Avodah Mailing List

Volume 32: Number 14

Sun, 26 Jan 2014

• 1. Re: Chief Rabbinate Says No To Religious Women in the IDF/ Sotah 8:6 (Zev Sero)
• 2. Re: Women wearing Tefillin (Kenneth Miller)
• 3. Re: Chief Rabbinate Says No To Religious Women in the IDF/ Sotah 8:6 (Micha Berger)
• 4. Fwd: Mishpatim and the Exterminator (Micha Berger)
• 5. talmudic treatments (saul newman)
• 6. shoftim (Eli Turkel)
• 7. How We Should View Money (Prof. Levine)

On 23/01/2014 5:30 PM, Chana Luntz wrote:
> Radvaz [...]  [or alternatively] it is possible that with a milechemes
> mitzvah the women are preparers of water and food for their husbands
> and so is the custom today amongst the Arabs.
>
> Now the second suggestion of the Radvaz would seem something of a half way
> house.  In modern terms he seems to be saying, women should go to the army
> in a milchemes mitzvah situation, just they should be the cooks and the
> cleaners and do the jobs that enable more men to be in the front  line units.

The Radvaz goes out of his way to specify that they supply their husbands.
This implies that they do not supply the general army, but only their
husbands.  Presumably they travel with their husbands and keep tent for
them in camp.


> It is interesting though that he quotes "kol kavuda" and not, as RZS
> later refers to Nazir 59a

It is indeed interesting, and I think it shows that he didn't even contemplate
that they would actually fight.  That's not conceivable to him, even as a hava
amina, so he doesn't feel the need to refute it.  Rather, he understands the
plain meaning of the Mishna and Rambam to be as you suggest *he* says, that
the women join the army in non-combat roles, supporting the combat soldiers.
And *that* is what he has a problem with.  Thus his objection is not from
"kli gever", but from "kol kevudah".  And his two resolutions are either to
"kalah mechupasah" literally, that she leaves her chupah and goes home, and
plays no role in the war at all, or else that she accompanies her chosson and
stays inside his tent, *rather* than "supplying water and food" for the general
soldiery.


> (although for some reason, only to Rashi, not the main text,

I referred to Rashi because the topic at that point was *not* whether women
should go to war, but RTK's quote from the Targum about Yael.  That quote
had been challenged, so I verified that it is indeed there, and that it's
also in Rashi in Nazir.  That bit is not in the gemara.


> One should not witness [tedah] a woman with the witnessings  [edei] of a man
> [...] and one should not witness  a man with the witnessings of a woman

Mistranslation alert.  The word used here means to wear; it has nothing to do
with the word for witness.  I'm sure you knew that, and were just translating
on autopilot.


> [quoting ROY]
> [And so I found just now that HaGaon Rabbi Moshe Feinstein in Shut Iggeros
> Moshe Kruch 6  (Chelek Yoreh Deah siman 75) allows to permit according to
> his words.]

First, for anyone who wants to look it up inside, it's actually in siman 75
of the OC section of that volume, not siman 75 of the YD section.
Second, RMF there actually *rejects* the suggestion that according to the
Bach and Taz this would be permitted.  He says that the issur on weapons is
not the same as other male clothing, and actually works in the opposite way.
He ends up permitting women travelling in dangerous areas to carry guns because
of the necessity, not because of the Bach. He distinguishes this situation
both from going to war, and from carrying weapons in safe areas, both of which
are forbidden for women.

(He also rejects out of hand the idea that women should refrain from travelling
in such areas, so as not to have to carry weapons for their protection.  As for
the idea that women should only travel with male companions to protect them, he
says that even if there is an armed man in the car the women should still be
armed, in case there are multiple attackers.)


> ...And that which Ya'el did not kill Sisera with the sword, because
> Sisera was tired and sleepy, and it was possible to kill him easily
> by way of a tent peg, but when the time is pressing and it is
> necessary to act quickly, like when the terrorists come with weapons
> .. for sure it is necessary to hurry to precede them with a gun and
> similar to it?

RMF points out that for the sake of saving the nation Yael had just
committed adultery seven times, so it seems absurd that she should suddenly
have worried about this far lesser prohibition!  The answer is obvious:
when Sisera was awake and dangerous, Yael had to subdue him by any means
available; once he was asleep the danger was over, so she was forbidden
to use a weapon when a tent peg would do.


>> That's completely different.  "Mikerev achecha" can be waived if
>> necessary, and presumably so can "melech velo malka",...

> So can eidus and dayanos, if both parties accept eg a certain karov
> as an eid as per [Mishna Sanhedrin 3:2] ?ne?eman alai aba..?.

Again that's completely different.  A woman *cannot* be a dayan.  Ever.  But
in a civil case the litigants can agree between them not to bring their case
to a qualified dayan, but to resolve their dispute in some other way, whether
by going to a non-dayan, or by playing a hand of poker, or by tossing a coin.
By agreeing to go to a woman they are not making her a dayan, they are
removing their case from the need for dayonus.  Having authority over others,
though, by definition makes one a "melech", and appointing a ger or a woman
as a melech is forbidden.  Consent isn't enough to waive that issur.  But
clearly there are circumstances that do allow it to be waived.

The point I'm making here is that there is a fundamental distinction
between an issur, which can be waived for an important enough reason,
and a psul, which can't.  If something is assur, we can deal with the
issur.  If something is impossible then it's impossible, and no reason
can be good enough to make it possible.   A woman or a ger as a "melech"
is not impossible, it's just assur.  A ger as a dayan, same story;
perfectly possible, just not allowed.  A woman as a dayan, though,
isn't assur, it's impossible.   So when we find that Devorah and Yael
were shoftos we can't just say the issur was waived, we must look for
other explanations.


-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

R' Micha Berger wrote:

> Again, "dekivan tetifilin tzarikh zehirus yeseirah guf naqi". Also
> Shabbos 39a, "tefilin tzerichin guf naqi keElisha ba'al kneafayim",
> and Y-mi sham. Which (skipping ahead a little), Michal bas Shaul
> could. And, like the Rama, but since men are mechuyavim, we wear
> tefillin anyway. But for the minimum of Shema and Tefillah, just as
> women should wear it for their minimum, zero.

Two thoughts: First, I can't help but wonder if there might be some poskim
who hold that nowadays, in our society, all women are like Michal bas Shaul
in this regard. It's my understanding that modern standards of cleanliness
is part of why so many people don't bother with mayim acharonim, and
perhaps the ideas can be connected.

Second, is it really true that - because of this guf naki problem - men
wear tefillin only for the minimum requirement? It seems to ne that men
actually go noticeably beyond the requirement. Are we really REQUIRED to
wear tefillin for *Birchos* Krias Shema and Shemoneh Esreh? Are we really
required to wear tefillin for Pesukei D'Zimra and Tachanun? What about
Birchos Hashachar and Aleinu?

And if you find a way to explain that those are indeed requirements, then
what of Mishne Berurah 37:7, who writes: "Anshei maaseh have the minhag to
learn after davening, in tefillin." Why is it praiseworthy for a man to
wear his tefillin even when it is clearly not required, but if a woman were
to do such a thing, mochin b'yadan?

(Disclaimer #1: My post should not be seen as recommending or advocating
that women SHOULD wear tefillin. I just don't understand why they're told
specifically NOT to.)

(Disclaimer #2: I must confess that at many times in my life I have used
the exact same argument that R' Micha has used in the quoted portion. But I
am coming to realize that it is, at best, a gross oversimplification, and I
seek the chevra's help in understanding the nuances better.)

Akiva Miller
____________________________________________________________
New Policy in Virginia
"Loophole" qualifies safe drivers for up to 50% off car insurance...
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3131/52e1e311724d363117639st01vuc

RJJB did us the favor of collecting the 2002 version of our discussion
into a single web page. http://www.panix.com/~jjbaker/ladun.txt

:-)BBii!
-Micha

------------------------------------------------------------------------


From: "Jonathan Baker" <jjba...@panix.com>
Subject: Isha Psulah Ladun

Josh Backon and I, on another forum (SCJM), have been having an argument,
and we thought we'd pass it along to the chevre and see what comes up.

Pardon the length: Josh wanted to be sure that his sources were cited,
as well as my counterarguments.

--


become a rabbi. S-- challenged him to prove that women can't be rabbis.
Josh chimed in with

>See: Yoreh Deah 242:14 in Shach, Birkei Yosef and Pitchei Tshuva for
>definition of semicha today. Also: Bet Yosef TUR Choshen Mishpat 25.

>As for women getting semicha: see Choshen Mishpat 7:7. They are ineligible
>(isha pesula la'dun) [see also Rambam Hilchot Melachim in the first perek]
>See also Rishonim on the gemara in Yevamot 45b.

I countered with Pitchei Teshuva CM 7 s"k 5, which says micol maqom
isha chachamah yecholah lehorot horaah (which is the definition of
modern smicha, according to the aforementioned SA YD 242:14 in Rema),
based on the Tosfos on Devorah.

Josh responded:
>The Tosfot there is "al pi ha'dibbur haya"; thus you can NOT use this
>incident to understand that women can be rabbis.

So we started trying to figure out exactly what Tosfos says. There are
about half a dozen relevant Tosfos on Devorah and women as dayanot.

S-- brought the Minchat Chinuch end of positive mitzva 83, which says
that women can be judges in a zabla if the litigants accept them, and
registered his annoyance with Josh for listing a bunch of sources that
don't seem particularly relevant to the issue at hand.

Josh then tried to shlug up the P.T., claiming that it was addressed
to a particular woman, to judge on a one-shot basis. I said that micol
maqom looked like a general heter, especially as a comment on a code.

Josh again:
>To follow up my prior posting: see Shulchan Aruch YOREH DEAH 127:3
>re: "ne'emanut" (reliability?) for "issur v'heter" (e.g. kashrut).
>Look in the Rema, Shach {EIN ha'nashim ne'emanot b'issur d'oraita].
>See also: Kreiti s"k 19; Yad Efraim YD 94:2; Nachalat Tzvi 42:3.
>Also: Tosfot Pesachim 4b d"h heimnuhu; ROSH Pesachim Perek Alef Siman 3;
>(and RAN there).

>Not only can they NOT get Yoreh Yoreh smicha; they don't even have
> ne'emanut on issurei d'oraita!

To which I responded, without looking up the sources, that that's
ridiculous, or else none of us could eat anything our wives/mothers
cooked, or could have relations with our wives based on their eidut about
having gone to the mikva. Basically, he had proven the sheretz tahor --
nice theory, but runs up against the wall of halachic reality.

By this time, we're getting pretty frustrated at the other's opacity.

Micha, in the meantime, tried a linguistic argument about Devorah from
shofeit vs. dayan, saying that shofeit meant war-leader while dayan meant
judge. I countered that this was post hoc ergo propter hoc, because dayan
qua judge doesn't show up until I Sam 24:16, so you can't argue that
because dayan existed later, it also existed earlier. We stalemated on
this one, I think, esp. since the Targum on Devorah translates shofeit as
dayna for her, while earlier in the book it translates shofeit as nagid.

[Micha's 2 cents: I said that shofeit could be used here strictly in
the sense of war-leader. Not that it's the primary meaning, but in a
discussion of the era of the Shofetim an obvious secondary meaning could
be intended. As she (among other shofetim) was not eim beis din (see
the Rambam's list), it would seem that the word "shofeit" in this
discussion should not be given the naive usage.

[I also suggested a different idea: perhaps a woman can't be a rav, but
could be a soferes in the sense of "divrei soferim" -- a navi + rav. In
fact, this could be the intent of the rishonim rather than her rule
being a nevi'ah's hora'as sha'ah. -mi]

Josh then tried to argue from Hil. Melachim 1:5 melech velo malka that
the ban on women having serarah barred them from being rabbis/ judges.
I countered that not everyone reads melech velo malka broadly; e.g. RJD
Bleich's article on Women on Synagogue Boards -- he reads it broadly,
but cites others who don't, and there are plenty of shuls with women on
the board.

Back on the issue of Devorah as judge, Josh:
>Look in the gemara in Megillah 14a, in Rashi there and in the GRA on
>Seder Olam.... [later] that gemara lists the shoftim.

In that Gemara -- nothing useful, a list of neviot, not dayanim/shoftim.
Nobody argues that Devorah wasn't a neviah.

--



This is where it starts to get interesting.

Here are a list of Tosfos: B"K 15a s.v. Asher; Yeb 45b s.v. Mi; Nidah
50a s.v. Col; Gittin 88b s.v. Velo; Shevuot 29b s.v. Shevuot;

One after another, Josh would raise "See the gemara in X place", and
each time I would look and tell him either "that's talking about eidut,
not dayanut" or he would say "see where it says isha psula ladun",
and I would say, "that's Tosfos saying it, not the gemara."

Tosfos based his opinion on a gemara in the Yerushalmi Yoma 32a, which
does indeed say that a woman cannot judge, based on a gezera shava between
"shnei anashim" and another "shnei." One might think that's dispositive.
But, if one reads on in the Yerushalmi, the gemara shlugs up the gezera
shava, hooking the other side to another halacha elsewhere, and leaving
this verse to prove (as in Shevuot 30a) that the witnesses and/or the
litigants (each pair) must both be standing up in court. So Tosfos bases
his ruling on a REJECTED DRASHA. Not a strong reed on which to balance
a major halacha.

The final straw that convinced Josh that there's something strange going
on here, was the Tosfos in Shevuot 29b

Here's my post:

Me Josh
:>Let's start from scratch: check the Tosfot in Shevuot 29b d"h "shevuot

:Yes, let's. That tosfos brings the alleged inference from the verse
:of "shnei anashim" which comes from the next page (30a), but that's
:talking about eidut, and the oath of eidut -- since women can't be
:witnesses, they don't take the oath of witnesses.

:>ha'edut". Only one who is a kosher witness can be a judge; since a woman
:>isn't a kosher witness, she can't be a judge. The Tosfot there brings
:>down all the relevant sources.

:So he then tries to infer it from eidut, and then brings that Yerushalmi
:again as support for his inference GLOSSING OVER THE FACT THAT THE GEMARA
:IN YOMA REJECTS THE GEZERA SHAVA THAT HE NEEDS TO MAKE THE PROOF!

:Then he brings Kiddushin 35a, which seems to disprove him, by saying
:"all are kosher to judge", but he comes back with Gittin 88b, which
:disqualifies batei din of nonjews and/or laymen, and then waves his
:hands a bit as if to say that this should also exclude women, but has
:to admit that women and men can both be litigants.

:Another weak Tosfos, that depends on handwaving.

:The closest he came was the citation of Niddah 49b/50a, which doesn't make
:for a valid inference (All witnesses can judge; No woman can witness;
:No woman can judge), except that he doesn't make the inference explicitly.
:Rather, he makes the inference, and then bases it on the weak Yerushalmi
:in Yoma, thereby shooting himself in the foot.

:In Aristotelian terms:

:All W are J,   No I is W   -->   No I is J;
:where I: isha -- woman W: kosher Witness J: kosher Judge

:which doesn't rule out the possibility of the statement "Some I are J,
:even if they aren't W" That would be, in First Figure, an A E E form,
:and there is no valid mood that fits those requirements. (P.V. Spade,
:Thoughts Words and Things, www.pvspade.com)

:So the inference doesn't work, and the support from Yoma is weak at
:best. And then he bases all the other Tosfos (B"K, Niddah, etc.)
:on this chain of "logic."

--
:>In Perek haCholetz 45b "isha eina re'uyah ladun".

:That's in TOSFOS for the third or fourth time, not in the GEMARA.

:>There seems to be a Yerushalmi in the 3rd Perek in Sanhedrin
:>and one in Yoma.

:I was referring to the one in Yoma 32a, which, while it does say what
:Tosfos brings, it also REJECTS that gezera shava. So how can Tosfos
:use it as a binding Amoraic precedent?

:>The Tosfot in Shevuot 20b d"h "shevuat ha'edut" quotes a gemara in
:>Kiddushin 35a (which I haven't checked up).

:Which again I don't see as relevant to this issue. That page talks
:about mitzvot asei shehazman grama, and whether or not women are
:equally bound with men as to civil law -- which they are.

--



:I must say I feel odd to be arguing this side of the question of women
:as judges. I've always taken for granted the Rav's statement that
:women shouldn't feel bad that they can't be witnesses or judges, since
:neither can the kohen gadol or the king. But now that I'm looking into
:it, it's not comparable at all, since the kohen gadol and the king are
:exempted from witnessing/judging by the Mishna, while women are exempted
:from witnessing by the Gemara (and possibly the Mishna), and exempted
:from judging only by Tosfos, and only by very weak logic in Tosfos.

:Which leads me to wonder -- what in Tosfos' milieu caused him to rule
:against counting women in communal roles? He's also the first to rule
:against counting women in a minyan for prayer (not counting in a minyan
:for benching comes from the mishna/gemara).

After this, Josh acknowledged my point -- that apparently Tosfos is
the first source to rule that women cannot be judges, and does so in
a very weak way. He suggested that we pass the issue along to Avodah:
is there an earlier source than Tosfos that passuls women from dayanut
(NOT eidut; that they are pasul l'eidut is well-established)? Is there a
stronger proof than rejected gemaras, invalid inferences, and handwaving?

Josh's commission:
>Ask if there is a DIRECT source (isha pesula ladun) BEFORE Tosfot. And ask
>if the Mei Menuchot or Shita Mikubetzet (or Shaagat Aryeh or Pnei
>Yehoshua) shver these Tosfot!!

He also notes that AhS derives the psul ladun from serarah, rather than
from eidut, which is at least a plausible derivation, if not really sup-
ported directly from any of the sources. I note that Rambam in Hil.
 Sanhedrin 2:1 where he lays out the requirements for judges does not
explicitly bar women from judging. He does say at one point "anashim
chachamim venevonim", but even that is marked as his chiddush by the
Ridvaz, who quotes the gemara as "baalei chochma..." -- i.e., genderless.

So we throw it to you: is isha psula ladun Tosfos' chidush, or is there
a real source/drasha/mesorah from which he gets it?

=====

Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2002 12:50:12 -0500
From: "Gil Student" <gil_stud...@hotmail.com>
Subject: Re: Isha Psulah Ladun

Jonathan Baker wrote:
>Tosfos based his opinion on a gemara in the Yerushalmi Yoma 32a...
>But, if one reads on in the Yerushalmi, the gemara shlugs up the gezera
>shava, hooking the other side to another halacha elsewhere, and leaving
>this verse to prove (as in Shevuot 30a) that the witnesses and/or the
>litigants (each pair) must both be standing up in court. So Tosfos
>bases his ruling on a REJECTED DRASHA. Not a strong reed on which to
>balance a major halacha.

I'm not so sure the Yerushalmi rejected the drasha. It looks to
me like the Yerushalmi darshens the word "ve'amdu" to prove that the
witnesses/litigants must be standing. The gezera shava seems to stand.
Admittedly, I have only looked at the text and not mefarshim. Perhaps
they understood it differently.

Also, FWIW, IIRC R. Saul Lieberman used the rationale of isha pesulah
ladun in his teshuvah on ordaining women. He said that while semicha is
not dayanus, for it to have any serious meaning we should treat it with
the same weight. Or something like that. The teshuvah was published by
UTJ in Tomeich Kahalachah vol. 1. They included a photocopy of RSL's
handwritten teshuvah so no one could deny that he wrote it. It can be
found in the YU library.

=====

Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2002 13:41:33 -0500 (EST)
From: "Jonathan Baker" <jjba...@panix.com>
Subject: Isha Psulah Ladun

I had written:
> :The closest he came was the citation of Niddah 49b/50a, which doesn't make
> :for a valid inference (All witnesses can judge; No woman can witness;
> :No woman can judge), except that he doesn't make the inference explicitly.
> :Rather, he makes the inference, and then bases it on the weak Yerushalmi
> :in Yoma, thereby shooting himself in the foot.

> :In Aristotelian terms:

> :All W are J,   No I is W   -->   No I is J;
> :where I: isha -- woman W: kosher Witness J: kosher Judge

WHOOPS!  I misread the mishnah, read it backwards.  That
should read All J are W, (which can also be read as "All -W are -J")
so All I is -W   +   All -W are -J   ->   ALL I are -J.

So the inference works.

Which leaves me wondering: why bring in the Yerushalmi? Is it just an
asmachta? Do we learn from klalim (I thought we didn't) in the mishna?
Where does the clal itself come from (all who are cosher to judge are
cosher to witness, but some who are cosher to witness are not cosher
to judge) - the Gemara doesn't say, but only addresses the issue of a
suma as an example of the latter. And Why Is Tosfos The First To Make
This Explicit? Is there some connection with the myth that "rashi's
daughters laid tefillin" - who would have been the mothers of the Tosfos.

=====

Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2002 16:29:32 +0000
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Subject: Re: Isha Psulah Ladun

Since that exchange on scjm, I recieved a personal email that lends
support to both of my (mutual exclusive) suggestions about the role
of Devorah. As the author hasn't chosen to share it with the cherah,
here's the part that is relevent to my earlier post.

I proposed two possibilities to scjm, as I inserted into RJJB's summary:

1- That she was a "soferet" (as in "divrei soferim") not a
"rabbanit". That Tosafos were not necessarily proposing that her rule
was a hora'as sha'ah, but rather that because she was a nevi'ah she is
different in kind than a rav.

This seems to be shitas Rashi in Avos 1:1, who considers Devorah amongst
the Zeqeinim listed there.

2- That the word "shofeit" was meant for its 2ndary meaning. IOW, that
she was a wartime ruler, and not necessareily a judge.

The Rashba on Shevu'os (pereq 4) writes "delo shofetes mamash, elah
minaheges keshofetim shashafetu es Yisrael".

In any case, it's clear from the rishonim (and not "only" Tosafos) that
the notion of a shofetes poses a halachic problem that needs addressing.
It's not a usable precedent.

Nor to I understand RJJB's line of argument that there is no source
predating Tosafos. As though that gives us permision to hold against
the one (group of) rishon(im) who does come out with a pesaq? Perhaps
their silence is merely because no one asked the question.

=====

Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2002 22:58:18 +0000
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Subject: Re: Isha psulah ladun

On Wed, Feb 06, 2002 at 05:29:12PM -0500, Jonathan Baker wrote:
:> 1- That she was a "soferet" (as in "divrei soferim") not a
:> "rabbanit". That Tosafos were not necessarily proposing that her rule
:> was a hora'as sha'ah, but rather that because she was a nevi'ah she is
:> different in kind than a rav.

:> This seems to be shitas Rashi in Avos 1:1, who considers Devorah amongst
:> the Zeqeinim listed there.

: I don't see that at all.  Rashi does not say she is different than any other
: shofet.  And if Yiftach was the final halachic authority (Yiftach bedoro
: k'Moshe bedoro), then so was Devorah in the same sense - that's what I
: get from that Rashi.

Ein hachi nami. They all were final halachic authorities, but qua
zeqeinim. I'm suggesting that the zeqeinim, being nevi'im (a feature
Rashi mentions), are soferim not rabbanim.

This would make Devorah an example of a soferes, not a rabbanit. Which
is the peshat I'm suggesting for Tosafos: that her access to devar H'
made the class she belonged to different in kind than the semichah that
is closed to women.

:> 2- That the word "shofeit" was meant for its 2ndary meaning. IOW, that
:> she was a wartime ruler, and not necessareily a judge.

:> The Rashba on Shevu'os (pereq 4) writes "delo shofetes mamash, elah
:> minaheges keshofetim shashafetu es Yisrael".

: What do any of these sources say to the Targum's translation of "shofetet"
: as "dayna", contra the translation of "shofet" as "negid" in Perek 2?
: You still haven't answered this...

The burden isn't on me, but on the Rashba -- who explicitly says
otherwise from the Targum. I therefore assumed some answer existed
without bothering to find one. (Yet.)

Note the Rashba is a Sepharadi contemporary (1235-1310ce) of the Baalei
Tosafos. The pesaq was widespread by the time of its first report.

======

Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2002 20:12:48 EST
From: RabbiRichWol...@aol.com
Subject: Re: minhag and bet din

In a message dated 2/5/02 3:53:39pm EST, Eli.Tur...@colorado.edu writes:
> As an aside is it obvious that the present day minhag of 2 days of yomtov
> outside of israel was instituted by a Sanhedrin hagadol.
> Source?

> The gemara in
> Beitzah says just they sent from EY without any indication who
> sent. Was there still a Sanhedrin in their days?

> More generally does Beis Din ha'gadol require lishkat haGazit or just
> many people with semicha which is probably the status of the sanhedrin
> in the days of the Amoraim.

Moreover the enitre Raison d'etre diappeared when a fixed calendar
was instituted

Tangentially, any place that was "makom hamagi'in" was not subject
to YTsG.
Which means sevearl things:

1) Today even in neighboring areas YTsG might not apply if shluchin
could have made it on time (except of course RH itself!)

2) With today's communcations, it is pashut to say that the entire
world is makom she'magi'in EVEN if we went back to kiddush hachodesh al
pi r'iyah! So YTsG is truly obsolete memah nafshach - except or course
RH itself which would not afford use of modern communications on YT.

The ikkar reason today is Minhag Avoseinu Beyadeinu.


Tangentially I have suggested in other posts that the ORIGINAL Takkanah
of Hanukkah was botel at the time of the Hurban, but it was re-instituted
later.
It probably was Observed all along, but the era of the Mishnah came after
the original Takkanah was over and before the re-confirmation of the TB
in Shabbos.

IOW, it is possible that the original Takkanah of YTsG WAS Sanhedric at
one time but is kept in motion NOW due to a combination of Inertia and its
ratification by TB stating somthing like "Minhag Avoseichem Biydeichem."

=====

Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2002 00:47:38 EST
From: RabbiRichWol...@aol.com
Subject: Re: Isha Psulah Ladun

In a message dated 2/5/02 3:52:33pm EST, mi...@aishdas.org writes:
> In any case, it's clear from the rishonim (and not "only" Tosafos) that
> the notion of a shofetes poses a halachic problem that needs addressing.
> It's not a usable precedent.

See the AhS re: using Michal as a precdent for women wearing Tefillin...
IIRC Orach Chaim Siman 37

AhS presumption: exceptions MAY be made for exceptional women

Im kein the fact that Devorah was a Nvi'ah would indicate that she was
bechezkas "exceptional"....

=====

Date: Sun, 10 Feb 2002 20:07:14 +0000
From: Chana Luntz <Ch...@KolSassoon.net>
Subject: Re: Isha psulah ladun

Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> writes
>:> The Rashba on Shevu'os (pereq 4) writes "delo shofetes mamash, elah
>:> minaheges keshofetim shashafetu es Yisrael".
>
>: What do any of these sources say to the Targum's translation of "shofetet"
>: as "dayna", contra the translation of "shofet" as "negid" in Perek 2?
>: You still haven't answered this...

>The burden isn't on me, but on the Rashba -- who explicitly says
>otherwise from the Targum. I therefore assumed some answer existed
>without bothering to find one. (Yet.)

Again, I don't understand the problem, so maybe I have missed something.
We know that a person who is posel to be a dayan (eg a karov) can be
a dayan if both parties accept that person (mishna, Sanhedrin 24a) -
it is one of the bases that a modern day dayan (who of course does not
have smicha) is able to judge. Is a modern day dayan not a "dayan"?

I also don't quite understand how we got from dayanus to rabbanus.
They are distinct titles even today (Yoreh Yoreh vrs Yadin Yadin)?
If anything, one of Tosphos' explanations for Devorah is that she did
not function as a dayan but as a rav (she taught, rather than judged).

=====

Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2002 20:12:07 +0000
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Subject: Re: Isha psulah ladun

On Sun, Feb 10, 2002 at 08:07:14PM +0000, Chana Luntz wrote:
: We know that a person who is posel to be a dayan (eg a karov) can be
: a dayan if both parties accept that person (mishna, Sanhedrin 24a) -
: it is one of the bases that a modern day dayan (who of course does not
: have smicha) is able to judge. Is a modern day dayan not a "dayan"?

Perhaps not. It's a good thing you raised this question as it forces
disambiguation.

The Sanhedrin is composed of dayanim. A modern day dayan is not a "dayan"
in this sense of the word.

Dayan in the more minimal usage is actually less than a poseiq. He is
providing a one-time ruling, more like a moreh de'asra than an IM. And,
if the dayan is operating by force mutual consent, it may be more because
of the rules of pesharah than those of din.

It is unclear which usage the Targum means when speaking of Devorah.
If you assume the latter, then I would say that Chanah is right.

=====

Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2002 23:34:16 -0500
From: Arie Folger <afol...@ymail.yu.edu>
Subject: Re: Isha psulah ladun

RMB wrote:
> Ein hachi nami. They all were final halachic authorities, but qua
> zeqeinim. I'm suggesting that the zeqeinim, being nevi'im (a feature
> Rashi mentions), are soferim not rabbanim.

Wadda?! I thought that zeqeinim are the rabbanim musmakhim par
excellance. Besides, what exactly are soferim that they may not fall
under the categories that exclude women from hora'ah?

BTW, why do you think that Devorah is necessarily not a precedent? I
believe that the presence of one case in massorah is a precedent. Only
when the exceptional nature of an event is emphasized (a la 2 ktuvim
habaim kee'had ein melamdim, or 3 ktuvim habaim kee'had ein melamdim)
do we state that it is not a useful precedent. And furthermore, even if
it isn't a useful precedent, we need to explain why, and anything short
of 'al pi hadibut shaani will bring about a useful precedent for some
(admittedly less common than rabbanit) cases.

I find the argument against women rabbaniot - bizman hazeh that we lack
smikhah - based on srarah most sound, and even that needs reinforcement,
as the whole idea of a rav having srarah is debatable, espescially
if we want to allow women to participate in government (ministers,
etc.) and also considering that Rambam's broad definition of srarah
(can't have a women or Druze sergeant in Tzahal, women as administrators
in institutionas that involve males, or even any administrative position)
is by no means accepted if current practice is any guide.

Rather, we accept Rambam's definition of srarah only very partially, and
wish that a rav would have real srarah that in a sense exceeds that of
a government minister or at least that of a mayor, and therefore accept
women in government and don't accept them in the rabbinate.

I hope that my assesment above is wrong in some way or another, so
please comment.

=====

Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2002 16:56:45 +0000
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Subject: Re: Isha psulah ladun

On Tue, Feb 12, 2002 at 11:34:16PM -0500, Arie Folger wrote:
: RMB wrote:
:> Ein hachi nami. They all were final halachic authorities, but qua
:> zeqeinim. I'm suggesting that the zeqeinim, being nevi'im (a feature
:> Rashi mentions), are soferim not rabbanim.

: Wadda?! I thought that zeqeinim are the rabbanim musmakhim par
: excellance...

Yes, but everything they said had the imprompreture of HQBH. Which is
why divrei soferim is more than mere deRabbanan.

So, all the precedent that Devorah could provide would at most be that a
woman combined with a dialogue with HQBH is permitted to give hora'ah. As
women today lack that ability, the precedent is unusable.

In fact, I argued that this is what the Tosafos meant. Rather than the
usual assumption that they were saying that she was a nevi'ah capable
of a hora'as sha'ah, I am arguing that they were saying that she was a
nevi'ah and therefore only setting precedent for other nevi'os.

: BTW, why do you think that Devorah is necessarily not a precedent? ...

Because so many rishonim squirm around explaining why she isn't. So, while
I lack the zechus to understand any of their answers to the extent of
being satisfied, I still must accept the maskanah they are trying to
justify.

...

Mishpatim and the Exterminator 
by Rav Benny Lau
Translated by Rabbi Uri Pilichowski 

A sweet idea for Parshat Mishpatim -- My apologies this isn't sweet
at all.

The luminous pictures of the Gross girls who died from pesticide poisoning
have given me no peace. But I struggle as before me I see the picture
of the exterminator (whose name I withhold). I have known him for many
years. One of the top rated exterminators, a "pro," he is squeaky clean,
thorough, humble, reliable and pleasant. The photo of the exterminator
sits before my eyes. With blurred eyes I go about my duties.

(In the voice of the exterminator) I get up and go about my daily
routine. I go from house to house faced with challenges of pests and
insects. Everywhere I visit I leave safety instructions. In the Gross
house I left instructions as well. I knew the chemicals were dangerous and
could cause harm, I warned them to leave the house if it began to smell.

It hit me like a lightening bolt. For years I have dealt with these
materials. I have spent my entire adult life working to save people
from harm. I have never caused harm to anyone. And here comes the
Sabbath. Every Saturday I read the week's Parsha and grapple with its
words. This time the Parsha strikes me cruelly. At the beginning of the
Parsha a mere ten verses after the opening, I read the new chapter of
my life:

(Verse 12) He who strikes a man and the man dies, shall surely die:

(Verse 13) But one who [struck a man] but did not stalk him, but God
brought [the incident] about, [God] will make a place for you to which
he shall flee.

Until today, I was the one who lit up the land, and today I am the one
who killed accidentally.

How did I come to this disaster? I open the Rambam's Laws of Murder and
Preservation of Life and look for myself in his words. The Rambam lists
the different types of people who hurt others unintentionally.

There are three categories of unintentional killers.

(1) There is a person who kills unintentionally, without at all knowing
that this will be the consequence of his actions. Concerning such a
person, the Torah states "Who did not lay in ambush." The law applying
to such a person is that he should be exiled to a city of refuge.

(2) There is a person who kills unintentionally, whose acts resemble
those caused by forces beyond his control -- i.e., that the death will be
caused by an extraordinary phenomenon that does not commonly occur. Such
a person is not liable to be exiled,

(3) There is a person who kills unintentionally, whose acts resemble
those willfully perpetrated -- e.g., they involve negligence or that
care should have been taken with regard to a certain factor and they
did not. Such a person is not sentenced to exile, because his sin is
very severe and exile cannot bring him atonement.

I know I do not belong to the third group, every action I took was with
great prudence, yet on the other hand -- can I say that this terrible
death was the kind of "miracle" that couldn't be expected?

Apparently, I can't belong to the second group either. Therefore, I fall
into the first group -- the set of the accidental killer. In another
of his works, the Rambam describes this killer as "An accidental killer
who is guilty, had he acted with more caution, there would have been no
error." Were my many jobs my undoing? Did I become insensitive to the
dangers of my chemicals?

Now I pray for the safety of the two other Gross children. Cities of
refuge are designed to save me from the families' revenge. The Gross
family has been shown to be a noble family that transcends strict justice.

I close this week's Parsha and open my prayer book. I caused death, Can
I save my life? Parshat Mishpatim is open before the judges of Israel,
they will determine my fate. I pray that they do not judge their neighbor
guilty. I pray that we stay the path, that our eyes and hearts are opened
not to hurt anyone, and we spread light and goodness to all those that
darkness has spread over and the ways of God remain hidden.

with regards to the various treatments for ailments that are brought down
[specifically thinking about management of rabies -- and considering the
limited success of current therapeutic interventions once the patient is
diagnosed]-

were these seen as suggestions,  medical treatments , or  religiously
infused ceremonies?

ie  are we talking about segulot ,  or  accepted medical treatments?

is there anyway of knowing if these treatments were more than anecdotally
successful?
did  these procedures emanate from the chachamim or the surrounding society?
or, once proven successful, did they spread to the  non-jewish neighbors as
well?

it woudl be interesting to know the success rate of the talmudic treatment
of rabies , and if they taught it to the gentiles as well....
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<<> A shofeit is more like a regional king

No, it isn't.  If it were then Pilegesh Begiv'ah wouldn't have happened,
because the "regional king" would have stopped it.  The last posuk in
Shoftim
says that the reason it happened was because all of EY was a literal
anarchy,
just like medieval Iceland, with a judicial system but no government.
 Anyone
could do whatever they wanted, and the only recourse anyone had was to sue
them afterwards.>>

Who says there was a shofet at that time? It is clear that the story is out
of chronogical order and we dont know when it happened and who if anyone
was in charge.
It is clear from shoftim that most/all shoftim were regional until Shmuel
and had limited authority
and as quoted in many years there was no shofet and there was anarchy.
However when there was a shofet he certainly did have local authority

-- 
Eli Turkel
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What should our attitude be towards money from a 
Torah standpoint?  The following is part of 
RSRH's commentary on Shemos 22:24.  It is 
admittedly a bit long,  but it is IMO fundamental 
to understanding an important aspect of Yahadus.  YL

24 If you lend money to My people, to the poor 
man who is with you, you shall not behave toward 
him like a creditor; you shall not impose interest
on him.

The original calling of Israel was v'lakachti eschem li l'am (above, 6:7), to
become a society comprised of the members of 
God?s people, a society comprised of the members
of one people, who interact and interrelate under the rule of God?s
Torah. Not the service in God?s Temple, but the society they are to
build, will be the stage for the revelation of God?s kingship.

A product and consequence of this calling is the mitzvah of halavah
Since this mitzvah is the cornerstone of the calling to be am Hashem, and since
one who fulfills this mitzvah thereby expresses his identification with
this calling, we thus clearly see the reason behind the mitzvah. This
mitzvah embodies not the idea of abstract justice, but the idea that the
society comprised of the members of the Jewish people is built on the
awareness that everything we possess is entrusted to us by God. This is
not the idea of mishpat, but the idea of tzedakah, the Jewish conception of
duty.

<Snip>

Whereas in non-Jewish circles the debtor carefully avoids his creditor,
the Torah instructs the Jewish creditor not to appear before the debtor, to
spare him from humiliation!

Lo sasimoon alav neshech. The first duty, 
addressed to the lender (lo s'eyeh lo k'neshe),
is in the singular, as the lender is usually an individual. The
second duty, however, is addressed to the entire community, to the
society as Am, and this is specially emphasized 
by the added (ende) nun: You, the
Jewish community as such, shall not impose any interest on borrowers.

 From this we see that, from the aspect of general law, the Torah
does not regard collecting interest as an intrinsically wrongful act. Interest
is not antithetical to the concept of justice, but is antithetical to the
basic principle on which Jewish society is to be built.

Were the Jewish lender allowed to regard himself as merely a nosheh
as one who, out of complete generosity, places the use of his own money
at the disposal of another individual for a certain amount of time, he
would then be entitled to receive compensation for temporarily relinquishing
his money, or for the use the borrower makes of his money.
But that is precisely what the Torah denies him. The money he loans is
not entirely his own, and the decision to loan the money is not merely
a matter of his own goodwill. His money belongs also to God, to lend
it is a duty, and the borrower is not simply an individual, he is Ami, one
of the members of God?s community, which by His Will must be built
on the basis of the wondrous power of duty.

When God took Pharaoh?s slaves out of Egypt and first conferred
upon them the right to own property as human beings and free individuals,
he immediately bound them together into a community, not
by the force of sheer personal need, but by the obligation to attend to
duty. It is not the poor who should have to seek out the wealthy; rather,
it is the duty of the wealthy person to seek out a neighbor who could
benefit from his wealth. The rich need the poor much more, and in a
much higher sense, than the poor need the rich. All that the poor man
can get from the rich is assistance for his material needs. But for the
rich man, the poor are the means that enable him to carry out his
sublime spiritual and moral task of paying to God the tribute He expects
in return for every penny He bestows on us.

When God grants us property, He reserves for Himself control of
the ways in which the property is to be used. The prime beneficiary in
this arrangement is to be Amo, the society to be created through the
spirit of His Torah. This is the spirit of tzedakah, the Jewish concept of
righteousness as a matter of duty, which to this day is responsible for
the miraculous survival of the Jewish people; and the highest form of
this tzedakah is Halavah, the duty to lend money to those in need (see
Commentary, Devarim 15:8). This is also the spirit to which any claim
to interest must yield.

The duty of lending money without interest is the granite rock foundation
on which the society of the Jewish people is based. This is one
of the cardinal duties by whose fulfillment God wants us to express our
homage to him through acts of sacrifice in daily life.

Inasmuch as collecting interest does not clash with the dictates of
natural law and is in keeping with ordinary concepts of law and justice,
according to which collecting interest entails no wrong, it becomes all
the more clear that the prohibition of interest is to be counted among
those mitzvos ? such as Shabbos, Shmittah, and Yovel ? that serve as testimony
and reminders of God?s dominion over the world and over Israel.

Cessation from work on the Sabbath, release of land and debts in
the seventh year, termination of title to land and servants in the Yovel
year ? these proclaim God as Master of the world and Owner of all
things: of human power, of the earth, of property, of people, of possessions.
This is also the reason for the prohibition of interest. God commands
us to relinquish the creditor?s right to receive interest from the
debtor, so that by fulfilling this mitzvah we acknowledge and proclaim
that He is Master and Ruler over all our movable assets; for only on
condition of this awareness did He redeem us from Egypt and grant us
independence and property ? so that we should build our national
life under His rule. For this reason the Torah concludes the detailed
laws concerning the duty of lending and the prohibition of interest with
the verse: Ani HaShem Elokechem Asher Hotzasi  Eschem Meretz
Mitzraim Lasas Lochem Es Eretz Canaan L'hiyos Lochem L'elokim (Vayikra 25:38).
Thus the Torah explicitly says that submission to God?s Will as expressed in
His Torah is the condition on which, and the purpose for which, He led us
out to freedom and granted us independence and property.

Hence also the saying of R Yosi: ?See how blind are those who lend
on interest. Otherwise, if someone is called ?godless,? he is deeply offended,
yet these people bring pen and ink, summon scribes and witnesses,
and have a document written, signed and witnessed, stating: So
and so has repudiated the God of Israel, Kofer B'Elokay Yisroel!? (Bava Metzia
71a).

To understand the reason for the prohibition against interest on
loans, we must consider not only the concrete effect on the financial
condition of the borrower, but also the essential nature of the mitzvah
of lending money as testimony to God?s sovereignty. This is evident
from the fact that not only is collecting interest forbidden, but the Torah
also prohibits, with equal severity, the paying of interest (see Devarim
23:20?21 and Commentary there).

<Snip>

Thus, the Torah raises interest-free loans to the highest duty of social
brotherhood, and protects the debtor against harsh treatment at the
hands of the creditor, who is prohibited from even embarrassing the
debtor. On the other hand, the Torah obligates the debtor to repay his
debt punctually, and prohibits him from spending the borrowed money
needlessly or investing it irresponsibly. ?If one knows that the person
who asks for a loan is likely to use it irresponsibly, it is better not to
give him a loan, so that one should not be placed in the position of a
pressing creditor? (Choshen Mishpat, 97:4).

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