Avodah Mailing List

Volume 33: Number 141

Sun, 08 Nov 2015

• 1. Re: What was the point of Avrahams tefilla/debate with Hashem about Sdom? (Micha Berger)
• 2. What was the point of Avrahams tefilla/debate with Hashem about Sdom? (Eli Turkel)
• 3. on gettting married (Eli Turkel)
• 4. Re: Lechem Mishne on Yom Kippur (Micha Berger)
• 5. Re: Shehecheyanu on Matza (Micha Berger)
• 6. Re: Ta'amai d'kra - why do we put tephillin on our weaker arm (Micha Berger)
• 7. Re: Lechem Mishne on Yom Kippur (Akiva Miller)
• 8. JP: What is Life? (Micha Berger)
• 9. Re: JP: What is Life? (Rabbi Alec Goldstein)
• 10. Re: JP: What is Life? (Chana Luntz)
• 11. Re: JP: What is Life? (Rabbi Alec Goldstein)
• 12. neutralized terrorist (Eli Turkel)

On Tue, Nov 03, 2015 at 09:41:57AM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote:
: I don't have a comprehensive model; as the Rivash said, "ani mitpalel
: leda`at zeh hatinok", I pray without models, just as I speak without
: formal rules of grammar.  Models are descriptive, not prescriptive, and
: therefore, while useful, they are not necessary...

I would say even further... Tefillah is inherently experiential.
Overanalysis may get you to know a lot /about/ tefillah, but it
creates a remove between the person and the experience itelf.

I think Rav Nachman's comments about theology are based on this point.

It's also why I prefer the dialog version of Mesilas Yesharim, even though
the Ramchal apparently rejected it in favor of the chapter version.
The dialog is between two old friends -- the protagonist, called the
chasid, who presents the ideas of MY and an old friend he encounters,
the chakham, who knows a lot of Torah, but at the beginning of the book
doesn't "get" the whole middos thing.

Personally, I need a reminder to stay on the topic of learning zehirus,
rather than learning what zehirus is. The structure of the original
format helps me that way.


On Tue, Nov 03, 2015 at 02:02:37PM +0200, Marty Bluke wrote:
: Lets look at Rashi and see how he explains things here. I would like to
: focus in on 2 Rashis, one at the beginning of the story and one at the end.

I think you are confusing comments describing the structure with those
descriubing the function.

Or are you thinking that Avraham was repeating the mistake of Bavel,
and actually waging war with G-d? The "war" isn't a real war, the defense
arrourney isn't a real attourney. But -- as you note -- he sure sounded
that way.

Obviously G-d does what's best, and not respond to whining human beings
to do anything but. And obviously he doesn't change His "Mind"; it's
a metaphor for doing something different now that He let us do our
little free-will thing.

I don't find your problems so compelling, but since you clearly do,
let me quote Sir Arthur Conan Doyle:

    How often have I said to you that when you have eliminated the
    impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?
                - Sherlock Holmes (The Sign of the Four, ch. 6)

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             When a king dies, his power ends,
mi...@aishdas.org        but when a prophet dies, his influence is just
http://www.aishdas.org   beginning.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                    - Soren Kierkegaard

> I understand all that, my problem is with Avraham making logical
> arguments to Hashem. To pay even beg for clemency is one thing, to try
> to persuade Hashem with logical arguments is a whole different ball game.

Why are you disturb by Avraham then Moshe's many prayers that make logical
arguments

-- 
Eli Turkel
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The Shulchan Aruch (Even Haezer 1) paskens that one must marry by the age
of 20. If he passes the age of 20 the bet bin forces him to get married so
that he will fulfill pru u-revu (ie he would get whipped a few times as an
encouragement to get married - better than speed dating)



Ramah adds that today we don't force on this or other things of getting
married.



Mordecai answers because the gemara at the end of Chezkat Habatim says that
after the churban it is best not to have children and the nation should
disappear. We allow marriage only because it is better that they be shogeg
and not mezid. The Mordecai concludes that true we don't prevent marriage
but certainly we should not force someone to get married.

-- 
Eli Turkel
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On Sun, Sep 27, 2015 at 12:44:05AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote:
: In the case where an ill person is eating on Yom Kippur, the Magen Avraham
: 618:10 brings varying views on whether he needs Lechem Mishne, whether he
: includes Yaaleh V'yavo in bentching, and whether he must make Kiddush...

: I'm focusing now specifically on Lechem Mishne, and I'm now ignoring
: Kiddush and Birkas Hamazon. Here are my questions of historical fact:
: During the years in the midbar, did the mon fall on Yom Kippur? Did a
: double portion of mon fall on Erev Yom Kippur? If not, then what did the
: children eat?

I found the Mekhilta. R' Eliezer haModa'i says that we learned that
mon did not fall on Shabbos. But how o we know it didn't fall on YT,
that it didn't fall on YK? ".... [uvayom hashevi'i] Shabbos lo yihyeh
bo..." (Shemos 16:26, darshened as a ribui)

The Maharam miRutenburg (shu"t hachadshos #170) says that based on this,
the people of Lotir had a minhag to use mishneh lekhem for the se'urah
on erev YK.

(The kingdom of Lotharingia was named after Eperor Lothair I or II. That
name evolved into the name of the French region of Lorrain. So I think
that's where he is talking about.)

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole
mi...@aishdas.org        heart, your entire soul, and all you own."
http://www.aishdas.org   Love is not two who look at each other,
Fax: (270) 514-1507      It is two who look in the same direction.

On Tue, Oct 20, 2015 at 10:17:43PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote:
: After writing the above, I found that Beur Halacha 641 "L'atzmo" does seem
: to hold that the Shehecheyanu is specifically on *building* the sukkah. He
: says that the Shehecheyanu "on the sukkah" applies only to one who built
: his *own* sukkah, and NOT to guests...

So, assuming this is so (since it's what I've assumed all along)...

: Here's another distinction between when we do or do not say Shehecheyanu:
: Mishne Brura 651:2 says that the sukkah gets a Shehecheyanu because it is
: made anew each year, in contrast to a shofar or megilla which lasts for
: many years, and also in contrast to Chanuka neros which are made each year
: but are not obviously so. I've always wondered why this logic wouldn't
: allow us to say Shehecheyanu when baking or preparing our Seder Matzos.

: R' Micha Berger wrote:
: > To my mind, this is where the assymetry resides. The pasuq
: > says "ushemartem es hamatzos", using the shoresh of
: > "shemirah" would mean it's a lav. So baking matzos doesn't
: > get a birkhas hamitzvah or a shehechiyanu, ...
: 
: If you're saying that "ushemartem es hamatzos" is purely negative, then Rav
: Shimon Eider explicitly disagrees...

Not negative in the sense of action vs inaction.  If it were, then
ushemartem es hamatzos wouldn't subsume the baking, and the symmetry
to building a sukkah would be complete.

It's a lav because the pasuq uses the shoresh /sh-m-r/, but that doesn't
rule out including necessary actions. And just as your quote from R'
Eider shows that it includes pro-actively guarding the matzos, it also
includes the baking. So the heksher mitzvah isn't "just" a hekhsher
mitzvah, it's also a lav.

Unlike building a sukkah.

Which would imply that we don't just omit a shehechiyanu on a lav
due to a lack of motive, there is an actual reason not to, one that
trumps including heksher mitzvah in the shehechiyanu.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Take time,
mi...@aishdas.org        be exact,
http://www.aishdas.org   unclutter the mind.
Fax: (270) 514-1507            - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm

On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 01:34:20PM -0400, M Cohen via Avodah wrote:
: why do we put tephillin on our weaker arm?
...
: But in terms of ta'amai mitzvos..

: assuming the head tephillin represents shibud of our head/brain to HKBH,
: and the arm tephillin represents shibud of our strength to HKBH
: then arm tephillin sbe on our stronger arm

Perhaps the point is to wrap your tefillin using your stronger arm, rather
than on it. This would fit the source derahsha, that the tefillin should
be wrapped by the same hand that is commanded to do the next mitzvah in
the chumash -- mezuzah.

To strengthen this idea a bit -- because I realize it needs strengthening
-- the mitzvah is only the tying, the tightening of the first loop. We
could take the optionality of the further wrapping in two opposite
directions:

1- We wrap around our arm so as to further express the ta'am hamitzvah,
which would lead to the position RMC assumes. Or

2- The wrapping is for an entirely different reason. Lehalakhah, we
are just putting a box on the arm, which need not feel like subjugating
it. Deprecating the significance this element because it's optional.

The hand being used to do the tying is doing avodas Hashem and therefore
should be the strong hand. Thus showing shibud, but in the same way as
nearly other mitzvah; being done with the stronger hand is not uniquely
tefillin.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             A person lives with himself for seventy years,
mi...@aishdas.org        and after it is all over, he still does not
http://www.aishdas.org   know himself.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter

I asked:

: During the years in the midbar, did the mon fall on Yom Kippur? Did a
: double portion of mon fall on Erev Yom Kippur? If not, then what did the
: children eat?

R' Micha Berger answered with a Mechilta that darshens Shmos 16:26, saying
that the mon did *not* fall on Yom Kippur. (I don't have a Mechilta, but
the Torah Temima on that pasuk very conveniently quotes it, adds some
explanation, and also gives a reference to Tosafos. Those who are
interested can look at the Tosfos on Beitzah 2b, V'hayah, which offers
differing ways to darshen that pasuk.)

At first, I thought this might leave my second question unanswered. But RMB
added:

> The Maharam miRutenburg (shu"t hachadshos #170) says that based on
> this, the people of Lotir had a minhag to use mishneh lekhem for the
> se'udah on erev YK.

It is hard for me to imagine using lechem mishne merely to commemorate the
lack of mon on YK. It must be that the people of Lotir had a tradition that
there *was* a double portion of mon on *Erev* Yom Kippur, presumably for
the children.

Akiva Miller
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R' Alec Goldstein,

You wrote in your opinion piece in The Jewish Press
<http://www.jewishpress.com/indepth/opinions/what-is-life/2015/11/06>:

> But, some will claim, perhaps Maimonides and Rabbi Feinstein are 
> wrong; perhaps Judaism views the fetus as something other than a human
> person.

The Igeros Moshe (CM 2:69.b) is in the minority on this position.

Now, after, I bothered writing the below, I see that Chana Luntz
translated the survey of sources from the Tzitz Eliezer vol 9 51:3. See
<http://lists.aishdas.org/htdig.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org/2013q3/072692.ht
ml>.

R' Unterman holds (Noam VI [1963], 1-11) that abortion is abazraihu
deretzicah, not actual retzichah. And perhapos in that family we could put
talmid reports that R SZ Aeurbach held it was a bitul asei of hatzalah,
or perhaps a violation of lo saamod -- or perhaps even theft (although
this third possibility isn't similar to the other not-quite-retzichah
but still killing-like answers). R' Aharon Lichtenstein -- vechai bahem.
RAL also discusses the Ran's shittah (Chullin 48a) that the issur is
derabbanan, a taqanah based on the ethics of retzichah.

The Chavos Ya'ir (siman 31, based on Nidda 13a) says it's
hashchasas zera. Related would be saying that abortion is a violation
of piryah verivyah (see Yevamos 63b), or destroying tzelem E-lokim
(Zohar, Shemos 3a, which is the portion in Choq, p' Shemos, Mon).

A third family of approaches is based on chavalah of the mother, see
Shemos 21:22. (Eg Tzafnas Pa'neiach 1:59)

R' Uzziel (Mishpetei Uziel vol 3 CM 46) suggests hashavas aveidah (!).

I personally do not understand the Tz"P or MU, since neither relate abortion
to the basic question of life, and yet it's included on the category
of retzichah for benei noach.

But in any case, you see how rare it is among acharonim to say that
abortion is actual retzichah, ie that a fetus is a human.

The Rambam himself is generally understood to hold that abortion is
NOT retzichah. This is why Rotzeiach 1:9 can distinguish between before
crowning and after as to whether we call the fetus or new-born whose
existence and birth threatens the mothers life a rotzeiach.

(CC: Avodah email list)

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             We are what we repeatedly do.
mi...@aishdas.org        Thus excellence is not an event,
http://www.aishdas.org   but a habit.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                   - Aristotle

On Fri, Nov 6, 2015 at 1:52 PM, Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote:
> The Igeros Moshe (CM 2:69.b) is in the minority on this position.

> Now, after, I bothered writing the below, I see that Chana Luntz
> translated the survey of sources from the Tzitz Eliezer vol 9 51:3. See
> <http://lists.aishdas.org/htdig.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org/2013q3
> /072692.html>.

> R' Unterman holds (Noam VI [1963], 1-11) that abortion is abazraihu
...

Hi Rav Berger,

Thank you for reading and writing.

I am not a Posek and I make no claims to be. The article was not primarily
intended as a halakhic piece, and indeed quoting the Rambam, Shulchan
Aruch, and Rav Moshe occupied only a small part of the article; and I
linked to two different articles with differing opinions about whether
abortion is biblical or rabbinic.

Personally I read that Rambam as suggesting abortion is a form of murder,
because the concept of *rodef* only applies to people, and the Rambam
applies it the case of the fetus. I am aware not everybody reads the Rambam
that way, but again, I am no Posek.

What are the implications of having Rav Moshe be in the minority? If we
reject Rav Moshe, we still are forced to admit it's prohibited, either
under the biblical *issur* or *chavalah* (or something similar), or it is
prohibited by dint of a rabbinic commandment.

We are rabbinic Jews. Even if abortion is a rabbinic prohibition, we do not
set aside rabbinic legislation unless there is a compelling reason to do
so.  The *halakhah *dictates that we must honor the status of the fetus as
a human or at least as human-like, and that was my main point. At the risk
of quoting myself, I would emphasize that my main point was:

"Are the pro-choicers, even if they reject science and religion, willing to
grant that the fetus has any protected status at all, or will they continue
to strip the fetus of any shred of human dignity it possesses? A society is
judged, after all, by how it regards it weakest members."

In other words, the article was more societal rather than halakhic. Thank
you for sending the additional sources and I will look them over after
Shabbos.

All the best,
Alec

R' Alex Goldstein writes:
> What are the implications of having Rav Moshe be in the minority? If
> we reject Rav Moshe, we still are forced to admit it's prohibited,
> either under the biblical issur or chavalah (or something similar),
> or it is prohibited by dint of a rabbinic commandment.

> We are rabbinic Jews. Even if abortion is a rabbinic prohibition, we do
> not set aside rabbinic legislation unless there is a compelling reason
> to do so. The halakhah dictates that we must honor the status of the
> fetus as a human or at least as human-like, and that was my main point.

Well not so clearly, if you take the view it is the limb of the mother,
then it is not regarded as human like, the prohibition is, as you say
chavala -- we would not say my leg was human like.

Part of the problem is that as an American you are enmeshed in the
American debate, and which is framed in terms of pro-choice/pro-life.
Here in England the debate has been framed differently (although there
is now some seepage over the Atlantic, as there are in other things --
there always a handful of trick or treater's now that appear on one's
doorstep on Halloween).

In England the debate has traditionally been framed in terms of the
welfare of the mother. In order to get an abortion, a woman needs two
doctors to sign off that it is in her best interest. That in effect
means that abortion is virtually on demand, because for a doctor, it
is virtually a no brainer that carrying a pregnancy to full term is
not in the medical interest of the mother. I am sure the statistics
are much better these days regarding maternal deaths than they used
to be -- but the old figures were something like -- have an abortion --
2% rate of death, carry to full term -- 9% rate of death. If a woman
is pregnant and come and asks you for a procedure that involves a 2%
rate of death, and not doing it carries the risk of a 9% rate of death,
there can be no medical question. Of course, even abortion carries
medical risk -- which is why contraception is free on the NHS -- even
for women who normally have to pay for medication (eg are not below 18,
on benefits, etc). The medical risk of pregnancy for a woman is regarded
as too great unless the woman chooses to put herself into a high medical
risk category. And that is true even though deaths from childbirth have
come down -- they have only come down because of the active intervention
of the medical system. (And, as you might suspect,women who do not
look after themselves in pregnancy have a greater risk of complications
at birth -- and women who do not want the baby are less likely to look
after themselves in pregnancy, so indeed the medical risks are higher for
somebody who is asking for an abortion). If you want some idea of what
the statistics of maternal death would be without medical intervention
-- find out how many of your women friends who have had children have
had non elective caesareans (almost certain maternal death) or heavy
bleeding after giving birth (very high risk of maternal death) -- even
if no blood transfusion was needed.

If you understand a fetus as being a limb of the mother, then the
medical justification for abortion if a woman does not want to go
through the risks of childbirth becomes almost automatic. As rabbinic
Jews it is hard to see how one can, rabbinically, demand that somebody
put themselves into a situation of high risk of medical intervention or
death for a rabbinic mitzvah (indeed, according to the Meshech Chochma,
that is the reason women are exempt from pru u'rvu in the first place
-- because the Torah does not demand that people put their life on the
line for one of its mitzvos -- darchei darchei noam). It is only if you
hold that in fact the fetus is a life, that you get into the question
of weighing her life against its -- and possibly insisting that she go
forward with a highly dangerous procedure for its sake.

At the risk of quoting myself, I would emphasize that my main point was:

"Are the pro-choicers, even if they reject science and religion, willing
to grant that the fetus has any protected status at all, or will they
continue to strip the fetus of any shred of human dignity it possesses? A
society is judged, after all, by how it regards it weakest members."

Now the best way to ask this question is to frame it in the theoretical
(but we may not be that far off this). When the medical system develops
the ability to produce test tube babies all the way to term, without
needing a human womb, what sort of status do or should those foetuses
have? Should they have any protective status as life? At this point of
course there is no more question of interference with any rights of the
mother -- so what are these entities? Is it manslaughter if you were to
switch off the machine growing them? At what point? Are they required
to be given a halachic burial? At what point? Are they metamei b'ohel
(ie can a cohen visit if there might be some dead ones in the building)?
Do we have to keep the male cohanic ones separate due to risk that the
other ones might die?

Regards
Chana

On Sun, Nov 8, 2015 at 6:37 AM, Chana Luntz <Ch...@kolsassoon.org.uk> wrote:
...
> If you understand a fetus as being a limb of the mother, then the medical
> justification for abortion if a woman does not want to go through the risks
> of childbirth becomes almost automatic.  As rabbinic Jews it is hard to see
> how one can, rabbinically, demand that somebody put themselves into a
> situation of high risk of medical intervention or death for a rabbinic
> mitzvah (indeed, according to the Meshech Chochma, that is the reason women
> are exempt from pru u'rvu in the first place -- because the Torah does not
> demand that people put their life on the line for one of its mitzvos -- 
> darchei darchei noam).  It is only if you hold that in fact the fetus is a
> life, that you get into the question of weighing her life against its -- and
> possibly insisting that she go forward with a highly dangerous procedure
> for its sake.
...

Hi Chana,

Thanks for the email.

I am in no way saying that the mother's life should be jeopardized,
either within *halakhah* or public policy. I hope I made that clear. If
not, I repeat it here. My issue was the "abortion on demand" culture,
which does not view abortion as a moral evil.

I do not accept that viewing abortion as *chavalah* means a woman who does
not want to go through the risks of childbirth has a right to an abortion;
unless of course the doctor's say she has a high risk pregnancy. There is
an an *issur* *chavalah*, and you are not even permitted to be *chovel*
yourself. Thank God we have the science to reduce the risks of childbirth.

A human leg is clearly human-like, because it is a human body
part. However a human leg could under no circumstances survive on its
own, so it's not fully human. However a fetus clearly can survive on its
own because one minute it's in utero, and then it's in the world. (The
fact that the infant requires the parents to feed it doesn't mean it's
not human.)

I am not familiar with the British perspective on the debate. However
as you describe it, it seems to be the exact problem I'm describing:
make the concerns of the mother the sole question, and the fetus doesn't
get a vote, so to speak.

I spoke to a friend of mine over Shabbos who says the Rambam his
often understood to say abortion is murder. The point is, we sometimes
disregard the opinions that deny us the wiggle room we desire precisely
because they deny that wiggle room. We must contend with the opinions
of the Rambam, Shulchan Aruch, and Rav Moshe to have an intellectually
honest halakhic discussion. But again my point was more philosophical
and societal than halakhic.

You may find it interesting that I've found some pro-choice ethicists
who accept that the fetus is life, but they refer to it as a type of
"justifiable homicide." (See, e.g., Robert P. George, *The Clash of
Orthodoxies* p. 67, quoting such a position, though George himself
opposes abortion.)

As for the *halakhah* of test tube babies - that's way too theoretical for
me. That's territory for a Posek.

Best,
Alec

There was an article by R Reem Hachohen (RY Othniel) on whether one has to
try and first main a terrorist (matzil be-echad me-evorov).

In the end of the article he mentions the question of a neutralized
terrorist. He also assume sthat mainly the laws of war apply. However he
the notes that the Netziv (Haamek Sheelah) followed by R Ariel pasken that
a war is conducted by a government and not individuals and as such the
halacha would follow the government directives

--------------------------
For the original question of matzil be-echad me-evorov he brings 3
considerations
1) Rodef - Mishne leMelech holds that matzil be-echad me-evorov applies
only to a 3rd party but not to the person being pursued. For the persued
the halacha is "Ha-ba le-horgecha hashkem le-horgo"

2) Ba Be-machteret different from rodef in that killing the rodef is a
mitzva while ba Be-macheteret is "reshut", also Shvut Yaakov claims that
there is no halacha of matzil be-echad me-evorov even for a third party.
However Chavot Yair disagrees.

3) Dinei Milchama - Knesset ha-gedola states that during war all of the
enemy has a din of rodef however the halacha
of matzil be-echad me-evorov doesnt apply since eveyone is considered
directly affected and not a third party

As stated before within dinei michama government rules are binding

-- 
Eli Turkel
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