Avodah Mailing List

Volume 27: Number 43

Tue, 09 Feb 2010

• 1. Re: Halacha vs. Policy - Poll re: Who To Marry (rabbirichwolpoe@gmail.com)
• 2. Re: Habituation (Michael Makovi)
• 3. Re: (no subject) (Micha Berger)
• 4. Re: Chezkas Kehunah (Micha Berger)
• 5. Re: Habituation (Micha Berger)
• 6. Re: Looking for sources about Chazal's Ruach Hakodesh (Micha Berger)
• 7. Re: Chezkas Kehunah (kennethgmil...@juno.com)
• 8. Rights in halakhah (Micha Berger)
• 9. Re: Halacha vs. Policy - Poll re: Who To Marry (kennethgmiller@juno.com)
• 10. Re: Halacha vs. Policy - Poll re: Who To Marry (Meir Shinnar)
• 11. Firing a Rabbi (Jonathan Baker)
• 12. Re: Mar'is Ayin and Personal Standards (kennethgmil...@juno.com)
• 13. Re: Mar'is Ayin and Personal Standards (Harry Weiss)
• 14. Re: Mar'is Ayin and Personal Standards (D&E-H Bannett)
• 15. Re: Habituation (Samuel Svarc)
• 16. Re: Mar'is Ayin and Personal Standards (Micha Berger)
• 17. Re: Halacha vs. Policy - Poll re: Who To Marry (Rich, Joel)
• 18. Re: Chezkas Kehunah (Allan Engel)

mikewindd...@gmail.com
> This is obvious, and. you don't need to serve under a poseq to know
> it. I don't see why serving under a poseq would make this any more or less
> obvious. Why on earth would someone think that it is better to marry the
> non-Jew??!! Just read all the Tanakhic narratives and midrashim about
> marrying gentiles,...

It is IMHO that intermarriage is such a ubiquitous theme in Tanach that
at times it seems to me that Tanach is a kind of "manifesto against
intermarriage". ;-) At least it's a major meta-Halachah.

[Email #2. -micha]

mikewindd...@gmail.com
> Rabbi Kaminetsky offers a litmus test to distinguish
> between those who have apprenticed under a poseq, and those who haven't,
> and according to his test, I have in fact so apprenticed!! 

> It is only due to my own knowledge of myself that I know I'm nowhere near
> the stature of a poseq, but if I were to rely on Rabbi Kaminetsky's test,
> I'd have to say I am in fact a poseq. Anyone who's standards are so low as
> his, I don't want to be a part of his group. If Rabbi Kaminetsky's litmus
> test for poseqim is indicative of his own personal stature as a poseq,
> then I don't want him as my poseq. He says I'm of the stature of a poseq,
> but I disagree and I say I'm not of that stature.

The above betrays a major logic flaw
Let me use a reductio ad absurdum

Litmus test:
If you add 2 Plus 2 you fail math and are  no longer eligible for a PhD

RMM's logic is tantamount to saying
"Since I DO know 2 plus 2 equals 4 - ergo I'm a PhD candidate!"

The litmus test here is to dismiss a certain error. It does not mean
that all those who fail to make the error are accomplished scholars!

Here this litmus test is to show that a novice scholar will usually
naively err.

A Complete Non-Scholar might intuit the correct answer - precisely
because he lacks intermediate level data! It's that intermediate level
that RYK is addressing

Here is another illustration

A typical non-Jew will rush to violate shabbos to save a life
Shabbos is no factor

A typical talmid chacham will do the same

But, It's the novice scholar or the new BT who is the most likely to
hesitate!

Therefore merely passing RYK's test might simply inidicate a lack of
gravitas to be even tempted by the incorrect hava amina.

------------------------


one has all their ducks lined up.
The best illustration I've seen is Shach taking on Rema on "bassar
sh'ma azlinan"
[Beginning of taaroves]
The Shach was not only a brilliant poseiq in his own right, his
methodology is IMHO often one of the best to emulate.

KT
RRW
Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

Rn' Chana explained how the AhS could hold there is an absolute issur
of exposing hair for a married woman, but not for an unmarried one. In
short: the sugyot regarding Sotah and divorcing one's wife speaking
only of married women, and furthermore say nothing about hirhur. By
contrast, he sugya in Berakhot speaks of hair in general (married or
not), and speaks of hirhur. It is thus possible, but not obligatory,
to say (as I do) that hair-covering applies to ALL women (married or
not), and is mitigated by hergel.

Thank you, then, for that explanation. I still hold by my position. I
tend to prefer the positions that reconcile as much as possible.
Furthermore, I prefer a few kelalim to many peratim - Occam's Razor.
So I'll still prefer my own position, viz. that hair-covering applies
to married and unmarried women equally, but that hergel mitigates the
issur. This is the simplest explanation, and has more kelalim and
fewer peratim.

But still, Rn' Chana has at least made the AhS's position sensible and
coherent. I still disagree with it, but at least it makes sense to me
now. Thank you.

[Email #2. -micha]

As I said, I don't see a meaningful difference between distraction and
habituation. Either way, hirhur / hana'ah is absent, and that, to me,
is the critical factor. If a blind man cannot see an attractive woman,
for example, that seems to me to mitigate the issur of looking at her,
even though he's neither habituated nor distracted. He won't have
hirhur / hana'ah from her, and to me, that's enough.

So whether Rav Aha was distracted by the mitzvah of simhat hatan
v'kalah, or whether he was holy and habituated to sexuality in
general, I don't see a nafqa mina.

> I want to stress that I am NOT campaigning for any particular act to be
> considered mutar or assur. Quite the contrary, it seems to me that *none*
> of these acts are inherently assur or inherently mutar -- they must *all*
> be evaluated in light of the norms of the society and the sensitivity of
> the individual. If it can be safely presumed that no significant
> hirhur/hanaah will result, then it is mutar, else it is assur.

> R' Akiva Miller

You adduce the Arukh ha-Shulhan in your support, but I think he'd
disagree with you. The AhS says the man can say berakhot in the
presence of uncovered hair, but he still prohibits the uncovering of
the hair. (Rabbi Henkin clarifies this point in many of his writings.)
According to the AhS, there is a non-negotiable issur of exposing
hair, regarding of societal norms or hirhur / hana'ah. Societal norms
and hirhur / hana'ah permit the man to see her hair, but the woman
remains prohibited to expose her own hair to men.

So we have a three-tiered progression:
1) Everything is absolute; women must cover their hair, and men cannot
say berakhot around uncovered hair, regardless of hirhur - Mishnah
Berurah
2) Men's berakhot can take habituation into account, but the issur for
women is absolute regardless of societal norms - AhS
3) Everything is subject to societal norms - Me, Rabbi Yosef Messas,
and a very very very very few others

I myself wholeheartedly agree with your belief that tzniut is bound
entirely by societal norms, and that none of its laws are absolute.
However, I must admit that I am differing with the AhS in this.

> A similar thought appears in "Understanding Tzniut" by Rabbi Yehuda Henkin,
> on page 95, where he writes:

> "As opposed to any touching at all between husband and wife when she is in
> a state of niddah, which is explicitly forbidden in the Shulchan Aruch
> [Yoreh Deah 195:2...], no such sweeping prohibition of all physical contact
> is found in relation to other 'arayot. Thus, while the Shulchan Aruch [Even
> ha-Ezer 21:1] forbids numerous forms of interaction with 'arayot including
> winks and gestures and pleasurable gazing, simple touching without
> intention of affect is not one of them."

> In other words, Rabbi Henkin is unaware of any *inherent* issurim in this
> area. None of these issurim is *always* in effect. They *all* carry the
> stipulation of being in effect *only* when they cause some amount of
> hirhur/hanaah.

> R' Akiva Miller

Handshaking is prohibited only b'derekh hibat biah, so indeed,
handshaking is prohibited only where there is hirhur / hana'ah. All
the more so would merely touching (say, poking) a woman be permitted,
as long as hirhur / hana'ah is absent.

What I suspect, however, is that different occasions call for a
different standard of hirhur / hana'ah. With your spouse, the
slightest bit of hirhur / hana'ah will lead to the bedroom, and so all
physical contact is prohibited. By contrast, with a stranger or
platonic friend, a mere handshake is unlikely to lead to the bedroom,
and so a different level of hana'ah / hirhur is tolerated.

Similarly, the laws of kol isha are stricter during Shema than during
the ordinary day, because reciting Shema requires purer thoughts. A
different amount of sexual thought is tolerated during Shema than
during the course of the day.

So I'd say ALL the laws of tzniut are subject societal norms, but that
different occasions have different standards for how much hirhur /
hana'ah is permitted.

Michael Makovi

On Tue, Feb 09, 2010 at 01:44:03AM -0500, j...@when.com wrote:
:  Are kohanim lemeita entitled to kavod from ashkenazim? 

This post was accepted in error. Two important things were missing:

1- Your name. We do not allow anonymous posting.

2- A subject line.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Like a bird, man can reach undreamed-of
mi...@aishdas.org        heights as long as he works his wings.
http://www.aishdas.org   But if he relaxes them for but one minute,
Fax: (270) 514-1507      he plummets downward.   - Rav Yisrael Salanter

On Tue, Feb 09, 2010 at 01:44:03AM -0500, j...@when.com wrote:
: So even if you hold by R moshe feinstein's chazaka (which many don't),
: it is still not at all pashut whether lemeita, ashkenazic kohanim are
: entitled to kavod.

It's not RMF's chazaqah, it's the chazaqah of every shul that has
duchaning. And the Gra's attempt to podeh himself from kohanim whenever
he encountered a new one so that among them at least one was a real
kohein is kind of unique, no?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

On Tue, Feb 09, 2010 at 12:24:56PM +0200, Michael Makovi wrote:
: Rn' Chana explained how the AhS could hold there is an absolute issur
: of exposing hair for a married woman, but not for an unmarried one. In
: short: the sugyot regarding Sotah and divorcing one's wife speaking
: only of married women, and furthermore say nothing about hirhur. By
: contrast, he sugya in Berakhot speaks of hair in general (married or
: not), and speaks of hirhur. It is thus possible, but not obligatory,
: to say (as I do) that hair-covering applies to ALL women (married or
: not), and is mitigated by hergel.

Despite the gemara's derashah/asmachta of a pasuq. Sorry, I don't see it.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

On Mon, Feb 08, 2010 at 07:35:30PM -0500, David Riceman wrote:
: Micha Berger wrote:
: >Unless the Ramban differs between a mar'eh and nevu'ah in general.

: According to the Ramban angels are capable of donning what appear to be 
: physical bodies.

Or actual physical bodies.

Still, I don't know if the Ramban would exclude the resulting conversation
from the term "nevu'ah".

I personally agree that he would. In fact, I already conceded that I
made a silly error by forgetting the whole reason why everyone else
disagrees with the Rambam.

My own theory is that according to the Ramban, nevu'ah is a message
Hashem sends via metaphors; as opposed to the Rambam (as explained by
the Abarbanel) who defines it as seeing higher realities. This is how
the Abarbanel answers the Ramban's question about who saved Lot, as
well as the machloqes between the Rambam and the Ramban as to who (or
Who) was the Man in the Throne in this week's parashah.

According to this theory, the Ramban would NOT call the conversation
with a mal'akh that is wearing a physical body "nevu'ah".

But wile I have a source for that explanation of the Rambam, the Ramban
is my own guesswork, so I didn't close the book on other possibilities.


On another front, RCManaster is correct that I only addressed on small
facet of his question. I think the question will end up further mudied
by the fact that both ruach haqodesh and nevu'ah are used in a specific
sense -- referring to a particular kind of transmission, and a more
general sense.

Not to mention added difficulty cause by the fact that we're blind people
studying the words "red", "blue" "green", etc... trying to map them to
places on the color wheel without ever having experienced sight, never
mind the actual colors.


Which brings me to RYGB's list...
On Mon, Feb 08, 2010 at 07:29:11PM -0500, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer wrote:
: Micha Berger wrote:
:> On Fri, Jan 29, 2010 at 07:29:08AM -0500, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer wrote:
:>: In R' Moshe Yechiel Tzuriel's Otzaros HaMussar vol. 1, in the Sha'ar
:>: HaBitachon, there is an amazing and comprehensive compendium on this topic.

>: How many people have access to OhM vol 1? Couldn't you include a couple
>: of highlights?

: p. 257:  List of 33 revelations of Eliyahu to Chazal.
: p. 258: List of 6 revelations of the Malach HaMaves and his subjugation
: by Chazal.
: p. 259: List of 41 miracles wrought by Chazal.
: p. 261: List of 5 incidents of Techiyas HaMeisim by Chazal.
...
: p. 266: List of 14 indicators of Chazal's yiras shomayim.
: p. 267: List of 7 indicators of Chazal's mesirus nefesh for mitzvos.

: There are many, many more such lists in the book!

But of those you gave, the only one that MIGHT qualify as proof of ruach
haqodesh in particular would be the first two -- if ruach haqodesh is
actually a necessary prerequisite of experiencing revelations of those
sorts.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             It is harder to eat the day before Yom Kippur
mi...@aishdas.org        with the proper intent than to fast on Yom
http://www.aishdas.org   Kippur with that intent.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                       - Rav Yisrael Salanter

j...@when.com asked:
> Are kohanim lemeita entitled to kavod from ashkenazim?

I'm not familiar with this term. What are "kohanim lemeita"?

> There is a Teshuvah of the RIVASH (94) that says that Kohanim
> today are only Safek Kohanim (same reason why kohanim cannot
> demand payment for pidyon haben).

First: My understanding is that most poskim reject this idea, and hold
today's kohanim to be *vadai* kohanim. The proof is that if the safek was a
real safek, then how could they say the birkas hamitzvah when they duchen?

Second: Even if that safek is accepted, there's a much simpler reason why a
kohen cannot demand payment for pidyon haben: Because the father has the
right to choose any kohen he likes. Even when Trumah was a real d'Oraisa,
no kohen could demand any; they were all dependent on the good will of the
farmers.

Akiva Miller

On Tue, Feb 09, 2010 at 12:52:59PM +0000, kennethgmil...@juno.com wrote
on the thread which I doctored to read "Chezkas Kehunah":
: Second: Even if that safek is accepted, there's a much simpler reason
: why a kohen cannot demand payment for pidyon haben: Because the father
: has the right to choose any kohen he likes. Even when Trumah was a real
: d'Oraisa, no kohen could demand any; they were all dependent on the good
: will of the farmers.

A few times on my blog I discuss the difference between rights and
duties, and later between
    - rights
    - duties to another (perhaps contractual, perhaps by fiat)
    - membership in a beris (forming a new whole and having
      responsibilities with it)
as a basis for a legal system. In short, barring a covenant, rights-based
legal systems appear to have the most success preventing people from
eating each other alive. However, halakhah has a different goal, and is
based on a beris. We discussed it here too, so I don't see reason to
give a longer version.

I dont believe that halakhah is based on a philosophy of rights.
However, there are specitic halakhos which clearly imply the existence
of a right.

Phrasing the issur of waking someone else up as "gezel shinah" implies
that a person owns an intangible right to sleep. Not just that I have a
duty to let you sleep if you wish to, but chazal articulate it in terms
usually used for property.

Similarly geneivas da'as.

The only other example I could think of is this right to select a kohein
to whom to give your terumah.

Can anyone else think of others?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             A sick person never rejects a healing procedure
mi...@aishdas.org        as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what
http://www.aishdas.org   other people think when dealing with spiritual
Fax: (270) 514-1507      matters?              - Rav Yisrael Salanter

R' Michael Makovi wrote:
> I've seen this before, and I've never understood where Rabbi
> Kaminetsky gets his prima facie from.

R' Isaac Balbin responded:
> Indeed, and this is why you have a problem with it. ...
> You have life and experience by virtue of the fact that you
> have not spent your days in a cloistered environment surrounded
> only by limudei kodesh. I don't say that disparagingly. This
> may well not be the case for the brilliant avreich who is ready
> to serve his apprenticeship. In certain groups it's in fact the
> rule rather than the exception.

This is very similar to how I was going to respond. Except that I would
phrase it more in terms of the textual learning one gets from learning from
seforim, versus the mimetic learning one gets from apprenticeship.

Personally, I am among those who would have answered that niddah is worse
than intermarriage, based on the obvious difference in penalties. One is
Karays d'Oraisa, and the other might not even be d'Oraisa at all - of
course the first is worse!

Yet at the same time, I recognized that Jews of all stripes have an
abhorrence to intermarriage which far surpasses almost any other aveira. It
took me a very long time to understand the reasons for that extreme
attitude, but I finally did reach an explanation which satisfied me, B"H.

Akiva Miller

____________________________________________________________
Water Heater
Some like it hot. Click now for a reliable new water heater!
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL2131/c?cp=wnfx7xQvjTNhEtt__mU7ywAAJ
z3zeK-F0bLcqGb51B0rOTOKAAYAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAADNAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGIAAAAAA=

WRT the discussion about RYK's psak, and whom it would actually apply
to - as the person who it would apply to would not normally be asking
she'elot - on another email list, several years back, there was a
discussion by a RW member - who was vigorously championing the
position that RYK rejected - that one should rather marry a non Jew
than not keep taharat hamishpacha - and the nafka mina was whether one
should try to be meshaddech two nonobservant Jews - or steer a
nonobservant Jew towards a non Jewish mate - and this RW poster was
insistent that it was preferable to steer the non Jew towards a non
Jew, and was against much of the activity of others for Jewish
shidduchim.
Therefore, the question does (and did) arise, and has a nafka mina
lehalacha for those who actually care about halacha
(most of the people on the list were shocked by the position taken -
but it is the extreme version of going by the book and determining
what is the most extreme issur involved...)

Meir Shinnar

Way behind on reading Avodah as usual, but I had a few thoughts on
this thread from last month.

RMi:

> CM 26:1 - just to show the issur of arka'os
> Chiqrei Leiv OC #50
> IM CM #76
> Chasam Sofer CM #205-206
> Minchas Yitzchaq #75

> The Chiqrei Leiv, OTOH, grants rabbis tenure. The CS says that a tenured
> rabbi can only be fired if you can prove negligence. The MY says this is
> true of all kelei qodesh.

> OTOH, the IM is meiqil, if one gives sufficient severance pay.

I don't see this applying here.  If, as most posters said, rabbis are
hired by contract, and such contracts can be not-renewed, then rabbis
in practice do *not* have tenure.  So the CL and CS are non-operative
in the American context.  MY by extension also falls by the wayside,
leaving only IM.

Rabbis have maintained for generations that "you can't fire a rabbi",
but if this is the halachic justification for that statement, it just
seems self-serving - the Rabbis are of course nog'im bedavar.

A couple of stories of rabbis being fired, from Jeffrey Gurock's book
on R' Mordechai Kaplan, "A Modern Heretic and a Traditional Community":

1) In the early 1900s, Cong. Kehillath Jeshurun (KJ) on the Upper East
Side decided they wanted to move from a Yiddish-speaking rabbi to one
who could give sermons in English, and tried to hire R' Mordechai Kaplan, 
then a new-minted Orthodox rav trained by the Seminary and later musmach by 
R' YY Reines, the founder of Mizrachi.  (the Seminary didn't have anyone
who could grant smicha, so you were sent to Europe).  R' Peyser, the old
rabbi refused to go, claiming "Halacha prohibits one from firing a rabbi."

So the shul published an ad calling for applicants for rabbi, one
qualification of which was the ability to give sermons in English.  Rabbi
Peyser wrote them a letter, indignantly repeating his claim that "you 
can't fire a rabbi."  The shul board wrote him back, "Thank you for your
application for the job of Rabbi.  Unfortunately, you do not meet our 
requirements.  We wish you luck in future endeavours"  or something similar.
R' Peyser got the message, and left.

2) In 1916, Joseph H. Cohen (my great-granduncle) and R' Kaplan left KJ to
set up a Modern Orthodox synagogue on the West Side, as they and many 
others were walking across the park to get to shul.  That shul - The
Jewish Center (first of the name).  By that time, R' Kaplan was already
writing about his apikorsische ideas, but not preaching them.  He was a
very well-known speaker, one of the top speakers in the Jewish Endeavour
Society (a kiruv group at the time aimed at the children of immigrants,
who were drifting away from tradition).  Cohen kept him on on condition
that he not preach his Epicurean theology from the pulpit.

In 1922, Kaplan started saying the wrong things in his sermons.  So Cohen
tried to fire him.  His response?  You can't fire a rabbi.  Cohen got the
board to vote on firing him.  The vote was very close, but the Kaplan faction
won.  Still, not wanting to remain in a shul that was bitterly divided over
him, Kaplan resigned shortly thereafter, set up his own shul, and gave his
daughter (Judith Kaplan Eisenstein - her husband R Ira helped Kaplan set up
Recon, but Ira's grandfather had been a staunch opponent of R/C, the Baal
Otzarot, Judah David Eisenstein).

So there you have it.  Rabbis like to claim you can't fire a rabbi, but
in effect, you can - the board can make it sufficiently uncomfortable for
the rabbi to remain.

--
        name: jon baker              web: http://www.panix.com/~jjbaker
     address: jjba...@panix.com     blog: http://thanbook.blogspot.com

R' Rich Wolpoe asked:
> ... the owner will not permit us to use boxes from unkosher
> products or even kosher dairy products. [This is a kosher
> fleishig Chinese Restaurant] It seems he has a very strong
> sense of mar'is ayin and is afraid that boxes from unkosher
> products or from dairy products will hurt his restaurant's
> kashrus reputation.
>
> Are his mar'is ayin standards over the top? Is there any
> halachic reason for him to think that way?

Why do you ask if there is a *halachic* reason for him to think that way?
He doesn't need any *halachic* reason. It seems to me that for questions of
Mar'is Ayin, a *sociological* reason would be quite sufficient.

Just as much as a person should be very careful to minimize the lashon hara
that comes from his own mouth, he should be careful to never underestimate
the lashon hara that comes from others.

"My chow mein is being delivered in a milk crate? I sure hope it was clean
and there was nothing in there to treif it up, and I'm certainly never
going to patronize them again, and I'll tell my friends too!" You're going
to tell me that a few drops are halachically negligible, and I will tell
you that perception can sometimes be more important than reality.

Or: "This margarine carton... It is milchik margarine! If the mashgiach had
noticed it, they would have sent it back to the distributor in this carton.
They must have used it! Oh no!"

I'm really not sure what you're asking. Isn't this a great example of being
machmir on oneself? Or do you feel that the owner is imposing *his* chumros
upon *you*?

Akiva Miller

____________________________________________________________
Home Improvement Projects
Make your dream home a reality. Click here to find all your home improvement needs!
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL2131/c?cp=-I9T_BwkmpR3d2smS0qM0QAAJ
z3zeK-F0bLcqGb51B0rOTOKAAYAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAADNAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAShAAAAAA=

> From: rabbirichwol...@gmail.com
>
> The owner of the restaurant at which I work puts large outgoing orders
> in used boxes. Most of those boxes come from the liquor store nearby.
>
> However, the owner will not permit us to use boxes from unkosher
> products or even kosher dairy products. [This is a kosher fleishig
> Chinese Restaurant] It seems he has a very strong sense of mar'is ayin
> and is afraid that boxes from unkosher products or from dairy products
> will hurt his restaurant's kashrus reputation.
>
>
> Are his mar'is ayin standards over the top? Is there any halachic reason
> for him to think that way?

Why not expand the question to a practical one for many of  us.  Costco or 
Sams Club do not provide bags.  They offer to pack your merchandise in 
boxes.  Many of  the boxes are from non kosher items.  Is it proper to 
bring things home in those boxes and to reuse those boxes?



Harry J. Weiss
hjwe...@panix.com

Re: <<restaurant at which I work puts large outgoing orders
in used boxes. ...However, the owner will not permit us to 
use boxes from unkosher products>>

For some fifty years I've been making matza on erev Pesach. 
As I make them very thin and large diameter, they are very 
likely to break in transport, I've found that the best way 
is to keep them whole, is to put them in new unused pizza 
boxes.

You should see some of the looks I get on erev Pesach and 
even more during Chol Hamoed when they see this old guy with 
a yarmulka carefully carrying a large pizza box.

Now that's mar'it 'ayyin!


David 

We need to define our terms. More specifics below.

On Mon, Feb 8, 2010 at 7:55 PM, kennethgmil...@juno.com
<kennethgmil...@juno.com> wrote:
> I wrote:
>
>> I think it is still fair to say that these examples all prove
>> that the acts of touching, seeing, or listening to ervah are
>> not *inherently* assur. They are assur only when they bring
>> one to hirhur or hanaah. The only difference between my first
>> guess and these responses, is in the mitigating circumstances
>> which hold the hirhur/hanaah down to the zero level.
>
> R' Samuel Svarc responded:
>
>> Incorrect. 'Oseh makom' is assur to look at, if ones very
>> looking is distracted then we have 'heterim'.
>
> How is that different than what I said? We agree that in some cases it is assur, and in other cases it is mutar.

"Inherently assur" means it is assur even if there is no 'hanuah'. It
is flat out 'assur'. But what if one doesn't do the 'issur' or does it
only minutely? If the 'issur' is to look and his very act of looking
is distracted? That is the heter.

> RSS continued:
>
>> You're conflating a stock issur of seeing 'ervah' which is
>> not dependent on 'hanaah' and is only mitigated when the
>> seeing itself is distracted, with an issur that is dependent
>> on 'hirur -hanaah', namely, touching.
>
> Are you suggesting that touching is *less* problematic than looking? I
> have always presumed touching to be equally forbidden, or even more
> forbidden. (I have > no sources for this, only that this is area
> where halacha is full of "fences", and it seems to me a logical
> progression: Just as kissing leads to relations, and
> touching leads to kissing, so too looking leads to touching. In contrast, to forbid touching because it might lead to looking sounds absurd.)

Now your conflating all types of touch. Touch is 'assur' when it leads
to 'hanuah', not that it might lead to looking, so your strawman can
be placed on the side. Looking at 'ervah' is 'assur' and is not
connected to 'hanuah'. The 'heter' of the AH is that ones tefillos is
not disqualified unless there is 'hanuah' and therefore habituation
mitigates the effect on tefillos, not on the overall 'issur'.

> Further: What do you mean when you say that:
> (A) the issur is *not* dependent on hanaah, and
> (B) the issur *is* mitigated if the person looking is distracted.
> What do you mean by that? Isn't the whole point of distraction that it insures the level of hanaah to be minimal or zero? Don't these two concepts work
> together?

No. As explained above.

KT,
MSS

On Tue, Feb 09, 2010 at 01:12:09PM +0000, kennethgmil...@juno.com wrote:
: R' Rich Wolpoe asked:
: > ... the owner will not permit us to use boxes from unkosher
: > products or even kosher dairy products. [This is a kosher
: > fleishig Chinese Restaurant] It seems he has a very strong
: > sense of mar'is ayin and is afraid that boxes from unkosher
: > products or from dairy products will hurt his restaurant's
: > kashrus reputation.

: > Are his mar'is ayin standards over the top? Is there any
: > halachic reason for him to think that way?

: Why do you ask if there is a *halachic* reason for him to think
: that way? He doesn't need any *halachic* reason. It seems to me that
: for questions of Mar'is Ayin, a *sociological* reason would be quite
: sufficient.

I'll go one step further... Is the owner saying he think it's assur to use
those boxes? It sounds to me like he's saying it's simply bad marketing.
I see RRW's post, like some of the cases in the discussion of policy vs
taqanah, as blurring the distinction between a tactical decision with
a halachic one. (That's not to say he is; just that it's how it looks to
me.)

E.g. When the OU did away with OU-DE, they didn't say that milchig
keilim ought to have the same din as milchig ingrediants. Rather, they
felt that for tactical reasons, given that much information posed a
nichshal that just wasn't worth it. The question wasn't on the halachic
level altogether.

And neither is this owner's worry about his restaurant's reputation
imply that he actually feels those who jump to conclusions force a
mar'is ayin and thus an issur on using the boxes.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             The fittingness of your matzos [for the seder]
mi...@aishdas.org        isn't complete with being careful in the laws
http://www.aishdas.org   of Passover. One must also be very careful in
Fax: (270) 514-1507      the laws of business.    - Rav Yisrael Salanter

WRT the discussion about RYK's psak, and whom it would actually apply to -
as the person who it would apply to would not normally be asking she'elot -
on another email list, several years back, there was a discussion by a RW
member - who was vigorously championing the position that RYK rejected -
that one should rather marry a non Jew than not keep taharat hamishpacha -
and the nafka mina was whether one should try to be meshaddech two
nonobservant Jews - or steer a nonobservant Jew towards a non Jewish mate -
and this RW poster was insistent that it was preferable to steer the non
Jew towards a non Jew, and was against much of the activity of others for
Jewish shidduchim.
====================
See melamid lhoil 3:8 where he discusses converting a civil married goyah
who is "married"  to a cohain .  He says yes (even with the issur of a
cohaim and giyoret!) but his final line is to warn them to keep taharat
hamishpacha else the loss is more than the gain.
KT
Joel Rich

As of February 22, our New York Office will be located at:
333 West 34th St.
New York, NY 10001-2402
All telephone and fax numbers (and e-mail addresses) will remain the same.
THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE 
ADDRESSEE.  IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE.  Dissemination, 
distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is 
strictly prohibited.  If you received this message in error, please notify us 
immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message.  
Thank you.

If today's Kohanim would be considered "safeik kohanim", would they be
obliged to do a Pidyon Haben on their firstborns, mita'am sofeik d'orayso,
or would it be a sfek sfeika?

The questions pertains to levi'im too.

On Tue, Feb 9, 2010 at 12:52 PM, kennethgmil...@juno.com <
kennethgmil...@juno.com> wrote:

>
>
> First: My understanding is that most poskim reject this idea, and hold
> today's kohanim to be *vadai* kohanim. The proof is that if the safek was a
> real safek, then how could they say the birkas hamitzvah when they duchen?
>
> Second: Even if that safek is accepted, there's a much simpler reason why a
> kohen cannot demand payment for pidyon haben: Because the father has the
> right to choose any kohen he likes. Even when Trumah was a real d'Oraisa, no
> kohen could demand any; they were all dependent on the good will of the
> farmers.
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avodah-ai
shdas.org/attachments/20100209/5dd1937d/attachment.htm>

------------------------------


Avodah mailing list
Avo...@lists.aishdas.org
http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org


End of Avodah Digest, Vol 27, Issue 43
**************************************

Send Avodah mailing list submissions to
	avodah@lists.aishdas.org

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
	http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
	avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org

You can reach the person managing the list at
	avodah-owner@lists.aishdas.org

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Avodah digest..."