Avodah Mailing List

Volume 24: Number 110

Sun, 30 Dec 2007

• 1. Re: Lashon Hara about non-Jews (T613K@aol.com)
• 2. Re: Lashon Hara about non-Jews (Michael Makovi)
• 3. Re: Lashon Hara about non-Jews (Michael Makovi)
• 4. Re: Lashon Hara about non-Jews (Zev Sero)
• 5. Re: Lashon Hara about non-Jews (Richard Wolpoe)
• 6. Re: Ashkenazim and Sephardim (Richard Wolpoe)
• 7. Re: Sometimes Chutzpah is Praiseworthy (T613K@aol.com)
• 8. Re: irrational anti-Semites? (Michael Makovi)
• 9. Re: New king (Michael Makovi)

 
 
From: "Doron Beckerman" _beck072@gmail.com_ (mailto:beck072@gmail.com) 

>>Ain HaNidon  Domeh LaRaayah. There isn't one Posek who says its forbidden to
speak LH  about non-Jews.<<


 
>>>>>
While that is true, I have heard  more than one mussar shmooze about  how a 
person should try to avoid saying anything negative about anyone, as  training 
in good midos.  In fact they say that a person should try to avoid  talking 
about other people altogether.


--Toby  Katz
=============



**************************************See AOL's top rated recipes 
(http://food.aol.com/top-rated-recipes?NCID=aoltop00030000000004)
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://lists.aishdas.org/private.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org/attachments/20071230/7e74eb86/attachment-0001.htm 

> There was some suggestion that perhaps the Torah forbids us to speak
> lashon hara about non-Jews because of hashchasas middos.  Bad middos are
> already forbidden by the Torah.  If the lashon hara about the non-Jew is
> an expression of those bad middos, so it is assur.  But not because of
> L"H, just because of bad middos.  The Torah forbids lending money to a
> Yid on interest, but allows it for a goy.  The Torah is m'chaiv hashavas
> aveidah for a Yid but not for a goy.  Why aren't we worried about the
> effect on middos in those cases?  Charging interest from a goy might
> result in (or come from) feelings of cruelty, selfishness etc.  The same
> for hashavas aveida.  But the Torah says we can keep it.  So obviously
> the Torah knows better than us and has kavanos that take in to account
> our nature and purpose in the world.  Sometimes b'davka speaking ill of
> a goy could be very beneficial.  It helps us stress in our own minds
> that a Yid is not a goy and that our first obligation is to love all the
> Yidden and then the rest of the world.
>
> Michoel Kelmar

Actually, it is forbidden by the Torah to take interest from a
gentile. The Torah permits interest to a nochri, which, as the Hertz
Chumash teaches, is a gentile passing through the land, not an
inhabitant. Elsewhere (I forget where; maybe Vayikra 25:35) the Torah
prohibits interest to a ger toshav. Rabbi Isidore Epstein in his The
Jewish Way of Life quotes Rav Hertz as well as the exact Gemara in
question (I have to check it) and brings Tosafot that we permit
interest from a gentile only because pragmatically, the taxes imposed
by gentile governments made it impossible not to charge interest.

It seems to me that perhaps the Torah prohibits interest only from a
gentile inhabiting eretz yisrael. Just as it is permitted to take
interest from a nochri passing through the land without settling,
perhaps the Torah is prohibiting interest only from our neighbors in
the land. If so, then again, just as I posited for lashon hara, taking
interest from a gentile would be perhaps a loophole due to the fact
that the Torah deals only with cases pertaining to eretz yisrael, and
ignores chutz la'aretz, as Rabbis Moshe Shmuel Glasner and Eliezer
Berkovits have pointed out regarding keeping Shabbat in a land where
Sunday is the day of rest (they say the Torah is not concerned with
how we do it; the Torah's concern is only that we are able to keep
Shabbat in the land where we control the economy; the chiyuv even in
chutz la'aretz notwithstanding).

Mikha'el Makovi

> Actually, it is forbidden by the Torah to take interest from a
> gentile. The Torah permits interest to a nochri, which, as the Hertz
> Chumash teaches, is a gentile passing through the land, not an
> inhabitant. Elsewhere (I forget where; maybe Vayikra 25:35) the Torah
> prohibits interest to a ger toshav. Rabbi Isidore Epstein in his The
> Jewish Way of Life quotes Rav Hertz as well as the exact Gemara in
> question (I have to check it) and brings Tosafot that we permit
> interest from a gentile only because pragmatically, the taxes imposed
> by gentile governments made it impossible not to charge interest.
>
> It seems to me that perhaps the Torah prohibits interest only from a
> gentile inhabiting eretz yisrael. Just as it is permitted to take
> interest from a nochri passing through the land without settling,
> perhaps the Torah is prohibiting interest only from our neighbors in
> the land. If so, then again, just as I posited for lashon hara, taking
> interest from a gentile would be perhaps a loophole due to the fact
> that the Torah deals only with cases pertaining to eretz yisrael, and
> ignores chutz la'aretz, as Rabbis Moshe Shmuel Glasner and Eliezer
> Berkovits have pointed out regarding keeping Shabbat in a land where
> Sunday is the day of rest (they say the Torah is not concerned with
> how we do it; the Torah's concern is only that we are able to keep
> Shabbat in the land where we control the economy; the chiyuv even in
> chutz la'aretz notwithstanding).
>
> Mikha'el Makovi
>

I just checked my original sources:

First, Rav Hertz (Devarim 23:21) says that the permission of interest
to a gentile extends only to the nochri, i.e. a gentile passing
through the land on a visit or business trip. To take interest from a
ger toshav, on the other hand, is forbidden. Then Rav Hertz says that
Rabbinically, it is forbidden to take interest from a gentile in
general.

Rabbi Epstein (late principal of the rabbinic school at Jews' College;
The Jewish Way of Life, page 78 - this book is rare so I will be
quoting extensively) says, "This prohibition [of interest - my
insertion], as it is clear from the context [Vayikra 25:36 - my
insertion], applies equally to "a stranger or a sojourner" - a non-Jew
- as to a Jew."

There, a footnote says:

"It is to be noted that the non-Jew to whom the Bible permits the
lending of money on interest (see Deuteronomy xxiii. 21) is
specifically described as Nachri, "a foreigner, that is a non-Jew who
is on a business-visit in Palestine and borrows money for trading
purposes" (see S. D. Luzzatto, Commentary on the Pentateuch, and Dr.
J. H. Hertz, The Pentateuch and Haftorahs, ad locum) but not to a
non-Jewish sojourner or resident in Palestine who is in need of
support. See Makkoth 24a. " 'He putteth not his money on interest'
(Psalm xv. 5), means not even from a heathen." From Baba Metzia 70b it
is clear that the Rabbis of the Talmud did not approve of the taking
of interest even from non-Jews. The Biblical law of Deuteronomy xxiii.
21 is explained to mean that interest may be paid to a non-Jew [my
note: davka *paid to*, not taken from]. This receives some support
from the causative "tashshich" (usually rendered "thou mayest bite"
[that is, lend on] interest) which many grammarians render "thou
mayest cause to bite [that is, allow him to take] interest".
Alternatively, the Talmud declares that the taking of interest from a
non-Jew is permitted only in an emergency to support one's life.
Apposite this is the gloss of Tosafoth on this Talmud passage in the
name of Rabbenu Tam (Jacob ben Meir of Ramerupt, 1100-1171): "That
nowadays the prohibition against taking interest from non-Jews is not
observed due to the many high taxes which we must pay to the kings and
rulers to be allowed to live. We live among the nations and are denied
every other livelihood." Once a breach has been made in Jewish law and
custom by force of untoward combinations and circumstances brought
about by a hostile world, it became difficult to re-establish the
observance of the law even with the improvement of conditions. See
also Joseph Albo, Ikkarim iii, 25.

Me again: We see from this that one way or another, interest from a
gentile is not be taken. The Talmud suggests that either you can pay
interest to him, or interest is allowed for a life-threatening
situation. Rabbis Epstein and Hertz, and Luzzatto, on the other hand
suggest that interest was permitted to the transient gentile but not
the settled one. (It seems to me that since the Talmud is not sure of
the answer, it means there was no Sinaitic kabbalah on the matter.
Therefore, we are free to offer our own speculations, though they have
no value l'maaseh due to the sealing of the Talmud.) If I may take the
suggestion of Epstein, Hertz, and Luzzatto a step further: the Torah
deals with gentiles in Israel, viz. the ger toshav and the nochri. But
it never legislates for the gentile in chutz la'aretz while we are in
galut, nor for the gentile who lives in Israel without being a ger
toshav. Both cases are outside the Torah's purview; the former because
the Torah envisions us in the land, and the latter because the Torah
envisions us in political control of the land (precluding non-gerei
toshav from settling). Therefore, Chazal had to legislate a d'rabbanan
to deal with these unanticipated cases.

Mikha'el Makovi

Kelmar, Michael J. wrote:
> The Torah forbids lending money to a
> Yid on interest, but allows it for a goy.  The Torah is m'chaiv hashavas
> aveidah for a Yid but not for a goy.  Why aren't we worried about the
> effect on middos in those cases?  Charging interest from a goy might
> result in (or come from) feelings of cruelty, selfishness etc.  The same
> for hashavas aveida.  But the Torah says we can keep it.

Charging interest and failing to return lost property are not negative
actions, which come from or could engender bad middos.  They are the
normal way we should expect to interact with strangers.  Why on earth
*should* you let someone use your money for free?  Would you let them
use your car for free, or live in your house for free?  Interest is
the just and fair price for the use of capital, which you could otherwise
use for your own purposes, and one should expect to charge it from
everyone.  And if someone has been careless enough to lose something
and you were lucky enough to find it, why on earth should you expend
time and energy to track them down, and then give it to them?  What have
they ever done for you, that you should do them such favours?  The
same applies to hacnasat orchim - if a strange family called and asked
if they could stay with you, you'd give them the phone number of the
nearest reasonably-priced hotel, not inquire after their allergies and
special needs!  Why should you put yourself out for them?  This isn't
a bad midah, it's a normal balebatishe midah.

The chiddush is not that we may charge interest to goyim, and need not
return their aveidos, but that we may not charge it to yidden, and must
return their aveidos.  And AIUI the reason for that is that these are
things we would automatically do for our own family and close friends;
it's normal to demand interest from a stranger, but strange to demand
it from ones brother-in-law.  And we would certainly return anything
our own relatives lost, without expecting any sort of reward.  No
mitzvah is required for us to behave like this.  But AIUI Hashem wants
us to regard every Jew, however distant genetically or socially, as our
own immediate family, and in order to engender that sort of midah we
are commanded to behave *as if* we felt that way already; doing so
regularly may cause us to actually have the feeling, at which time we
would no longer need the mitzvah, because we'd be acting that way even
without it.

Speaking LH, though, seems like something negative.  You're going out
of your way to hurt someone.  It stands to reason that it's a bad midah
whether you speak it of a yid or a goy.  So it seems a valid question
why the Torah restricts the issur to yidden.

Unless we say that it isn't really a bad midah, because if there is
something negative to be known about someone then people ought to know
it, so they'll know to be careful, even if one doesn't know of any
specific reason why they might need to know it.  It should just be
general knowledge, so that anyone who has a to'eles won't need to
make inquiries.  And that the issur on telling LH except to those who
have a specific and important reason to know is yet another example
of something we would do for a close relative or friend, about whom
we generally care, but not for a stranger, and Hashem wants us to feel
that way about every yid.

-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                       	                          - Clarence Thomas

On Dec 30, 2007 11:08 AM, Kelmar, Michael J. <MKelmar2@monlife.com> wrote:

> There was some suggestion that perhaps the Torah forbids us to speak
> lashon hara about non-Jews because of hashchasas middos.  Bad middos are
> already forbidden by the Torah.  If the lashon hara about the non-Jew is
> an expression of those bad middos, so it is assur.  But not because of
> L"H, just because of bad middos.  The Torah forbids lending money to a
> Yid on interest, but allows it for a goy.  The Torah is m'chaiv hashavas
> aveidah for a Yid but not for a goy.  Why aren't we worried about the
> effect on middos in those cases?  Charging interest from a goy might
> result in (or come from) feelings of cruelty, selfishness etc.  The same
> for hashavas aveida.  But the Torah says we can keep it.  So obviously
> the Torah knows better than us and has kavanos that take in to account
> our nature and purpose in the world.


I am not disagreeing with this just aisi this leads me to a very big kasha -
namely
Why are the rabbanan [Chazal] concerned about issues that the Torah is not?
E.g., mid'oraisso a brother  & sister  who convert are allowed to marry each
other [kek'tanim shenoldu] but derbbana say "iz past nisht" to be mattir
something for them that is assur for a Jew.

And there are countless others g'zeiros that have to do with the Torah being
mattir something that Hazal felt "is pst nisht."  What gives Chazal the
right to second guess the Torah?

If the answer is that it depends upon the generation/dor then ein hachi
nami, we should NOT be mattir beahvior NOW in our time that is politically
incorrect if it would lead to bad middos -

Or OTOH  is the answer something else?

-- 
Kol Tuv / Best Regards,
RabbiRichWolpoe@Gmail.com
see: http://nishmablog.blogspot.com/


>  Sometimes b'davka speaking ill of
> a goy could be very beneficial.  It helps us stress in our own minds
> that a Yid is not a goy and that our first obligation is to love all the
> Yidden and then the rest of the world.
>
> Michoel Kelmar
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://lists.aishdas.org/private.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org/attachments/20071230/0844d6de/attachment-0001.html 

On Dec 30, 2007 7:25 PM, Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 27, 2007 at 10:35:00PM -0500, Richard Wolpoe wrote:
> : Micha:
> :> The notion that Sepharadim come almost entirely from Bavel whereas
> :> Ashkenazim are primarily from EY, but a mix of both, is from Prof Agus.
> :> Search Avodah's archives for the name "Agus", this has been discussed
> :> repeatedly in the past.
>
> : This is hardly Agus's notion alone. Most of the major litrugicists
> subscribe
> : to it
> ...
>
> I wrote the above under the impression that it was distinctly Prof
> Agus's notion to take this notion and extend it beyond liturgy into a
> discussion of the role of Bavli in Ashkenaz vs its role in Sepharad and
> the evolution of its acceptance in a special role in halachic development
> even in Ashkenaz.
>
> Tir'u baTov!
> -Micha
>
> --
> Micha Berger
>

Yes I am modeh Agus did extend it quite a bit.  Just that the parameters
already went beyond liturgy by the time of Rabbeinu Tam and Or Zarua.

Think of this.  Midrash Rabbah is primarily from EY. Anytime a Minhag is
rooted in Midrash Rabba it COULD represent an example of the  EY v.s Bavel
dichotomy [iow it is not restricted to Yersuhalmi per se either].

What I am saying is that there have been several generalizations on this
thread that are mostly true but somewhat mis-leading.

Agus, Ta Sehma et. al. never  make this a Yerushalmi  Bavli dichotomy,
rather they make it a EY vs. Bavel dichotomy and that encompasses many other
texts.

Similarly this is not limited to liturgy.  Just that with the liturgy it is
so blatant you don't need a PhD to figure out the pattern.

But it is also true that saying Minhag Ashkenaz = Minhag EY is not 100%
true.  This is a trend not an absolute.  Yekum Purkan illustrates an
exception.

Also the Ashkenaz Amidah had 19 brachos whilst Kallir had 18 [viz.  Binyan
and tzemach were merged to preserve literally 18 even AFTER laminnim]

-- 
Kol Tuv / Best Regards,
RabbiRichWolpoe@Gmail.com
see: http://nishmablog.blogspot.com/
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://lists.aishdas.org/private.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org/attachments/20071230/fe34def0/attachment-0001.htm 

 
 
From: R' Mikha'el Makovi

> PuAh was so named according to one  Peshat, since she acted with brazenness
> towards her father ? Hofio  PaneHa Kenneged AviHa. This refers probably to
> her remarking to her  father that his decree was worse than Pharo's. It is
> likely that she is  attributed with this name on this particular occasion
> since without her  Chutzpah she would not have had a job; no Jewish babies
> would have been  born.
>
> But why is this acceptable? Why is the Medrash praising  her for this
> temerity and insubordination? Is this the way for a  daughter to speak to 
her
> father? 



>>>>>
When a child says something bold and brassy but the father loves what the  
child said and thinks it's bright and delightful, the father is not upset with  
his daughter -- he is pleased and delighted with her wit and chachma!  You  
can imagine a young girl of 11 or 12 saying, "Abba you're worse than  Paraoh!  
Don't you want any Jewish babies to be born anymore? You should  marry Ima 
again and have more children, and don't worry Abba, if Ima needs any  help with 
the baby, I'll help her."  I bet he just ate her up!

 

--Toby  Katz
=============



**************************************See AOL's top rated recipes 
(http://food.aol.com/top-rated-recipes?NCID=aoltop00030000000004)
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://lists.aishdas.org/private.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org/attachments/20071230/ccde517f/attachment.html 

> Pharaoh has two worries about the Jews, in the same sentence, that seem to
> contradict each other: " the Jews are multiplying too rapidly, there are too
> many of them" AND "they might go up out of Egypt." Well duh if there are too
> many of them, LET them leave, wouldn't that be the solution?  So it's hard
> to understand exactly what his point is.  "There are too darn many of them
> and they might leave!"  Makes no sense.  (Reminds me of that joke, "I won't
> eat at that restaurant, the food is terrible, and such small portions!")
>
> Rashi says Pharaoh was speaking euphemistically, not wanting to curse
> himself, but his real fear was not that the Jews might go up and leave
> Egypt, but that the EGYPTIANS might be forced to leave their own country!
>
>
> Hirsch says that the Egyptians -- like all anti-Semites -- wanted a few Jews
> around, because they knew they were good for the country, but not /too/ many
> -- like there's some optimum number of Jews an anti-Semite would want in his
> country, not too few and not too many.
>
> The contradictory nature of Pharaoh's anxiety ("There are too many Jews but
> I don't want them to leave") reminds me of how the Soviets used to treat
> Jews -- hated them, persecuted them, but wouldn't let them leave.  It's
> like, "We all know this stinking country is a hellhole, one vast Gulag.  Why
> should you Jews be able to escape this prison-country?"  Like letting them
> leave would be a privilege, a reward for being such impossible people.
>
> There is also an additional phrase in there, "they might /join our enemies
> and fight us/, and then leave." It still doesn't make clear exactly what
> Pharaoh's concern was.  I'm not totally satisfied with Rashi or with Hirsch
> but maybe somebody else came across another commentary on this question that
> sheds more light on it?  Or do we just say, you can't expect anti-Semitism
> to make sense, and that IS the message?
>
>
> --Toby Katz
> =============

I think the answer might be davka that Pharaoh didn't know what he
wanted. He was afraid we would stay in the country and be a
fifth-column, but all the same, he wanted to continue using our labor.
He was afraid to keep us and afraid to let us go.

Alternatively, perhaps he was afraid that we would leave and return as invaders.

Mikha'el Makovi

> R' Mikha'el Makovi wrote:
> "I personally think it was a new king."
>
> It seems that this is a machlokes in Chazal.  I'm not so sure we are
> entitled to personal opinions.
>
> Michoel Kelmar

First, thanks for the smicha!

As for the personal opinion bit, my rabbi gave a talk on this the other week:

On the one hand, people often think, erroneously, that they are
entitled to an opinion on a Torah matter. The reason he says, is that
(he cited a source for the following, but I forget it) Torah is our
heritage, and so it is really is part of us. Therefore, we think we
are entitled to an opinion on it. Sometimes of course this is true.
But more often, we are woefully under-learned on a subject but don't
know it. He related a story of a man (an experience mattress salesman
of a few decades) who argued a halachic point with someone (much more
knowledgeable in halacha); this mattress-salesman asserted that
something ought to be the halacha, because that's what felt right to
him. So when someone wanted to buy a mattress, and the mattress
salesman gave his opinion, the halacha expert (who knew nothing of
mattresses) came up and said the mattress salesman was wrong. The
mattress salesman said "What do you know about mattresses?", and other
man responded, "And what do you know about halacha?".

On the one hand, he said, Torah is not simply a cold academic
endeavor, but rather a way of life. One cannot simply know that the
Maharal says this and Rav Hirsch says that and Rambam says this and
Ramban says that, etc. One must, at some point, have his own opinion
to live by. Torah is not something for one to simply be able to rattle
off all the shitot without one having his own shita.

So it's a difficult balance. My personal answer, not necessarily my
rabbi's, is that one can and should espouse his own shita, but still
give full attention and respect to the alternative. Before rejecting,
one must investigate it seriously. Therefore, I personally think the
king was a new one, but I (in theory) know about the alternative. I
say in theory because the fact is, I don't know the alternative, just
like I don't know a million other things. But in the end of the day, I
still need to hold something. I can't learn anything from the Torah if
the Torah to me is a haze of conflicting shitot that I hold nothing
regarding them.

Mikha'el Makovi


------------------------------


Avodah mailing list
Avodah@lists.aishdas.org
http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org


End of Avodah Digest, Vol 24, Issue 110
***************************************

Send Avodah mailing list submissions to
	avodah@lists.aishdas.org

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
	http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
	avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org

You can reach the person managing the list at
	avodah-owner@lists.aishdas.org

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Avodah digest..."