Avodah Mailing List

Volume 27: Number 47

Thu, 11 Feb 2010

• 1. Re: Mar'is Ayin and Personal Standards (rabbirichwol...@gmail.com)
• 2. Re: Rights in halakhah (Chanoch (Ken) Bloom)
• 3. Re: logic (Eli Turkel)
• 4. Aristotle was an Orthodox Jew and the Rivash apposed Kabalah? (jew@when.com)
• 5. Re: Microwave Ovens on Shabbos (Chana)
• 6. Re: Rights in halakhah (Rabbi Arie Folger)
• 7. Re: Chezkas Kehunah (j...@when.com)
• 8. Re: Chezkas Kehunah (Micha Berger)
• 9. Re: Aristotle was an Orthodox Jew and the Rivash apposed Kabalah? (Zev Sero)
• 10. Re: Habituation (kennethgmil...@juno.com)
• 11. Re: Rights in halakhah (Zev Sero)
• 12. S'udas Purim in the Morning (rabbirichwol...@gmail.com)

Akiva Miller kennethgmil...@juno.com :
[Re: reataurant owner]
> If the owner claims that the halachos of Mar'is Ayin forbid him to
> use those boxes, then those others would have a good point. But if the
> owner says something like, "people could see it and come to the wrong
> conclusion. I have a reputation to protect." - then I see no problem.?

Re: Kashrus agencies
> Again, as long as they don't make any claim that the halachah requires
> them to do this, they are on safe ground.


OK I will "let the cat out of the bag"

1 the restaurant owner is a Chinese Non-Jew. His concern is economic

2 Kashrus Agencies often told me their humros were [mere] "Standards"
and NOT strictly halachic requirements as per SA.

3 and my opposition to not avoding DE as a policy is because it will
"dumb down" Or miss an opportunity for the masses to learn about nat
bar nat. It's also confusing for the sophisticated consumer who could
use that distinction.

Micha:
> Bedi'eved, a chazaqah is a chazaqah. But who wants to get to that point?

Which is why some standards, policies, stringencies are made to avoid
problems - even though Talmudic law permits them. L'migdar Milsa.

KT
RRW
Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

On Wed, 2010-02-10 at 16:06 -0500, Micha Berger wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 10, 2010 at 03:49:26PM -0500, Zev Sero wrote:
> : >If I cared about implication, then I would say that rights and duties
> : >are equivalent. What's my right to life but everyone else's duty not to
> : >kill me?
> 
> : That's exactly what I wrote about two messages ago...
> 
> But since I don't care about implication, since it's less of an effect
> on culture than how we talk about the principles, we're STILL in
> disagreement.
> 
> :>My whole point is what is considered primary, how the legal theory
> :>influences the culture of the people who fall under it.
> 
> : And this is what I've not been getting about your theory for as long
> : as you've been propounding it.  This distinction you're drawing doesn't
> : seem to make sense.  There is no "primary"; they're the same thing.
> 
> There is a difference between a philosophy that says the human condition
> is based on A, therefore B, and one that says the human condition is
> based on B therefore A.
> 
> The different self-images create different people. Even if they create
> the same law.

To phrase that another way.

In many cases, contemporary political parlance has shifted from talking
about negative rights to positive rights. Comparing the US constitution
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (e.g. Sections 25, 26, and
27) shows the shift in thinking between 1791 and 1948. This shift is a
slippery slope of sorts in the way we've thought about rights,
obligations, and governments.

The obligations-based view of one's conduct towards another person and
the rights-based view of one's conduct with respect to another person
may be duals which can express the exact same legal mandates and
prohibitions, but which lens we consider primary in viewing these
consequences determines the nature of the slippery slope, and the
evolution of how the legal theory changes.

--Ken

<I think, if we are to continue, we
should spend some time establishing our terms.>

I agree and as such have moved this avodah.
Lets begin with some example that you suggest with gemara logic
differs from math logic (including multi-valued logic and probability)


-- 
Eli Turkel

"There is a true story of a great philosopher

renowned throughout the world, whose name was
Aristotle - that at the time of his old age he wrote
a letter to his student Alexander the Macedonian -
the king of Greece (See source Shalshelet
HaKabalah) this text:
Blessed is Hash-m [the G-d of the Jews - the sole
G-d of the universe and of all], that opens eyes of
the blind, that shows the sinners the straight path.
He is exalted with praises that are worthy of Him -
For I do not know how to praise Him upon all of
the mercy and great kindness that he bestowed
upon me.That he took me out of this foolishness that I was

                                                              
immersed in all the days of my life in dealing with
wisdom of philosophy to explain everything
according to nature - that's understood through
rationalization.
And I made many books on this wisdom - like the
sand that is on the banks of the of the sea.
Until I was rebuked now by the mingling of my
life with one (Jewish) sage from the sages of
Israel. And in his speaking to me, he
demonstrated his tremendous wisdom.
And I recognized the high level of the holy Torah,
that was given at the Mount Sinai.
And he drew my heart with the words of the Torah
that showed me and explained to me true novelties
and wonders that were done [by Hash-m, the G-d
of Israel]." - Aristotle 


http://www.jerusalemlife.com/torahkids/arisheb.pdf


"Although Isaac was very strict in his halakic decisions, he was farfrom
being narrow-minded. He has nothing to say against secularknowledge; he
disapproves the study of Aristotleonly because the latter professed belief
in the eternity of matter anddenied God's providence. Isaac's responsa
evidence a profound knowledgeof the philosophical writings of his time. In
one of them (No. 118) Heexplains the difference between the opinion of Levi
ben Gershom (Ralbag) and that of Abraham ben Davidof Posqui?res (RABaD) on
free will, and gives his own views on thatcomplicated subject. He shows
himself a decided adversary of the Kabalah. His teacher says Isaac never
spoke of the Sefirot, and Isaac cites the words of a certain philosopher
who reproaches the cabalists with believing in the "Ten" (Sefirot) as the
Christians believe in the Trinity (No. 159)."

http://www.statemaster.com/encyclopedia/Isaac-ben-Sheshet

-- I have also heard a rumor that anyone who does not believe in kabalah is
considered an apikorus. Certainly, the Ramchal (who has the status of a
rishon according to many) practiced kabalah. Can anyone reconcile these two
views? Is this letter from Arisitotle accurate? I would say the author has
a migoo because he could of made it sound so, so much less ridiculous. 

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I don't know why I don't seem to be seeing these posts originally, only when
other people comment, but I gather that RJS wrote:

> >   Being that the microwave is not considered utilizing fire (I
> believe),
> > an=
> > d that the issur of cooking on shabbos applies to cooking with fire
> exclus=
> > ively-  is there a tshuva that would allow me to use a microwave on
> shabbo=
> > s with the provision that it run on a timer and the light will not
> turn on=
> >  when I open the door? If so, where can I find it?
> >
> > =20
> > -Josh Schulman=20

The Yalkut Yosef says no - this is chelek daled, Shabbat 3, siman 118 letter
19.  He says there in his summary:

It is forbidden to cook on Shabbat b'makshir hamikro gal or beturbo gal even
if it works by way of a Shabbat clock, and one should not be lenient in this
for a choleh sheain bo sakana. But if there is a need to cook on Shabbat the
needs of a choleh sheyesh bo sakana according to the determination of a
doctor, it is better to cook in a micro-gal.

And he has quite extensive footnotes there in which he discusses the issue.

Now as I have noted on this list before, there appears to be a gap between
the position of the Yalkut Yosef on time clocks on Shabbat and that found in
ROY's most recent volume of Yabiat Omer (10 Orech Chaim Siman 26) and so it
is possible that ROY might argue differently.  However he does not address
the question in that teshuva.

BTW, somebody on this list was asking earlier, and I don't remember who,
about written teshuvos regarding non religious Jews and touching wine. Have
a look at Yabiat Omer chelek 1 Yoreh Deah siman 11.  The question as posed
was: "in the din of wine that was touched by a mumar l'chalel Shabbat
befarhesia if it is possible to permit to drink it in order not to embarrass
the mumar".  8 or so pages later he concludes that we can rely on the Binyan
Zion, HaRi Asad and others and permit, especially as the din of stam yanum
is derabanan, and considering him a mumar is only derabbanan, and with two
derabbanans it is permitted to be makil in such a situation.  You really do
need to read the full teshuva though to see all ramifications of what he is
discussing.

Regards

Chana

RZS and RMB have been arguing about whether there is a difference
between a rights based and a duty based philosophy of law. Particular
attention was paid to the question whether there is a difference
between a right to life and a duty not to kill. Well, one difference
is whether one considers it  society's obligation (absent insurance
contracts) to provide for every conceivable means, including
experimental procedures and medication that may or may not be helpful,
in order to preserve life. In a duty based system, your duties are
defined, in a rights based system, you can keep on demanding "but I
have a right to live." Of course, conversely, abuse is possible in the
form of triage and denial of care, but I don't think that that should
be different between the two systems. Finally, another difference is
that rights can be given up, whereas with duties, that is harder.
Hence, in a rights based system, euthanasia would sooner be accepted
than in a duty based system.

The interesting thing is that while the difference re: euthanasia is
acknowledged, with Judaism and its offshoots being strongly opposed to
active euthanasia, despite the subjects acquiescence, while the rights
based secular systems are increasingly in favor, yet, regarding the
obligation to heal, the situation is reversed, with Judaism being
strongly in favor of greater efforts, while the secular systems are
moving away from that. I think that a crucial reason for this
difference is the gemara in IIRC Sanhedrin, which explains the duty to
heal as coming from the obligation to return lost objects. Hence,
another duty, not the duty not to kill, is operative in medical care,
as far as Judaism is concerned.

However, while the above differences may exist, I can see some holes
in the above reasoning, since halakha does not always mandate
extending life. Still, I believe the above reasoning to be generally
correct.
-- 
Arie Folger,
Recent blog posts on http://ariefolger.wordpress.com/
* Is the New Israel Fund Indirectly Responsible for the Goldstone
Blood Libel? (en & de)
* Is Mu?ammar Al-Qadhafi Jewish
* After the Tefillin Terror Scare
* Der schwierige Nachlass
* Was ist Bitach?n (Zuversicht)?

 

 
On Tue, Feb 09, 2010 at 05:29:37PM +0000, Allan Engel wrote:
: If today's Kohanim would be considered "safeik kohanim", would they be
: obliged to do a Pidyon Haben on their firstborns, mita'am sofeik d'orayso,
: or would it be a sfek sfeika?

But they aren't. There is a chazaqah in place."


I just spoke spoke to a Rabbi that takes all halachic questions over the
phone professionally. We pretty much had the following conversation....

"Hi Rabbi, I am a kohen. my wife recently
told me (and a friend corroborated this) that she had relations once
with a non-Jew in college. We have been married for 2 years and she
told me this as soon as we both found out that such a woman is
prohibited from marrying a kohen according to orthodox Jewish law (I told him that I
thought a kohen should not marry such a woman because it wasn't the
right thing to do and was not very observant at the time- though I never
would have thought it could invalidate our children from being considered
kohanim). She had dated this non-Jew for a short time. He
asked me about my parents. I told him that my mom grew up modern
orthodox. He asked me if she dormed in a college and I told him she
did. The Rabbi said that there was a good chance that she too had
relations with a non-Jew once, and also that there was a good chance
that my father's mother (being a holocaust survivor I suppose) also had relations
with a non-Jew once prior to meeting my father. 


The Rabbi said because of this, I can be a chalal (he used those
exactwords; chalal)- theproduct of a union between a kohen a someone
prohibited to him. He thenasked me if the penetration my wife had with this
non-Jew was painful.I said I wasn't sure, she didn't say. He said that if
she truly hadrelations with him the penetration would have been painful,
therefor,there is a doubt whether she is "someone who is forbidden to
akohen". Last but not least,he told me that since there are two doubts, I
can remain married to mywife (because of sfek sfeka deoreita lekula).
Heassured me that I can still go up for the first alliya, duchen,
andeverything- and that our children will be able to also. (I was half
expecting him, at the end of the conversation, to tell me to "quack like a
rooster" while duchening; B''H, he didn't ). 

--Now, we said that the reason we have to honor kohanim is because theyare
not safek kohanim, but rather, that they have a chazaka. If theywere safek
kohanim, being that safek derobanan lekula, we would nothave to honor them
according to the Rema and Tosfot. However, becausethey have this chazaka,
we do have to honor them. How do we know thatthey have this chazakah?
Because if they duchen, being that ducheningis a deoreita, if they were
safek kohanim, they would not be permittedto duchen, because safek deorieta
lechumra (in the sense of not doing).But this Rabbi just said that I, a
real kohen deoreita with a chazaka,can remain married to my wife who most
certainly had relations with anon-Jew because I might be a chalal. 
So you see, 

1) When it comes to kavod; they have a chazaka. 
2) When it comes divorce; they do not have a chazakah. 

This Rabbi used the same exact logic as I did, when itsuited the kohen.
There seems to be a double standard: every non-kohen(who is not a Rabbi
(talmud chacham takes precedence)) has to treatkohanim with the kavod as if
they have chazaka- even if it makes theirlife difficult. While kohanim can
treat themselves as if they do nothave a chazaka- when it makes their life
difficult.

-I have heard there is a family that have documentation proving they are kohanim- I would run to treat them as vadai kohanim! 

-Josh S. 


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On Wed, Feb 10, 2010 at 10:05:38PM -0500, RJS j...@when.com wrote:
: I just spoke spoke to a Rabbi that takes all halachic questions over the
: phone professionally. We pretty much had the following conversation....

There is much in this post I wouldn't have felt comfortable raising in
public. I'm not sure if you're admitting that you duped a rabbi in order
to get his opinion on kohanim, or just said something about a real
person's history...

However, now that the post was approved and the damage done...

The Rav in question did not assume every kohein is a safeiq. Rather, he
tried to find grounds for creating a specific sefeiq in your case. Both
in the kohein's geneology, and in the wife's story about college life.

Second, you write:
:                       Last but not least,he told me that since there
: are two doubts, I can remain married to mywife (because of sfek sfeka
: deoreita lekula). Heassured me that I can still go up for the first
: alliya, duchen, andeverything- and that our children will be able to
: also....

The fact that a safeiq is treated as a state in itself, and thus can
be treated as part of one side for one question and though it's part of
the other side for another is admittedly weird. We're used to thinking
in two valued logic, and therefore that doubt means the "real value"
of true of false hasn't yet been fully determined. In the kind of logic
we're used to, that would be a paradox. In a multivalent logic (one that
allows values between true and false), the rules are different. The
weirdness is in the gap between the kind of logic Artistotle et al
developed and made part of western culture, and the kind of logic Chazal
used.

(This is *not* in argument with that RETurkel is saying on the "logic"
thread. He includes multivalent logics as part of math.)

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             The trick is learning to be passionate in one's
mi...@aishdas.org        ideals, but compassionate to one's peers.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

That Aristotle converted is an old Jewish legend.  Is it true?  Who knows?
Did Nero really convert, as Jewish legend insists?  Again, who is to say?
Dismissing it just because it *is* a Jewish legend would clearly be wrong.

As for the Rivash, quoting Wikipedia, which is in turn heavily based on
the Jewish Encyclopaedia, is worthless.  The JE was written by Reformers
and Maskilim, with the specific intention of denigrating Torah and its
believers, and especially Kabala and Chassidus, which the maskilim saw
as their chief enemy.

In particular, the bit about how "Isaac cites the words of a certain
philosopher" is downright dishonest in its implication that he cites those
words approvingly.  The very way he refers to the fellow, "echad min
hamitpalsephim", shows his opinion about the quote.

-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                     - Margaret Thatcher

(I am indebted to listmember R' Samuel Svarc for several things he wrote,
both on-list and off-list, which showed me some important differences in
halachah between seeing ervah and touching ervah.)

I would like to highlight two more things which are easily confused with each other.

A man might be in a certain situation, where he is exposed to ervah, but
because of certain factors, he might correctly conclude that he is allowed
to stay in that situation, provided that he does not deliberately *look* at
the ervah.

The same man, in the same situation, exposed to the same ervah, and with
the same factors applying, might INCORRECTLY conclude that he is not only
allowed to stay in that situation, but is even allowed to say brachos
there.

Consider the case where the ervah that I am referring to is excrement.
Excrement is an inherently objectionable thing, and one is not allowed to
say brachos in its presence. This is true even for a person who is both
blind and has no sense of smell. The criteria are whether the excrement is
visible or smelly, not whether HE can see or smell it.

R' Michael Makovi wrote:

> If a blind man cannot see an attractive woman, for example,
> that seems to me to mitigate the issur of looking at her,
> even though he's neither habituated nor distracted. He won't
> have hirhur / hana'ah from her, and to me, that's enough.

(Let's set aside the fact that it is not *possible* for him to look at
her.) The problem with this paragraph is that it stops a few words short.
"That's enough..." for what? Yes, that's enough to allow him to stay in
that situation. But it is not enough to allow him to say brachos there.

Mechaber 75:6 --

"If ervah was in front of him, and he turned his face away from it, (29) or
he closed his eyes, or it was nighttime, or he is blind, then he is allowed
to say the Shma -- because Hashem made this dependent on sight, and he
cannot see it."

Mishne Brurah 75:29 --

"But the Acharonim conclude that none of these solutions help, except for
turning his face away, because the pasuk (Devarim 23:15 - A.M.) does not
write, "you shall not see", but "it shall not be seen" - meaning "it will
not be visible". And even turning his face, which was allowed, is only in
the case where he turned his entire body and is standing in another
direction, so that becomes at his side (and not in front of him - A.M.).
But if he merely turned his face, it does not help. Similarly, if he is
himself naked, no solution can be devised which would allow him to speak
divrei Torah. The Mishbetzos Zahav wrote that if he is in one reshus, and a
naked man is in another reshus facing him, and he closes his eyes from
seeing, in such a case all authorities would allow it. Something similar
can be found in Derech Hachaim. In Eshel Avraham 79:8 it sounds like he
changed his mind about this, and Chayei Adam 4:9 doesn't sound that way
either. However, if there was a glass window 
 making a hefsek between him and the ervah, and he closes his eyes from
 seeing, then it would help according to all opinions, because at least a
 chatzitzah is covering the ervah..."

R' Michael Makovi later wrote:

> Rn' Toby Katz was confused by my heter for a blind man to look
> at photographs in Playboy. What I was trying to do was made an
> extreme example: this man has 0% hirhur, and so he has 100%
> heter. He can look at Playboy all day, because he'll get no
> hirhur whatsoever. The case of a blind man looking at
> photographs sounds ridiculous, and it is - that was precisely
> my intention. I was trying to find a case where there is
> absolutely positively no hashah of hirhur whatsoever. The
> hashash is so non-existent, that it doesn't even make sense
> to discuss the case. To prohibit a blind man to look at
> photographs in Playboy would just be the most outrageous
> pesaq ever. (Unless the fear was that he'd look at them in
> public, and cause a hilul hashem. The fear wouldn't be
> hirhur / hana'ah, however.)

Yes, the case of a blind man looking at photographs is ridiculous. But I
would say that because it is simply not possible for him to LOOK at the
photos, the case must be reworded: What can he do in the PRESENCE of these
photos?

Can he hold these photos up in front of his face? Yes, for exactly the
reasons which RMM gives - there's no hanaah. But can he hold the photo in
front of his face, and say a bracha? The above-cited MB is directly
relevant to this question. (My guess is that the photo is merely a picture
*of* ervah, and is not *actual* ervah, and that, combined with his
inability to see it, would allow him to say the bracha. But if someone
would say that the photo *is* actual ervah, I could not demonstrate that he
is wrong.)

R' Isaac Balbin wrote:

> There was a recent Psak that a blind man may use his hands to
> determines how a woman "looks" if that is important to him
> being able to determine that she is attractive to him for the
> purposes of marriage.

R' Michael Makovi responded:

> That was Rabbi Yuval Cherlow, my rosh yeshiva at Yeshivat
> Hesder Petah Tiqwa. I'd have to ask him to be sure, but IIRC
> I believe his heter was based on the presumption that for
> this blind man, feeling people's face is normal for him, and
> he gets no hana'ah from it. I'm not sure, however, if he
> permits this only for the sake of shiddukh/marriage, or if
> he permits blind men to feel women's faces in general.

Let's invoke Occam's Razor again, and aim for the fewest guesses, with the
only jump being a postulated equivalence between seeing for a sighted
person, and touching for a blind person. Now, a sighted man must not look
at women, because he might enjoy it, although an exception is made in the
case of a prospective wife. Similarly, a blind man must not touch women,
because he might enjoy it, even if an exception might be made in the case
of the prospective wife.

Akiva Miller

____________________________________________________________
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Rabbi Arie Folger wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 11, 2010 at 3:54 PM, Zev Sero <z...@sero.name> wrote:
>> The right to life has
>> *never* been construed by its advocates as a right to be given the means
>> to sustain life, whether in the form of food, shelter, clothing, or
>> medical care;
> 
> You should read some of the more recent constitutional amendments in a
> number of European countries.

That's precisely because those constitutions are *not* based on the
natural law school, and their framers do *not* advocate a "right to life".


Rabbi Arie Folger wrote:
> RZS and RMB have been arguing about whether there is a difference
> between a rights based and a duty based philosophy of law. Particular
> attention was paid to the question whether there is a difference
> between a right to life and a duty not to kill. Well, one difference
> is whether one considers it  society's obligation (absent insurance
> contracts) to provide for every conceivable means, including
> experimental procedures and medication that may or may not be helpful,
> in order to preserve life. In a duty based system, your duties are
> defined, in a rights based system, you can keep on demanding "but I
> have a right to live."

No, you can't.  Because the right to life is by definition a *negative*
right, just as are its two classical companions, the rights to liberty
and to property. (Jefferson's version replaced "property" with the more
wordy and roundabout "the pursuit of happiness", to avoid being seen as
endorsing slavery; but it meant the same thing.)  The right to life has
*never* been construed by its advocates as a right to be given the means
to sustain life, whether in the form of food, shelter, clothing, or
medical care; any more than the right to property can be construed as
a right to be given someone else's stuff!  The minute you concede the
existence of positive rights, then the scenario you describe is the
first station on the road to Hell.

> Finally, another difference is
> that rights can be given up, whereas with duties, that is harder.

No it isn't.  Because duties are *to* someone, and that person can
always waive them.

> Hence, in a rights based system, euthanasia would sooner be accepted
> than in a duty based system.

Only if the duty not to kill is seen as owed not to the potential victim
but to God (or the King, or the victim's family).

> The interesting thing is that while the difference re: euthanasia is
> acknowledged, with Judaism and its offshoots being strongly opposed to
> active euthanasia, despite the subjects acquiescence, while the rights
> based secular systems are increasingly in favor, yet, regarding the
> obligation to heal, the situation is reversed

This is because Judaism sees everybody as Hashem's property; a slave
cannot waive his right not to be killed, because the right doesn't
belong to him but to his Owner.  On the other hand if the Owner consents
to killing His slave, the slave's consent is not needed.

> I think that a crucial reason for this
> difference is the gemara in IIRC Sanhedrin, which explains the duty to
> heal as coming from the obligation to return lost objects.

But this obligation can be waived by the beneficiary, and is also
subject to considerations of economic efficiency.  Since the loser must
reimburse the finder for all expenses he incurred in returning his
property, if the anticipated costs will exceed the property's value
then he is presumed to consent to its non-return.  The same is true of
medical care; one need not spend more on a person's care than he would
be willing to spend out of his own pocket.  But the duty not to kill
him is absolute, because only his Owner can waive it.

-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                     - Margaret Thatcher

B"H we have been invited to a Bar-Mitzva on Purim morning which means
we will be eating a sumptuous meal then

It is likely that I will be working Purim afternoon - and will not be
able to have a s'udah with my family then.

While it's the common Minhag to have the Purim s'udah in the afternoon
[except on erev Shabbos - EG see Rema O"Ch 695:2] is there any reason
NOT to make the morning Bar Mitzvah meal the iqqar S'udas Purim? [FWIW
Rema b'sheim ThD says it's OK in the AM every in the year]

KT
RRW
Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile



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