Avodah Mailing List

Volume 11 : Number 054

Monday, August 18 2003

• Re: Technique to allow Kohanim to visit kever?Mearat HaMachpela
• Re: Fragmentation of the self
• Re: Maseces Midos on Tisha Bav
• Re: Woman as
• RE: Someich Noflim
• Fwd: RE: Someich Noflim
• Re: Woman as
• Re: Woman as
• The Culture Wars: Jews Among the Nations
• Re: Pinocchio
• Re: technique to allow Kohanim to visit kever - legitimate ?
• Re: technique to allow Kohanim to visit kever - legitimate ?
• Re: Pinocchio
• Re: Pinocchio
• Re: Avodah post/ modeh al hoemes
• pythagoras
• Re: mussar vs psak
• Re: Woman as
• Re: Woman as

Steve Brizel wrote:  
> RHS discussed this issue with respect to Kohanom visiting the MMoras
> Hamachpelah. RHS pointed out that most poskim ... have held that Kohanim
> should avoid such a situation because of the tumas ohel issue.

Tonight I heard R Mordechai Eliyahu's radio Shiur where he touched on
this issue. (Cohanim at Meaarat HaMachpela). His psak allowed them,
based on the construction of the present building(Herodian) being over
an aboveground clear space which is itself above the kvarim. (This fits
in with how the few people who have gone below the present building's
floor have described it. )There is much more than 4 tefachim below the
floor of the present building and the ground level, as anyone who walks
up the steps to the meara sees. One (or a group) of the local Rabbonim
from Hevron/the Hevron hills area recently published a whole sefer on
the issue, their maskana was to matir. I dont recall exactly who but
it may have been Rav Elbo. IIRC Rav Lior (Rav of K Arba\Hebron and a
significant Israeli Posek) also is matir. RM Eliyahu on the radio more
or less stated that nowadays the olam follows his psak.

Dov A Bloom
dovb@netvision.net.il

Poor RYGB! He lets me post a beautiful article-in-progress, and so far all the
email has been about one person's feedback!

> There are four possibilities:
> 1. Identifying with both the YhT and YhR
> 2. Identifying with only the YhT
> 3. Identifying with only the YhR
> 4. Identifying with neither
>
> Of those four, the only undeniably good one is 2 - identifying with only the
> YhT (I don't think being oved Hashem with both yetzarim means identifying
> with both).

Position 4 seems to be adam qodem hacheit, and therefore arguably the
goal to which all of history progresses to restore. (However, see below.)

"Eizehu gibor? Hakoveish es yitzro" seems to be written from #2's
stance. The YhR is "his yeitzer" which he can conquer. The combat implied
can only be someone in #2 and #4, and the lack of specifying adjectives
("yitzro" without "hara") implies only two players.

Actually, I think this is most simply understood from the ChhL's shitah
of seichel vs yeitzer. That which RYGB attributes also to RYSalanter,
but one responder questioned. (I didn't check OY or Iggeres haMussar yet
to have my own opinion.) In this shitah, yeitzer without an adjective
is always YhR, because YhT is synonymous with seichel. And, it would
make #2 the stance of adam kodem hacheit, not #4.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                        ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                           - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (413) 403-9905

From: "Carl and Adina Sherer" <sherer@actcom.co.il>
>> Any thoughts on how the minhag started and on what it may be based?

> I think it would depend on when they davened Ma'ariv. I could see
> davening Ma'ariv so that you finish at shkiya and then learning until
> Tzeis. That would not be a real issur of Talmud Torah (at best, being
> mosif to Tisha b'Av is minhag).

I'm afraid that statement is incorrect. It is a "real issur" to eat or
learn or anyting before tzeis at the end of the day. This is not "mosif",
it is still halachically treated as daytime.

> My guess is that it was very
> difficult for people in the Lvush's time to make a real seder after
> Tzeis (and likely after eating) because most people did not own
> sforim and the Batei Medrash were (IIUC) outside of town. So the
> minhag tried to accomadate them by letting them learn right after
> shkiya. They davened Ma'ariv early so that people would not make a
> mistake and think it was mutar to learn on Tisha b'Av itself

But that's the point...it still IS Tisha Bav "itself" until tzeis!!

...
>> Similarly, the historical chevra Shas
>> or asara batlanim was supported by the community so learning was their
>> "task."

> But you're not allowed to do any "task" on Tisha b'Av. Although
> there's not an outright issur m'lacha, Chazal say that one who
> "works" on Tisha b'Av will never see a siman bracha from that work.
> Why would learning be any different?

Some early Teshuvos, which I saw in shul last week, I think permit teaching,
probably kids. There is a parallel to hilchos aveilus. I think most would
agree that sitting in a beis medrish is a whole lot different than sitting
in an office or at a booth at the market, in terms of feeling the
significance of the day!!

You can't avoid giving an answer either along the lines that I explained
(learning without iyun, and adding the iyun after nightfall) or some other
explanation. I was trying to feel out if anyone has a better explanation why
learning could be permitted "m'bod yom" on the ninth, while you are trying
to explain that it is not "really" tisha bav. (Keep in mind that even if
bein hashemashos begins at shkia, the gemara in Taanis says that bein
hashmoshos is assur on TB. In addition, there is no indication in the Levush
that he was referring to after shkiya).

Avraham

In message <1ca.eff62fc.2c686188@aol.com>, Mlevinmd@aol.com writes
>And yet the halacha clearly acknowledges that men do find women a
>temptation against which they must guard themselves. Or how are you to
>understand the references in all the discussions about handshaking and
>dancing and tznius to the concept of lifnei iver?
>Yes, but it is not something that makes a woman evil; in fact, it is more of a
>man's problem. As  a good friend, women should make it easier for men to
>avoid temptation for which men should be grateful.

Go back to the original imagery, the pshat of lifnei iver.

Lifnei iver lo titen michshol. The image is of the blind man, tap, tapping
down the street with his cane. And of a seeing person deliberately placing
in his path an obstacle with the deliberate intention that he should
fall, or reckless disregard to whether he does so or not. How else
would you describe the actions of the person placing the obstacle in
the blind man's path than evil? True, it is the blind man's "problem"
that he cannot see. But that does not make the action of the seeing
obstacle placer any less evil. Nor does one expect the blind man to be
grateful that seeing people do not deliberately place such obstacles in
his path. What you are describing is not lifnei iver, but the additional
chesed of a person seeing an already existing obstacle in the blind man's
path and clearing it out the way. That is indeed a chessed for which
the blind man should be grateful. But that is not the commandment of
lifnei iver. That, perhaps could be classed as al tamod al dam re'echa
(eg if there was a risk that the blind man might injure himself, even
to death), or as chessed, but not lifnei iver. Once you use the imagery
of lifnei iver, you are talking about creating a deliberate sakana
(whether physical or spiritual), and most people would class those who
create a deliberate sakana for others evil if they truely know what they
are doing, and foolish if they are unaware of it (and again Mishlei and
Kohelet have some choice words for fools of this kind)

Regards
Chana

-- 
Chana Luntz

 From Rabbi Simcha Weinberg, shlita, ylct"a, in the name of his father,
Rabbi Yaakov Weinberg zt"l:
>A child is going to the doctor for an injection. He wants his mother there
>even though he will still receive the injection and it will still be scary
>and might hurt. Having the parent there makes the fear and potential pain
>bearable. That is Bitachon; my parent is there holding my hand and making
>the fear and pain bearable.

I am not sure if to classify this with the CI's view of Bitachon or the
view of Bitachon that the CI attributes to the Chassidim.

I should note (if I have not done so previously) that I am planning,
l'zecher the CI's 50th yahrzeit in Cheshvan, to do an essay on his shittah
on Bitachon for the JO. This year that would be the November issue BE"H.

I do not know if I mentioned this previously, but I believe a neat
"capsulization" of the machlokes CI and the Chassidim is whether
everything is l'tov (for the good, although not necessarily my personal
good and enjoyment) or l'tovah (also for my personal good and enjoyment),
and that this was the chilluk in madreiga between Nachum Ish Gamzu
(gamzu l'*tovah*) and his talmid R' Akiva (kol man d'avid Rachmana
l'*tav* avid), and he was only zocheh to reach his Rebbe

Some questions I hope to deal with, from a correspondent I greatly admire:

> I believe that you are correct in Mivtacho. However, it needs more
> definition. What do we mean that Mishan Umivtach Latzadikim? Was Hashem
> a Mivtach for Tzadikim and not for Dovid Hamelech? Why do you think that
> Dovid was framed? Was Adam Harishon?

As you noted-counterbalances - or balanced by positive images. Also,
this is a foreign woman; the image of a "heimish" woman is much more
positive. If so, the tempting part is not that of a woman but the
foreigness of that woman- and this is in fact how the classic meforshim
understand it.

[Email #2. -mi]

I respond in two ways:

1. Lifnei Iver is a halachic construct. It does not apply to someone who
is not "suma b'dovor"; in other words, there is no lifnei iver before
the other person commits to doing an aveira. It also does not apply to
"trei ivre dnahara", see Avodah Zara 6 etc.

I do not deny a Rabbinic prohibition of mesaea...but that is another
discussion.

2. Lefnei Iver does not deny someone a right to exist. If G-d made women
a certain way and men a certain way then than it is how He made it. Women
have their own obligations but they do not include self-extinction in
any facet of their lives.

I remember the Rav sharing a story with us. R. Chaim was speaking to a
well known Rav when a women in the house began to sing. The other Rav
made as if to go in and to tell her to stop. Not so, said R. Chaim. She
has a full right to sing; it is we who cannot listen...and with this he
led the two of them out into the street.

That does not give women a right to ignore tsnius because of their own
obligation and because they are expected to be good citizens and seek
the spiritual welfrae of their brothers. However, it does delimit the
concept of tsnius to not calling attention to themselves ratehr than
supressing or hiding every aspect of femininity.

M. Levin

>   I respond in two ways:
>   1. Lifnei Iver is a halachic construct. It does not
>   apply to someone who is not "suma b'dovor"; in other
>   words, there is no lifnei iver before the other
>   person commits to doing an aveira. It also does not
>   apply to "trei ivre dnahara", see Avodah Zara 6 etc.
>   I do not deny a Rabbinic prohibition of mesaea...but
>   that is another discussion.

This is why I used a very specific example, that of handshaking, where
the concept of lifnei iver has been raised (I believe RMF may well have
raised it, although I would have to check). Obviously if you hold that
handshaking is mutar this example is not applicable, but I am sure we
can find others. The advantage to the handshaking case is that it is
not so simple to argue trei ivre d'nahara.

The fact that it is a halachic construct is irrelevant. If you hold that
lifnei iver applies to handshaking, then when a woman sticks out her hand,
she is acting has temptress is she not?

Your assertion was that the concept of woman as temptress does not exist
in Judaism. I am giving you a case where it does.

>   2. Lefnei Iver does not deny someone a right to
>   exist. If G-d made women a certain way and men a
>   certain way then than it is how He made it. Women
>   have their own obligations but they do not include
>   self-extinction in any facet of their lives.

Of course the question then arises, what constitutes self- extinction?
At the extreme, I am sure some nudists (actually all of them) argue that
being forced to cover up is a form of self extinction.

But the question here is not over that balance - ie how ought the
relations between the sexes be regulated so as to have fairness and
justice for all in an unfair and unjust world. The question was, does
woman by her very nature (or actually, as a consequence of the curse if
you are reading closely) act as a temptation (ie a yetzer hora) for man.
That was the analogy drawn by RTK, against her will, from the pasuk's
structural similarity with that relating to Kayin.

>   I remember the Rav sharing a story with us. R. Chaim
>   was speaking to a well known Rav when a women in the
>   house began to sing. The other Rav made as if to go
>   in and to tell her to stop. Not so, said R. Chaim.
>   She has a full right to sing; it is we who cannot
>   listen...and with this he led the two of them out
>   into the street.

Does that not, if anything emphasize the point. She had the right to sing,
but merely by singing, she was drawing R Chaim etc into averah, and he
had to exercise his will to overcome the situation. The yetzer hora also
presumably has the right to be what it is. But being what it is forces
man into action otherwise he will be inexorably led along a certain path.

Or is the question here, whether you should hate the yetzer hara or see
it as an opportunity for growth? We all know the aggadita regarding what
happened when they tried to abolish the yezter harah for gilui arayos.

Regards
Chana

Re: Avodah V11 #42
From: "Akiva Blum" <ydamyb@actcom.net.il>
>> I know of Kol Yisroel Areivim zeh lozeh, but where is our responsibility
>> to non Jew from?

TK:
>1. "...venivrachu vecha kol mishpechos ha'adamah."
>...implies that WE have a
>duty to be good to those who are good to us.

RAB:
> All that it shows is that Hashem loves us and cares about us. Where does
> it show a general obligation to goyim?

TK:
>5. Messianic statements in Tanach about how the whole world will one
>day be filled with the knowledge of Hashem, implying that Hashem cares
>about all the people in the world, not only the Jews.

RAB:
>That's right. He does. but I don't have to.

TK:
>6. Avraham davening for Sedom, Yonah being sent to Nineveh, 
>etc, etc, etc. ... Jews care about ALL of G-d's creatures.

RAB: 
>Same again. Hashem cares about his creations ( as he says explicitly
>to Yonah). But where does it show that I have to care at all?

Imitatio Dei. Ma Hu rachum, af atah rachum. Looking at all of the
references to the goyim in Torah and concluding that we have no
responsibility towards them is--impossible.

Toby Katz 

> There is a fascinating mussar talk of the Saba MeSlabodka, R Natan Zvi
> Finkel: called Binyan and Hurban. He posits that thru churban there is
> another , better binyan . This is based on his interpretation of the
> midrash " HKBH built worlds and destroyed them" before briat HaOlam. The
> Saba seems to claim that only thru making trials / which turn out to
> be mistakes we can correct them and build a better world. Just as HKBH
> did. Only the failed attempt allows an improved effort.

I understand this as the fact that the Alter was an experimental
scientist who sought to empirically uncover mussar therapeutics, much as
psychologists were beginning to do contemporaneously. I recall the much
commented upon story in the Making of the Gadol about how he wanted to see
whetehr a Jewish child brought up in an intensely frum environment would
begin to daven on his own. accordingly, he did not teach his daughter
how to daven... but had to relent when at age 6 she still had not began.
The real meaning of that story is mussar experimentation.

M.Levin

R' Gil Student raised a few questions about this procedure, including <<<
but what about in between his legs? Or his arms that extend beyond his
feet? >>>

The question that bugs be about it is whether it is a legitimate ohel
to begin with. But no stretch of the imagination is it a platform or
structure which he walks on, nor it is a roof which is a protection for
him. It is part of his shoe, and by extension, I wonder if if might be
tofel to his body and therefore would not prevent the tumah from coming
up. This sounds awfully familiar to another case, but I can't think of
it right now.

Akiva Miller

 From a friend:

Concerning Kohanim at the Ohel - total misconception. There is an
issue how to get to the Ohel, as one has to walk through the cemetery,
and many of the approaches are close to graves. One eitzah is to drive
up to the Ohel, where there is a short path with fences on both sides
that leads you to the Ohel itself. Inside the Ohel there is no shaalo,
as it was constructed (by the Rebbe for his FIL) in a way to avoid all
shaalos for Kohanim (no roof over the actual grave, a mechitza around
the grave etc). However a car is not always an option, so the other way
is to go through the cemetery surrounded by a mechitza. They have this
contraption 10 tefachim high, that surrounds the Kohen on all 4 sides,
which he carries with him till the door entering the Ohel, the theory
probably being that the mechitza puts him in his own reshus surrounded
by walls.

Not being a Kohen, I don't know who originated this idea, but I seem
to recollect that not everyone likes it (IIRC goes into the sugya of
"Ohel Zoruk"). But in any case, nothing to do with shoes etc.

At 11:48 PM 8/12/2003 -0400, [RMLevin] wrote:
>> There is a fascinating mussar talk of the Saba MeSlabodka, R Natan Zvi
>> Finkel: called Binyan and Hurban. ...                                The
>> Saba seems to claim that only thru making trials / which turn out to
>> be mistakes we can correct them and build a better world. Just as HKBH
>> did. Only the failed attempt allows an improved effort.

>I understand this as the fact that the Alter was an experimental
>scientist who sought to empirically uncover mussar therapeutics, much as
>psychologists were beginning to do contemporaneously. I recall the much
>commented upon story in the Making of the Gadol about how he wanted to see
>whetehr a Jewish child brought up in an intensely frum environment would
>begin to daven on his own. accordingly, he did not teach his daughter
>how to daven... but had to relent when at age 6 she still had not began.
>The real meaning of that story is mussar experimentation.

IIRC the story concerns the Alter from Kelm. I am not sure that the AfS
was as great an experimenter as the AfK.

YGB 

>There is a fascinating mussar talk of the Saba MeSlabodka,
>R Natan Zvi Finkel: called Binyan and Hurban. He posits
>that thru churban there is another , better binyan . This is
>based on his interpretation of the midrash " HKBH built
>worlds and destroyed them" before briat HaOlam. The
>Saba seems to claim that only thru making trials / which
>turn out to be mistakes we can correct them and build
>a better world. Just as HKBH did. Only the failed attempt
>allows an improved effort.

When I first saw this shmuess it struck me as being a bit Sabbatean in
the sense that one must do bad in order to do good.

Gil Student

Thank you for your comment. Prior to posting I spoke to the person who
was holding my copy and asked him to verify what I was about to post and
I posted what he told me. EMES! I guess, al tivtchu b'rea. In any case,
I hope that this error still was in some way helpful to you.

M. Levin

In a recent daf yomi the gemara discusses a cohen throwing things a
distance 21 by 23 amot plus another 1/2 from the ramp to the "garbage".
Rashi does the calculation of the total distance by converting 21x23 to
22x22 (pretty accurate) and then adding the half amah at the end (less
acurate). The total is within the accuracy of the gemara of over 30 amot.

However, later the gemara reduces the figure by the length of the
cohen himself assumed to be 1x1 amah. Thus the figure is 20 1/2 by 22.
Using Rashi's method of converting this to 21x21 amah, multiplying by
1.4 and adding 1/2 gives 29.9 amah which is not enough. The true formula
of sqrt(20.5*20.5 + 22*22) does indeed work.

Interestingly there is no Rashi on the second calculation.

To me it seems obvious that indeed Rashi did not know the Pythagoras
theorem and/or could not calculate square roots. He always converts it to
an iscoles right triangle and multiplies by 1.4 not just for convenience
but because that was all that was known.

Eli Turkel

R' Akiva Atwood asked a question about mussar and p'sak, and I offered
my definition of the word "p'sak".

R' Micha Berger's response was <<< I wouldn't question this being a
valid definition, but it's so far from common usage as to be useless in
discourse. >>>

I totally agree that my definition of "p'sak" is very far from common
usage, which is why I raised the issue. It is very difficult for me to
get a clear and precise explanation of how common usage *does* define it.

Okay, enough for the pet peeves. Back to the subject at hand, "Mussar
vs Psak"...

RMB brought a gemara where Rava *paskened* that Rabah is *required*
to do things which other people wouldn't have to do, but that Rabah was
*required* to go *lifnim mishuras hadin*. RMB referred to this as <<<
a basic paradox about lifnim mishuras hadin. There exists a chiyuv in
din to go beyond the exact letter of the din. >>>

I agree. It sounds very much like something I thing we discussed here
many years ago: Is there an area of "reshus", or is everything truly
issur or chiyuv?

When I was at Ohr Somayach, my rebbe was R' Moshe Pindrus, father of the
current (and oft-cited on Areivim) mayor of Beitar. One of the ideas
he tried to teach me (I phrase it that way because I frequently waver
between accepting it or not) is that people are mistaken when they imagine
a broad spectrum of "must not - should not - optional - should - must".

Rather, he said, what possible reason can a person have for abstaining
from an action in the "should" category? And if one does an action in
the "should not" category, how will he justify it when he gives his
Din v'Cheshbon? (As R' Noach Weinberg of Aish once said, "Wasting time?
That's a *terrible* sin! It's a kind of suicide!")

Expanding on this, he explained that of all the options which are
available to me at any given moment, I must figure out which of them is
closest to the "must" end of that spectrum, and do that thing, ignoring
all other options. I asked him how to apply this principle to real life;
for example, a person who is looking at his bookshelf, trying to decide
what to learn now --- isn't it the same mitzva no matter which sefer
he chooses?

He explained that depending on where he is holding right now, he will
be in greater need of some topics that others. He should seriously
consider what he *needs* -- rather than what he *likes* -- to learn,
and his chiyuv is to concentrate on that. Rav Pindrus did concede that
if a person works himself up too much over this, he may end up with
psychological problems, and will certainly end up with less time spent
learning, both of which are "yotzay s'charo b'hefsedo" situations.

(He also pointed out that sometimes the question will go in an entirely
different direction. Not which sefer should I learn, but which form of
relaxation will do the best job of recharging my batteries?)

He stressed that although there is one theoretical option which is
better than all the others, the difference between the best and the
second-best (or even the tenth-best) is probably too small to be worth
spending time on. But that's not the same as saying "too small to be
worth *considering*." The difference *is* worth considering.

And it seems to me that this is similar to what Rava told Rabah (as RMB
brought it): For an ordinary person, the halacha would not require a
certain action, and might even disapprove of it -- after all, he has
his family and his own finances to consider, for example. But for a
person in Rabah's situation, that action becomes mandatory. Perhaps
because this is because the Kiddush HaShem which would result outweighs
the concern for his personal situation. Or perhaps Rava based his psak
on some middah which he saw in Rabah, and which this action might have
helped to correct. (This thread is, after all, titled "Mussar vs. Psak".)

But don't we find many cases in our learning, that a certain option is
clearly labeled as a "reshus", neither forbidden nor mandatory? How do
we reconcile this paradox? I would suggest that the resolution is that
each is speaking to a different audience.

A legal system must be phrased in the abstract, speaking about a typical
situation. (We often preface a halacha by saying that "All else being
equal" the halacha is such and such, because the next line will tell
us the many exceptions.) As such, there's no way any system can tell
me which sefer I must pick to learn next. Certain things must remain
in the vague world of "reshus", or the vague world of "raui l'hachmir",
or the vague world of "lifnim meshuras hadin".

But in the real world, no situation is totally typical. Every real
situation has myriad factors influencing it one way or the other. Ashrei
is the one who is capable of figuring them out (with or without the help
of someone more learned) and has weighed the options, and clearly sees
the way in which he *must* go.

Whoever is still reading, I thank you for your patience. This piece has
merely been my version of what RMB pithily summed up as:
<<< What LMH is an actual chiyuv depends on the individual; where he's
holding and which derekh he's on. >>>

Akiva Miller

[RML writes]:
> As you noted-counterbalances - or balanced by positive images. Also,
> this is a foreign woman;the image of a "heimish" woman is much more
> positive. If so, the tempting part is not that of a woman but the
> foreigness of that woman- and this is in fact how the classic meforshim
> understand it.

I don't think that is necessarily right. If you look on the page of my
mikros gadolos, on the posuk in Mishlei I quoted to you (6:24), you will
see that while Rashi indeed understands it the way you do, the others on
the page (Ibn Ezra, Radak) do not. And while Chochma is described as being
feminine, it is chochma versus isha (yes sometimes nochria, which would
make the balance as you describe it, if nochria had been used throughout,
we would not be having this discussion). But the term is often isha -
which rather suggests that your average woman (isha) is the opposite of
chochma (although there are a few other alternatives, imecha - for one,
not surprisingly is another positive image, as is eshet chayil at the
end. But the standard isha, who is neither imecha nor an eshet chayil
rather tempts man into adultery, for which the remedy, not surprisingly,
is torah and mussar).

Regards
Chana

Quick and very partial rejoinder of a few places tin mishlei hat are
positive without modification of a woman:
22, 18
19,14
31,30

11,16
12,4
31,10

In general, I think that the way to approach this subject is without
preconceptions of either feminist or anti-feminist type. you will find
a variety of characterizations of a woman but this very varieity is like
complexity of life itself. Complexity is precisely what Judaism has and
Christianity does not.

[Email #2. -mi

The issue is: is woman an existential Temptress, a personification or
incarnations of the Serpent and in cahoots with him or is she an earthly
being that sometimes presents a challenge as do so many other creations
of G-d. At toher times she is a friend and an Eizer.

In the first portrayal she is demonic; in the second, equal to us abd
a partner.

BTW, i really do not see this as an enlightened opinion. I think that
this is what the Torah tells us as pshat.

M. Levin

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