Avodah Mailing List

Volume 31: Number 73

Fri, 19 Apr 2013

• 1. Re: [Areivim] Israel Torah community (Zev Sero)
• 2. "Simtuta" (Elazar M. Teitz)
• 3. Opening up Yahadus to Ridicule (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi, its Kosher!)
• 4. Lama Li Kera Sevara Hu (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi, its Kosher!)
• 5. What Is Kiddush HaShem? (Meir Rabi)
• 6. Re: What Is Kiddush HaShem? (Zev Sero)
• 7. Re: YT Sheni in Eretz Yisrael (Chana Luntz)
• 8. Re: Quick question wrt birchas hagomel (Poppers, Michael)
• 9. Re: (Areivim) Two Income Families and the halacha (Chana Luntz)
• 10. infinity (Eli Turkel)
• 11. Re: infinity (Rich, Joel)
• 12. Pesach Sheni (cantorwolb...@cox.net)
• 13. Re: [Areivim] infinity (Micha Berger)
• 14. Re: Pesach Sheni (Zev Sero)
• 15. Re: [Areivim] infinity (Zev Sero)

On Areivim, Chana Luntz wrote:
> The problem is that we are forbidden*d'orisa*  from having a ger toshav do
> melacha for us on shabbas - Yevamos 48b (explaining Shemos 23:12 as
> referring to a ger toshav it not being able to refer to a ger tzedek, as a
> ger tzedek is already included by virtue of D'varim 5:13).  See also Krisus
> 9a which sets out a machlokus as to the level of work that a ger toshav may
> do for himself on shabbas - although the consensus appears to be that for
> himself he may do work, just not for us (see Tosphos Yevamos 48b "ze ger
> toshav").

Of course that gemara may go according to the opinion of Acherim that a
ger toshav accepts all the mitzvos except kashrus.

But leaving that aside, see Tosfos on Krisus 9a, who derives a practical
halacha about a servant nowadays, which seems to me to imply that this is
all an asmachata, and really the issur on a ger toshav is the same as that
of amira lenochri, which is mid'rabanan, and which has the exceptions that
Chazal made.   After all, if it were really mid'oraisa, then how do we
know that it's only work for us?  Surely we'd have to prove it from a pasuk.
But if it's really mid'rabanan then of course we don't have to prove anything.

Note also that the Rambam doesn't mention this issur on a ger toshav, but
only the general one on amira to any nochri (Shabbat ch 6).  If the Rambam
held there was such an distinction he would surely mention it somewhere.

-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

      To all who have used this term in recent days, please note that the correct word is "situmta."

EMT         

Is it possible that the discussion about who did not or does not wear a
head covering, is prohibited chatter, since it is perceived by some to be a
slight upon the character of those they hold in esteem, notwithstanding
that others see not wearing a head covering by those people as an honorable
stance?
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The MenoRas HaMaOr says that the principle of BeMakom SheBaAley Teshuvah
OmDim, does not apply to transgressions that are by our own thinking and
awareness, known to be wrong.

Thus again we verify the superiority of the gift HKBH has given us and
charged us to employ, the human mind, over the direct Divine Revelation.

This also is reflected in the RaMBaN?s well known exhortation, be not a
Menuval whilst maintaining the rules of the Torah. This means that unless
we use our Gd given powers, the Torah can be distorted to effectively
produce Nivul, which BTW sounds pretty much like evil.

Thus the exhortation, VeShaftu Mishpat Tzeddek, and the cutting criticism,
SheFot HaShofTim, when the judges were judged, sure they employed the
Halacha but they abused it to promote injustice.
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Halacha differentiates between a Yid being coerced to violate Torah for the
benefit of the G, where we are not instructed to give up our life and
according to some forbidden from doing so; and those instances where we are
coerced to belittle our allegiance to HKBH.

This being the case it does not seem correct to suggest that Kiddush HaShem is
achieved by defying the world's opinion, and doing that which it insists we
not do.

Best,

Meir G. Rabi
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On 18/04/2013 10:29 PM, Meir Rabi wrote:
> Halacha differentiates between a Yid being coerced to violate Torah
> for the benefit of the G, where we are not instructed to give up our
> life and according to some forbidden from doing so; and those
> instances where we are coerced to belittle our allegiance to HKBH.
>
> This being the case it does not seem correct to suggest that Kiddush
> HaShem is achieved by defying the world's opinion, and doing that
> which it insists we not do.

Defying his demand is always kiddush haShem, whether it's required or not.
And when there's no countervailing requirement to save ones life there's
no question that it's kidush haShem.

-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

RZS writes:

>I've made this point several times -- that "hizaharu beminhag avoseichem
biydeichem" was an instruction from the Sanhedrin, which makes it a din
>derabannan, not a minhag.  The "minhag" in the quote is *what* they ordered
us to do.  "That which was previously your minhag, and which you now propose
>to abandon, keep doing it", but now instead of it being a safek de'oraisa
it's a vadai derabanan.  We treat it *as if* it were a safek, because that
was >what we were doing before we got this order, and the order was to keep
on doing it.

I certainly agree there is a (lot of) logic to that position - and there is
quite a lot of rishonic support for it.  But, on the other hand, such a
position does completely undercut those who hold that a tourist from chutz
l'aretz visiting Eretz Yisrael keeps two days.  Ie it works beautifully with
the Chacham Zvi, but those who hold, following Rav Yosef Karo and others,
that a tourist must keep two days, have only the gemora in pesachim to rely
on, regarding what happens if a person goes from a place where they have one
minhag, to a place where they have another minhag, with the intention to
return, and therefore they have to read into this gemora that the term
minhag avoseinu means more than your reading above.  Ie they have to say
something like, not only was the instruction of the Sanhedrin to continue
treating the day *as if* it as was a safek, because that was what we were
doing before we got this order, and the order was to keep on doing it, but
that, from now on, you need to treat this as a form of local minhag, a form
of avosainu b'yadainu that follows the general rules of minhag.  Because
clearly in the old days, when YT Sheni was really being kept because of
safek, in places where was no safek, eg when the olei regel from Bavel came
up to Yerushalayim, they did not keep two days, even though they had the
intention to return.  So if you actually kept it the way it was kept then,
you would not keep two days in Eretz Yisrael.  And if it is a pure rabbinic
gezera, then you would not now include in the gezera things that were not
included by Chazal, ie the Sanhedrin that gave the instruction.  So the only
way you can get to the two days in Eretz Yisrael position is if you do
understand that the reference to minhag avoseichem biyadeichem is more than
the understanding you give above.

Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and

Regards

Chana

In Avodah V31n72, RAMiller wrote:
> Based on the Igros Moshe O"C 2:59, I think that it might be a mistake
> to say that Hagomel relates to the actual danger of a voyage. It might
> be better to speak of the *potential* danger. I will explain:
> In his first two paragraphs, he writes:
> "The main difference between a ship and travel on land is this: When
> one travels on dry land, there's no real difference between staying at
> home, because if nothing happens then there's nothing to worry about,
> whereas in a ship on the water, the very travel itself is a danger
> which one must be rescued from, because one cannot live in the water
> except for a mashehu of time without being rescued, and the ship
> provides that rescue. Therefore, since the ship is occasionally
> damaged, and his rescue would not be a sure thing, one must give
> thanks by saying Hagomel. If so, then all the more so for an airplane,
> which is even worse than a ship, for one cannot be in the air for even
> a moment, so being in the airplane is certainly a rescue, and since
> the airplane is occasionally damaged, here too his rescue would not be
> a sure thing, and so he must give thanks by saying Hagomel.
> "And this is why we say the bracha when traveling by ship even today:
> Even though today's ships are vastly safer than those of the gemara's
> time and even of the Shulchan Aruch's time, because only on very rare
> occasions does a ship sink -- and it is perhaps even rarer than travel
> on ordinary roads which were dangerous in their days -- the logic is
> this: The ship in which one sits is actively rescuing him from the
> danger of being in the water, and even our ships are rescuing him from
> that danger, and so it is inherently proper to say the bracha. Only if
> there would be a certainty, without any doubt, that the ship would
> rescue them from the water, [only then] would they be exempt, because
> [only then] could it be imagined that Hashem did not do a chessed for
> them on this trip. But since even modern ships are not guaranteed --
> because on very rare occasions there *are* unrescued sinkings -- it
> *is* considered, at least, that Hashem has done a chesed worthy of the
> bracha. And ev
 en if it is a small chesed compared to that of those days, we still have
 to ay the bracha; would we not thank Hashem for His chesed because it was
 a small one?"
> R' M Cohen asked:
>> I thought about the issue boat trips previously. For every boat
>> trip they brought a KT!? If you take a rowboat offshore from Yafo?
>> Everyone who goes ocean sailing? Sailing overnight? Sailing out of
>> sight of shore? Staten island ferry ride? <<
> The Igros Moshe says that - theoretically speaking - if one's ship
> were guaranteed not to sink, then such a trip would be exempt from
> Hagomel. I think it might be reasonable, based on that, to conclude
> that even if the ship *would* sink, but he is always close enough to
> shore that he can swim back, then too the trip would be exempt. But if
> the ship travels further, then the arguments of the Igros Moshe would
> apply, and he'd have to say Hagomel. <
To RMC's siuggested trips, I would add as a question upon the apparent
opinion of Rav Moshe z'l': what's the p'saq when one travels a certain
distance via helicopter?  That said, perhaps yeish l'chaleiq bein
"commuting" l'"traveling", and perhaps what RAMiller quoted b'sheim Rav
Moshe is only in regard to the latter?

A gut'n Shabbes/Shabbas Shalom and all the best from 
-- Michael Poppers via BB pager

I wrote:

>>It is one thing for Beis Din to try and apply halachic principles, but
when
>> such halachic principles would involve uprooting concepts such as the 
>> Married Woman's Property Act, by deeming property that the state says 
>> is hers as his, I find it very difficult to
>> believe that the state would uphold such an arbitration.   Ie one can
>> arbitrate over property that the state understands to be legitimately 
>> in dispute, but if the BD says her earnings belong to him and 
>> arbitrate based on such a principle, I think any secular court would 
>> just strike that arbitration down.

And RJS replied:

>Granted that there must be a dispute in order to have an arbitration, but I
would think that there is an obvious argument to be made here: the husband
>has an equitable interest in her property, just as she has an interest in
his. This is the basis for most divorce settlements, after all.

Yes, but that is a particularity of divorce law.

>In our case the heirs would argue that the husband accepted the particular
halachic responsibilities of sustaining his wife with the understanding that
>he was to be compensated by being granted his halachic rights over her
earnings; it would be inequitable to change the deal at this point.

First of all, in many dual income families, the wife is sustaining him (eg
kollel family, wife working, wife may well be the higher earner).  Therefore
the "deal" between husband and wife as you have framed it (and as the
halacha frames it) would be struck down by any English court as inequitable
in such a case.  But even in the situation where the husband worked and the
wife earned nothing, I can't see a secular court accepting that Jewish
husbands, and particularly their heirs, should be better off than non Jewish
husbands and their heirs.  Or putting it another way, I can't see them
accepting that Jewish wives be worse off than non Jewish wives due to the
existence of a kesuba, and if any court agreed to such a deal would it not
be liable to be overturned under the various forms of anti-discrimination
legislation?  

Secondly, the secular law has a concept of survivorship.  That is, if one
person holding a joint bank account dies, the other automatically inherits
all the money in that account without needing probate or letters of
administration.  It just doesn't go through the regular estate division
channels (the same is true if a property is held jointly, although this can
be mitigated by ensuring that properties are held as tenants in common, but
even then, only one part of the property will be deemed part of the
deceased's estate).

So, let's take the joint bank account situation (which is what RMB started
off with).  The bank account was owned jointly by husband and wife.  On the
husband's death, according to secular law, the account is now automatically
the property of the wife, and only she can operate it.  The bank account,
according to the secular law, is not subject to the will or intestacy of the
husband, halachic or otherwise.  So what is the beis din going to do?  How
is it going to get access to the bank account, over which it technically has
absolutely no secular legal grounds to have jurisdiction.   It would somehow
have to lean on the wife to assign over (at least some of) the money in the
bank account to the heirs, if it deemed (as it presumably often would) that
the amount in the bank account exceeded the amount owed under the kesuba.
But it has no secular legal basis to do so - and any attempt to do so would,
to my mind, be struck down by a secular court as being a form of duress if
it was ever challenged.  

Note by the way that if somehow they had managed to persuade the wife to
legally assign over the account a few minutes before the husband's death, so
that the full balance of the bank account was deemed to be part of the
husband's estate, in countries like the UK (not Australia I know, but that
is unusual), it would then be subject to inheritance tax, which in the UK is
40%.  So even were the beis din somehow to be able to manipulate the law to
get the account monies into the estate, so they could then arbitrate on them
as part of the estate, that might well just give an opening for the tax man
to scoop a significant portion of it.  Do you really think a Beis Din is
going to do that?

So in terms of death, we are back to getting the wife, post decease, to
agree to go to beis din, the beis din to work out what halachically should
actually belong to the heirs, and then rely on the good will of the wife to
assign over a large part of what she legally (according to secular law) has
to the heirs (which of course could well include sons from a previous
marriage), all without any secular backup.  Do you know anybody who had done
this (husband's dying before wives is not exactly uncommon)?

And in terms of during the course of the marriage - remember that under the
halacha, in relation to various forms of property, the husband is entitled
to eat from the fruits of such property during the course of the marriage.
And for other properties, the capital increase in the property belongs to
the husband.  In both these cases, under secular law, both the fruits and
the capital are most commonly added to the capital of the property and
considered part of the property.  They would therefore, likely, in total be
within the control of the wife if they were originally the wife's property,
during the course of the marriage, unless a lot of complicated paperwork was
filled out at numerous points during the marriage.  And if nto done, then at
best on the husband's death, the beis din would have to require the wife to
submit all of her property for examination so as to make the appropriate
division and then persuade her to assign over that which they deemed to be
the husband's.  Yes, a secular *divorce* court does this as part of their
routine.  The courts dealing with the administration of estates do not.  Do
you know of any communities where routinely and completely voluntarily the
wife submits a list of all of her assets to beis din as part of a husband's
death, knowing that the end result will be to take away a significant
portion of them from her?  If they don't then what does that tell you?

Some possible analyses to get us out of this mess - because it is a mess in
the sense that the halacha and what is going on just doesn't stim, is to say
that:

a) due to the presence of DDD, husbands and wives now routinely are deemed
to have the arrangement of aini nizonit v'aini osah. Ie because DDD insists
that women's income belongs to the woman, then that voluntary condition in
halacha becomes the accepted norm (but even then, what do you do with
divorce, when, as you say, suddenly there are equitable interests, including
those of the husband, that are brought into play, so this is not a great
solution, and it does take away the protection that the kesuba specifically
provides.)  On the other hand, it can operate as a justification for
kollelniks learning and not working to support their wives, due to DDD they
have been forced into an aini nizonit arrangement, so they no longer have
the obligation to support her, whatever the kesuba says, and so any such
support is voluntary.

b) the husband is deemed to be gifting to his wife halachically throughout
the course of the marriage (but that assumes she has a yad, which is
difficult, although since an arrangement of (a) also assumes that she then
has a yad, maybe by deeming (a) we solve this problem as well) anything that
the secular law assumes is actually hers, but the halacha says is actually
his.  In theory he can gift to whomsoever he wants (so long as you solve the
yad problem and any kinyanim problems) so why not his wife?  At that point
beis din can quite happily deal solely with his estate as at death, and
ignore everything that is secularly her property, on the grounds that the
husband gave it to her before his death.  But what if we know the husband
was not inclined to give the wife anything that he didn't absolutely have
to?  Does DDD mandated "giving" fit in with the halacha?  Surely the Shach
would say not, otherwise the solution to the inheritance problem was to have
the husband actually inherit, but due to the influence of DDD to immediately
"gift" such inheritance to the father of the wife, and all honour would be
satisfied.

(c) some forms of property that exist today may arguably have no existence
in halacha, and hence avoid the whole system.  eg question what is the
halachic status of a bank account anyway.  It may be that a form of property
that the halacha does not really recognise (dvar shelo b'olam, for example)
can be deemed to side-step the halachic requirements of inheritance, or
husband control, and therefore may be dealt with solely under secular law.
But then how do you deal with such property when it is unquestionably part
of the estate (eg a bank account solely in the name of the husband)?  Does
halacha not apply to it at all, and only DDD applies?

Any other ideas?

As you can see, it is not as though I have any answers at this stage, just
lots of questions.  And maybe Beitei Din who have to deal with these
questions regularly have worked out answers that I am unaware of. I would be
very happy to be enlightened.

>Joe Slater

Regards

Chana

<<Here's a quick summary of the issues:
http://www.yutorah.
org/lectures/lecture.cfm/792566/Rabbi_Aryeh_Lebowitz/Ten_Minute_Halacha_-_K
ohanim_Flying_in_Plastic_Bags
>>

I note that Rabbi Lebowitz takes it for granted that "ad le-rakia" does not
mean forever.
He suggests perhaps until the cloud cover. He does assume that 3-5,000 feet
is within
the limit of "ad lerakia" and so they would not help for planes
landing/taking off but
would help for planes in the middle of the flight.
He further brings a shitah of RHS that requires the tumah to be "near" the
Cohen and so
would not affect the Cohen in the plane.

BTW some of his facts are wrong as the United plane to the US takes off
well before midnight
though ElAl does fly between midnight and 1pm

-- 
Eli Turkel
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I note that Rabbi Lebowitz takes it for granted that "ad le-rakia" does not mean forever.
He suggests perhaps until the cloud cover. He does assume that 3-5,000 feet is within
the limit of "ad lerakia" and so they would not help for planes landing/taking off but
would help for planes in the middle of the flight.

Eli Turkel
===============================================
I always wonder about such assumptions and their cliff like nature. Is this
another instance where we are trying to guess what chazal might have said
about something they might not have thought about.  Is it a plumb line or
earth center radius definition?  Was bokea ad harakia meant literally or
figuratively meaning anywhere humans could reach then? Imagine a vertical
cliff next to a graveyard as an example.
KT
Joel Rich
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There are those who have the minhag to eat matzah on Pesach Sheni (this coming Wed).
My question is: Must it be Kosher L'Pesach matzo?


"Behold I do not give lectures or a little charity. When I give, I give myself."  Walt Whitman

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On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 12:49:35PM +0300, Eli Turkel wrote on Areivim:
: This assumes modern science. Chazal clearly talk about the celestial bodies
: going UNDER the earth at night and cooling the streams

Only the earlier members of Chazal. In any case, the question was about
the moon going overhead and becoming tamei. Not whether it is /always/
overhead.

The question would be whether Chazal had the tools to know where above
the earth the moon would be, and to estimate the likelihood of even a
single qever in that strip.

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 24th day, which is
mi...@aishdas.org        3 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Tifferes sheb'Netzach: When does domination or
Fax: (270) 514-1507        taking control result in balance and harmony?

On 19/04/2013 11:30 AM, cantorwolb...@cox.net wrote:
> There are those who have the minhag to eat matzah on Pesach Sheni
> (this coming Wed). My question is: Must it be Kosher L'Pesach matzo?

If it isn't, then in what sense is it matzoh?

-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

On 19/04/2013 12:03 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 12:49:35PM +0300, Eli Turkel wrote on Areivim:
> : This assumes modern science. Chazal clearly talk about the celestial bodies
> : going UNDER the earth at night and cooling the streams
>
> Only the earlier members of Chazal. In any case, the question was about
> the moon going overhead and becoming tamei. Not whether it is /always/
> overhead.

In particular the assertion was that Chazal would not have thought of the
moon as being "over" the earth.  This quote proves the exact opposite: that
they did very much think in those terms.

Oh, and how can the moon become tamei?  How is that even a suggestion?


> The question would be whether Chazal had the tools to know where above
> the earth the moon would be, and to estimate the likelihood of even a
> single qever in that strip.

I don't see how that's at all relevant.  Whether they thought it does or
it doesn't pass over kevarim, where is there even a hint that they would
have had a problem if it did?  The entire premise of this sub-thread is
the premise that it's impossible to say that a Cohen may not go to the
moon, and therefore any theory that would produce such a result must be
wrong.  What's the basis for that premise?  I don't see how the conclusion
that cohanim may not visit the moon is even slightly implausible.  Either
it's true or it isn't, but it's certainly plausible.


-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan


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