Avodah Mailing List

Volume 25: Number 33

Wed, 23 Jan 2008

• 1. Re: spanish minhagim (Richard Wolpoe)
• 2. Re: Roast lamb (from areivim) (Richard Wolpoe)
• 3. Three steps back (Moshe Y. Gluck)
• 4. Re: Roast lamb (Elazar M. Teitz)
• 5. Bending Knees (Richard Wolberg)
• 6. "Zeh Keli v'anveihu Elokei avi va'arom'menhu" (Richard Wolberg)
• 7. Re: Fasting on YK (chana@kolsassoon.org.uk)
• 8. Tu B'Shvat "Don't Cut Your Nose to Spite Your (Saul.Z.Newman@kp.org)
• 9. Re: Fasting on YK (Yitzhak Grossman)
• 10. Hopeful Vision (Richard Wolberg)

On Jan 16, 2008 10:26 AM, Simon Montagu <simon.montagu@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Jan 16, 2008 2:08 PM, Eli Turkel <eliturkel@gmail.com> wrote:
> > After kiddush and before hamotzi they have a minhag to eat three foods
> > that have three
> > berachot (etz,adamah,shehakol). I was always taught to have hamotzi as
> > soon as possible
> > after kiddush
>
> My wife's brothers also have this minhag. The reason for it is to make
> up the total of 100 berachot per day in spite of the shorter Amida on
> Shabbat.
> _
>

FWIW My rebbe - Rav Yoseph Weiss made a bracha on Besamim on Friday Night -
probably for the same purpose
-- 
Kol Tuv / Best Regards,
RabbiRichWolpoe@Gmail.com
see: http://nishmablog.blogspot.com/
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avodah-aishdas.org/attachments/20080123/e140cef4/attachment.html 

On Jan 20, 2008 3:39 PM, kennethgmiller@juno.com <kennethgmiller@juno.com>
wrote:

>
> I want to make sure I'm understanding you. Suppose a plain piece of raw
> meat was placed in a keli (such as our pots or our pans), without any water
> or oil or other liquid, and then that keli was placed on a stovetop, and the
> fire was turned on, and it was kept like that until the meat became fit to
> eat. Then it turned out that the keli had been a dairy one.
>
> Are you saying that this keli can be kashered by hagalah, and that libun
> is not required?
>
> If that's not what you mean, then please clarify further. If that IS what
> you mean, I do follow your logic, but it is quite a chiddush to me, and I'd
> love to see your source. (OTOH, I never really learned YD in depth, so it
> being a chiddush proves nothing.)
>
> Thanks
> Akiva Miller
>


Zli vs. Bishul make all kinds of nafka minas for getting rid of Dam  [as in
a liver/kaved] and  also wrt to abosption [kdei kilpa vs. totla bliah]

When you roast in a pan you are cooking. Period with or withou any added
liquid.
You cannot "kasher" [viz. remove dam] by pan roasting.

There are probably other cases such as milk/meat contaminations [roasting
milk and meat in a LARGE vented oven would not create bass bechalav pan
roasting meat and cheese would probably do a d'orraiso bishul. yada yada
yada]


-- 
Kol Tuv / Best Regards,
RabbiRichWolpoe@Gmail.com
see: http://nishmablog.blogspot.com/
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avodah-aishdas.org/attachments/20080123/a880a593/attachment.htm 

The Beis Yosef (OC 123) says that one of the reasons we take three steps
back after Shemoneh Esrei is because at Matan Torah the Yidden went back
three Milin - our three steps parallel that. The problem is that all the
Midrashim I could find said that the B'nei Yisrael went back 12 Milin! Rashi
on the Pasuk (Shemos 20:14) also quotes this, so it was no secret. I could
not find any other measurement for this. The only solutions I could think of
are either that there is another Maamar Chazal somewhere that says three
Mil, or that there is a typo, and it should say three _Parsaos_ (which equal
12 Mil). If the latter Pshat is correct, one must wonder how all the
Rishonim and Acharonim quote this Pshat without the correction. Of course,
that's what leads me to conclude that the Pshat is incorrect, which further
leads me to ask again, where is the source for the B'nei Yisrael moving back
three Mil by Matan Torah?

KT,
MYG 

To my comment:
 
<Obviously, those who made the takanah went to great lengths to  prevent any chance of the eating of kodashim bachutz or the  appearance thereof>

R. Micha Berger responded:

<Taqanah?

I thought this was an issue of battling minhagim -- Ashkenazim avoid
confusion by not having roasted meat, Sepharadim commemorate the
qorban by making a point of serving roasted meat.>

     If the minhag is mentioned in the Mishna, and is described by the M'chaber as "_g'zeira_ shema yomru b'sar pesach hu," it sounds as though in some places, a takanah was made not to eat it.  

     As for the prohibition extending to tz'li keidar, even though it isn't kasher for korban pesach: it's no different than beef or fowl, which are likewise not kasher for the korban, and yet are included in the minhag not to eat roasted on leil haseder.

EMT 
_____________________________________________________________
Click to learn about options trading and how to make more money from the pros.
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL2121/fc/Ioyw6i3m5bfWckd8CgdeW3ceyU4QW7cnnRg6ouVplF1rWLLToprpSS/

I'd be curious how many of you have bent your knees at the following?

The generally accepted minhag is to bow the body and head by Mo?dim,  
without bending the knees. Shulchan Aruch w/Mishnah Brurah 113:7,  
Piskei Tshuvos 113:4

When saying ?Va?anachnu Kor?im U?mishtachavim? in Aleinu one should  
bow as he does by Mo?dim. Shulchan Aruch w/Mishnah Brurah 113:3,  
132:MB9 This would clearly mean that you DON'T bow your knees at kor'im.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avodah-aishdas.org/attachments/20080123/cc435b9d/attachment-0001.html 

Michael Poppers wrote:
Eloqim is a plural form, but "avi" is singular and thus b'pashtus can't
refer to "our parents," else the word in the Torah should have been
"avosai."

It was meant in the collective sense. Since masculine gender is used  
often to refer to both, so that was the reason I wasn't grammatically  
exact.
ri
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avodah-aishdas.org/attachments/20080123/ffc417fb/attachment-0001.htm 

RYG writes:

>An interesting distinction, but I stand by what I wrote; I don't see
>why we should differentiate between one already in danger and one who
>will soon be in danger.  In both cases there is a threat to life that
>must be countered either by hilul shabbos, or by my sacrifice.  I 
don't
>really see why the latter falls under the rubric of lo sa'a'mod any
>more than does the former.

It is not just that the person is already in danger versus one who 
will soon be in danger, but that once the person is already in danger, 
there is a specific halacha vis a vis shabbas (or yom kippur) which 
applies - namely that shabbas is doche.  That means that, cooking on 
shabbas for the person who is already sufficiently sick is completely, 
al pi halacha, mutar.  Going to get the food from the neighbour 
therefore is a chumra, and we do not (at least according to RSZA) 
impose a chumra in the case where it will cause tzar.

The fact that this is true can  be seen from the very example 
brought.  If a person is sufficiently sick so as to be a choleh sheyesh 
bo sakana, it is highly unlikely that the cooking being done on shabbas 
is being done by them.  It is almost certainly the case that the person 
doing the cooking is somebody else - perhaps a spouse or family member, 
perhaps a neighbour.  Perhaps even the neighbour whose food one might 
otherwise have thought ought to be confiscated in order to feed the 
sick person, or perhaps another neighbour.

So why does RSZA's concept of tzar not extend to them?  Why do we not 
say that - well the spouse or family member or neighbour might well get 
tzar from cooking on shabbas, which at least sort of feels like chillul 
shabbas and assur, even if they know that it is really mutar, and why 
do we not weigh their tzar against the tzar of the other neighbour with 
the food, and conclude that tzar plus chillul shabbas should outweight 
tzar without chillul shabbas?  And even further, why do we allow the 
person in question to cook at all?  Why is it not OK for the person to 
say to the choleh sheyesh bo sakana, you go and cook, but I am not 
putting my olah haba at stake for you? 

My understanding of the answer to these questions is because - if 
there is a choleh sheyesh bo tzakana there - then it is perfectly mutar 
for the person to cook for them.  The obligations of shabbas are pushed 
aside vis a  vis the cook, whoever they may be.  For that person then 
to refuse to cook is, again, a violation of lo sa'amod.  And to have 
tzar about this is not real tzar, because the halacha dictates that one 
ought to cook.  To refuse to cook in such circumstances is the classic 
case of the chassid shoteh - I am being so frum and not looking or 
touching the woman and hence letting her drown.  But to not have food 
for one's shabbas meal is a real form of tzar.  And since there is 
nothing wrong with cooking in the particular circumstance, and cooking 
will solve the lo sa'amod problem, we are not require to put the 
neighbour with the food into a state of real tzar.

But in the case of the woman on Yom Kippur, she is not yet in a state 
of choleh sheyesh bo sakana - so none of the specific halachos of  
being doche Yom Kippur apply.  And there is no necessity for her to 
ever get to the state, if the husband stays home, or pays for help or 
whatever.  So, it seems to me, he would be in violation of lo sa'amod 
if he did not seek to prevent it.

>Yitzhak

Regards

Chana



__________________________________________________
Get up to ?150 by recycling your old mobile - visit www.tiscali.co.uk/recycle

"is the tree of the field a man" - You are warring against the men,
and thus you are right (or allowed to) kill them, but is the tree part
of this war? Does it deserve to die? No! You shall preserve the trees
and most certainly not destroy them, for they are valuable and worthy
of preservation, and since they are not part of the war, you cannot
destroy them.

--- interesting the strategy in 2nd intifada, where war was made by jews 
davka on olive trees  and probably other roadside trees. as i understand, 
there were 2 rationales--  1] trees used by the enemy as cover to kill 
jews    2] land-revering enemy  esteems his olive trees almost as a 
demigod.

the rationale of 1] is pikuch nefesh. the rationale of 2] is 
demoralization of the enemy; or revenge/spite of the enemy.

the reading of the pasuk would seem to allow 1]; not  sure about 2].
does anyone know if there were any Sh'ut  about  arbocide limitations in 
guerilla war/occupation ?

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avodah-aishdas.org/attachments/20080123/1dc154c7/attachment-0001.html 

[cc'ing Avodah]

On Wed, 23 Jan 2008 14:27:59 +0100 (GMT+01:00)
"chana@kolsassoon.org.uk" <chana@kolsassoon.org.uk> wrote:

> RYG writes:
> 
> >An interesting distinction, but I stand by what I wrote; I don't see
> >why we should differentiate between one already in danger and one who
> >will soon be in danger.  In both cases there is a threat to life that
> >must be countered either by hilul shabbos, or by my sacrifice.  I 
> don't
> >really see why the latter falls under the rubric of lo sa'a'mod any
> >more than does the former.
> 
> It is not just that the person is already in danger versus one who 
> will soon be in danger, but that once the person is already in danger, 
> there is a specific halacha vis a vis shabbas (or yom kippur) which 
> applies - namely that shabbas is doche.  That means that, cooking on 
> shabbas for the person who is already sufficiently sick is completely, 
> al pi halacha, mutar.  Going to get the food from the neighbour 
> therefore is a chumra, and we do not (at least according to RSZA) 
> impose a chumra in the case where it will cause tzar.

I'm maintaining that even before the woman is in danger, there's no
absolute requirement for her husband to undergo za'ar to prevent her
from needing to eat on YHK, since said eating will be perfectly
permitted, and I'm arguing that the reasoning of RSZA still
applies.

> The fact that this is true can  be seen from the very example 
> brought.  If a person is sufficiently sick so as to be a choleh sheyesh 
> bo sakana, it is highly unlikely that the cooking being done on shabbas 
> is being done by them.  It is almost certainly the case that the person 
> doing the cooking is somebody else - perhaps a spouse or family member, 
> perhaps a neighbour.  Perhaps even the neighbour whose food one might 
> otherwise have thought ought to be confiscated in order to feed the 
> sick person, or perhaps another neighbour.
> 
> So why does RSZA's concept of tzar not extend to them?  Why do we not 

Who said it does not?

> say that - well the spouse or family member or neighbour might well get 
> tzar from cooking on shabbas, which at least sort of feels like chillul 
> shabbas and assur, even if they know that it is really mutar, and why 
> do we not weigh their tzar against the tzar of the other neighbour with 
> the food, and conclude that tzar plus chillul shabbas should outweight 
> tzar without chillul shabbas?  And even further, why do we allow the 

Who said that we don't consider their za'ar?  If the neighbor will
(wrongly) feel great distress upon cooking on Shabbos for the sick
person, I assume that we would indeed not compel him to do so, provided
that there's an alternative means of obtaining food for the sick
person.  If the only two alternatives are either the cook's (misguided)
za'ar from cooking on Shabbos or the neighbor's za'ar from being
without food for Shabbos, then there would indeed be a tossup as to
which one should suffer.  RSZA may be assuming that the cook (rightly)
does not mind saving the life of the sick person; your suggestion that
he (mistakenly) might is speculative.

> person in question to cook at all?  Why is it not OK for the person to 
> say to the choleh sheyesh bo sakana, you go and cook, but I am not 
> putting my olah haba at stake for you? 

He certainly is entitled to say that, even out of simple
laziness, without any religious considerations, if the sick person is
himself capable of cooking.

> My understanding of the answer to these questions is because - if 
> there is a choleh sheyesh bo tzakana there - then it is perfectly mutar 
> for the person to cook for them.  The obligations of shabbas are pushed 
> aside vis a  vis the cook, whoever they may be.  For that person then 
> to refuse to cook is, again, a violation of lo sa'amod.  And to have 
> tzar about this is not real tzar, because the halacha dictates that one 
> ought to cook.  To refuse to cook in such circumstances is the classic 
> case of the chassid shoteh - I am being so frum and not looking or 
> touching the woman and hence letting her drown.  But to not have food 
> for one's shabbas meal is a real form of tzar.  And since there is 
> nothing wrong with cooking in the particular circumstance, and cooking 
> will solve the lo sa'amod problem, we are not require to put the 
> neighbour with the food into a state of real tzar.

An interesting distinction, but I don't see the need for it, as above.

> But in the case of the woman on Yom Kippur, she is not yet in a state 
> of choleh sheyesh bo sakana - so none of the specific halachos of  
> being doche Yom Kippur apply.  And there is no necessity for her to 
> ever get to the state, if the husband stays home, or pays for help or 
> whatever.  So, it seems to me, he would be in violation of lo sa'amod 
> if he did not seek to prevent it.

My position is that there's no lo sa'amod since there won't actually be
any danger, since she will eat and be fine.

> >Yitzhak
> 
> Regards
> 
> Chana

Yitzhak
--
Bein Din Ledin - bdl.freehostia.com
An advanced discussion of Hoshen Mishpat

To Rabbi Akiva, what was most important was the transcending of the  
world
and its limitations, and hence in a mitzvah the essential element was  
what was
common to each, that it embodies the will of God which has no  
limitations.
Therefore he says that the Israelites responded primarily to this common
element in receiving the Torah and they said "yes" to positive and  
negative
alike.

We can in fact go deeper in our understanding of Rabbi Akiva's  
statement.
When he says that the Israelites said "yes" to the negative  
commandments, this
was not simply that they sensed in them the element common to all  
expressions of
God's will; but more strongly, that they only saw what was positive  
even in
a negative thing-the holiness that an act of restraint brings about.

This sheds light on the supernatural statement in the Torah that the
Israelites "heard what was normally seen." For since the physical  
world's
existence was for them only an intellectual perception and the only  
sensed
reality was the existence of God, they could not sense the existence  
of things
which opposed holiness ("the other gods") but saw only the act of  
affirmation
involved in "Thou shall have no other gods."

We can see this orientation of Rabbi Akiva very clearly in the story  
related
in the Talmud, that Rabban Gamliel, Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah, Rabbi  
Joshua and
Rabbi Akiva were on a journey and decided to return to Jerusalem  
(after the
destruction of the second Temple). When they reached Mt. Scopus they  
rent
their garments. When they reached the Temple Mount, they saw a fox  
emerging from
the Holy of Holies and they began to weep-but Rabbi Akiva laughed.  
They asked
him: "Why are you laughing?" and he replied: "Why are you weeping?"  
They said, it
is written, "the common man who goes near (to the Holy of Holies)  
shall die,''
and now foxes enter it-should we not cry?

He said, "this is why I laugh. For it is written 'And I will take to  
Me faithful
witnesses, Uriah the priest and Zechariah the son of Jeberechiah.' Now  
what
connection has Uriah with Zechariah? Uriah lived during the times of the
First Temple, while Zechariah prophesied at the time of the second.  
But the Torah
links the prophecies of both men. Uriah wrote, 'therefore shall  
Zion,because of
you, be plowed like a field.' And Zechariah wrote 'Yet shall old men and
women sit in the broad places of Jerusalem.' So long as Uriah's  
prophecy had not
been fulfilled, I was afraid that Zechariah's would not be. Now that  
it has, it
is certain that Zechariah's will come true."

Even in the darkest moment of Jewish history-when foxes ran freely in  
the
Holy of Holies, Rabbi Akiva saw only the good: That this was proof  
that the
serene and hopeful vision of Zechariah would be vindicated.
Adapted from Chabad  "Torah Stories"


My personal feelings have been very optimistic also for another  
reason. It
is our traditional belief that God knows everything that will ever  
occur.
Hence, if the end of man were to be total evil, then it seems unlikely  
that
God would have created a world doomed to failure.
ri



-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avodah-aishdas.org/attachments/20080123/ca0c38d2/attachment.htm 

------------------------------


Avodah mailing list
Avodah@lists.aishdas.org
http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org


End of Avodah Digest, Vol 25, Issue 33
**************************************

Send Avodah mailing list submissions to
	avodah@lists.aishdas.org

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
	http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
	avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org

You can reach the person managing the list at
	avodah-owner@lists.aishdas.org

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Avodah digest..."