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Volume 36: Number 128

Thu, 15 Nov 2018

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Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Message: 1
From: Micha Berger
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 13:06:54 -0500
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] daven/learn


On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 07:25:01PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote:
: I'm told the "minhag haolam" is to get up early to learn and then daven
: (even if that is not the first minyan available). Assuming the learning
: starts after the earliest time for davening, shouldn't the "minhag"
: be to daven first, then learn?

Perhaps it's because of Berakhos 31a:

    Tanu Rabbanan: We do not stand to daven neither from din, nor from devar
    halakhah, ela mitokh halakhah pesukah.

    And what is halakhah besukah like?
    
    Abayei said, like what Rabbi Zeira said.

... and then quoting a settled halakhah that Rabbi Zeira said once.
("benos Yisrael hichmiru al atzman...")

    Rava said, like that which Rav Hoshia said..

But I think you get the idea.

So, maybe people assume 1,600+ year-old discussions in the gemara
qualify.

I don't think that's shitas Rashi, though. Rashi ('halakhah pesuqah")
says the gemara is worried about topics that a person would continue
thinking about during davening. (The Be'er Heitev holds like Rashi.)

But in any case, looking a little more meta: The gemara's assumption
is that one is supposed to learn before davening, and the gemara then
discusses what it is one should be learning. Later on in the sugya:

    Tanu Rabbanan: We do not stand to daven from within sorrow, nor
    laziness, nor silliness, nor chatter, nor qalus rosh, nor devarim
    beteilim ela mitokh simchah shel mitzvah.

Perhaps the learning is indeed seen as a prep for davening. (In addition
to talmud Torah.)

See OC 93. In the SA, that second TR is in se'if 2, and the first, in
se'if 3. Se'if 4 amos, "Ha'oseiq betzorkhei tzibur ke'oseiq baTorah",
because there is similar simchah shel mitzvah.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             When one truly looks at everyone's good side,
mi...@aishdas.org        others come to love him very naturally, and
http://www.aishdas.org   he does not need even a speck of flattery.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Rabbi AY Kook



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Message: 2
From: Zvi Lampel
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 20:07:16 -0500
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Bereishit


On Fri, Oct 26, 2018 at 2:13 PM Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote:

> On Mon, Oct 08, 2018 at 09:26:27AM -0400, Zvi Lampel via Avodah wrote:
> : Know that G-d brought out these creations, all of them, to physical reality
> : during the six days of *Breishis* by Himself, in His Own Glory -- not by means
> : of an agent, meaning Nature. Creation was contrary to the way things are
> : after the conclusion of the six days of *Breishis*, wherein *Hashem
> : Yisborach* conducts His world by means of the agent, i.e. *Nature*

Just to be clear, that was a quote of the Maharal.

> While the Rambam treats nature as a hypostatis,

Looked that up in the dictionary. Don't want to get bogged down in your
usage.

> the Ramban famously says there is no "it" to nature.

Famously, but phantomly. Ramban (see, for example, on Shmos 25:24) no less
than Rambam, holds that olom kiminhago noheig. Ramban repeats a number of
times that each "Va-yehi  khein" in Breishis means that Hashem made that
minhag permanent.

Rambam teaches that during maaseh breishis, Hashem put the normal
properties and behaviors into the natures of the things He created and
formed. He also instilled in them the potential for certain aberrational
behaviors, to be actualized upon certain conditions, such as the staff
turning into a serpent. But such changes open can only last temporarily.

But then there is the constant reaction of natural events to mankind's good
and evil deeds, which is a neis nistar. This, Rambam explains, is
nevertheless the greatest miracle of all:

> "The Torah amply states that the improvement of affairs that goes with
> loyal service to Hashem, and their worsening that goes with rebellion, is a
> continuous miracle...not due to a natural cause or the behavior of
> metsius...And this is a miracle greater than any other miracle....".
> (Rambam's Maamar Terchiass HaMeisim [near the end])

This view as well is shared by the Ramban. And this is his point in the
passages in which he is mistakenly understood to be saying that "there is
no 'it' to nature." As an example, in Toras Hashem Temimah, he cites the
Rambam approvingly and says, "Most people think that the Alm-ighty does not
constantly enact miracles, that the world proceeds in its way, and many of
the chachamim think so, too, but the Rav (Rambam) curses them....All our
affairs are entirely miracles, there is no nature and way that the world
proceeds, for behold the promises of the Torah are all absolute miracles
...The fact of "And I shall give your rains in their time [if you keep the
mitzvos]," Hashem will open for you his good treasure-house, the heavens,
to give the rain to your land in its time an d to bless...is the same as
the plague of the firstborn, the dever and arov, and the drowning of the
Egyptians in the sea...the only difference is that between the hidden and
the open...."

So, Ramban in context does not mean that there is no such thing as nature.
His point in all his famous and repeated declarations is that it is a
central Torah fact that man's deeds are rewarded or punished by the forces
of nature, and that this is miraculous. No different from the Rambam. He,
just as Rambam, is not saying that outside of this area there is no minhago
shel olom, no "it" to nature.

> From RZL's quote of the Rambam:

:> When any one of us is deprived of breath for a short time, he dies, and
:> cannot move any ?longer. How then can we imagine that any one of us has
:> been enclosed in a bag in the ?midst of a body for several months and
:> remained alive, able to move??

>Which doesn't mean that creation happened by miracles we could understand
either. It justifies the Michtav meiEliyahu's position that creation is
incomprehensible by any means. And instead we pick which simplified model,
which perspective, we choose to explain the unknowable from.

Except that the Rambam speaking for himself declares,

MN 2:17 (see http://press.tau.ac.il/perplexed/chapters/chap_2_17.htm, note
6, for a ?compilation of translations of this passage.)?

For we, the community following in the footsteps of Moshe Rabbeynu and
Avraham ?Avinu, aleihem hashalom, believe that the world came into being in
such-and-such a ?form, and became such-and-such from such-and-such (haya
kach mi-kach), and such ?was created after such.?

>See pereq 30. There was no time, no 6 days. Just 6 steps in logic.

The interpretation that when the Torah says days it means levels is given
by the Ralbag, based upon, and compelled by, his take of Chazal who say
that Hashem created everything full bloom instantly and simultaneously. But
that's (just one of the possibilities) offered by Ralbag, not Rambam. The
Ralbag demonstrates he was well acquainted with the Rambam's writings on
the subject, and he himself states that none of his fellow rishonim before
him "realized" that this was what Chazal were saying.

The two issues raised in this post, the issue of time with the issue of
miracles and ha-olom beMinhago noheig, actually tie together. Rambam in the
above mentioned payrush on Avos famously maintains that it was on erev
Shabbos that Hashem instilled potential aberrational behavior in the nature
of the 10 things listed. However, the potentials for aberrational behaviors
were instilled in the natures of all other creations ON THE DAY THE TORAH
INDICATES. E.g. one example he gives is that the nature of water to split
was instilled on day 2. So he is understanding the days as units of time,
in which there were days 1-7 and a 6th day bein ha-shemoshos. If one were
to attempt imposing the concept of "step of logic" on the use of the word
"day" in this passage, the passage would not make sense.

Moreh Nevuchim 2:30 does not differ.

In MN 2:30, Rambam emphasizes that time itself is something Hashem created.
It is a result of the turning of the sphere, which itself is something that
was created. Thus, creation did not happen after a certain amount of time,
because time could not exist before creation. This is the meaning of his
saying that creation, the initial creation ex nihilo, happened "outside of
time." (See Abarbanel ?(p. 8, left-hand column, middle), Crescas and
Ephodi. Shemtov does attribute the "levels" peshat to Rambam.)

But then he poses a question: If the sphere and heavenly bodies were first
created the fourth day, how were the first three days measured? He is
obviously assuming, in his question, that the creation days of the Torah
are units of time. The question is how could there be a first, second and
third day, if the thing that produces time, the revolving sphere, did not
exist until day four. The question includes the assumption that each day of
maaseh breishis witnessed a new creation ex nihilo of the rakia, the
vegetation, the creatures, etc., so the heavenly bodies that determine
units of time did not exist until the 4th day.

He answers that day does not mean a unit of time, but a step of logic.
No, wait, he doesn't.

He answers that Chazal teach that despite the impression one may get from
the pesukim, there was not a new creation ex nihilo each of the 6 days.
There was one creation ex nihilo of everything, and then a
"revealing"/separation/extraction of each component. What occurred on day
4 with the heavenly bodies responsible for time was not their creation.
Their creation and behavior of determining time began at the instant of
creation ex nihilo. He cites the Chazal comparing the process over the six
creation days to that of various types of seeds. Even though they were all
planted one day, each one sprouts later, on a different day.

Repeat: later, on different days. The question of how there was time and
days 1, 2, and 3 before day 4 is answered with the principle that the
heavenly bodies responsible for time existed from the moment of creation.
Nothing in the Rambam's words (either here or in his treatment in the first
chelek of word meanings) about days meaning levels.

"The particle "ess" in the phrase "ess ha-shamayim ve-ess ha-aretz ("the
heavens and the earth") signifies "together with." Our Sages have explained
the word in the same sense in many instances. Accordingly, they assume that
God created, with the heavens, everything that the heavens contain, and
with the earth, everything the earth includes. They further say that the
simultaneous Creation of the heavens and the earth is implied in the words,
"I call unto them, they stand up together" (Tehillim 48). Consequently, all
things were created together, but revealed (nisgalu) / were separated from
each other (nivdelu) one by one (rishon rishon). Our Sages illustrated
this by the following simile: We sow various seeds at the same time; some
spring forth after one day, some after two, and some after three days,
although all have been sown at the same time. This outlook, which is
undoubtedly the correct one, solves the problem of... how the first day, the
second day and the third day were determined....

This is explicit in the words of our Sages in Bereshis Rabba. They said,
regarding the light the Torah says was created on the first day. They said
it as follows: These [lights of the luminaries mentioned in the Creation of
the fourth day] are the very same lights that were created on the first
day, but were not hung in their places until the fourth day. Behold, they
explicitly stated this idea."

All this would be an awful way to express the simple idea that by "day"
the Torah means not a unit of time but a logical step.

Zvi Lampel



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Message: 3
From: Micha Berger
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2018 12:01:19 -0500
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Bereishit


Did you intentionally reply off-list? Or should I copy your email and this
one onto Avodah?

On Tue, Nov 13, 2018 at 08:07:16PM -0500, Zvi Lampel wrote:
:> While the Rambam treats nature as a hypostatis,

: Looked that up in the dictionary. Don't want to get bogged down in your
: usage.

A lot resided in the word "hypostasis", and a reason why I couldn't find
a more apt word among normal English ones.

:> the Ramban famously says there is no "it" to nature.

: Famously, but phantomly. Ramban (see, for example, on Shmos 25:24) no less
: than Rambam, holds that olom kiminhago noheig. Ramban repeats a number of
: times that each "Va-yehi  khein" in Breishis means that Hashem made that
: minhag permanent.

But it's minhago shel olam. Not an "it".

The Ramban talks about nature being a pattern in events, but those events
are /directly/ caused by HQBH. It is this direct causality that people
mistake for his saying there is no teva.

According to the Rambam, nature is the product of the Seikhel haPo'al,
which is acted upon by mal'akhim, which, if you chase the chain of
causality up to the start, is a product of hashgachah kelalis and
Divine Da'as. But there is an "it" there. Teva is a metaphysical object,
not a pattern.

See Moreh 2:11-12 (ch. 10 may be a useful prelude.)

(Nevu'ah is also mediated through the Seikhel haPo'al [2:35], but that's
a different subject.)

A homo sapien who lacks da'as is less of a person, and thus to that
extent is less subject to hashgachah peratis. Instead, he is left to teva
(Moreh 3:18). Not that he is left to minhago shel olam, but that HQBH
delegates his fate.

I tried to semi-explain by talking about the Ramban's lack of "'it' to
nature". But you apparently took me to mean there is no nature. Rather
than no metaphysical "object" to pin nature on.

That's what I was talking about, and most of your reply doesn't actually
address the chiluq I'm making.

: So, Ramban in context does not mean that there is no such thing as nature.

No, but he does mean there is no such "thing" as nature. It's not a
hypostatis.

: His point in all his famous and repeated declarations is that it is a
: central Torah fact that man's deeds are rewarded or punished by the forces
: of nature, and that this is miraculous. No different from the Rambam. He,
: just as Rambam, is not saying that outside of this area there is no minhago
: shel olom, no "it" to nature.

: Which doesn't mean that creation happened by miracles we could understand
: either. It justifies the Michtav meiEliyahu's position that creation is
: incomprehensible by any means. And instead we pick which simplified model,
: which perspective, we choose to explain the unknowable from.

: Except that the Rambam speaking for himself declares,

: MN 2:17 (see http://press.tau.ac.il/perplexed/chapters/chap_2_17.htm, note
: 6, for a ?compilation of translations of this passage.)?

: For we, the community following in the footsteps of Moshe Rabbeynu and
: Avraham ?Avinu, aleihem hashalom, believe that the world came into being in
: such-and-such a ?form, and became such-and-such from such-and-such (haya
: kach mi-kach), and such ?was created after such.?

:>See pereq 30. There was no time, no 6 days. Just 6 steps in logic.

: The interpretation that when the Torah says days it means levels is given
: by the Ralbag, based upon, and compelled by, his take of Chazal who say
: that Hashem created everything full bloom instantly and simultaneously. But
: that's (just one of the possibilities) offered by Ralbag, not Rambam...

It's the Ralbag's PESHAT in the Rambam, not his own shitah. See also the
Abravanel and The Aqeidas Yitzchaq (shaar 3) on Bereishis. The
Abarbanel specifically endorces the Ralbag's "yesod" in understanding
the Rambam. https://www.sefaria.org/Abarbanel_on_Torah%2C_Genesis.1.1.10
This is how the Rambam was understood by other rishonim. Even by a
non-Aristotilian like R' Yitzchaq Arama.

RYBS too, Mainodies between Philosophy & Halakhah, pg 187.

In any case, the Rambam's problem with time is because in his world (again,
following Aristo) time is a property of a process. Until the spheres spin,
there are no processes, no time. The notion of time as a dimension in which
processes occur evolves into being through Galieleo and Newton. When the
Rambam analyzes "zeman", he isn't talking about time the way we think of
time.

His problem is with zeman as a whole without spheres, not yom before
the sun.

And it's not a problem we modern people would face, anyway.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "The most prevalent illness of our generation is
mi...@aishdas.org        excessive anxiety....  Emunah decreases anxiety:
http://www.aishdas.org   'The Almighty is my source of salvation;  I will
Fax: (270) 514-1507      trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya



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Message: 4
From: Rich, Joel
Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2018 05:37:51 +0000
Subject:
[Avodah] local culture and the Bavli


See here for some interesting thoughts on how local culture impacted the Bavli:

https://kotzkblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/197-babylonian-influences-on-babylonian_72.html

Me-Yet R' Ellman would not ( at least when I asked him) say that any of these insights should impact the halachic process today. definite food for thought

KT
Joel Rich

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Message: 5
From: Rich, Joel
Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2018 05:35:38 +0000
Subject:
[Avodah] Deference to Minority Opinions


Question: I've been thinking about the number of times the shulchan
aruch(or M"B) says that it's worth giving deference to a minority opinion.
I'm wondering if this is the result of the algorithmic approach rather than
going through the entire sugya to come to a conclusion? Do we see this same
propensity in prior authorities who were not writing codes in this manner?
Other reason why different authorities might deal with this issue
differently?
KT
Joel Rich

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Message: 6
From: Micha Berger
Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2018 13:52:22 -0500
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Eishes Yefas Toar and Pruzbul


On Sat, Oct 13, 2018 at 10:31:20PM -0400, R Akiva Miller replied to my
post:
:> So why the difference in approach? Why wasn't ribis permitted
:> keneged YhR, or lending past shemittah, or qinyan deOraisa be
:> when the buyer takes posession of the merchandise, rather than
:> the seller takes the money? Again, all for the sake of keneged
:> YhR?

: Indeed, as you wrote (in the first paragraph that I quoted,) Chazal
: encountered many people who were on a lower plane. Some people were up to
: the standards and expectations addressed by the Torah, but to accommodate
: the more frail humans, Chazal had to help them out. And with that help, the
: fight against the Yetzer Hara is on more level ground.

But that's the converse of my question. I didn't ask why Chazal found
the taqanos they did. Or in the case of ribbis, engineered a solution
using a pre-existing loophole.

I asked why the RBSO didn't. If Chazal knew that people couldn't keep
up the moral standard, obviously the Author of the deOraisos did too.
And therefore, why didn't He allow ribbis for the same "lo diberah
Torah ela keneged YhR" reasons as eishes yefas to'ar.

Once we have G-d  making compramizes for EYT, why did He leave ribbis
to Chazal? Why did Hashem make it that money is qoneh? He knew better
than chazal that it would create situations where a seller is still
holding something he no longer owns, and sometimes that will mean
carelessness in how the item is guarded. Why did Chazal need to invoke
hefqer BD hefqer and totally rewrite how sale works?

(That said, I am almost satisfied with RDR's answer, below.)


: But I've always understood the Yefas Toar to be an unwinnable situation.
: The Bechira Point is off the scale. NO ONE will be able to avoid taking her
: (unless he follows the prescribed procedure)...

Today's militaries assume otherwise.

Avoiding ribis is less of a problem when "money" is primarily a metal or
contract to swap, only a half-step beyond barter. One is "only" losing
opportunity cost. But once we got prime rates etc... so that there is
a difference between present and future value of money can be done in
some settings, avoiding ribbis became something not enough lenders could
afford, and the poor suffered.

Eishes yefas to'ar is similarly situational. Whether it is "unwinnable"
at best depends on the kind of war one is fighting. Maybe when fighting
barbarian tribes. But not as a general rule.

: Alternatively:

: D'rabanans cannot forbid things that are explicitly allowed by the Torah.

But they can allow things explicitly denied by the Torah? If you can
engineer heter isqa into something that covers most of the situations
where ribbis is needed, they could have engineered and issur.

But I also recently encountered while learning Arukh haShulchan something
that may be a counter-example.

There is a gezeiras hakasuv that there are no shevu'os when the dispute
is over qarqa. So, while modeh bemiqtzas (e.g.) about money or metaltelin
requires a shevu'ah deOraisa, if it is about real estate there is no
shevu'ah deOraisa.

However, Chazal still require the nitba to make a shevu'as heises in
order to retain his chazaqah on the land.



And on Tue, Oct 16, 2018 at 11:16:00AM -0400, R David Riceman replied to the
same post:
: It is in general true that the Torah allows multiple regimes, so that it
: is open to differing economic regulation (as you observe). On a technical
: level, however, I don't see how we could permit yefas toar if the Torah
: prohibited it, so that would reduce rather than increase our options.

I am sure the same was said before heter isqa. Chazal were a bunch of
rabbis capable of finding 49 ways to be metaher a sheretz. Our inability
to figure out how they would have created a law like eishes yefas to'ar
doesn't prove it impossible.

For that matter, the gemara apparently concludes that pruzbul was only
enacted because shemittah today is derabbanan. Although I think it's left
open whether pruzbul would not work when shemittah is deOraisa. Or
whether hefqer BD would meant it would work, but they question the
hava amina that Hillel would circumvent a deOraisa like that.

What kind of "you don't" the gemara is talking about would impact your
answer.

That said, I like RDR's "more important point". Repeated here, since it's
been nearly a month -- an eternity as list-time goes:

: But there's a more important point. What's weird about war is that
: it's not a permanent state. One has to make the transition between
: civilian/soldier/civilian, and very different rules apply in those
: different contexts (look again at H. Deos 6:1). When Hazal say "hasatan
: mekatreg b'shaas hamilhama" that's partly because the soldiers don't
: have years of experience internalizing the rules of war.

: But economic change (from Biblical small farmer to Hazal large estates to
: rishonim merchants) was generational, and it is much easier for a person
: to regulate his own YhR internally if his temptations are uniform over
: his lifetime.

: So it makes a lot of sense that k'nagged YhR is specifically mentioned
: in the context of milhama.

The reason why I said above I am only "almost satistfied" is that it
borders on explaining too much. We aren't looking only for a chiluq
between EYT and my sample dinim derabbanan. But also between deOraisa
and derabbanan.

You are left saying there is a whole set of dinim on a tightrope --
they are lifelong challenges and therefore controllable enough for HQBH
not to want to compromize for human nature, and yet history evolved
the situation to the point where they pose impossible challenges that
chazal needed to accomodate.

Well, not necessarily "impossible". At least: by Chazal's day these grew
into challenges that are so rarely met, the usual outcome is more costly
than the din -- such as the poor not being able to get a loan.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             When we are no longer able to change a situation
mi...@aishdas.org        -- just think of an incurable disease such as
http://www.aishdas.org   inoperable cancer -- we are challenged to change
Fax: (270) 514-1507      ourselves.      - Victor Frankl (MSfM)


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