Avodah Mailing List

Volume 29: Number 6

Sat, 14 Jan 2012

• 1. Re: who avoids whom? (Chana Luntz)
• 2. Re: who avoids whom? (Micha Berger)
• 3. Re: Cholov Stam (Akiva Blum)
• 4. Re: Do we Owe Respect to Old Bones? (Arie Folger)
• 5. Re: Balancing needs (Chana Luntz)
• 6. Re: Forms of Bitul (Chana Luntz)
• 7. Re: Yom Tov Sheni for Olim LeReget to the Beit (Micha Berger)
• 8. Re: Balancing needs (Micha Berger)
• 9. Re: [Areivim] netilat yadayim (Zev Sero)
• 10. animals and bechira?? (Harvey Benton)
• 11. Re: animals and bechira?? (Lisa Liel)
• 12. Re: animals and bechira?? (Micha Berger)
• 13. sarah/127/loshon rabim?? (Harvey Benton)

RMB writes:

>Kol Yisrael areivim plus ein apitropos la'arayos places a large obligation
on all of us to avoid lifnei iveir and mesayeiah lidevar aveirah in these
>areas.

I don't see why ein apitropos la'arayos places any greater burden on others
to avoid lifnei iver and mesayeiah lidevar avairah in these areas than in
any other area of halacha, nor kol yisrael areivim.  Not that an obligation
to avoid lifnei iver and mesayeiah lidevar avairah is negligible, but I
cannot see any justification for making the obligations greater in this area
than in any other equivalent averah.

>But it's still a problem "owned" by the potential avaryan, first and
foremost.

Agreed - the Nazir cannot get out of the averah by claiming that "she gave
me the wine and hence I ate".

>That said, tzeni'us is a middah to be developed, and not entirely (and
perhaps even not primarily) about preventing hirhurim. 

I don't disagree with this, even this kind of definition of tznius, but
Kimchis is not necessarily the best example of it.  A much better example,
as it completely divorces the matter from anything to do with women, are all
the halachos in the second siman of Orech Chaim regarding appropriate
conduct in the bathroom.

>Otherwise, why was Kimchis rewarded by having all 7 sons merit becoming
kohanim gedolim for ensuring that "the rafters of my home have never 'seen'
>the plaits of my hair" (Yuma 47a)?

>On a tangent, I don't understand one element of that story... He son R'
>Yishmael was metamei through the roq of a nakhri, and so the backup had to
serve on YK. (Although R' Yishmael did serve in the past, the gemara says he
>held 4 qav of qetores.) This is how his brother Yeshvav served as KG. I
find it odd, because this seems like an odd part of a reward -- one of her
sons >got to be KG through the other's mishap?

This is the only bit of the story you don't understand?

First of all, the question can be asked, how do the chachamim know that it
is in her merit that all her sons were kohen gadol, maybe it was in the
merit of her husband, their father?  One answer, that they were all her
sons, but not all sons of the same father, is somewhat difficult, because as
kosher kohanim, she can only have had them with a different father if her
previous husband had died (and the second and/subsequent husbands were not
cohanim gadolim).  And presumably she would not have been allowed to marry
more than twice because of the halachos of katlanis.  But perhaps the fact
that they came from two fathers and only one mother was enough to indicate
it was her merit.

Secondly, one of the miracles of the  beis hamikdash was that the kohanim
gedolim did not become metameh - although one can answer that this was only
in relation to tumas keri, and not to forms of tumah that are within the
kohen's power to prevent (or maybe it was bayis rishon, and not bayis
sheni).

Thirdly of all there is the practicality of the matter.  Where and how did
she prepare for eg tevila if she kept the plaits of her hair always covered
(and presumably plaited).  This may be what the Tosphos yeshanim means by
saying at the time that it is possible to cover.  But there is clearly a
tension between being medakdek in this and being medakdek in hilchos tahora.


One could say that this is the answer to your question.  After all, the
Yerushalmi quotes in relation to this story the pasuk kol kavuda bas melech
penima mimishbatzos zahav.  This story with R' Yishmael apparently happened
on Yom Kippur, but since he was out in the shuk presumably the garments onto
which the rok of the nochri fell were indeed the bigdei zahav and if one
accepts the argument that the reason he was not protected was because he
should have been more careful with hilchos tehora, perhaps this also links
back to being overly careful with tznius perhaps leading to kulos in hilchos
tehora.

On the other hand, while I might be mistaken, I have the distinct impression
that, while the pashtus of the gemora would seem to be referring to the
braids of the hair of the head, at least some of the more mystically minded
rishonim appear to be understanding this as referring to hair in different
place.  This particular gemora keeps being quoted by some of the more
mystically minded rishonim (such as Ramban, Rokeach) in their discussion of
appropriate behaviour during tashmish and the consequential nobleness of
resultant offspring.  If that is right, then we are actually discussing
something entirely different.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

Regards

Chana

On Wed, Jan 11, 2012 at 11:33:25PM -0000, Chana Luntz wrote:
: I don't see why ein apitropos la'arayos places any greater burden on others
: to avoid lifnei iver and mesayeiah lidevar avairah in these areas than in
: any other area of halacha, nor kol yisrael areivim.  Not that an obligation
: to avoid lifnei iver and mesayeiah lidevar avairah is negligible, but I
: cannot see any justification for making the obligations greater in this area
: than in any other equivalent averah.

I just meant that halakhah already recognizes how hard it is to separate
stimulous from instinctive response in this area. Therefore, the person
who might provide that stimulous should be more cautious than usual.

...
: I don't disagree with this, even this kind of definition of tznius, but
: Kimchis is not necessarily the best example of it.  A much better example,
: as it completely divorces the matter from anything to do with women, are all
: the halachos in the second siman of Orech Chaim regarding appropriate
: conduct in the bathroom.

Kudos for the reminder.

...
: First of all, the question can be asked, how do the chachamim know that it
: is in her merit that all her sons were kohen gadol, maybe it was in the
: merit of her husband, their father? ...

I assume they're saying that such behavior as the story attributes to
Kimchis would be sufficient to explain their being kohanim gedolim. Not
that they were told secrets mei'achorei hapargod.

We also don't know if their explanation is intended to be taken with a
focus on sechar va'onesh, as a statement about causality -- how to impart
the kind of values we need in a kohein gadol, both, or hainu hakh.

...
: Secondly, one of the miracles of the  beis hamikdash was that the kohanim
: gedolim did not become metameh - although one can answer that this was only
: in relation to tumas keri, and not to forms of tumah that are within the
: kohen's power to prevent (or maybe it was bayis rishon, and not bayis
: sheni).

The Y-mi's version says this neis (and most of the nissim of the BHMQ) ended
with Shim'on haTzadiq.

: Thirdly of all there is the practicality of the matter.  Where and how did
: she prepare for eg tevila if she kept the plaits of her hair always covered
: (and presumably plaited)....

Or we can be medayeiq in her saying it was the rafters of her home. When
such uncovering was necessary, she was at the miqvah, not home. I also assume
we aren't lauding a woman for never bathing for cleanliness, either.

: One could say that this is the answer to your question.  After all, the
: Yerushalmi quotes in relation to this story the pasuk kol kavuda bas melech
: penima mimishbatzos zahav.  This story with R' Yishmael apparently happened
: on Yom Kippur, but since he was out in the shuk presumably the garments onto
: which the rok of the nochri fell were indeed the bigdei zahav...

Since he (or anyone) wasn't allowed to wear bigdei kehunah unless doing
the avodah, if he was on that side of the soreg, I would think it must
have been bigdei chol, no?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             If a person does not recognize one's own worth,
mi...@aishdas.org        how can he appreciate the worth of another?
http://www.aishdas.org             - Rabbi Yaakov Yosef of Polnoye,
Fax: (270) 514-1507                  author of Toldos Yaakov Yosef

> -----Original Message-----
> From: avodah-boun...@lists.aishdas.org [mailto:avodah-
> boun...@lists.aishdas.org] On Behalf Of Prof. Levine
> Sent: Wednesday, 11 January, 2012 7:46 PM
> 
>  From http://tinyurl.com/8xonx58
> 
> In light of this current state of affairs, such that the farms are
> indeed uniformly inspected for non-kosher animals, and the dairy plants
> inspectors work with the farm inspectors data, Rav Belsky ruled that
> the heter of cholov stam applies for those who wish to rely on it,
> albeit based principally on farm inspections rather than on dairy
> inspections. The correlation of data between the farm and dairy
> inspections extends the farm inspections efficacy to the dairies, from
> which point the milk is bo lyad Yisroel and retains its permissibility.
> 
> It should be noted that the above, newly-formulated position on cholov
> stam is actually the total reverse of Reb Moshes heter: Reb Moshe
> was mattir cholov stam based on dairy plants being inspected by the
> government, and government inspection of farms was a non-issue due to
> the concept of bo lyad Yisroel. Now, in contradistinction, government
> inspection of farms plays the central role, and dairy plant inspection
> is no longer central for the heter. It is also important to note that
> the new position does not rely on bo lyad Yisroel and may appeal to
> those who were not comfortable using this rationale in this case.
> 


The OU article mentions that these are the practices based on state
regulations, from context that would be New York. Do these changes only
apply to New York fresh milk, and milk products produced in the state of New
York?

Akiva

RAM asked me:

> How would you respond to R' Micha Berger's question, which was:
>
>> What about the bones of ... Adnei hasadeh -- which it is a
>> violation of retzhichah to kill?
>
> My -- probably mistaken -- understanding is that Adnei Hasadeh are
> precisely those homo sapiens who were not endowed with Tzelem
> Elokim. Is it possible for there to be a being which is assur to murder,
> yet not be metameh?

My response? It fits perfectly, as I never suggested that it would
have been permitted to murder a pre-Adam homo sapiens sapiens. That
would have been a gaping ethical hole in any theory suggesting Adam
was not the first homo sapiens sapiens, just the first to be endowed
with a tzelem.

However, given that pre-Adam homo sapiens sapiens (and reasonably, any
homo sapiens, be it a neatherthal or whatever, too) would still be
protected by the prohibition on murder, and nonetheless, unlike later
humans, his bones would still not convey tum'a upon direct contact
(maga' or massa', not ohel, which is anyway restricted to Beney
Yisrael), well that would mean that indeed, such old bones could be
kept in museum displays, unlike, say, bones unearthed even in a pagan
dig, from about 5000 years ago.

-- 
Arie Folger,
Recent blog posts on http://ariefolger.wordpress.com/
* Wir ziehen um! ? We are Moving
* Muslims Question Their Calendar ? Could it Have Happened to Us?
* Technologie und j?disches Lernen
* Biblical Advice for the Internet Age iv
* The Disappearance of Big Ideas
* Rabbi, wie stehen Sie zur Ein?scherung?
* Biblical Advice for the Internet Age iii

RMB wrote:

>Defining terms, just to minimize misunderstanding as well as to help
>readers who aren't used to them (borrowing from wikipedia):

>consequentialism: the moral worth of an action is determined only by
>its resulting outcome, and that one can only weigh the morality of an
>action after knowing all its consequences.

>utilitarianism: the proper course of action is the one that maximizes
>the overall happiness.

>deontological ethics: from the greek word meeting chiyuv + logia. Rules
>bind you to your duties.

>I am not sure what utilitarian but not consequentialist ethics would look
>like. Whomever wrote the utilitarianism page on wikipedia also doesn't,
>because they write that utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism.

But not all forms of consequentialism are necessarily utilitarian. (ie in
venn diagram terms, the circle representing the set of utilitarianism falls
within the greater circle representing the set of consequentialism).  

Which is why I wrote:

.  And my instincts are that halacha
: is generally not utilitarian - but I would be loathe at this stage to say
: that it is *never* utilitarian, and certainly that it is never
: consequentialist.  After all, the definition of wisdom in pirkei avos
: relates to being able to identify consequences.  Is one not to apply
wisdom,
: or is wisdom irrelevant to the application of halacha?

>In any case, wisdeom is relevent to deontological ethics, as is knowing
>consequences. The difference is which consequences are most relevent: who
>becomes the victim and how badly (consequentialism) or who becomes
corrupted
>and how badly (deontologism)

Why are consequences and wisdom necessarily relevant to deontological
ethics?  As you say, one can well take the view that I have to stick to my
chiyuv, whatever that may be, and it is HaShem's job to deal with the
consequences (and at the extreme, consequences do not actually exist, being
coincidental and organised by HaShem, so why should I consider them?).

I think once you accept that wisdom involves taking consideration of
consequences into consideration, then you are into forms of
consequentialism.  It is just the nature of the consequences that you
consider that becomes the issue.  If the consequences you consider involve
maximising the total happiness, then you are into utilitarian territory.
But considering who becomes corrupted and how badly is also a form of
consequentialism, it is just the value that is to be maximised that changes.


>-Micha

Regards

Chana

RMB writes:

>I am not entirely conflating the two, I am considering them subtypes of
>a single general issue. But in any case...

>1- Lemaaseh, we actually hold 1:60 is derabbanan, and that even bishul
>beta'aroves (siman 98 and Chulin 98) only requires a rov deOraisa.

Aruch HaShulchan Yoreh Deah 98:15:  The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch posken
that the ikar of ta'am k'ikar is d'orisa b'min sheaino mino and need shishim
min haTorah. ...

Yalkut Yosef Kitsur Shulchan Aruch 98:1: Ha'ikar l'dina d'ta'am k'ikar hu
min haTorah .. 

Need I go on.


> Which means the derashah from the nazir's shelamim is an asmachta. So if
my
>theory is problematic on these grounds, it's only a problem according
>to a shitah we don't follow.

No see above. Even amongst those rishonim who hold that it is not a drasha
gamura still (most) hold that the requirement for sixty in min b'ano mino is
min haTorah (eg Tosphos).


...
: So, as I have been trying to argue from the beginning, I just don't see
how
: you can bring any proofs or include in the discussion the Yoreh Deah siman
: 98 type case of taste bitul.  At most your discussion would surely have to
: be limited to comparing the Yoreh Deah siman 109 type case of bitul, and
: rov.  And even there, I am not sure you get the same results for a rov
: de'iqah leqaman and deleisa leqaman.

>Why not? Kol deparish applies to both.

And Socrates is a horse.

There are enough differences between d'iqah lequaman and deleisa leqaman (as
between men and horses) to make the fact that a statement might apply to
both cases not enough to make them the same.  

For example, the whole issue in Bechoros regarding the fact that tumas
ma'asah applies even where tumas ma'aga doesn't (which is the basis on which
those rishonim who disagree with the Rosh hold that one cannot eat all of
the three pieces in one sitting) only makes sense in relation to de'iqah
leqaman.

Rabbi Meir's shita of being choshesh l'meuta, in contrast, only applies
where it is deleisa leqaman.

Indeed, I am not sure that kol deparish does necessarily apply to deleisa
leqaman.  The classic case of deleisa leqaman is that rov times a boy does
not turn out to be a saris or a girl an alyanis.  It is not that the boy or
girl separated from anything - it is more a case of a statistical rov being
applied.

: And your linking up to regular forms of safek seems very difficult too.
: Those who understand the principle of safek d'orisa l'chumra to be
d'orisa...
: (the Rashba, the Ran and Tosphos), do not, as far as I am aware, link it
to
: any of the psukim referred to above.  And clearly the majority (according,
: inter alia, to Rav Ovadiah Yosef) who hold that the principle of safek
: d'orisa l'chumra is d'rabbanan basically are holding that once there is a
: safek, according to the Torah the matter is completely mutar ...

>The way I see it, all agree that in a case of rov, it would be assur
>de'oraisa, and in a case of mi'ut, it would not.

As mentioned above, this is not true of min shebeano mino.  It is true of
min shebemino (well not all, Rashi, for example, disagrees, but this is the
position of the majority).

> The question becomes whether the kellal is "assur if rov" or "mutar if
mi'ut", with a nafqa
>mina when the safeiq is kemechtza al mechtza.

But the classic form of safek that you use to illustrate the case is that of
bein hashmashos.  This has nothing to do with rov.  Thus there is yet
another jump from discussions of rov to discussions of classic safek.

From this way of looking at the world, saying safeiq deOraisa lechumera
doesn't eliminate the notion of safeiq from the deOraisa lexicon. Because
that would deny the whole spectrum, and thus also eliminate rov.

Yes, that is my point.  Your thesis (leaving aside all the other problematic
aspects of it) insists on a position that safek d'orisa l'chumra is a
d'orisa principle, whereas the majority, at least according to ROY, who
poskens accordingly, is like the Rambam that safek d'orisa l'chumra is a
rabbinic principle.  This means that, according to this conception, safek
and rov are entirely different principles, with rov applying in various
limited circumstances, such as min b'mino, as a d'orisa principle.  

: But the esrog's status is rabbinic - and therefore the fact that the
rabbis
: extended it because *we* are not sure, doesn't mean that there is anything
: intrinsically a mixed identity about bein hashmashos, just that we don't
: know what it is.

>But "not sure" means "and therefore say it's both". Whether the
>uncertainty is rabbinic or Torahitic, that's not the way we today (aside
>from Quantum Mechanics) think of "don't know". Chazal treat unknowns as
>a mixture, (1) for both kinds of unknown, and (2) that is entirely alien
>to western culture, ever since Aristo codified the logical principles
>of the Law of Excluded Middle and Law of Contradiction. In any context,
>this is a novel idea worthy of playing out what it say about how chazal
>see the world.

But while you keep asserting that this is the way that Chazal treat
unknowns, I just don't think it is true.

That is why I pointed you in the direction of the discussion regarding
timtum and koi.  Have a look, for example, at Bechoros 41b.

Ta Shma the Torah states "zachar" (to be used as an olah) to exclude a
female, but when it says "zachar" below, what is it coming to exclude? - a
timtum and an androgonous.  Now who is the author of this braisa.  If you
want to say the tanna kama - [that cannot be because] sfeka hu. ... and
similarly further on when it analyses the position of Rabbi Yishmael.

That is, if you understand a timtum and androgonos to be a safek, then, as
Rashi puts it "leka safek kamei shamaya ele vadai beriya bifnei atzmo" - ie
there is no concept of safek to HaShem or the Torah, and thus if the *Torah*
is coming to exclude a timtum or androgonos, then these individuals *must
be* an independent form of creation, a separate gender, and not just a safek
male or female.

The point of this whole gemora is that, when one is dealing with a safek
while *we* may not be sure, klapai shamayim they are sure.  

On Mon, Jan 09, 2012 at 03:33:21PM -0000, Chana Luntz wrote:
: How would you characterise bein hashmashos using Rabbi Bensimon's
typology?
: I would have thought it would have be considered a safek b'etzem...

>It might depend on the nature of the safeiq.

>If you hold that every moment is a safeiq, that the day switches at some
>point in time between sunset and tzeis and we can't tell when, then it
>is a safeiq begeder siba. If it's a safeiq whether the day switches at
>sunset or at tzeis, perhaps that's because it's a sadfeiq be'etzem --
>we know the two moments, we don't know which is halachically meaningful.

Clearly if I am out and about without a watch, and shabbas is approaching, I
am going to have a safek b'geder siba, as I won't have all the information I
need about the point at which the rays of the sun's light stop hitting the
earth, so I will not be able to determine shkia.  This parallels not having
all the information one needs to determine whether a piece of meat is kosher
or not (ie its history).  But in the general case, regardless of whether
every moment is considered a safek or not, the reality is that even if I
have absolutely all the physical evidence and history and scientific
measurements possibly available of the precise angle of the sun and its
movement in relation to the earth, I *still* don't know whether it is day or
night.  That seems to me to be a safek be'etzem, it is inherent in the
nature and creation of the thing, not because of some lack of knowledge on
my part such as history or angle or time that in theory some other person
could bring me (if they had been watching closely).  It is, to use the
language you use below, a safek in how to assign the din (of yom or layla)
to the metzius.

: So I don't think my examples of a timtum or a koi are red herrings.  These
: examples, ie of safek b'etzem are at the heart of the form of safek that
RMB
: wants to utilise to derive his quasi quantum mechanical theology....

>Timtum and koi are sefeiqos in pesaq, not in biology. Even if we gave
>the metumtum a full body MRI, s/he is still begeder safeiq. It's a
>safeiq be'eztzem.

Yes, exactly, and so is shkia.

>The three chatichos are begeder siba, a safeiq because we don't know
>the metzi'us.

Yes, that is right.  And that is why I think that this language RDR brought
is coming to assist me in the argument I was making.  You started by talking
about the three chatichos (ie a safek b'geder siba), but you then jumped to
discussing shkia and sfekos more generally (ie which included sfekos
b'etzem).  The discussion about sfekos b'etzem are centred in the gemora
around the timtum/androgonos and the koi.  My point was that the gemora
deals with these kinds of sfekos, not in the way you appear to explain it,
but in a way that assumes that either HaShem knows whether a person is a
male or female (if indeed we are dealing with a safek), or alternatively
that it is a separate kind of creation, a beria bifnei atzmo, and this is
*not* called safek.


>IOW, I am suggesting that the sevara behind safeiq is a subtype of that for
>mixtures because when a person is in doubt, he entertains both conflicting
>possibilities.

But, as indicated in various places above, I do not believe this matches the
halachic reality.


>So, I can now speak of three kinds of sefeiqos:

>1- The safeiq is on the level of what is the metzi'us. Kol deparish.
>2- There once was a known din, so the safeiq is in what that din is. Kol
   qavuah.
>3- There is a safeiq in how to assign a din to a metzi'us -- safeiq
   be'etzem.

>When I speak of safeiq being a kind of taaroves because safeiq creates
>a mixture of identity in the affected people's minds, I am only talking
>about #1. It's something I'm saying about what "metzi'us" means, and
>therefore doesn't touch sefeiqos in a specific item that was qavua or
>in pesaq on an issue in general.

OK, at least we are getting a bit closer, ie it is not every type of safek
to which this, but just a more limited type of safek (and it excludes sfekos
b'etzem).

But if you look at the literature on safek d'orisa l'chumra and safek
d'rabbanan l'kula - there are many many examples in which the safek is one
of what is the metzius.  If the governing rule was kol deparish, then
regardless of whether the halachic question that arose due to the safek in
metzius was due to a din that is d'orisa or d'rabbanan, the halacha should
be the same, but of course it is not.  Take indeed the case brought by the
Aruch HaShulchan and in the Yalkut Yosef in the simanim I referred to at the
beginning of this posting.  If something, such as a drop of milk, fell into
a meat stew, and it was not known whether or not there was sixty against
that drop of milk, and then, before there was a chance to measure, the whole
tavshil upended, and measurement became impossible, then the tavshil is
assur, even though it is known than there was definitely rov meat to the
milk, because of safek d'orisa l'chumra.  Here is a case of a safek of what
is the metzius - we do not know whether or not there was sixty of meat
against the milk drop (although we do know that there was rov).  And the
principle that is applied is safek d'orisa l'chumra, because the requirement
to have sixty to drown out the taste is from the Torah.  If on the other
hand we were dealing with a safek in metzius where the requirement was
d'rabbanan, then whatever it was would be mutar, because of safek d'rabbanan
l'kula.

>Tir'u baTov!
>-Micha

Regards

Chana

This thread began, typo in subject line and all in Nov '09. I revived it
last June when I got to Y-mi Eiruvin 3:9, top of vilna 26b), in which we
learn that some "seder mo'ados" was available in R' Yosi's day. Meaning a
calendar (if not the current one) must have been in use before R'
Hillel II. (Even according to those who disagree with R' Bachaye and R'
Chananel.)

The thread is at http://bit.ly/mtp2YM , the revival I'm mentioning is
the v28n91 post in that thread.

Someone else just pointed out to me that ANY mention of precomputed
calendar in the Y-mi has to predate R' Hillel II -- the text was closed
(aside from less intentional drift) by then.

But here's another bit of evidence... Y-mi Sukkah, end of 4:1, vilna 18a.

    R' Simon [a/k/a R' Shimon ben Pazzi] charged those who do the
    computations... Have in mind that you do not make neither teqi'asah
    [RH] on Shabbos, nor Arvasa [Hoshana Rabba] on Shabbos. And if you're
    stuck, make Teq'asah [on Shabbos] and do not make Arvasa.

R' Simon and R' Yosi are both third generation amora'im (turn of through
early 3rd cent CE), roughly contemporary.

So, in their day, people did preplan the calendar, but there was enough
leeway that these things were a decision. This still fits R' Bachaye
and R' Chananel, because it still means they planed RC and only used
eidim as part of the maaseh mitzvah of qiddush hachodesh. But it gives
an earliest possible date for the use of a fixed calendar, no?

It could be explained two ways, and I'm not sure the difference is all
that much:

1- There were guidelines, but the algorithm wasn't firm enough to force
their hand on when RH is. Somewhat computed, since there are times
you couldn't get both RH and HR to be on a day other than Shabbos,
but not entirely.

2- There was an algorithm, but the ilin demashchevin had the authority
to refine the algorithm.


The question is what is the "seder mo'ados" that R' Yosi speaks of?
Was it that people were preplaning moados far enough ahead to mail the
Alexandrians of a while in advance?

Abayei veRava were 4th gen. Meaning just after the time in question, the
calendar was steady enough for Abayei to talk about YT sheini shel goliyos
being minhag avos. Same question about "seder moados" -- it's possible
YT sheini became a derabbanan rather than a real safeiq deOraisa due to
precomputation and mail, not due to fixing the calendar permanently.

And R' Hillel II, who the tradition says was pre-meqadeish the months,
was 5th. (Which doesn't mean he invented the current calendar, just that
he enabled qiddush without eidim coming to the Sanhedrin.)

It seems that with the exception of a lack of clarity of one dechiyah rule
which wasn't decided until R' Saadia Gaon's day, our calendar was very
around the era of Abayei veRava, give or take at most a decade or two.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             It's nice to be smart,
mi...@aishdas.org        but it's smarter to be nice.
http://www.aishdas.org                   - R' Lazer Brody
Fax: (270) 514-150

Shorter dictionary this time, just as reminders:
    consequentialism: look at the the outcome
    utilitarianism: maximize happiness
    deontology: look at people's behavior

On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 10:00:18AM -0000, Chana Luntz wrote:
:>I am not sure what utilitarian but not consequentialist ethics would look
: >like. Whomever wrote the utilitarianism page on wikipedia also doesn't,
: >because they write that utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism.
: 
: But not all forms of consequentialism are necessarily utilitarian. (ie in
: venn diagram terms, the circle representing the set of utilitarianism falls
: within the greater circle representing the set of consequentialism).  

RnCL wuoting her prior post:
:: And my instincts are that halacha
:: is generally not utilitarian - but I would be loathe at this stage to say
:: that it is *never* utilitarian, and certainly that it is never
:: consequentialist....

This is the lne that throught me. RnCL, I took you as saying that it is
harder for you to assert at this point that halakhah isn't in general
consequentialist is something harder than that it isn't in general
utilitarian. If every utilitarian ethical theory is consequentialist
(maximizing happiness is judging based on outcome), then it's utilitianism
that will always be at least as hard to rule out. No?

Was I thrown off by the double negative (loath... to say that it is never)
and misunderstood?

...
: Why are consequences and wisdom necessarily relevant to deontological
: ethics?  As you say, one can well take the view that I have to stick to my
: chiyuv, whatever that may be, and it is HaShem's job to deal with the
: consequences (and at the extreme, consequences do not actually exist, being
: coincidental and organised by HaShem, so why should I consider them?).
...
: But considering who becomes corrupted and how badly is also a form of
: consequentialism, it is just the value that is to be maximised that changes.

I don't think it is. Even though the buzzword is based on the word
"consequence". Deontology literally means "reasoning about rule-following
people" -- and having rule-following people or having rules be followed
are outcomes one uses for ethical judgments. Every ethical theory
would be consequentialist if the term didn't refer to a limited kind
of consequence.

Consequentialism looks specifically at object of the verb. Yes, the
verb may be reflexive, it's the viewpoint of the person being hit that's
judged. Deontology looks at the subject.

A deontologist might say it's wrong to hit, even to hit yourself.

A consequentialist might say it's wrong to get hit, even by
yourself. Therefore causing someone to get hit, such as by hitting
yourself, is unethical.

Ha'adam nif'al lefi pe'ulasav is saying "it's wrong to be a hitter",
which I think of a deontological. Perhaps it doesn't compartmentalize
into either bucket.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Strength does not come from winning. Your
mi...@aishdas.org        struggles develop your strength When you go
http://www.aishdas.org   through hardship and decide not to surrender,
Fax: (270) 514-1507      that is strength.        - Arnold Schwarzenegger

On 12/01/2012 11:31 AM, Saul.Z.New...@kp.org wrote:
>
> _http://yeranenyaakov.blogspot.com/2012/01/rav-morde
> chai-eliyahu-and-netilat.html_
> a wartime bracha.....

What a wonderful story, but I wonder about the halacha here.  Isn't it
an explicit halacha that soldiers in camp in wartime are exempt from
netilat yadayim for meals?  AIUI this has nothing to do with pikuach
nefesh, and is not merely a leniency bish'at had'chak but rather a
condition of the basic halacha; just as one is exempt from washing if
one eats mezonot, so one is exempt if one is a soldier in a camp at war
(provided there are 10 soldiers there).  Further, in such a situation,
even if water is plentiful and one chooses to wash anyway, wouldn't the
bracha be levatalah?


-- 
Zev Sero        "Natural resources are not finite in any meaningful
z...@sero.name    economic sense, mind-boggling though this assertion
                  may be. The stocks of them are not fixed but rather
                 are expanding through human ingenuity."
                                            - Julian Simon

do animals have bechira??
eg bilaam's donkey (apparently they 

can see angels (at least in this case)
and have thoughts (

?
hmz
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No, animals do not have bechira chofshit.  Only Bnei Adam, who have 
Tzelem Elokim, have bechira chofshit.

Lisa

On 1/13/2012 2:06 PM, Harvey Benton wrote:
> do animals have bechira??
> eg bilaam's donkey (apparently they
> can see angels (at least in this case)
> and have thoughts (
> hmz
>
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> _______________________________________________
> Avodah mailing list
> Avo...@lists.aishdas.org
> http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org
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On Fri, Jan 13, 2012 at 02:20:08PM -0600, Lisa Liel wrote:
> No, animals do not have bechira chofshit.  Only Bnei Adam, who have  
> Tzelem Elokim, have bechira chofshit.

RHB, you should take a look at our discussion about tzaar baalei chaim.

I argued that bechirah chafshis and being aware of one's own thoughts
go hand in hand. Bechirah means being able to think about one's thinking
and also to make decisions, and thus change one's train of thought.

Therefore, I concluded that since animals do not have bechirah, they
neither are aware of their own thoughts. They can feel pain, but not
think about feeling pain. Misery and suffering the way humans do is
simply impossible.

And from that I argued that tzaar baalei chaim is a mitzvah bein adam
le'atzmo, because (while one can cause pain) one isn't causing suffering.
But a little boy who pulls wings off flies or hunts squirrels is
practicing middos that will haunt human victims later.

http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol10/v10n091.shtml#14

http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/getind
ex.cgi?section=A#AGRIPROCESSORS%20IN%20THE%20NEWS%20KASHRUS%20QUESTION
or http://bit.ly/wjIp6P

Gut Voch!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Weeds are flowers too
mi...@aishdas.org        once you get to know them.
http://www.aishdas.org          - Eeyore ("Winnie-the-Pooh" by AA Milne)
Fax: (270) 514-1507

sarah lived one hundred and twenty
seven years, but in the chumash, imo, 

the loshon rabim/is not accurate, eg, 

sheva shanim is correct, but is one-
hundred and twenty also not loshon
rabim??
compare to lshon in megillas esther 
do any meforshim talk about this??
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