Avodah Mailing List

Volume 01 : Number 001

Monday, July 20 1998

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Topics:
Date: Fri, 17 Jul 1998 12:19:00 -0400
From: "Clark, Eli" <clarke@HUGHESHUBBARD.COM>
Subject: RE: Avodah V1 #2


Micha Berger writes:)

>Every mitzvah has two reasons:

>1- Because Hashem said so.

>2- Whatever reason Hashem had for saying so.

>To be really pedantic about it, a makor speaks to #1, above, but doesn't
>address #2. Admittedly, #2 can only be addressed by successive approximation,
>since no one can ever understand HKB"H's Motivation for doing anything.
>However, the language that "X is done because of a gezeirah shavah" can
>obscure the fact that the real reason for "X" still isn't known.

As a general rule, the gezerah shavah is presented in the gemara as a
source for a halakhah, not as a reason.   I think the distinction is
clear.  (When the gemara asks: Minayin?  it is not engaging in a quest
for ta'amei ha-mitzvot.)

>Rav Yisroel Avraham Abba Krieger (a talmid and ben-bayis of the Or Samei'ach,
>and my great-grandfather) argued in a teshuvah that the macholokes over
>wearing tephillin on cholo hamo'ed was tied to that of whether one may write
>on on ch"hm.

Now you know what rishon he was drawing upon.  Of course, once you take
that view, you are going to come to the conclusion that tefillin should
be laid on hol ha-moe'd.  Needless to say, defenders of the
Sefardic/Zoharic/hasidic minhag sought to de-link the two issues.

Kol tuv,
Eli


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Date: Mon, 20 Jul 1998 13:30:36 EDT
From: Joelirich@aol.com
Subject: Re: Avodah V1 #2


In a message dated 98-07-20 12:19:46 EDT, clarke@HUGHESHUBBARD.COM writes:

<< 
 As a general rule, the gezerah shavah is presented in the gemara as a
 source for a halakhah, not as a reason.  >>

On a related topic:
The reason I've heard given to reconcile that a g"s can be attacked if its
not mufneh with the rule that one must have a mesora for a g"s was that they
may have had a mesora that there was a g"s between 2 inyanim w/o a  mesora of
which words were involved; or that there was a mesora of the words but not the
inyanim. Thus logic may still be needed to determine the g'"s. Two questions:
1.Has anyone heard a different explanation?
2.Has anyone gone through shas to see if a g"s is attacked does the attacker
have those words or inyanim in another g"s? This would seem to be needed to
uphold the reason I gave.

Kol Tuv
Joel


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Date: 20 Jul 1998 11:01:11 GMT
From: "Arthur J Einhorn" <0017801@CCMAIL.EMIS.HAC.COM>
Subject: Re: Whereabouts


     Lecvod Harav Shlit"a,
     I have two questions from the last time I stayed at the Jerusalem
     Plaza.
     1. Is it mutar for a frum Torah observant Jew to stay in a hotel or
     eat in the dining room where they have mixed swimming in plain view
     where you can not avoid seeing the women when you go into the dining
     room which is right next to the swimming pool with large windows?
     2. The pool opens about 7:00 am. The women start to come about 7:30.
     Is a man aLlowed to go to swim till the women come knowing that they
     will showup in bathing suits albeit the man will not swim when they
     are in the pool and will leave as soon as they come?
     Thank You,
     Ahron Einhorn


______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________
Date: Mon, 20 Jul 1998 08:19:38 -0500 (CDT)
From: "Shoshanah M. & Yosef G. Bechhofer" <sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu>
To:
Subject: Whereabouts
Message-ID: <Pine.HPP.3.93.980720080156.17497A-100000@casbah.acns.nwu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Reply-To: baistefila@shamash.org
Sender: owner-baistefila@shamash.org
X-Listprocessor-Version: 8.2.06 -- ListProc(tm) by CREN

Sorry for this "form letter," but it is the most efficient way for me to
let you know where we hope to be and how to reach us, if possible, during
the three weeks that we shall be abroad.

We leave iy"h to E.Y. tonight. While there, we will be spending time at
the Rogoways in Petach Tikva, 03-933-8744 and the Shapiros in Matityahu,
08-926-2031. We are, with gratitude to my father for arranging this, going
to be at the Plaza Hotel in Yerushalayim for Shabbos Mattos-Masei and next
Sunday night. The immediately following three nights we will be spending
in Tzfat, at the Hadar Hotel. For the balance of the time we should be
with the Shapiros or Rogoways - my wife knows the exact details, I don't.

On Monday after 9 Av we leave to England for a week. Here I have no details
for most of the time except that Wed. night we shall be in Manchester at
the Fulda Hotel, and that over Shabbos Nachamu we shall be in Hendon, at
the Ner Yisrael Shul. The only information I have about that is the Rabbi,
Rabbi Kimche's, phone number, at: 181-455-7347.

I hope, courtesy of arrangements by my father-in-law, to have e-mail
access, at least from time to time, in Israel - but no guarantees! In
England I am pretty much sure that we will not have e-mail access.

We would be very happy to see old friends and meet new acquaintances on
our trip!

Kol Tuv and L'Hitra'ot,
YGB

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila


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Date: Mon, 20 Jul 1998 12:07:36 -0700
From: "Newman,Saul Z" <Saul.Z.Newman@kp.ORG>
Subject: dancing ma yofis


wht is the origin of the attitude of 'dancing ma yofis before the
poritz' ?  is this a halacha, a 'daas tora', or just a wise practice in
dealing with goyim? i'm curious as to whether it is an operational
derech still. i believe i read that r shach was against begin annexing
the golan as violating this principle, and said there would be dire
consequences for defying the Nations. Is this tied to the three shevuot,
on a national level?              kol tuv


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Date: Mon, 20 Jul 98 16:27:06 EDT
From: Alan Davidson <DAVIDSON@UCONNVM.UCONN.EDU>
Subject: saying good shabbos


Relatedly, aren't there sources which state that one should be careful
how they say good shabbos to someone before davenning minchah Friday
afternoon b/c if one does not intend to be yotsey Shabbos and says good
shabbos without the intention not to be yotsey they can no longer daven
a weekday Sshemonah Esrei.


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Date: Mon, 20 Jul 1998 23:17:42 +0300
From: Daniel Eidensohn <yadmoshe@netmedia.net.il>
Subject: Multiple truths and Kabbala


 Paul Rothbart wrote:

> I don't want to belabor the point but I still don't really understand
> this idea of multiple truths (especially as expressed by the Ritva) for
> all of the following reasons (if I am just repeating previous points I
> appologize)

There is an interesting tshuva Zivchei Tzedek Y.D. 26 where he addresses the
current thread. In part he says, "This question is very deep and we are not
able to reach a full understanding on an issue that even the Rishonim z"l
were not able to handle. He brings the Ritva (French rabbis) and quotes a
similar answer from Rabbeinu Chananel. Brings down Chagiga 3b to conclude
that multiple answers were actually given on Sinai and quotes the Shelah
Hakodesh that this is actually what happened. Then he quotes the Chidah that
conflicting answers were actually given to Moshe and that the conflicting
answers actually helps clarify each position "light is seen only in contrast
to darkness" He quotes the Rashi Kesuvos 57 a that they are both true - if
not here - but under different conditions it will be true elsewhere."that
even though that this chachom says it is prohibited or permitted in this
particular case it is not actually so - nevertheless the sevora is true and
this true sevora was received by Moshe Rabbeinu but perhaps for a different
case. "And  the Achronim have other answers.".  [BTW Rav Eliyashiv told me
that this Rashi is the proper understanding of Eilu v'Eilu]

The main issue is his conclusion:"In spite of all this analysis the question
is not satisfactorily answered and we don't have the ability to deal with it
properly because even concerning the answer of the French rabbis the gaon
Shelah writes  the following:' This matter is very far from our human
intellect and incomprehensible....and the mind is not fully satisfied with
the words of the French rabbis. but is  satisfied with the the idea and
secret that their answer  has according to Kabbala...' ....thus we can not
comprehend the answer completely...but must accept the partial answer of the
three answers given to the masses. And that is enough already for this
issue...But the main answer is only according to the path of the secrets of
Kabbala and we have no involvement in these mysteries"


                                                   Daniel Eidensohn


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Date: Mon, 20 Jul 1998 16:43:25 -0400 (EDT)
From: micha@aishdas.org (Micha Berger)
Subject: Plurality


I recently summarized a number of my posts on this subject for scj. For those
of you sane enough to avoid scj, here's what I wrote:

The idea that "Eilu va'Eilu" means they're both right is found in the Ritva
(Eiruvin 13b, on the famous "Eilu v'eilu"), the Ramban (intro to Milchemes
Hashem), a few places in the Maharal, and in Rav Tzadok haKohein (see below).

To my mind, this is the whole reason why "it's not in heaven". Because the
Truth that's in heaven allows for plurality. The voice from heaven will assert
the rightness of both sides. Whereas in practice, you can't do both
alternatives. It is our job to map the infinite Divine Truth to a single
halachah.

Here's a golden oldie I sent to mail-jewish April 1995 (">"), with
ammendations (in brackets) spliced in as per a followup post ("}") a month
later. In addition, a comment I posted here last August ("]"), and one from
avodah@aishdas.org from a year back (")"). In other words, an amalgam of
pretty much anything I have myself on record on the topic.

> In short, Goedel presented a set of theorems that boil down to showing
> that any sufficiently robust finite formal system that is consistent
> (i.e. does not claim both something and its opposite -- A and not A)
> must be incomplete. Does this mean that halachah must be incomplete?
> The question could be resolved on a number of levels:

> 1 -- As [name omitted] points out, [Divrei Elokim Chaim] is not consistent.
> Eilu va'eilu divrei Elokim Chaim -- both these and those are the words of the
> Living G-d. When two opinions argue, both are teaching Hashem's word.
> [DE"C], contains paradoxes. Abayei could say assur, and Rava could say mutar,
> and both are within [DE"C].

} Both schools were teaching DE"C. So, the level of DE"C does include
} contradiction. (Or maybe, to be more exact, the logic used by DE"C does
} not include Aritotle's law of contradiction.) By not being consistent,
} DE"C stands outside the class of systems subject to Goedel's analysis.

] Rav Tzadok HaCohein uses the same kind of absence of the law of excluded
] middle (IOW, the same notion that something can be both a and not-a) to
] explain halachic debate. "Whenever a new thing found about the Torah by
] any wise person, simultaneously arises its opposite.... When it comes to the
] realm of action (po'al) it can not be that two things true simultaneously.
] In the realm of the mind (machshavah), on the other hand, it is impossible
] for a man to think about one thing without considering the opposite."
] Therefor "these and those are the words of the living G-d / G-d of life"
] because Torah exists in the realm of the mind, where conflicting notions
] can coexist.

> 2 -- On a different level, halachic rulings are made. We can not follow
> both Abayei and Rava. As R. Tzadok Hakohein writes ([Resisei Laila sec 17,]
> on the quote "eilu va'eilu), the logic of the mind could hold something and
> its opposite, the logic of deed can not.

> However, this part is open-ended. New piskei halachah (rulings) are
> constantly being created. On this level halachah not finite.
> Either way, Goedel's th'm wouldn't apply.

> 3 -- It halachah a formal system? That is to say, does it involve the
> manipulation of forms, symbols qua symbols, or does it revolve around
> the semantics of the symbols?

) The Malbim, in his introduction to Vayikra, writes that through 613 rules
) of reasoning and hermeneutics all of the Oral Torah can be derived from the
) written Torah. This surely sounds like a formal system to me.

) No, it doesn't preclude machlokes [debate, disagreement]. If no formal
) system (that has a subset that is isomorphic to number theory) can be both
) consistant and complete, then such a view of halachah would also be so
) limited.

) I want to draw a distinction between number theory (NT), which was
) demonstrated not to be finitely axiomatizable, and systems akin to
) Principa Mathematica (PM), which try to be axiomatic systems that represent
) number theory.

) Since DE"C does allow for inconsistancy, in that it contains both sides of
) many (all?) machlokesin. This would mean that the Malbim's notion, which
) appears to cast TBP in the same mold as PM, is not threatened by G-del. You'd
) expect there to exist some propositions which both they and their inverse are
) "derivable" within DE"C.

} Could [for example Rav Moshe's responsa, Igros Moshe] have been produced
} algorythimcally? Are piskei halachah merely geometry like: applying a set
} of rules iteratively to a collection of verses (and halachos liMosheh
} misinai -- laws given ascripturally to Moses at Sinai)?

} My point was that it wasn't. I was trying out the idea that the conversion
} from a pluralistic DE"C in R. Tzadok's thought-logic, to a usable p'sak
} halachah was a creative, and therefor system enlarging process. In fact,
} I was insisting that Goedel seems to imply the idea of getting a singlular
} p'sak halachah from the iterative application of a finite set of rules to
} a finite collection of givens is not always possible.

) Meta-halachah, in particular the process by which DE"C is mapped to a single
) halachic p'sak, can be intuitive, even if the TBP is recusively enumerable.

> This actually gets us on a tangent involving Serle's argument that
> computers can not think because computers manipulate symbols, while
> minds manipulate ideas. (Syntax vs. semantics). The artificial
> intelligence groupies have a counter-argument, that there is no real
> distinction and so on....

> However, if Serle is right, halachah can not be mapped to a formal
> system, as it involves semantics, not just forms.

} R. Tzadok gives us an out. The iterative application gives us DE"C, which
} allows contradiction. A creative [manipulation of semantics, non-formal
} entities], and therefor non-closed, system of p'sak gives us halachah,
} which must be distinct.

DE"C isn't the only indication that the Torah's logic, at least on some
levels, lacks a law of excluded middle. But this post is long enough. I
include this teaser to invite prodding for me to do a similar compendium on
doubt resolution and paradox if anyone's is interested.

-mi

--
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287 Help free Yehuda Katz, held by Syria 5848 days!
micha@aishdas.org (11-Jun-82 -- 26-Jun-98)
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.
http://www.aishdas.org -- Orthodox Judaism: Torah, Avodah, Chessed


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Date: Mon, 20 Jul 1998 16:43:25 -0400 (EDT)
From: micha@aishdas.org (Micha Berger)
Subject: Plurality


I recently summarized a number of my posts on this subject for scj. For those
of you sane enough to avoid scj, here's what I wrote:

The idea that "Eilu va'Eilu" means they're both right is found in the Ritva
(Eiruvin 13b, on the famous "Eilu v'eilu"), the Ramban (intro to Milchemes
Hashem), a few places in the Maharal, and in Rav Tzadok haKohein (see below).

To my mind, this is the whole reason why "it's not in heaven". Because the
Truth that's in heaven allows for plurality. The voice from heaven will assert
the rightness of both sides. Whereas in practice, you can't do both
alternatives. It is our job to map the infinite Divine Truth to a single
halachah.

Here's a golden oldie I sent to mail-jewish April 1995 (">"), with
ammendations (in brackets) spliced in as per a followup post ("}") a month
later. In addition, a comment I posted here last August ("]"), and one from
avodah@aishdas.org from a year back (")"). In other words, an amalgam of
pretty much anything I have myself on record on the topic.

> In short, Goedel presented a set of theorems that boil down to showing
> that any sufficiently robust finite formal system that is consistent
> (i.e. does not claim both something and its opposite -- A and not A)
> must be incomplete. Does this mean that halachah must be incomplete?
> The question could be resolved on a number of levels:

> 1 -- As [name omitted] points out, [Divrei Elokim Chaim] is not consistent.
> Eilu va'eilu divrei Elokim Chaim -- both these and those are the words of the
> Living G-d. When two opinions argue, both are teaching Hashem's word.
> [DE"C], contains paradoxes. Abayei could say assur, and Rava could say mutar,
> and both are within [DE"C].

} Both schools were teaching DE"C. So, the level of DE"C does include
} contradiction. (Or maybe, to be more exact, the logic used by DE"C does
} not include Aritotle's law of contradiction.) By not being consistent,
} DE"C stands outside the class of systems subject to Goedel's analysis.

] Rav Tzadok HaCohein uses the same kind of absence of the law of excluded
] middle (IOW, the same notion that something can be both a and not-a) to
] explain halachic debate. "Whenever a new thing found about the Torah by
] any wise person, simultaneously arises its opposite.... When it comes to the
] realm of action (po'al) it can not be that two things true simultaneously.
] In the realm of the mind (machshavah), on the other hand, it is impossible
] for a man to think about one thing without considering the opposite."
] Therefor "these and those are the words of the living G-d / G-d of life"
] because Torah exists in the realm of the mind, where conflicting notions
] can coexist.

> 2 -- On a different level, halachic rulings are made. We can not follow
> both Abayei and Rava. As R. Tzadok Hakohein writes ([Resisei Laila sec 17,]
> on the quote "eilu va'eilu), the logic of the mind could hold something and
> its opposite, the logic of deed can not.

> However, this part is open-ended. New piskei halachah (rulings) are
> constantly being created. On this level halachah not finite.
> Either way, Goedel's th'm wouldn't apply.

> 3 -- It halachah a formal system? That is to say, does it involve the
> manipulation of forms, symbols qua symbols, or does it revolve around
> the semantics of the symbols?

) The Malbim, in his introduction to Vayikra, writes that through 613 rules
) of reasoning and hermeneutics all of the Oral Torah can be derived from the
) written Torah. This surely sounds like a formal system to me.

) No, it doesn't preclude machlokes [debate, disagreement]. If no formal
) system (that has a subset that is isomorphic to number theory) can be both
) consistant and complete, then such a view of halachah would also be so
) limited.

) I want to draw a distinction between number theory (NT), which was
) demonstrated not to be finitely axiomatizable, and systems akin to
) Principa Mathematica (PM), which try to be axiomatic systems that represent
) number theory.

) Since DE"C does allow for inconsistancy, in that it contains both sides of
) many (all?) machlokesin. This would mean that the Malbim's notion, which
) appears to cast TBP in the same mold as PM, is not threatened by G-del. You'd
) expect there to exist some propositions which both they and their inverse are
) "derivable" within DE"C.

} Could [for example Rav Moshe's responsa, Igros Moshe] have been produced
} algorythimcally? Are piskei halachah merely geometry like: applying a set
} of rules iteratively to a collection of verses (and halachos liMosheh
} misinai -- laws given ascripturally to Moses at Sinai)?

} My point was that it wasn't. I was trying out the idea that the conversion
} from a pluralistic DE"C in R. Tzadok's thought-logic, to a usable p'sak
} halachah was a creative, and therefor system enlarging process. In fact,
} I was insisting that Goedel seems to imply the idea of getting a singlular
} p'sak halachah from the iterative application of a finite set of rules to
} a finite collection of givens is not always possible.

) Meta-halachah, in particular the process by which DE"C is mapped to a single
) halachic p'sak, can be intuitive, even if the TBP is recusively enumerable.

> This actually gets us on a tangent involving Serle's argument that
> computers can not think because computers manipulate symbols, while
> minds manipulate ideas. (Syntax vs. semantics). The artificial
> intelligence groupies have a counter-argument, that there is no real
> distinction and so on....

> However, if Serle is right, halachah can not be mapped to a formal
> system, as it involves semantics, not just forms.

} R. Tzadok gives us an out. The iterative application gives us DE"C, which
} allows contradiction. A creative [manipulation of semantics, non-formal
} entities], and therefor non-closed, system of p'sak gives us halachah,
} which must be distinct.

DE"C isn't the only indication that the Torah's logic, at least on some
levels, lacks a law of excluded middle. But this post is long enough. I
include this teaser to invite prodding for me to do a similar compendium on
doubt resolution and paradox if anyone's is interested.

-mi

--
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287 Help free Yehuda Katz, held by Syria 5848 days!
micha@aishdas.org (11-Jun-82 -- 26-Jun-98)
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.
http://www.aishdas.org -- Orthodox Judaism: Torah, Avodah, Chessed


Go to top.

Date: Mon, 20 Jul 1998 23:17:42 +0300
From: Daniel Eidensohn <yadmoshe@netmedia.net.il>
Subject: Multiple truths and Kabbala


 Paul Rothbart wrote:

> I don't want to belabor the point but I still don't really understand
> this idea of multiple truths (especially as expressed by the Ritva) for
> all of the following reasons (if I am just repeating previous points I
> appologize)
>

There is an interesting tshuva Zivchei Tzedek Y.D. 26 where he addresses the
current thread. In part he says, "This question is very deep and we are not
able to reach a full understanding on an issue that even the Rishonim z"l
were not able to handle. He brings the Ritva (French rabbis) and quotes a
similar answer from Rabbeinu Chananel. Brings down Chagiga 3b to conclude
that multiple answers were actually given on Sinai and quotes the Shelah
Hakodesh that this is actually what happened. Then he quotes the Chidah that
conflicting answers were actually given to Moshe and that the conflicting
answers actually helps clarify each position "light is seen only in contrast
to darkness" He quotes the Rashi Kesuvos 57 a that they are both true - if
not here - but under different conditions it will be true elsewhere."that
even though that this chachom says it is prohibited or permitted in this
particular case it is not actually so - nevertheless the sevora is true and
this true sevora was received by Moshe Rabbeinu but perhaps for a different
case. "And  the Achronim have other answers.".  [BTW Rav Eliyashiv told me
that this Rashi is the proper understanding of Eilu v'Eilu]

The main issue is his conclusion:"In spite of all this analysis the question
is not satisfactorily answered and we don't have the ability to deal with it
properly because even concerning the answer of the French rabbis the gaon
Shelah writes  the following:' This matter is very far from our human
intellect and incomprehensible....and the mind is not fully satisfied with
the words of the French rabbis. but is  satisfied with the the idea and
secret that their answer  has according to Kabbala...' ....thus we can not
comprehend the answer completely...but must accept the partial answer of the
three answers given to the masses. And that is enough already for this
issue...But the main answer is only according to the path of the secrets of
Kabbala and we have no involvement in these mysteries"


                                                   Daniel Eidensohn


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Date: Mon, 20 Jul 1998 19:45:46 -0400
From: sroth4@juno.com (Paul Rothbart)
Subject: Re: Plurality


On Mon, 20 Jul 1998 16:43:25 -0400 (EDT) micha@aishdas.org (Micha Berger)
writes:


>DE"C isn't the only indication that the Torah's logic, at least on 
>some
>levels, lacks a law of excluded middle. But this post is long enough. 
>I
>include this teaser to invite prodding for me to do a similar 
>compendium on
>doubt resolution and paradox if anyone's is interested.
>
I would be interested! I would also like to know the places where the
Maharal talks about this issue. 

SHraga ROthbart


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Date: Mon, 20 Jul 1998 20:49:18 -0400
From: rhendel@mcs.drexel.edu (Russell Hendel)
Subject: We *CAN* Know Gods Reasons For the Commandments!!!!!


1) WE CAN UNDERSTAND GODS REASONS FOR MITZVOTH
===============================================
This shocking point was proven (proof reproduced below) by Rav
Samsom Raphael Hirsch in his beautiful but neglected essay
"GRUNDLINEN EINER JUDISCHEN SYMBOLIK"--Groudlines for Jewish
Symbolism--reprinted in Rav Hirsch's collected works published
by Feldheim.

1a) THE 3 CLASSICAL QUESTIONS THAT SEEM TO STIFLE UNDERSTANDING MITZVOTH
========================================================================
Briefly Rav Hirsch opens this mammoth essay (over 100 pages)
with the classical questions:
>>Do we have the right to interpret Gods mitzvoth as being for a 
symbolic purpose?
>>Even if that is so who are we to know what that symbolic purpose is?
>>Even if we have the RIGHT to so interpret do we ever dare say that
we MUST interpret the mitzvoth this way?

1b) ANSWERS TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS FROM GOD HIMSELF
===================================================
Rav Hirsch in his traditional clear and lucid style conclusively proves
the answers to the above.

CATEGORY 1: Of course we have BOTH the right and obligation to interpret
a commandment symbolically if GOD HIMSELF ordered us to do so.

In fact 3 1/2 commandments are designated by GOD himself as being symbolic:
        * Milah
        * Shabbos
        * Tefillin
        * Pessach Mitzrayim

This is the first of the 3 categories of commandments where we MUST 
interpret the commandment symbolically.

1b) GOD AS KING
================
Using the traditional model of God as King suppose a King issue 
a commandment (e.g. Give your wives a red rose on WIFE DAY) and 
ordered everybody to say >>This is symbolic of my love to you<<.

Would anybody DARE disobey the Kings orders to use the Rose
symbolically? Would anyone DARE insult the king and give his
wife a rose and say >>Because the King said so<<

1c) CATEGORY TWO
================
You might say >>OK YOu have a point! God might say that a mitzvah
is a symbolic? But you yourself admit there are only 3 such mitzvoth.<<

So we explore Rav Hirsch's CATEOGRY TWO:
>>A symbol is simply something that does not have intrinsic value but
>>rather represent something else or some other act. So suppose God
>>says take this object and God--while not calling it a symbol--
>>explicitly CONNECTS the object with some commerative action.

For example God Himself EXPLICITLY connects TZITZITH with "remembering
Gods Commandments"...so Tzitzith MUST be classified as symbolic.

1d) OTHER ISSUES
================
As to the other issues: Given that we MUST interpret symbolically, HOW
should we so interpret? What about Korbanoth and other symbolic mitzvoth
that don't fall into the above two categories?

All I can say is that Rav Hirsch spends 100 pages answering these questions
with clear convincing logic and numerous sources and commandments.

I would be happy--if there is interest--to summarize this beautiful essay
in a series of postings if there is further interest

2) THE CHINUCH--An insightful word from the Rav
===============================================
The Rav (Yosef Beer Soloveitchick) once noted that the Chinuch always
speaks about SHARASHAY HAMITZVAH (the "roots of the mitzvah") to indicate
that all we can see are the EFFECTS of the commandment.

In other words the Ravs position was that when we speak about reasons
for the commandments we are speaking about OBSERVED EFFECTS OF THESE
COMMANDMENTS on those that perform them.

Russell Jay Hendel; Phd ASA Rhendel @ mcs drexel edu


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