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Volume 37: Number 19

Thu, 14 Mar 2019

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Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Message: 1
From: Micha Berger
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 09:53:22 -0400
Re: [Avodah] Is a child required to pay for food and clothing

On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 03:24:25PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote:
: From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis
: A. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:5) writes that although a child is required
: to feed and clothe his parents, the expense must be borne by the
: parents. However, if the parents cannot support themselves, the children
: are obligated to provide the funds (if they are capable of doing so)...

This is an involved sugya in Chazal (Mishnah Yevamos 7:5, Y-mi Yevamos
42a, Bavli Yevamos 69b, Qiddushin 32a, Pesiqta Rabasi 31:1). "Mishel av"
and "mishel atzmo" become something of buzz-phrases.

:                                     ... The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:6)
: explains that beis din has the authority to coerce members of society to
: maintain social welfare, and children have a moral obligation to provide
: for parents who are destitute.

And leshitaso, supporting one parents mishel av, or feeding children
who have reached adulthood, can come from one's tzedaqah funds. And they
are first in the "aniyei irekha qodmin" type sequence. See AhS YD 251:3-4.

Tir'u baTov!

Micha Berger             Life isn't about finding yourself.
mi...@aishdas.org        Life is about creating yourself.
http://www.aishdas.org            - George Bernard Shaw
Fax: (270) 514-1507

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Message: 2
From: Micha Berger
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 12:48:40 -0400
Re: [Avodah] derech psak

(Replying to 3 posts in one email. If one answer bores you, scroll


On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 07:24:38AM +0000, Rich, Joel wrote:
:> RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And
:> his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of
:> your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are
: > at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros,
: > being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence.
: > But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some
: > level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds

: Yes I've heard him say that many times and it is the heart of my issue,
: I don't see why being able to see the 70 sides should be an issue
: in psak...

As I noted, we see this in practice in Brisker Chumeros. Eiruvin (among
Ashkenazim, where 60 ribo dates back to Rashi), tzitzis on a tallis
qatan birshus harabbim on Shabbos, etc... There are many such cases where
everyone else says the law is closed and lequlah, and they're busy being
chosheish for some rejected shitas harishonim.

So to me, the "why" is really the only question. Not the "what" --
choosing a pesaq is a problem for Briskers. They lent their name to a
whole category of chumeros because of it.

(In fact, R Chaim famously spoke about some of his pesaqim not being
qulos in Shabbos or Yom Kippur, but chumeros in piquach nefesh. Again,
all about the chumeros, not about finding one side the more compelling

So, here is my suggested "why" after more thought:

1- It is only an issue in a style of lomdus that makes it difficult
to choose sides. Not that one can SEE both sides, but that one finds them
equally compelling.

2- Something specific to Brisk... I think they inherited from the Gra
a disbelief that questions posed after "Ravina veR' Ashi sof hora'ah"
are really ever fully closed.

To quote a translation I found on chabad.org of R' SY Zevin's Ishim
veShitot, pg 33 in the 2007 edition:

    Why were the rishonim called rishonim ("the initiators")? Because
    they were the formers and creators. They quarried the depths,
    pierced the mountain, penetrated to the very foundations [of the
    Talmudic discussion]. The rishonim did not become tangled with
    far fetched argumentation, rather they gave us "it itself," the
    plain truth. R. Chaim leaped backwards through the generations
    and returned to the rishonim, albeit with a different expression
    and parlance, yet treading the same path, in the same fashion. With
    his clarity of explanation and strength of logic, he penetrated to
    the essence and root of the entire Talmudic corpus, transforming it
    into sifted flour. The point of truth, the pure truth-this was his
    portion, this he sought and located persistently ...To separate and
    to join together, this was the strength and merit of R. Chaim. To
    dissect something with the sharp chisel of logic and to investigate
    it thoroughly. To break it down to its elemental components and
    thereby to erect it in its clearest purity upon the point of truest
    truth, without any extraneous mixtures. This was the way paved by
    R. Chaim. In this way he shone as a giant tower of light upon the
    entire great sea of the Talmud and its many commentaries...

3- I more than once expounded the model that there are 3-sheheim-4
categories of concerns that a poseiq needs to consider.

    1- textual strength
       a- compilling sevara
       b- source authority (acharei rabim lehatos or halakhah keR
          Aqiva meichaveiro, or the "obvious" difference between the
          shitah of the Rambam and some baal Tosafos we only hear
          from once)

   2- mimetic strength -- what are people doing? How broad of a
      swath of the qehillah?

   3- hashkafic argument - only as a fall back, but what best fits
      the sho'el's or poseiq's worldview. When halakhah allows two
      options, this could / should be a tiebreaker. Such as the Zohar
      saying that wearing tefillin on ch"m is qotzeitz bintiyos.
      For those whose hashlafah spends a lot of time looking at the
      Zohar, that's reason to pasqen against wearing them. For Litvaks
      and Yekkes, not so much.

But lomdus doesn't take #2 into account. And #3.... Brisk is pretty
much a hashkafah of not having a hashkafah! (With RYBS's existential
exploration in post-facto "halachic hermeneutics" -- as he puts it --
lessons we can take from the din, not really an exception. Because they
are just that, post facto lessons, not claims of possible reality a
pesaq should accomodate.)


On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 07:47:54AM +0000, Ben Bradley via Avodah wrote:
: In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek
: or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more
: a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for
: halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries.

I think your last clause has much to do with that 4 way balance I listed
above. Turning divrei Elokim Chaim into halakhah lemaaseh isn't only
about sevara.

It might also explain why derekh halimmud isn't given that much weight.

But really, I drifted away from my original point (in a prior email).
Lomdus of any flavor is a different kind of animal than the learning
Tur-Beis Yoseif-SA -- Rambam vs Rosh -- one finds more of in posqim
(or the AhS).

I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we
understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather
than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject.


On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 03:12:32PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote:
: I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example
: if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to
: derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did
: not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei
: dsatrei...

In practice, no. Around the end of the zugos, few dinim were established
by derashah. For R Yishmael and R Aqiva, derashah was a post-facto way of
proving a din. Which is why the gemara can ask "but according to Beish
Shammai where do /they/ learn..." -- because the pesaqim are already givens.

For that matter, so is lomdus a system for explanation of already known
shitos. But derashah is less impactful than lomdus. Derashos don't have
nearly as many implications about how to apply known din to new cases.

Besides, don't take the "compeating" lists of derashos too seriously. We
find R' Aqiva using rules of kelal uperat (eg R' Aqivah on Y-mi Eiruvin
18b or Bavli Pasachim 36a) and (less often) R' Yishma'el using ribui

Tir'u baTov!

Micha Berger             The same boiling water
mi...@aishdas.org        that softens the potato, hardens the egg.
http://www.aishdas.org   It's not about the circumstance,
Fax: (270) 514-1507      but rather what you are made of.

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Message: 3
From: Akiva Miller
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 17:43:34 -0400
[Avodah] Mishkan vis a vis Ohel Moed

In Maftir of Pekudei, we read:

40:34) The cloud covered the Ohel Moed, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan.
40:35) Moshe was not able to enter the Ohel Moed, because the cloud rested
on it, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan.

From this repetitious wording, it seems clear me that "Ohel Moed" and
"Mishkan" are two different things. My starting point is that there are two
distinct structures that might have these names. One is the central
building that was 30 amos long and 10 amos wide and was covered with
various skins and fabrics. The other is the outer enclosure that was 100
amos by 50 amos and was basically a long curtain. My question is which name
refers to which structure.

(The Chatzer HaMishkan refers to the area between the two, but that could
be its name regardless of whether the Mishkan is the central structure or
the outer enclosure.)

On Shabbos, I asked several learned people which is which, and I was
surprised by the wide variety of answers.

1) Some confirmed my understanding, which is that the Ohel Moed is the
central structure, while Mishkan refers to the outer enclosure. But if so,
then I was confused. The pasuk says that Moshe could not enter the inner
Ohel Moed, which implies that he *was* able to enter the Chatzer. How could
he have entered the Chatzer if the Kavod Hashem was filling it?

2) Some said I had it reversed: The Mishkan is in the center, and the Ohel
Moed is the entire enclosed area. That would make sense, because the cloud
fills the whole area, and it is the cloud which creates the issur to enter,
even though the Kavod Hashem is only in the central building. But frankly,
I always presumed that the OHEL Moed would have a roof. Is it possible that
the entire corral is called an "ohel" on account of the main pavilion?

3) Some said both terms refer to the same central structure.
4) Some said both terms are used inconsistently, and one must always check
the context.

In any case, the structure of these two pesukim begs to be explained. The
Kavod Hashem seems to be an effect caused by the cloud, and Moshe's
inability to enter is also an effect caused by the cloud. A simple reading
of the pesukim would NOT support the idea that the Kavod Hashem was a
direct cause of Moshe's inability to enter.

ANYWAY, I guess my first question has to be which is which. And THEN I will
see what the psukim mean.

Thanks in advance!
Akiva Miller
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Message: 4
From: Rich, Joel
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 08:50:44 +0000
[Avodah] psak

I suppose this is blatantly obvious to others, but I've updated my mental
psak model. In the past I've used a delicate dance analogy between the
poseik and his community (TBD) as to his acceptable range in psak and what
the community will accept. This could have also been expressed as a two
circle Venn diagram (but where in the intersection do you land?) It occurs
to me we need a third circle (or maybe this is better expressed as two
magnetic fields pulling on a piece of metal = the poseik), which represents
what other poskim would find acceptable. This would explain R' Schachter's
reference to poskim we disregard (e.g., Rogatchover, R'Avi Weiss?) because
they are something like "too creative" (me = outside consensus of other
Joel Rich

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Message: 5
From: Micha Berger
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 14:38:00 -0400
Re: [Avodah] psak

On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 08:50:44AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote:
:                                 This could have also been expressed as a
: two circle Venn diagram (but where in the intersection do you land?) It
: occurs to me we need a third circle (or maybe this is better expressed
: as two magnetic fields pulling on a piece of metal = the poseik), which
: represents what other poskim would find acceptable. This would explain
: R' Schachter's reference to poskim we disregard (e.g., Rogatchover,
: R'Avi Weiss?) because they are something like "too creative" (me =
: outside consensus of other poskim?)

Then there are the people who are so creative, they are playing by the
wrong set of rules. Whereas I think you are focusing on going too far
with the valid rule set.

Before either of your examples, Rabbi Meir (or R Nehorai, R Nechemia
or R Elazar ben Arakh, if one of those is his real name. - Eiruvin 13b)
That is, when he is indeed called Rav Meir and is not stam mishnah, or
the attribution is his possible real name, or is Acheirim. So, Rabbi
Meir from the time in his life when he rose to the sobriquet "Rabbi
Meir" until his participation in the attempted coup against R Shimon
b Gamliel.

This is why halakhah keRabbi Meir begezeirosav (Kesuvos 15) but iin
general, we have the rule of Rav Acha bar Chanina (same sugya in
        It is revealed and known to the One Who "Spoke" and
        the world was that there was no one in R Meir's generation
        who was like him. And why didn't they establish the halakhah
        like him? Because lo yakhlu chaveiro la'amod al sof da'ato.
        For he could say al tamei tahor, and bring proof, and al
        tahor tamei and bring proof.

Rashi: They couldn't understand which of hus rulings were correct.

R Meir was just too bright for them to follow.

(Or maybe, he was just too much into lomdus, and when he was done they
could see both sides. <grin>)

If it wasn't for RAbC I would have simply said the reason why we don't
hold like R Meir is because when we do hold like him, it's a stam
mishnah. The only times we use his name is when we don't.

Tir'u baTov!

Micha Berger             A sick person never rejects a healing procedure
mi...@aishdas.org        as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what
http://www.aishdas.org   other people think when dealing with spiritual
Fax: (270) 514-1507      matters?              - Rav Yisrael Salanter

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Message: 6
From: Micha Berger
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 14:10:55 -0400
[Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 23: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 1)

We've had too many people raise this topic over the years not to share
this section of R' Bednarsh's series on-list.

So I give you, Avodah's 24th or 25th "eilu va'eilu" discussion!


Topics in Hashkafa 
Rav Assaf Bednarsh
Adapted by Leora Bednarsh.
Yeshivat Har Etzion

                     Shiur #23: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 1)

The principle of halakhic pluralism appears in the context of the
disagreements between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. The gemara states:

    R. Abba said that Shmuel said: For three years, Beit Shammai and
    Beit Hillel disagreed. These said: The halakha is in accordance
    with our opinion, and these said: The halakha is in accordance with
    our opinion. A Divine Voice emerged and proclaimed: Both these and
    these are the words of the living God. However, the halakha is in
    accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. (Eiruvin 13b)

We find this phrase in the context of Aggada as well:

    It is written [with regard to the episode of the concubine in Giva]:
    "And his concubine went away from him" (Shoftim 19:2). [What occurred
    that caused her husband to become so angry with her that she left
    him?] R. Evyatar says: He found her responsible for a fly [in
    the food that she prepared for him]. R. Yonatan says: He found her
    responsible for a hair. And R. Evyatar found Elijah [the prophet]
    and said to him: What is the Holy One, Blessed be He, doing now? He
    [Elijah] said to him: He is engaged in studying the episode of the
    concubine in Giva. [R. Evyatar asked him:] And what is He saying about
    it? He [Elijah] said to him: [God is saying the following:] Evyatar,
    My son, says this, and Yonatan, My son, says that. He [R. Evyatar]
    said to him: God forbid, is there uncertainty before Heaven? [Doesn't
    God know what happened?] He [Elijah] said to him: Both these and
    these are the words of the living God. [The incident occurred in
    the following manner:] He found a fly in his food and did not take
    umbrage, and later he found a hair and took umbrage. (Gittin 6b)

This concept is also found, in different words, in a passage describing
the nature of Torah study:

    "Those that are composed in collections [ba'alei asufot]" (Kohelet
    12:11) - These are Torah scholars, who sit in many groups [asupot]
    and engage in Torah study. These [Sages] render something ritually
    impure and these render it pure; these prohibit an action and these
    permit it; these deem an item invalid and these deem it valid. Lest
    a person say: Now, how can I study Torah [when it contains so many
    different opinions]? The verse states that they are all "given from
    one shepherd." One God gave them; one leader [Moshe] said them from
    the mouth of the Master of all creation, blessed be He, as it is
    written: "And God spoke all these words" (Shemot 20:1). [The plural
    form "words" indicates that God transmitted all the interpretations
    of the Ten Commandments.] So too, you should make your ears like a
    funnel and acquire for yourself an understanding heart to hear both
    the statements of those who render objects ritually impure and the
    statements of those who render them pure; the statements of those
    who prohibit actions and the statements of those who permit them;
    the statements of those who deem items invalid and the statements
    of those who deem them valid. (Chagiga 3b)

From a moral perspective, it is certainly virtuous to respect all the
divergent halakhic opinions and honor all Torah scholars. Philosophically,
however, this concept is difficult to understand. In the context of
Aggada, it is easy enough to understand how both sides of the argument
can be correct. After all, as in the story of the concubine of Giva,
perhaps more than one infuriating mistake was made, or more than
one conversation transpired between the characters, or more than one
motivation led the personalities to act as they did. But in the realm
of Halakha, when something is either permissible or forbidden, it is
more difficult to understand how both sides of the argument can be
correct. If something is permissible, it is certainly not forbidden,
and if something is forbidden, it is certainly not permissible.

The Chida: Instrumental Pluralism
""" """""" """""""""""" """""""""

One approach to resolving this difficulty that minimizes the extent
of true halakhic pluralism is quoted by the Chida.[1] According to
this approach, only one opinion can actually be correct. For example,
only the opinion of Beit Hillel is 100% correct, and the opinion of
Beit Shammai is correspondingly 100% incorrect. In what way, then,
are the words of Beit Shammai "the words of the living God"? The Chida
explains that just as light is only recognized and appreciated by
means of contrast with darkness, the true halakhic interpretation can
only be properly understood and appreciated by contrasting it with the
incorrect interpretation. It is for this reason, he explains, that when
Moshe went up to Mount Sinai to receive the Torah, God told him all
the divergent viewpoints regarding every halakhic dispute - in order
to explain to Moshe which view was correct and to clarify exactly how
and why it was more accurate than the contrasting view. Therefore, one
must work hard to understand even the rejected viewpoint, for one cannot
properly understand the accepted viewpoint if one does not consider the
alternatives, understand the exact ways in which the accepted opinion
diverges from the suggested alternatives, and know the logical reason
that the true opinion is accepted and the mistaken opinions rejected.

According to this understanding, there is no true pluralism within the
halakhic system. The rejected viewpoint is called "the words of the
living God" only because it is instrumentally useful in the intellectual
endeavor of understanding the one correct viewpoint.

R. Moshe Feinstein: Practical Pluralism
"" """"" """""""""" """"""""" """""""""

A second interpretation is explicated by R. Moshe Feinstein in the
introduction to his magnum opus, Responsa Iggerot Moshe. He explains
that only one opinion can correspond to the authentic Divine will, and
it is revealed in Heaven which opinion is correct and which opinion is
incorrect. Nonetheless, for practical halakhic purposes, both opinions
are equally valid and legitimate. R. Moshe references the principle of
lo ba-shamayim hi,[2] according to which God does not expect us to follow
the heavenly halakha, which corresponds to absolute truth, but rather to
follow the earthly halakha, as explicated by the halakhic process that is
given over to human hands. If a qualified Torah sage, expending maximal
effort and suffused with fear of Heaven, reaches a halakhic conclusion,
then that halakhic conclusion is operatively true for himself and for
all his followers, whether or not it corresponds to the ultimate truth.

According to this theory, there is no room for pluralism in the realm
of theoretical truth, but on the practical plane there is ample room
for halakhic pluralism. If truth is defined for practical purposes as
legitimacy, as a conclusion which was reached by following the proper
halakhic process, then two mutually contradictory opinions can both be
legitimate and valid for practical halakhic purposes, so long as they
are both the product of the halakhic process as properly practiced.

Tosafists and Ritva: True Pluralism, No Objective Truth
""""""""" """ """""" """" """""""""" "" """"""""" """""

A third approach is quoted in the name of the French sages, i.e. the
Tosafists, by the Ritva.[3] The Ritva explains that when Moshe went up
to the Heavens to receive the Torah, he was taught multiple possible
interpretations of each halakha, leading to divergent possible rulings
on practical halakhic questions. When he asked God which interpretation
was actually correct, God answered him that it would be up to the Sages
of each generation to vote and decide what the halakha would be.[4]

The Ritva seems to hold that there is no objective heavenly truth. God
has no opinion as to what the halakha should be; He leaves it entirely
up to us to determine the content of the halakha. If, in fact, there
is no objective truth, then there is room for true pluralism, as every
interpretation is equally valid. Both opinions can be the words of the
living God, because God Himself intended neither interpretation, but
rather revealed many options for interpreting the Torah and required
only that we follow one of those options.[5]

This denial of objective halakhic truth is somewhat radical, as pointed
out by the Chavot Yair.[6] Mainstream Jewish philosophy assumes that
the mitzvot of the Torah were not decreed arbitrarily, but rather
were commanded by God because He, in His infinite wisdom, knew exactly
which actions bring spiritual benefit to our souls and which actions are
spiritually detrimental. It is therefore difficult to understand how God
Himself could have no objective knowledge as to which interpretation
of the Torah maximizes the spiritual benefit to our soul and avoids
spiritual damage. Additionally, the Chavot Yair expresses bewilderment
as to how the majority vote of the Sages of each generation, who are
only human and therefore fallible, can successfully avert the harmful
effects of following an interpretation that may not actually correspond
to the underlying spiritual reality of the world.

We could defend the Ritva by suggesting, as the Chavot Yair concludes
begrudgingly, that the commandments are arbitrary, and that spiritual
benefit accrues not from the particular action of any mitzva, but rather
from the experience of obeying divine commandment; our souls are damaged
not from the particular action involved in any transgression, but rather
by the experience of transgressing a commandment. Therefore, it is not
necessary to identify the correct interpretation of any mitzva, so long
as there is an authoritative interpretation that we can accept and obey.

Alternatively, we can posit that all possible interpretations of any
halakha are known by God to be equally beneficial to our souls, and
therefore He allows the Sages to choose between them. Additionally,
one could suggest, as does the Chavot Yair himself parenthetically,
that God adapts reality and refashions the world in accordance with
the interpretation of the sages of each generation,[7] and therefore
any interpretation adopted by the majority of the sages automatically
corresponds to spiritual reality. In the next shiur, however, we will
suggest a different understanding of the Ritva that avoids this problem


We have seen three different understandings of the principle of
"these and these are the words of the living God." According to the
interpretation quoted by the Chida, only one opinion can be correct, and
the incorrect opinion is only instrumentally valuable in deepening our
understanding of the correct opinion. According to R. Moshe Feinstein,
only one opinion can be theoretically correct, but any opinion that
results from the proper application of the halakhic process is correct
for practical purposes. According to the Ritva and the Tosafists, both
opinions can be correct even in the realm of ultimate truth, and there is
no objective correct answer to a halakhic question. In the next shiur,
we will elucidate a fourth approach to understanding halakhic pluralism
which differs fundamentally from these three understandings.


Enayim, Bava Metzia 59b. The Chida quotes this interpretation in the name
of "the Rishonim." He also quotes the interpretations of Rashi and Ritva,
elucidated below.

[2] See our previous shiur for a full elucidation of this concept.

[3] Eruvin 13b. This explanation appears explicitly in the commentary of
one of the Tosafists, R. Shimshon of Sens ("Tosafot Sens"), to Eduyot 1:5.

[4] This idea has its roots in the Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 4:2. R. Shimshon
of Sens concludes that a Rabbinic court can rule in accordance
with an opinion that was rejected by the majority of the sages of a
previous generation, even though the earlier sages were greater and more
accomplished, because God expressly granted the sages of each generation
the right to rule as they see fit for their generation.

[5] This does not mean that God has no opinion as to how we should act in
this world. There clearly are behaviors that are completely outside the
realm of possible interpretations of the Torah and absolutely contravene
God's will. However, within the circumscribed realm of all possible
interpretations of the Torah, God Himself has no preference as to which
interpretation we should follow.

[6] R. Yair Chaim Bachrach (Germany, 1639-1702), Responsa Chavot Yair 192.

[7] This idea is elucidated by the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, quoted in the
previous shiur. In that shiur, we also quoted the Ran, who offered two
justification for following the majority vote of the Sages in spite
of their fallibility. However, the Ran's view does not explain why God
Himself would have no opinion as to which interpretation corresponded
better to the spiritual reality.

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Message: 7
From: Professor L. Levine
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 12:40:51 +0000
[Avodah] I did not show proper honor to my parents. Must I

From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis

Q. I did not show proper honor to my parents. Must I ask them forgiveness?

A. One who transgresses a mitzvah ?bein adam l?chaveiro? (between man and
his fellow man) must ask forgiveness both from Hashem, for not heeding His
commandment, and from the friend that was wronged. For a mitzvah ?bein adam
la?Makom? (between man and Hashem), one need only ask forgiveness from
Hashem. The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 33) is uncertain if honoring a parent
is a mitzvah ?bein adam l?chaveiro?. On the one hand, a mitzvah of ?bein
adam l?chaveiro? generally applies equally to all people and perhaps the
extra honor that is due to a parent is a mitzvah ?bein adam la?Makom?. On
the other hand, maybe the mitzvah creates a unique obligation to the
parent. The Minchas Chinuch above leaves the question unanswered. Elsewhere
(Mitzvah 364), the Minchas Chinuch writes that honoring parents falls under
the category of mitzvos ?bein adam l?chaveiro?. In practice, if one did not
show proper respect, one must ask forgiveness from their parents (Yalkut
Yosef, Kibud Av V?aim1:12).

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