it is the same issue. If science/nature has changed from
> the time of Chazal, should we revise halachah accordingly - at least
> lechumrah? Many, but not all, would say yes.

In the case of the louse, the case for changing the halacha is that it
seems that chazal thought lice are generated spontaneously, and their
psak that it is allowed to kill them was based on this theory, and had
they known what we we know they would not have permitted it.

In this case, what is it that chazal thought? Did they think that
loss of an eye could make a person drop dead? Obviously they did not.
R Yosef seems to have lived a long time without eyesight. The original
gemara on this (AZ 28b) gives a reason which Tosfos translates as `the
eyesight depends on the heart's understanding', which seems somewhat
obscure. Midaat atzmi I speculate that perhaps the underlying theory
is that blind people have a higher mortality rate than sighted people,
because they're more accident-prone, and for this reason chazal allowed
chilul shabbat to save an eye. If that is indeed the reason, then I
believe the same applies today.

-- 
Zev Sero               I must say, I actually think what we learned during
zev@sero.name          the inspections made Iraq a more dangerous place
                        potentially than in fact we thought it was even
                        before the war.                         - David Kay

> IIRC, R. Aaron Soloveichik held that anyone who Paskin's that
> killing Kinah on Shabbos should be put into Cherem.

Huh? Anyone who paskins that it's muttar or assur?

Avi Burstein

David Hojda wrote:
>The case involved a man who was in Haddassah with a detached retina that
>had occurred erev shabbos. The surgeon scheduled the repair for Shabbos
>AM. The man's brother called two major poskim and they both said that he
>may not have the surgery, even though it would lead to loss of vision
>in that eye, as modern medicine would not consider an eye injury to be
>a situation of sakkanas nefashos.

A little research indicates that it is not simple to permit treatment
on Shabbos for blindness in one eye - without it being diseased. There
are some who permit treatment if there is a danger of becoming blind in
both eyes without treatment. Thus we need to distinguish between possible
danger - as indicated by bleeding or even tears - and blindness because of
a detached retina - which is not inherently dangerous according to Chazal
or modern medicine. Consequently there is simply no conflict in this case
between the views of Chazal and modern medicine - in contrast to the case
of jaundice and mila. Thus it would seem to be a major chidush to permit
the operation. A similar question would be permitting plastic surgery for
a disfiguring facial wound - when there is clearly no danger involved. If
the plastic surgery is not done the person will suffer severe scarring.
These questions require major poskim.

For example:

1) Tzitz Eliezer as summarized by Dr. Steinberg says: A disease in two
eyes or even one eye with a discharge from the eye or tears because of
injury or the eye is bleeding and this is the beginning of middle of the
course of the disease - it is permitted to be mechallel Shabbos for it.
However at the final stage of the disease it is not permitted. When there
is danger of blindness in both eyes - there is some basis to permit
chillul Shabbos even when it doesn't seem to present a danger to the
rest of the body. (Vol 8 #15:9-14).

2) Shevet HaLevi #73 :"but if it is a danger of only blindness -
without any disease - the kadmonim wrote that blindness itself does not
permit chillul Shabbos".... He also quotes Chasan Sofer and others that
blindness per se does not permit chillul Shabbos. Some permit treatment
if it is blindness in both eyes - apparently because a blind person
would be exempt from mitzvos. - though this hetair is problematic.

The language of Shulcan Aruch (328:9) also seems to militate against
operating for blindness - if there is no indication of disease. "A person
with pain in his eyes or eye and there is fluid or tears because of
the injury or it is bleeding.. and it is the beginning of the disease -
one is mechallel Shabbos."

Look also at the Encyclopeida Talmudis -"Choleh" volume 13 column 267.
Blindness is not considered a danger to his life

                         Daniel Eidensohn

> That would seem to indicate that 
> a)the Poskim were certain that Nature had changed or 
> b)They were certain that the previous knowledge was wrong. 

> If they were not certain, then there would have at least 
> been a safek and they would have allowed the surgery!

I think that neither of the two suppositions above is correct. It seems
to me that they were basing psak on the fact that *Medical Knowledge and
Ability to Heal* has changed, not nature changing and not that previous
knowledge was wrong.

Let's use different examples.

It used to be that many women died in childbirth from things that are
handled well routinely now. Many things that used to be pikuach nefesh
in childbirth are not now. Another example is scarlet fever. One of my
sons had it twice and it was no big deal at all, just requiring the same
Moxipen that any other strep throat requires -- however, many decades
ago it was certainly a big deal and my uncle was sick for literally
months from the same thing that my son had cured almost instantly.

In the cases above, no one asserts that nature has changed and no one
asserts that previous knowledge was "wrong", just that medical and
scientific advances have enabled us to cure and/or fix much more than
we used to be able to.

With all of this, I am not saying that the surgery should have been
disallowed and I am sure that had I been this person's doctor I would have
done whatever I could have to save his eye. I would have rather ruled
as the posek did that allowed the surgery, as I hold that we must be as
merciful to others as possible and if there is a halachic way to allow the
patient to keep his eye, I'd have done everything in my power to find it.

 --Rena 

I'm flabbergasted. Words fail me. (It's taken me 12 hours to calm down
in order to post this).

For starters, according to the SEFER REFUAT HA'SHABBAT Perek 38, Chelek
Alef, #4 S'if heh, retinal detachment ("hipardut shel ha'rashtit")
is in the category of choleh she'yesh bo sakana and thus, according
to Shulchan Aruch OC 328:12 one is mechallel shabbat (in fact, a gadol
batorah should be the first one !!) even for a melacha d'oraita.

Retinal detachment is *not* in the category of sakanat eivar (see:
Nishmat Avraham OC 328 #26 who quotes a gemara in Avoda Zara 28b and a
Mishna Brura OC 328 s"k 22). If one carefully reads OC 328:9 "ha'choshesh
b'eynav ..." and if one is aware that retinal detachment can be either
rhegmatogenous (retinal tear) that can also happen after ocular trauma,
or nonrhegmatogenous (detachment without a tear) from diabetes, uveitis or
systemic disorder (Current Opinion in Opthalmology 2000;11:455-61) such
as sarcoidosis, Vogt-Koyanagi-Harada disease, cytomegalovirus infection,
collagen vascular disease, disseminated intravascular coagulopathy,
malignant hypertension, hypercortisolism, renal disease and others,
the fact that there is a possibility of a serious systemic disease,
mandates full workup and treatment of the eye.

Let's not forget OC 328:12 re: chillul shabbat for a choleh she'yesh bo
sakanah: "ha'zariz harei zeh meshubach; bv'ha'sho'el (chacham) HAREI HU
SHOFECH DAMIM".

Last but not least: standard treatment of retinal detachment is either
pneumatic retinopaxy (local anesthetic followed by injection of small gas
bubble into the vitreous) or scleral buckle (tiny sponge or silicon band
is attached to the OUTSIDE of the eye, followed by vitrectomy with
cryotherapy). Since there is no aspiration of blood and assuming the
cryotherapy machine is on, there isn't even any chillel shabbat d'oraita.
So the entire question doesn't make sense.

Josh

Dr. Josh Backon
Hebrew University
Faculty of Medicine
backon@vms.huji.ac.il

[RHM:]
>This subject came up a few times during RYGB's Daf Yomi Shiur in
>Chicago. IIRC, R. Aaron Soloveichik held that anyone who Paskin's that
>killing Kinah on Shabbos should be put into Cherem. Is my memory serving
>me correctly?

>If it is then I take from that that RAS must hold that once Chazal Pakin'd
>that a Kinah does not reproduce sexually which is a requirement for the
>Issur, than it doesn't matter what we dicover subsequently about its
>nature. The Psak stands eventhough the stated reason for Chazal's Psak
>was that Kinim do not reproduce sexually.

Yes, we spoke about this many times. I have no doubt that RAS would
pasken definitively that mechalelin Shabbos to save an eye, and he
would be machrim someone who said otherwise. We live in a world that
gives undue credence to verbal and anecdotal psak. In the absence of
an explicit teshuvah or at least recorded horo'oh by a bar samcha that
someone paskened not to be mechallel Shabbos on an eye I do not believe
(I think I am not allowed to believe) that someone ruled fahkert.

YGB 

I was always under the impression that halacha demands that if there is
a small fire in a home on shabbos (for instance, a candle falls over,
lights the tablecloth on fire), a person must not put it out even if it
may lead to the whole house burning down, as long as there is no definite
risk to life.

However, recently (in response to a situation where that happened)
I heard that nowadays this doesn't apply in many situations because of
the way that homes are built, especially in apartment buildings/multi
family homes. In an apartment building, even though you may be able to
evacuate your whole family, since there is no guarantee that the rest
of the building will be able to escape in time, one can't assume that
there is no risk to life. Also, the simple fact that a gas line can
explode at any moment would mean that lives are always immediately in
danger. Even in private homes, but where the construction is such that
the houses are practically joined together, one can't assume that other
peoples lives are not at risk.

Has anyone ever heard (or read about) this issue being addressed?

Avi Burstein

On 24 Feb 2004 at 21:08, Isaac A Zlochower wrote:
> I don't know what "most" of the poskim have to say about where to
> start the shabbat kiddush. I do know that va'yehi erev is not the
> start of the pasuk. It is merely the start of the second phrase (after
> the etnachta) Look it up. I have therefore become accustomed to
> starting kiddush with "Va'ya'ar Elokim et kal asher asah..." (despite
> Rabbe Meir's derash). 

I do the same, although I say until "Vayehi Erev Vayehi Boker" (v'lo 
ad b'chlal) b'lachash.

 - Carl

On Wed, Feb 25, 2004 at 08:18:15AM -0500, David Riceman wrote:
:> I am learning Ramchal's Derech Hashem ... the Ramchal writes
:> that G-d must exist. Not only does G-d exist but he MUST exist, presumably
:> because a perfect being's perfection necessitates His existence.

:> I cannot, al regel achas, recall seeing this anywhere in the rishonim.

: This sounds like the ontological proof. IIRC Harry Wolfson published a
: paper claiming that, indeed, it does not exist in rishonim and discussing
: why not. I'll try to find details when I have more time.

The "presumably" is part of the ontological proof. For those who need an
explanation of what that proof is, here's a thumbnail charicature:
Picture the most perfect being. That being most be real, since reality
is more perfect than being imaginary. Thus, we just proved G-d exists.

A better explanation, and some counterarguments, is available at
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument>.

However, I agree with the others who posted that the Ramchal himself,
rather than RGS's presumed explanation for it, is stating merely that
G-d's existance is necessary logically, whereas the existance of anything
else is contingent.

And this is the approach, as already posted, of Hil Yesodei haTorah 1:1-5,
2:5, 2:9-10.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             I slept and dreamt that life was joy.
micha@aishdas.org        I awoke and found that life was duty.
http://www.aishdas.org   I worked and, behold -- duty is joy.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Rabindranath Tagore

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