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Volume 25: Number 372

Sun, 02 Nov 2008

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Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Message: 1
From: Yitzhak Grossman <cele...@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2008 16:26:49 -0400
Re: [Avodah] Hypocrisy in halakhah

On Wed, 29 Oct 2008 23:17:48 +0200
"Michael Makovi" <mikewindd...@gmail.com> wrote:


> Thus, I've seen, for example, Rabbi Nahum Eliezer Rabinovitch using
> Ramban and Meiri to justify saving a non-Juif (French) on Shabbat
> l'hatchila, without his even mentioning that anyone disagrees with
> their opinion. We cannot simply overturn the halakhah, but we can

Does this stance of R. Rabinovitch appear in writing?

> Mikha'el Makovi

Bein Din Ledin - bdl.freehostia.com
A discussion of Hoshen Mishpat, Even Ha'Ezer and other matters

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Message: 2
From: Zev Sero <z...@sero.name>
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2008 16:48:37 -0400
Re: [Avodah] Hypocrisy in halakhah

Michael Makovi wrote:

> 3) Hilul hashem also obviates mistreating them. Even in secret, a
> hilul hashem is a sin. This answers the question of Rabbis Aharon
> Lichtenstein and Yehuda Amital about saving a nicht-Jude on a desert
> island, where mishum eiva is no concern. Even if mishum eiva is not
> present, a hilul hashem b'seter is still present, and thus it is
> forbidden to not save him.

This makes no sense.  It (deliberately, I think) confuses two very
distinct meanings of "chilul Hashem".  The core meaning of "chilul Hashem"
is erasing a Name or serving AZ or similar things; obviously that applies
in secret just as much as in public.  It's also applied to doing averot
befarhesia; by definition that does *not* apply in secret.  But here we're
talking about a borrowed use of "chilul Hashem" to simply mean anything,
even not an avera, that will make outsiders think less of yidden, and
therefore of Hashem.  By definition, an act can only be this sort of chilul
Hashem if people will find out; if nobody finds out then it will not have
this effect on their perceptions, and therefore the Name will not be

I say above that I think the confusion is deliberate, because I think
the Melamed Leho'il intended us to notice this, and take the appropriate
dosage of salt.  I believe that in recent times such a hint has been
referred to as a "dog whistle".

Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
z...@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas

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Message: 3
From: "Jay F Shachter" <j...@m5.chicago.il.us>
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2008 16:47:46 -0500
[Avodah] Double Standards In Jewish Law

The posting which began this thread of discussion was incorrectly
titled "Hypocrisy in halakhah"; it turned out, upon reading the
posting, that it did not describe hypocrisy at all, but, rather, a
double standard.  Hypocrisy is articulating a standard for one's own
conduct which contradicts one's own conduct.  The posting described
not that, but a different thing, in fact, an unrelated thing, namely,
having two different standards of conduct for two different classes of
people, or, having two different standards governing one's conduct
toward two different classes of people.  It is hypocritical to say, "I
must do X" while not doing X; it is not hypocritical to say, "I must
do X toward class A, and Y toward class B", unless one does not do X
toward class A, or Y toward class B.  Thus, it is not hypocritical to
say, "I must treat Jews differently than I treat non-Jews".  It is not
even hypocritical (although it may be morally suspect for other
reasons) to say "non-Jews must treat me differently than I treat
non-Jews" because it is not a universal moral principle that
relationships must be symmetrical; non-symmetrical relationships may
properly exist.  For example, I might be married to two women.  Each
of my wives must be faithful to me, but I need not, and, in fact,
cannot, be faithful to each of my wives, and, in fact, may not, under
Jewish law, be faithful to either of them, because the relationship of
husband to wife is not a symmetrical one: a woman can have only one
spouse at a time, whereas the same is not true for a man.

One need not, however, postulate a non-symmetric relationship between
Jew and non-Jew, to justify a double standard of conduct toward Jew
and non-Jew.  The relevant moral distinction is, in fact, a universal
one, and it is the distinction, not between Jew and non-Jew, but
between laws that must be observed even among people who do not
observe them in return, and laws that must be observed only within a
community of people who are themselves bound to observe the same law.

Consider the following halakha.  Jewish law states that if a Gentile
brings a cause of action against a Jew in a Jewish court in a land ruled
by secular law, then the Jewish court must examine both the relevant law
under halakha and under the local Gentile legal system.  The Jewish
court must then render whichever finding is favorable to the Jew.  If
Gentile law favors the Jew, the Jewish court must rule according to
Gentile law and favor the Jew.  If Jewish law favors the Jew, the Jewish
court must rule according to Jewish law and favor the Jew.

This is precisely the kind of halakha that we don't want the antisemites
to find out.  It makes us appear to be unprincipled, clannish,
dishonest, manipulative -- all the things that the antisemites have
always known we were.  In all honesty, doesn't this halakha strike you
as rather distasteful?  It strikes me that way.

But laws must be carefully thought out, by clear-thinking people.  If
you think about this law, you will realize that it is both necessary and
fair.  In the absence of such a law, Gentiles would have an unfair
advantage over us.  Consider the situation that would result from not
having the abovementioned "distasteful" halakha.  Whenever a Gentile had
a dispute with a Jew, he would find out which legal system favored him.
If the Gentile legal system favored him, he could compel the Jew to
participate in a lawsuit in the Gentile court system.  The police power
of the state could then be enlisted to enforce any resulting judgment.
But if the Jewish legal system favored the Gentile, he could sue the Jew
in a Jewish court, and the Jew would be bound by conscience and
community pressure to carry out any resulting judgment.  This places the
Gentile at an unfair advantage -- two legal systems from which to
choose, against only one for the Jew -- because if the Jew sued the
Gentile in a Jewish court, the Gentile could not be compelled to comply.

The principle involved is a universal one, and, in fact, applies to
Jews also, under certain circumstances.  Consider the case of a Jew
who brings a case to the Jewish court after failing to obtain his
desired relief in the Gentile court.  I assume that we are all agreed
on the basic premise: a Jew may not, on pain of "xerem" (total
exclusion from the Jewish community), initiate a cause of action
against another Jew in a Gentile court, except, possibly, to obtain
whatever relief has already been granted ex parte in a properly
convened Jewish court.  If there is any disagreement on this basic
premise, then of course I welcome hearing it.

Now, in the case where a Jew, in violation of the Torah, enlists a
Gentile court against another Jew, fails to obtain the desired result,
and then comes to the Jewish court as a second resort, the halakha is
that we do not accept this case, even if it has merit.  We reject it
out of hand.  And the reason could be the same as the reason behind
the law governing Gentile claims in Jewish courts.  This Jew has
already gone to a Gentile court -- in violation of halakha -- and
sought his relief.  If he had been granted a favorable judgement
against his fellow Jew presumably he would have enlisted the police
power of the state to enforce it.  To allow him to come to Beyt Din
after failing in the Gentile court would give the renegade Jew an
unfair advantage over the one beholden to the Torah, because the
Torah-observant Jew does not have the option of taking the renegade
Jew to a Gentile court.  The renegade Jew must, in effect, be treated
as a Gentile, such that Beyt Din says, "We will apply the Gentile law
to you, and under the Gentile law, as evidenced by your failed
lawsuit, you are not entitled to the relief you request".

The same analysis can be successfully applied to nearly all the laws
that are applied differently to Jews than to non-Jews.  In all cases,
or in nearly all cases, you will find that without such a difference,
the Jew would be placed at an unfair disadvantage vis-?-vis the
non-Jew.  It has nothing to do with there being any difference between
a Jew and a non-Jew, except insofar as the Jew observes Jewish laws,
and the non-Jew does not.  For example, a non-Jew, even a non-Jew
living under Jewish sovereignty, is not obliged to return to me a
twenty-dollar bill that fell out of my pocket.  If I, however, were
obliged to return to him the twenty-dollar bills that fall out of his
pockets, then the advantage would all be his, and the disadvantage
would all be mine.  Within a religious community, however, in which
all people are obliged to return lost property to one another, then of
course I must do the same myself.

                        Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter
                        6424 N Whipple St
                        Chicago IL  60645-4111

                        "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur"

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Message: 4
From: "Michael Makovi" <mikewindd...@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2008 18:32:56 +0200
Re: [Avodah] Hypocrisy in halakhah

> "Michael Makovi" <mikewindd...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>Thus, I've seen, for example, Rabbi Nahum Eliezer Rabinovitch using
>> Ramban and Meiri to justify saving a non-Juif (French) on Shabbat...

> Does this stance of R. Rabinovitch appear in writing?
> R' Yitzhak Grossman

Tradition, 8:3 1966 & Le'ela 1:5 (18-23) 1979



(Same url)

This is in response to the Shahak affair. Also, Rabbi Shlomo Riskin
used this same Ramban for the Noah Feldman affair, although I don't
think he used Meiri.


know, is not a halakhic authority), in response to the complaint that
"mishum eiva" is not ethical, responds that halakhah works by legal
tools and not moral/ethical ones, but that everyone knows that the
underlying motivation is certainly moral/ethical. So if we justified
saving nicht-Judes via a pragmatic self-preservation argument, this
doesn't obviate an ethical impetus or motivation behind the legal


"You have to violate the Sabbath to save everyone, but the reason
given in the sources is utilitarian (nicht-Judes won't save us if we
don't save them). Rabbi Soleveitchik said he was troubled by this. My
point was that all legal systems have to operate in a legal fashion.
That doesn't mean there aren't moral considerations pushing you, but
those are not in themselves enough to get to the result you want.

"You have to go through the system, the halakhic rules. When you get
to the utilitarian factor, that's the rule. That's the way to get to
where you want to go. That no more means you are ignoring ethical
factors than when a rabbi tries to free an agunah whose husband is
missing. He's certainly motivated by ethical factors, by great concern
for the suffering of the woman, but that's not enough. You need to
work within the system."

Professor Shapiro  is asked "Are there a significant number of
Orthodox Jews who believe you should not break the Sabbath to save the
life of a nicht-Jude?", and he answers,
"The idea that you can break the Sabbath to save a Jew is
questionable. During the Maccabee's day, they allowed themselves to be
killed. The rabbis say you violate one Sabbath so you can observe many
Sabbaths. Today everyone says you violate the Sabbath to save a life.
Some Orthodox Jews may wish we lived in a time when nicht-Judes
understood we can't break the Sabbath to save their life, but we live
in an era when no nicht-Jude is going to understand that."
He closes,
"The important thing is not the reasoning but the result."

End quote.

Professor Shapiro's claim that it is controversial even to save a Jew
on Shabbat is an interesting one. Rabbi Unterman (as explained by
Rabbi Jakobovits - http://tinyurl.com/Jakobovits-Shabbat) and Rabbi
Shalom Carmy (http://www.kolhamevaser.com/?p=9) both give this same
argument, saying that just as one cannot save a life (any life) via
murder, idolatry, and immorality, Shabbat is almost like this too.

(Full URL for Rabbi Jakobovits:

It is also interesting that a blogger quoting Rabbi Carmy (ibid.)
gives the same explanation as Professor Shapiro:
http://myobiterdicta.blogspot.com/search?q=carmy+feldman That same
blogger notes that to go from eiva to ahavah is not so far, and this
parallels Rabbi Jakobovits, who wants to say mishum eiva is synonymous
with mipnei darkhei shalom.

Rabbi Lamm also makes an argument similar to Professor Shapiro's: he
says that just as in secular law, halakhah will sometimes preserve a
law on the books but rewrite that law and hedge it so much, that it
becomes effectively inoperative. Case in point: saving a nicht-Jude on
Shabbat. http://www.forward.com/articles/11308

Mikha'el Makovi

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Message: 5
From: "Eli Turkel" <elitur...@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2008 18:43:37 +0200
[Avodah] kabbalat hashabbat

I am looking for sources for the tefillot of kabbalat shabbat
In partuclar mizmor le-dovis seems to be the oldest chapter in
Tehillim connected to kabbalat shabbat.
What is its connection to shabbat?

also why some parts of lecha dodi are not said shabbat yomtov
and parts of the previous tehillim are skipped
(I know of the shiur of RYBS - looking for other reasons)

Eli Turkel

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Message: 6
From: "Michael Makovi" <mikewindd...@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2008 23:55:34 +0200
Re: [Avodah] Hypocrisy in halakhah

R' Zev Sero noted:
"For instance: during the times of the blood libels, how many times did
we point out that we don't even eat blood in an egg, and argue that al
achat kamah vechamah we couldn't possibly be putting human blood in our
baked goods."

A problem I see with your example is that while our proof was wrong,
what we were trying to prove was correct. I.e., in the end of the day,
we certainly did NOT eat human blood, and we certainly would have been
disgusted to kill a nicht-Jude to use his blood in our matzot (and
murdering a nicht-Jude IS murder, whether or not culpable in a beit
din). It's just that the nicht-Judes wouldn't accept a ingenuous (a U
- ingenUous, not ingenIous) answer, so we had to give a DISingenuous
one. But either way, what we were trying to prove stood.

On the other hand, if we had proved to them that we don't have a
one-sided law about the goring ox, etc., not only would the proof be
wrong, but the idea being proven would also be wrong.

I see no moral difficulty with being disingenuous when proving
something that actually is true, even if the proof itself is wrong. If
I prove that pork chops are treif using Genesis 1:3, well, I'm still
correct that they're treif! But if I use the same pasuk to prove that
OU glatt kosher lamb chops are treif, we've got a problem.

But I see your point (which is not affected in the least bit by your
faulty (IMHO) example) - we would say that any discriminatory laws of
ours, we'd say to ourselves that we know Torah is true, so any
discrimination against nicht-Judes, and any lies we have to tell to
the nicht-Judes to save ourselves, are of no moral difficulty to us.
Hypocrisy would not trouble us. We know we are correct, end of

Actually, as soon as I finished this entire post down to the bottom,
past what follows, I realized the following:
My critique of your (R' Zev Sero's) blood-in-the-egg example is
ill-founded. According to you, we ARE correct even if you use a
disingenuous argument. I.e., it is NOT correct that Jewish law is
discriminatory, but on the other hand, it IS correct that morally
speaking our law is correct in discriminating against nicht-Judes. Our
law is discriminatory, but this discrimination is correct and proper
and fitting, and so even if the proofs we give to the nicht-Judes are
false, we are still correct morally speaking. It's like when you are
arguing with someone and you KNOW you are correct, so you give a
disingenuous proof with the other disputant accepts. In one way, you
just lied. But on the other hand, you were correct anyway, so what
does it matter if you won with a lie - you were correct in your
initial argument anyway!

Perhaps it is precisely because the hypocrisy DOES trouble me,
however, that I go with Meiri.

(I have preserved what I had written prior to my above realization,
because I think my prior thinking on right-wrong
ingenuous-disingenuous shows my gut reaction to the hypocrisy, prior
to my intellectual realization that my case against R' Sero was
ill-founded. My statement, "On the other hand, if we had proved to
them that we don't have a one-sided law about the goring ox, etc., not
only would the proof be wrong, but the idea being proven would also be
wrong.", while this statement is not correct given what I realized
later, I think it shows what my core gut thinking is like prior to any
fancy rationalizations and intellectual conceptions. That is, it
initially never occurred to me that the discrimination is morally
correct and therefore justifies the disingenuity. My only thought was
that either we are correct or incorrect that halakhah discriminates,
and that we tell the nicht-Judes the truth or else be hypocritical. At
first, it never occurred to me that we could lie without being
hypocritical, as per R' Sero's case.)

Similarly, the idea that a Jew can steal and get only restitution,
while a nicht-Jude would get death, and that a Jew could do teshuva
and a nicht-Jude could not, despite the fact that the Torah is
supposed to be teaching moral and religious truths that are equally
applicable to Jew and nicht-Jude alike with barely any distinction,
gave me immense (IMMENSE) discomfort. I asked one of my rabbis about
it, and he only told me that the Torah makes this distinction, and yes
it troubles us, but what can we do? Thus, I was delighted beyond
measure when I saw that Rabbi Ahron Soloveichik, Rabbi Moshe
Feinstein, Rabbi J. David Bleich, and Chelkat Yoav Tanyana (anyone
know anything about him??) all say the Noahide death penalty is a
maximum, not an imperative - see

Similarly I was troubled when I learned we ostensibly do not save a
nicht-Jude on Shabbat, I asked another rabbi and he told me to see
Derech haShem on these matters. Thus, I was delighted when I saw Rabbi
Jakobovits's argument to Shahak, and a few months later Rabbi Shlomo
Riskin's argument to Feldman, and a few months later Rabbi Nahum
Rabinovitch's argument to Shahak and several other arguments to
Feldman (see my previous post to Avodah in this same thread,
responding to R' Grossman).

Mikha'el Makovi

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Message: 7
From: "SBA" <s...@sba2.com>
Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2008 15:52:41 +1100
Re: [Avodah] Kiddush in Shul - Friday night - Some off-list

From: Avrum 
The minhag still remains in practice today in the Viener Kehilla. Even in
Williamsburg where the nussach was changed to Sefard, they still make
The chazan starts from borei pri hagofen and not from yom hashishi.
All children are lined up next to the chazan and the kiddush wine is
distributed to them.
The same is done for Havdala where the shamash starts from the birchas
hagofen - not from hinei. Then besomim, ha'esh, hamavdil. 

The only time when Kiddush is not made are the first two nights of Pesach,
since this Minhag originated for the orchim who don't have where to eat.
However on Pesach 'kol dichfin yeisei veyeichol' therefore there is no need
to be motze the guests because they will participate in the Kiddush of their
baal achsanye.

Sukkas it is interesting that Kiddush is made - even though it's chutz
lesukah. (I didn't look up why)

I think the Sharei Teshuva brings that it's a segulah to stand while Kiddush
is made in shul "for ayefos haraglayim" -?for tired feet. I think the Mishna
Brurah brings it.

Once a year leil simchas torah the zechus of yayin lekidush ulehavdolah
is?auctioned. This usually is sold for a higher price than all other
zechusim. (chasanim, ner le'omed etc.)

There are a lot of halochos throughout the year that are nogeya to how and
when this kidush is made (sefira, chanukah, etc.)

I was last year in KAJ on simchas torah (due to a family member that was
hospitalized in the neighboring Colombia Hospital). 
There, the Chazan turns around and recites Kiddush facing the crowd. A
gigantic becher is filled, and there's a special small table covered with a
mentele embroidered with words from Kiddush (don't remember which). He
raises the 'kos' high in the air while doing the kiddush, with their style
nussach - ceremony style...
Just wrote to you what came to my mind now.

> From: tk 
That sounds right
> That could also mean stam giving aniyim wine for their own Kiddush


I remember both Kiddush and Havdollah in shule in Carlton.
It was a culture shock to come to a shule where this was not done.
Without checking, I think the source is in Pesachim, perek Arvei Pesachim.

Let me tell you a story..

Many years ago in the time of Rabbi Zaichyk at Mizrachi it happened that I
davvened there Friday night which was Asara Betevet. Being daylight saving
Mincha started at 8 and kabbalat shabbat followed. 

As a guest I was asked to davven for the amud and about Lecha Dodi time I
realised that the gabbai was preparing Kiddush - which would have been way
before the roughly 9.30 zman. I motioned that I didnt want  
to make Kiddush and was told that R Zaichyk (who was away that  
week) had instructed Kiddush was to be said. However in deference to my
obvious not wanting to make Kiddush the late Bernie Pushett told someone
else to do it. 
I pondered the matter as it would be a new shaila - only recently in
Australia has the issue of early davvening/ daylight saving for asara
betevet been real. 

The next week I was in Yerushalayim and davvening in my old yeshiva Kol
Torah had the opportunity to ask my teacher Harav Yehoshua Neuwirth shlita
author of Shmirat Shabbat Kehilchata as to his views. 

We discussed backwards and forwards - brit on fast days - giving to children
- is the need to wait at the end of asara betevet so absolute - and then he
said- (and I am freely translating) every Wednesday I discuss halachic
issues with the Rosh Yeshiva (Harav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zatzal) and I
will I ask. 

A few days later Rav Yehoshua sees me across the street and in his humility
and to mekayim divrei chachamim crosses over Rehov Hapisga and tells me
Kiddush should be said - saying "Harosh Yeshivah madgish sheyesh lekayeim et
haminhag". He added that even though this is not Minhag Yerushalayim etc the
Rosh yeshivah was always makpid on kehillot keeping minhagim and in that
context wanted that Kiddush should be said where such had always been the
Minhag - and the wine given to children.

This was the minhag in all the established shuls in Europe.

The chasidim abandoned the Minhag when they set up their own shtiblekh/ 
botei medrash.


From: Zalman 
Most MO and classic orthodox shuls in the US have the Kiddush in shul 
Friday night.The yekke shuls in WH also have kiddush.
The shtiblekh do not.

From: Arie Folger 
I don't get Areivim, but would be interested in the most fascinating
responses. BTW, I heard that when American Jews weren't 'aumeyd
benissoyau'n and accepted to work on Shabbos, would insist on consuming
only yayin mevushal. --Arie

From: Danny Schoemann [mailto:doni...@gmail.com] 
We used to do it in the Adas Yeshurun of Johannesburg; they probably
still do, but I left 18 years ago.

I've also seen it done in Etz Chaim of Strasbourg as well as in Breuers, NY.
Never seen it done in EY.

From: Rabbi Chaim I 
This minhag goes back to the time of the Gemoro when oniyim and orchim would

be given a Shabbos meal in a room adjacent to the shul.  Presumably wine was

not plentiful and so the Chazan would say the Kiddush in shul within earshot

and presumably eyeshot of those who were in the anteroom to be mekayem 
'kiddush bemokom seudah'.  Even when the practise of providing such Shabbos 
meals was discontinued the minhag of making Kiddush persisted.  One argument

was because it had the force of a takono deRabonon that cannot be abrogated 
even when the original reason no longer pertained. Others say because it was

seen as the official declaration of kedushas Shabbos in shul for whcih 
reason - in most shules - the Chazan faces the Kehilo when he says it.

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Message: 8
From: "Elazar M. Teitz" <r...@juno.com>
Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2008 06:15:09 GMT
Re: [Avodah] monogamy (was: Hypocrisy in Halacha)

     In the opinion of many Rishonim, the cherem d'Rabbeinu Gershom is not
     applicable bimkom mitzva, of which two examples are mentioned by the
     RM"A in EH 1: yibum, and one who has been married ten years without
     children.	It would be extremely odd if the takana was made as a
     result of Rabbeinu Gershom's personal experience, yet did not apply in
     that very circumstance.

Are you safe? Click for quotes on a home security system. 

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Message: 9
From: "Elazar M. Teitz" <r...@juno.com>
Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2008 06:46:53 GMT
Re: [Avodah] Kiddush in shul Friday night

R. Dov Kay Writes;
<I am curious as to the mainstream custom in shuls in pre-war Lithuania.
 I don't have the AhS to hand, but don't recall his saying that the custom
was not practised, so presumably it was (together with the recital of
maarovos and other customs that are now stigmatised as "Yekkish").  I
notice that many Litvaks (or neo-Litvaks) davka adopt Yeshivishe customs,
even though these were not practised in the vast majority of shuls in Lita
(eg yisgadeil rather than yisgadal).  Does anyone know where to found a
collection of mainstream Litvish minhag (other than AhS)?>

     The community in which I live was founded about 130 years ago
     primarily by Litvaks, and has, by and large, preserved its minhagim
     since. I understood from my father z"l that they were the standard in
     pre-war Lita. These included the saying of maaravis on Yom Tov, saying
     the piyutim in chazaras hasha"tz on Yom Tov and the arba parshios, and
     making kiddush and havdala in shul.  However, starting about 55 years
     ago my father had kiddush made by pre-bar mitzva boys, although if
     none are present, the chazzan still says it.  

     Havdala, unlike kiddush, _was_ made in the beis midrash of the
     yeshivos I attended, since (unlike the situation for kiddush) the boys
     had no reason to gather on motza'ei Shabbos. 

     As far as yisgadeil vs. yisgadal is concerned, it is a very recent
     yeshivishe practice.  In my yeshiva days, the '40s and '50s, yisgadal
     was exclusively said: in Torah Vodaath, the Mir, Telshe, Ponevez and
     Ner Israel. (I was well-traveled.)  I have also noticed that many of
     those who say yisgadeil will say "tisgadal v'siskadash" in the k'dusha
     of shacharis on Shabbos.
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