Avodah Mailing List

Volume 23: Number 203

Mon, 24 Sep 2007

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Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Message: 1
From: "Moshe Feldman" <moshe.feldman@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 22 Sep 2007 18:47:42 +0200
[Avodah] Purchasing produce grown by goyim in EY during

The Netziv is in HaAmek Davar Vayikra 25:4 (at the end) says that
Shevi'is is an issur connected to the cheftza of the land (in contrast
to Shabbos, which is an issur solely on the person) and consequently
there is a mitzva to purchase land from goyim so that the land rests.
Rav Yaakov Ariel, in his introduction to Katif Shevi'it (put out by
Otzar HaAretz), points out that therefore we should not purchase
produce from goyim who farm in Eretz Yisrael if this will cause them
to farm the land more intensively during Shevi'is.

Kol tuv,

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Message: 2
From: "kennethgmiller@juno.com" <kennethgmiller@juno.com>
Date: Sun, 23 Sep 2007 02:47:14 GMT
Re: [Avodah] Rationalism and supernaturalism

R' Eli Turkel wrote:
> ... Rambam outlaws "magic shows" as kishuf while others define 
> kishuf as being "real black magic" as opposed to sleight of
> hand. However, Rambam could not hold this shita since on
> philosophical grounds he denies the existence of real magic ...

Can someone explain those "philosophical grounds" to me?

What did the Rambam say about the various gemaras that a person said the Shem Hemeforash and was able to fly in the air, or kill another person, or whatever. If one accepts the idea that white magic exists, isn't it inconsistent to deny black magic?

Akiva Miller

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Message: 3
From: Arie Folger <afolger@aishdas.org>
Date: Sun, 23 Sep 2007 10:12:53 +0200
Re: [Avodah] Mysticism and rationalism

I wrote
> > Cognoscenti see in the Moreh Nevukhim a mystical system, too (in the
> > third

RYG asked:
> That may be the view of some, but is it the mainstream understanding?

It is my understanding that that view is fairly mainstream. I learned it from 
an academician. The difficulty here is distinguishing between Kabbalah 
(Zohar, Bahir, perhaps even Sefirot, etc.) and mysticism in general. Look, 
the philosophical Rishonim and Geonim did not exclude Sefer Yetzira from the 
cannon, and despite Rav Sa'adya Gaon's attempt to explain it philosophically, 
I don't think it can be entirely reduced to rational philosophy.

But then again, mysticism need not conflict with rational philosophy. What 
matters is the kind of mysticism. According to most readings in Rambam, ve'al 
a'hat qama veqama other authorities, the soul retains individuality after 
death, meaning that the soul has a real, separate existence, distinct from 
the body. Consequently, it isn't so surprising to consider the world of the 
soul, i.e. mysticism.

With this, I have also replied to your other question. However, I would like 
to stress that even if you were to deny what I consider obvious, meaning that 
you would deny that mystical experiences can be real and valid even according 
to rationalist philosophers, I care to stress that Ashkenaz clearly accepted 
mysticism, as we see the numerous references to angelology, as in Makhnisei 
Ra'hamim and Midat haRa'hamim 'Aleinu Hitgalgeli. Thus, the Ashkenaz that 
rejected the popularization of kabbalah and may be never even accepted the 
authoritative character that some other circles granted it, this same 
Ashkenaz clearly accepted Jewish mysticism as a concept.

Hence there is no contradition between accepting the mystical concept of 'eit 
ratzon regarding seli'hot, and rejecting the inclusion of kabbalistic prayers 
or minhaggim.

Kind regards & gemar tov,
Arie Folger

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Message: 4
From: "Marty Bluke" <marty.bluke@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 23 Sep 2007 15:11:22 +0200
Re: [Avodah] Shehecheyanu for shmitta

On 9/21/07, Michael Poppers <MPoppers@kayescholer.com> wrote:
>  BTW, mei'inyan l'inyan: do you know why "shehecheyanu" isn't made by a
> b'ris (which surely is a "qiyum bequm va'asei")? The "Sharashei Minhag
> Ashk'naz" Vol1 piece on this topic is worthwhile (and speaking of "Sharashei
> Minhag Ashk'naz," see my next post)....
Actually the minhag in EY is to make a shehecheyanu at a Bris.

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Message: 5
From: Michael Poppers <MPoppers@kayescholer.com>
Date: Sun, 23 Sep 2007 10:25:45 -0400
Re: [Avodah] Shehecheyanu for shmitta

RMarBl replied to me:
>> BTW, mei'inyan l'inyan: do you know why "shehecheyanu" isn't made by a
b'ris (which surely is a "qiyum bequm va'asei")? The "Sharashei Minhag
Ashk'naz" Vol1 piece on this topic is worthwhile.... <<
> Actually the minhag in EY is to make a shehecheyanu at a Bris. <
Yes (for details l'halachah, see SA YD 265:7 and nos'ei keilim), and as per
Rav Hamburger, this started w/ RaMBaM (Hilchos Milah 3:3 [NB: in my
"Sharashei" volume, the source is listed as 3:5] and B'rachos 11:9) but is
not at all mentioned in the Talmud, by the G'onim, or by any other early
pos'qim (in fact, the Tos'fos specifically explain why this b'rachah is
*not* made -- e.g. see BT Sukkah 46a d'h' ha-oseh and BT B'choros 49a d'h'
l'achar) and was not accepted by S'faradim before the Inquisition-related
geirush S'farad (sources include the ba'al Ohel Moeid, RaShBA, and RaN).
Accordingly, as noted by the BY (I don't have a Tur YD at home, but Rav
Hamburger refers to YD 265 d'h' [any transliteration mistake mine] shedar),
what became minhag e'Y' us'vivoseha (language found in SA YD 265:7)
certainly has a basis in RaMBaM, but what was the RaMBaM's basis?  (Lest
one consider this merely an argument from the absence of a positive
statement not to make the b'rachah, such no-shehecheyanu-by-b'ris
statements are replete among the Rishonim, as hinted above re Tos'fos, but
read the article -- it's too long to be reproduced via pager :-).)

Chag Sameach and all the best from
--Michael Poppers via RIM pager
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Message: 6
From: "Richard Wolpoe" <rabbirichwolpoe@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 23 Sep 2007 13:37:31 -0400
Re: [Avodah] Shofar and guf naki

On 9/21/07, Michael Poppers <MPoppers@kayescholer.com> wrote:
> In Avodah Digest V23#201, RDK responded to RRW:
> > the Siddur HaGra and the Siddur Ezor Eliyahu, which is fairly
> authoritative as far as the minhagei GRA are concerned, put
> birchos haTorah after birchos hashachar and immediately before korbonos,
> which makes the most sense, because it puts mikra, mishna and gemara (ie
> parshas Tamid, Eizehu mekoman and Rabbi Yishmael) straight after the birchos
> haTorah. I believe that this is also old minhag Ashkenaz.... <
> I believe that RDK is correct on that last point. (I can't speak, however,
> for what the GRA advocated.)
> G'mar tov and all the best from
> --Michael Poppers via RIM pager
Correct this is the  format works for Tur and is essentially the form done
in KAJ
As far as I can tell {AFAICT}  This contrdicts the GRA who is makpid EVEN on
hirhurrim {se Gil Steudent about Hirhurei Torah!}

Another example, Rema specifically exempts Selichos from Birkas hatorah. How
can that possibly work for GRA!  You are saying Hashem Hashem over and over

The Rema relis on any passuk that is in TECHINA form is OK
Therefore KAJ says TEhillim before DAvening EVERY day
Rema exmpts mah Tovu for same reason

Regardless of the Tur model or others, we all do Mikra Mishna Braisso after
Birkas hatorah with Birkas Kohanim and the 2 elus...' Then this same pattern
is repeated in Karbanos

Rinat Yisrael does GRA siddur one better.  Moderh ani IMMEDIATELY followed
AT HOME w/ al netilas Yadayim etc. and Birkas Hatorah. AISI, they do NOT buy
the GRA's shitata in the Siddur but rather in the Bei'ur and accomodate an
early immediate Birkas Hatorah. Rinat being proudced In Israel lich'ora
follows the GRA on this point. Rema is NOT makpid on this

Kesiva vaChasima Tova
Best Wishes for 5768,
Please Visit:
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Message: 7
From: Dov Bloom <dovb@netvision.net.il>
Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2007 01:13:06 +0300
Re: [Avodah] Berich Shemei

Richard Wolpoe wrote in response to R Micha's question: 
I have heard TWO versions.
Version A  - The yekkishe Minhag is pre-Ari etc. and therfore NEVER incorporated Brich  Shemi etc.
Version B  - The Yekkes reacted to Shabtai Zvi and therfore removed kabbalah AFTERWARDS 
...I favor Version B but note that  I suspect some Shlah influence  [e.g tikkun leil Shavuos] but NOT Lurianic stuff.  [E.G. no Psalm 30 before Barcu She'amar]

I (DB) favor version A. 

Ashkenaz poskim Rishonim and Achronim  stressed the minhag very much. 
There is a famous Maharil that especially on issues connected with Tfila one should respect the minhag and not even change the tunes in shul! 

We know the "yekkim" coined the phrase "minhag avoteinu Torah Hi". 

See Magen Avraham on SA OH 690 22 who stresses the importance of following minhag, quoting the Tshuvot HaRamah besheim HaMaharik on not abandoning a minhag, and explaining the principle "minhag oker halacha".

WRT Berich Shmei, Siddur Avodat Yisrael of Baer says in place of his regular commentary in Shacharit of Shabbat (p 222) (my translation) "Berich Shmei has been copied into the new (!) siddurim from the Zohar...".  

On page 122,Shacharit of weekdays, he says clearly that Berich Shmei is not found in the 2 important 16 century siddurim that he quotes from all the time , "gam beKitvei Yad uv'chol siddur yashan einenu, veHaAcharonim he'etiku mi-Zohar al-pi HaAri....ve'Yaan ki beharbeh kehilot Ashkenaz ein omrim oto lo aarich be'peirusho" (neither is it found in the siddur manuscripts nor in any old siddur, and the Achronim [he means here newcomers, Johnny-come-latelys, not poskim achronim] copied it from the Zohar according to the Ari. Since many Ashkenazic communities don't say it I won't bother commenting on it....). [ad can leshono]

So R Seligman Baer who extensively studied the Ashkenazi Siddurim in old printed versions and manuscripts says nothing to indicate RRW's Version B, that Berich Shmei was ever included in Ashkenazi tfila and later excluded because of SZ. If there were MSS or siddurim to evidence, he would quote them (see below on Kabbalat Shabbat).

RRW correctly brings a parallel. Mizmor Shir Hanukat HaBayit LeDavid, which is a late addition (less than 200 years) is not found in Yekke siddurim. 

I may add that Baer and Heidenheim also don't print Thilim 27 LeDavid, H Ori VeYishi, which Litvaks say from RH Elul thru Sukkot. That is also a very very late addition so the classic Yekkim of course didn't add it to their siddurim, because "minhag avoteinu Torah Hi". Neither do they repeat Zecher-Zeicher on Shabbat Zachor, which has become popular only in the last decades and has been discussed on Avodah extensively before.  

One late addition which did find its way into the Yekke Siddurim is Kabbalat Shabbat. Baer correctly notes that all of the Kitvei Yad don't have Kabbalat Shabbat, and "lo yad'u hakadmonim davar me-amiratam beleil Shabbat....". He quoted the Mate Moshe in 1615 as still not having it, and says he found it first mentioned by Yosif Ometz in 1630. He (grudgingly?) quotes the Ya'avetz as having it in his siddur "Al pi haRamak" (Cordovero). He identifies the time of the Ramak and goes on to include Kabbalat Shabbat in his Siddur and even comments on it, unlike Berich Shmei....

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Message: 8
From: Daniel Eidensohn <yadmoshe@012.net.il>
Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2007 01:26:13 -0400
[Avodah] Rav Yaakov Emden & Christianity

I just came across an interesting article written 30 years ago by Blu 
Greenberg - Judaism 27:3 1978 p351-363. Any more recent writings on this 

Rabbi Jacob Emden: The views of an enlightened Traditionalist on 

page 358 "In his commentary Eitz Avos (40b-41a) on Pirkei Avot (4:11), 
Emden describes Christianity as a "religion in the service of God," a 
religion which God sees as good and, therefore, He sustains it; it came 
to spread the word of God to those 'who, until then, had worshipped wood 
and stone, who denied the existence of God altogether, who did not 
believe in good and evil, or in the afterlife. Christianity spread the 
notion of one God, one Ruler of all the universe who metes out justice 
to His creations. Christians accept the seven Noahide Laws and many 
other mitzvot which they voluntarily take upon themselves. In addition 
to these good qualities, God also gave them prophecy through their 
righteous ones, and through these prophets gave them laws and 
commandments by which to live. Because of all this - because they met 
these tests of a holy community-their religion was upheld and maintained 
by God. Emden continues: these two families, Christianity and 
Mohammedanism, which God selected as vehicles to bring faith into the 
world, were never brought under the yoke of mitzvot of the Torah; their 
fathers never gave it to them, nor did they stand at Sinai; neither were 
they slaves in Egypt; therefore, they are not obligated for the 
613mitzvos and are thus exempt from the prohibition of shittuf. Emden 
concludes with the repetition of a previous theme: though some of their 
evil ones cause us sorrow with their violent actions and false 
accusations, there are righteous ones who protect us from those who 
rise  up against Jews, and wise ones among them who search for truth in 
our works and find no fault in our faithfulness to our Torah and mitzvot. "

Shailos Yaavetz (1:41): 

*? *Non?Jews who have not been acquired as slaves are not comparable to 
animals and have familial relations and this is surely true concerning 
these nations which have religion and a legal system and they believe in 
the Creator of the world who runs it and gives reward and punishment as 
well aas believing in a number of other fundamental principles. So even 
though they worship many deities they are not in fact prohibited to do 
that - as our sages have said that non?Jews are not prohibited 
concerning shituf (Devarim  4:19)? They believe  that there are 
intermediaries that G?d uses to run this world such as stars and angels 
as well as many other agents for G?d?s providence over the world. Thus 
they include these agents in their worship of G?d saying that it is 
G?d?s will that they give some honor to G?d?s servants and in a sense 
the servant of the king is like a king. This is the religion of most 
idolators in the world as is well known?

Daniel Eidensohn

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Message: 9
From: "Chana Luntz" <chana@kolsassoon.org.uk>
Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2007 11:47:55 +0100
[Avodah] Halizah (or is it better for one person to do a

RYG writes in response to RMB:

> What's your source for the assertion that Halizah is only 
> kiyumis / materes?  The Hinuch concludes his discussion of 
> Yibum(598) with the statement that:
> ve'over al zeh ve'lo yibem yevimto, kelomar shelo ba aleha 
> biah ahas shehi ikar mizvas aseh zeh o she'lo patrah 
> be'halizah, bitel aseh zeh
> and his discussion of Halizah (599) with:
> ve'over al zeh ve'lo razah le'yabem yevimto ve'lo la'haloz 
> be'ro'a le'vavo, bitel aseh zeh
> They seem pretty parallel to me.  Additionally, the Minhas 
> Hinuch (598) writes (regarding Halizah):
> zarich le'chavein la'zeis ye'dei ha'mizvah, ki hi mizvas aseh 
> ve'hi ke'kol ha'mizvos

Well you seem to both be right.  The Encyclopedia Talmudit brings as a
machlokus rishonim whether or not chalitza is a mitzva chiyuvis or not.
The Mordechai, inter alia, appears to agree that it is a mitzvah
chiyuvis, and therefore even if neither yevam or yevama wants to do
chalitza, and the yevama has no intention of getting married, they
should be forced like other mitzvos aseh.  On the other hand others
appear to hold that if she does not want to get married again, and he
does not mind the zika remaining, there is no need to do chalitza as the
chalitza is only a heter for her to get married to somebody else, just
like shechita is a mitzvah to permit the animal to be eaten.  See there
(it is under section aleph, on the facing page to the beginning).  The
Encyclopedia Talmudit does not (as is its way) provide any conclusion,
and it would seem from the sources quoted that the machlokus extends to
the achronim, so why not to Avodah.

> Yitzhak

Earlier RSM wrote:

> My example of 4 black balls and one white one indeed did not 
> completely correspond  to the case of yevamot, and was merely 
> designed to illustrate the difference between selecting with 
> replacement and without replacement, to show why the number 
> of possible selections is five factorial and not five to the 
> fifth power.   A complete match to the yevamot case is the 
> follows: A box has 5 balls of the following colors: black, 
> white, brown green and grey. 5 people, who happen to be named 
> Mr. White, Mr. Black, Mr Brown, Mr. Green, and Mr Grey choose 
> balls, one after another without replacenment, from the box. 
> A "match" is when someone chooses a ball from the box whose 
> color corresponds to his name (this is like a yavam marrying 
> his yevama). A perfect match is all five doing so, which will 
> happen on average in only 1/120 of the cases. Clearly it is 
> possible that there will be no matches, or one or 2 or 3 
> (only four matches is impossible, sin ce if the first 4  
> match, the fifth one must be a match as well). I have been 
> unable to devise a general formula for calulating the 
> likelyhood of a certain number of matches for any given 
> number of brothers; 

This of course is what I was after - or more specifically, what I wanted
to do was compare the probability of getting one or more yibumim in the
case of five yevamas as opposed to the case of six yevamas.

As you say, if getting five yibumim occurs via five factorial, ie 1/120
or 0.833% then if there are six yevamas, the equivalent would be 1/720
or 0.139%.  But what I really want to know is what is the probability of
getting one or more yibumim occuring (which could be calculated if we
can work out what the probability of getting all chalitzos, because then
we could subtract that figure from 1).

 RER did an empirical calculation for five and concluded: 
>5     Yibumim      1     possibility
>3     Yibumim    10     possiblities
>2     Yibumim    19     possibilites
>1      Yibum       46     possibilities
>0     Yibumim     44     possibilities
>We see that out of the 120 there are 76 cases (120-44), i.e a 63%+
possibility that will be at least one Yibum and 30 cases (1 + 10 +19),
i.e. a 25% 
>possibilty that there be more than one.

I am not quite sure how one would go about doing this for six.  Again 6
yibumim would be 1 possibility out of 720, and there would be no chance
of their being 5 yibumim but how you get to the equivalent of that 44
figure (how did you even get the first one RER, I am struggling to keep
the alternatives straight?).  There must be some sort of formula that
gets you there - don't we have some mathematicians on this list?

Getting back to the substance of our discussion, RSM writes:

> That means, as I understand it, that while there may be a 
> whole debate about Reish Lakish's principle and whether it is 
> d'orisa or d'rabbanan, elsewhere, that debate does not start 
> to apply to yibum/chalitza, because chalitza is already 
> discounted as a mitzvah when one is discussing yibum, so the 
> whole Resh Lakish principle does not apply if the option is 
> chalitza as opposed to yibum. 
> >>
> Reish Lakish makes his statement (or more accurately *could* 
> make his statement - "amar l'cha Reish Lakish") that 
> "chalitza b'makom yibum lav mitzva hi" in order to save his 
> whole principle, which the gemara suggests is refuted (leima 
> tehavei t'yuvta d'Riesh Lakish) by the case of chayvei lavim 
> and yibum. To present this tentative suggestion that Reish 
> Lakish could conceivably make to avoid being entirely refuted 
> as a fundamental principle universally accepted and 
> applicable to our case is IMO something of a stretch.

Why?  As you agree, the gemora makes it clear that Reish Lakish's
principle would appear to be completely refuted by the case of chalitza
and yibum, if we understood the halacha as you understand it, ie that
chalitza is a real mitzvah alternative.  Given that we appear to hold
like Reish Lakish's principle in other places, this is more than an
academic discussion.  If Reish Lakish's principle can be refuted here,
there we can't hold like it elsewhere.  So the gemora comes riding to
the rescue of Reish Lakish's principle by explaining that in the face of
yibum, chalitza cannot be considered a mitzvah.  There appears to be no
disagreement proposed to this statement, and this is where the sugya
concludes.  If you do not say that this is a fundamental principle
universally accepted, you then have to reject Reish Lakish's priciple
elsewhere wherever it appears.  You would also surely need to show
somebody else who holds differently, otherwise you appear to have a stam
gemora without refutation.  

 I am 
> happy with my statement that "lav mitzva" means "lav mitzva 
> kol kach" even according to RL. 
> My proof from the case where when appropriate the yavam is 
> persuaded to do chalitza instead of yibum is still valid;

But the gemora in Yevamos 101b brings a braisa that derives this aspect
(ie that the judges are required to persuade the yavam where
appropriate) from the pasuk "v'dibru elav".  In fact the authority of
the court to pursuade the yavam could be argued to be proof in the
opposite direction.  If it were true that yibum and chalitza are
alternative mitvos, with yibum merely being the more preferable, then
why is there a need for a specific posuk to tell the judges to tell him
not to bring strife into his home - obviously shalom bayis should take
precedence and the judges would logically of their own accord tell him
that if he couldn't work it out himself.  Only if you say that in the
face of yibum chalitza aino mitzvah does it seem absolutely necessary
that the Torah brings a pasuk specifically telling the judges that they
have authority to, and should, counsel the yavam that if there is a risk
that he is going to bring strife into his home, because on the face of
it the couple do not seem compatible, he should not do yibum.  Otherwise
everybody's inclination, in the face of a vadai mitzva aseh with no real
alternative, would be to take the risk.

> case of safek is merely another case where chalitza is a 
> proper procedure, and one who does so is m'kayem a mitzva. 

As far as I can see, the way one should be thinking about it is this.
Yes one who does chalitza is m'kayem a mitzvah (whether a mitzvah
chiyuvis or kiyumis seems to be a machlokus as set out above), but that
when one is faced with a yibum/chalitza choice, one should not take into
account the fact that chalitza is a mitzvah in its own right, but should
ignore that in the face of yibum.  Thus, all one must consider is
whether it is appropriate for yibum to be performed or not, and only
once that decision is made, does the question of chalitza come into
play.  It therefore seems to me that the same analysis ought to be being
applied to the case of safek - and hence the idea of "going for max" in
terms of doing a vadai mitzvah ought to be generalisable (unless of
course you agree with the Aruch L'Ner who appears to hold that one
should generally go for the vadai mitzvah, and the only reason that this
is not done here is not really because of the gemora's reason about
everybody getting a chance to get their yevama, but because one yavam
cannot marry five yevamos in any case).

> Saul Mashbaum



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Message: 10
From: "Chana Luntz" <chana@kolsassoon.org.uk>
Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2007 12:54:43 +0100
Re: [Avodah] lifnei iver/kanaus

RDB writes:

> R' Zalman Nechemia Goldberg holds that the Rav has the status 
> of a Shomer Chinam in this case. The Ptur from golus is 
> because it was done in the context of what the Rav deemed 
> necessary for chinuch, but in the case of taking the item - 
> taking the item serves the purpose of chinuch w/o the Rav 
> being negligent in making sure he could return it.

But even if the Rav is not negligent, if the item is lost or stolen,
then he has been put in the position of having to swear that he was not
negligent.  Why should he be put in this position if what he did was not
only mutar but a mitzvah?

And is it so clear that the Rav in the hitting case was also not to some
degree negligent?  After all, the pupil died, so it would seem prima
facie that the Rav must have applied too much force.  And this case is,
in the Mishna, paralleled to the case of the shaliach beis din where the
person died under his hand - and is there not a whole maklokus about
this question - because the person has to have been assessed by the
court as to how many malkos he could take without dying, so prima facie,
if the shaliach beis din gave the requisite number of malkus, he should
be considered onus, and no question of galus should arise, so why do you
need a special heter - and at least some of the answers given to this
question relate to the shaliach beis din having given an extra lash over
and above the court recommended amount, and even so he is considered
patur for the reason given in the Mishna - namely that his action is not
considered rishut but a dvar mitzvah.  So why if the Rav was a bit
negligent in relation to the object, since it was in the course of what
the Rav deems necessary for Chinuch, which RZNG learns is a dvar mitzvah
based on a kal vochomer why is the Rav not patur from a degree of

And further, having finally had the opportunity to review the Mishna
regarding the Rav killing the talmid and the related gemora (I
apologise, I should have done this previously, I do try and look things
up rather than rely on memory of things I learnt a long time ago, but
things have been so busy lately), it seems to me that if you did want to
learn this as a kal v'chomer it has an ever greater consequence.

Because, unlike as I remembered it, the reason given in the mishna for
the ptur of the Rav is not because of remoteness in the pursuit of a
mitzvah, but specifically because of the mitzvah aspect.  That is (for
those on the list who are not familiar with it) - the Mishna in Makos 8a
quotes Abba Shaul as explaining that the reason the Torah brings the
case of exile specifically for where somebody was inadvertently killed
in the course of the person to be exiled chopping wood is because just
as chopping wood is a dvar reshus, so a case of exile must be for a dvar
reshus, to exclude a father killing his son or a rav his talmid or the
shaliach of beis din (ie because these are engaged in a mitzvah and so
the act is not one of reshus).   And then the gemora further down brings
a Rabbi who asked Rava- how can Abba Shaul say that the chopping of wood
is necessarily voluntary, as maybe the chopping was being done to build
a sukkah or for the misbeach.  And Rava answered that in those cases it
is still considered reshus, as if the person were to find ready chopped
wood suitable for the sukkah or the mizbeach, it would not be a mitzvah
to chop, so here too it cannot be considered a mitzvah.   And then
Ravina asked, but if this is correct, then the Rav (or father etc)
should not be patur from galus, as this too should be reshus, as if the
talmid would learn then he wouldn't need to hit and so hitting wouldn't
be a mitzvah, so here too hitting should not be a mitzvah.  And then
Rava answers back that it is still a mitzvah to hit a talmid even if he
would learn without being hit, and he quotes the pasuk from Mishlei
29:17.  And although Rava goes back and gives another answer, it does
not seem he is resiling from the idea that hitting even in the absence
of need for the immediate lesson is not a mitzvah

On the basis of this interchange and pasuk though, it would seem that,
if hitting can be considered a mitzvah even if not needed for the talmid
to learn the particular lesson in question, then according to RZNG the
taking of a talmid's property could also be considered a mitzvah even if
not needed for the talmid to learn the particular lesson in question -
maybe perhaps on the basis that one only really learns well on bread and
water and sleeping on hard benches, so maybe a Rav should confiscate all
of a talmid's wealth so as to ensure he learns well.  Which does seem a
huge consequence.+

> course, if the Rav thought that the necessary objective of 
> chinuch would be best served by destroying the object, he is 
> within his rights according to RZNG.) 

And the same should therefore be true about destroying a talmid's




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