Avodah Mailing List

Volume 14 : Number 035

Friday, November 26 2004

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Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2004 14:44:37 -0500
From: "David Riceman" <driceman@worldnet.att.net>
Subject:
Re: Requesting this list to list machshava classics


From: "Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <ygb@aishdas.org>
> It [machshava - DR] is the involvement in analysis and explication of 
> issues including:
>    Hashgachah
>    Bechirah
>    Emunah (all 13 Ikkarim)
...
How does this harmonize with your insistence that it cite mussar,
kabbalah, or hassidus? Certainly the Rambam's Peirush on Sanhedrin 10:1
(the locus classicus for 13 Ikkarim) contains none of these three.

David Riceman 


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Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2004 15:01:01 -0500
From: "David Riceman" <driceman@worldnet.att.net>
Subject:
Re: Requesting this list to list machshava classics


From: "Micha Berger" <micha@aishdas.org>
>       (Yesodei haTorah is largely redundant after the Moreh, and not
>       treated as "a classic" in most circles -- from the Gra to RSRH.)

Whenever I teach Moreh Nevuchim I always run through Yesodei HaTorah
(and H. Tshuva) first - MN is a disorderly work and HYhT expresses
at least some of the basic principles in simple, systematic prose.

add

Drashoth HaRamban and Shaar HaGmul
Drashoth HaRan

MaHaRaL's Hiddushei Aggadoth (and his other sefarim as needed)

Rav Kook - e.g. Mamarei RAYH, Oroth HaKodesh and Oroth Hatshuva

I don't see how you can get by without some mention of the Zohar

The other problem is that after Napoleon many of the basic problems
were first raised by non-religious Jews and then reacted to by religious
Jews. You need something about Zionism (Oroth and Kol Dodi Dofeik are
not sufficient), something about sociology and Judaism (I know of no
adequate analysis of Mordechai Kaplan's ideas), and something about the
relationship between halacha and civil law/democracy (I'm not familiar
with Rabbi Herzog's writings, but I believe this was one of his major
concerns).

David Riceman


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Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2004 14:49:48 -0500
From: "Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <ygb@aishdas.org>
Subject:
Re: Requesting this list to list machshava classics


At 02:44 PM 11/24/2004, David Riceman wrote:
>How does this harmonize with your insistence that it cite mussar, 
>kabbalah, or hassidus? Certainly the Rambam's Peirush on Sanhedrin 10:1 
>(the locus classicus for 13 Ikkarim) contains none of these three.

To qualify as a *Ba'al* Machashavah a *contemporary* authority must take 
note of all available approaches.

YGB


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Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2004 13:24:07 -0800 (PST)
From: Harry Maryles <hmaryles@yahoo.com>
Subject:
Re: Requesting this list to list machshava classics


"Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <ygb@aishdas.org> wrote:
> (Machshava) is the involvement in analysis and explication of issues
> including:
>     Hashgachah
>     Bechirah
...

I had no idea that when one speaks of Machshava one speaks specifically
of the above categories. Machshava translates in english to the word,
"thought". This is what lead me to think that the concept of Machshava
had to do with philosophy. But looking at the above categories, certainly
philosophy is a part of it.

 From Wikipedia: "Philosophy literally means 'love of wisdom' from the
Greek 'philo' and 'sofia'. It is now widely used to designate the pursuit
of knowledge or wisdom about fundamental matters concerning life, death,
meaning, reality, being and truth."

Most if not all of the above would certainly fit in with this
definition. Did not RYBS in "Halakhic Man" and "Lonely Man of Faith"
touch on some of these themes... certainly the Tachlis HaBriah? Doesn't
this qualify him as a worthy Baal Machshava then, your assertion to the
contrary not withstanding?

[Email #2. -mi]

"Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <ygb@aishdas.org> wrote:
>>Most if not all of the above would certainly fit in with this
>>definition. Did not RYBS in "Halakhic Man" and "Lonely Man of Faith"
>>touch on some of these themes... certainly the Tachlis HaBriah?
>>Doesn't this qualify him as a worthy Baal Machshava then, your
>>assertion to the contrary not withstanding?

> Very few and in a very limited way. Therefore, no.

> But, praytell, what is the tachlis ha'beriah according to RYBS?

In a nutshell,The purpose of existence is for Man to encounter and
cognate the physical universe through religious eyes and engage it
through Torah and Mitzvos... Halakhic Man.

HM


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Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2004 19:26:28 -0500
From: "Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <ygb@aishdas.org>
Subject:
Re: Requesting this list to list machshava classics


At 06:30 PM 11/24/2004, Harry Maryles wrote:
>In a nutshell,The purpose of existence is for Man to encounter and
>cognate the physical universe through religious eyes and engage it
>through Torah and Mitzvos... Halakhic Man.

1. That's not a tachlis for the Beriah; that is what Man does with
the world.

2. Is this a contribution of any sort? It basically states the obvious!

YGB 


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Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2004 10:12:30 -0500
From: "David Riceman" <driceman@worldnet.att.net>
Subject:
Re: Requesting this list to list machshava classics


From: "Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <ygb@aishdas.org>
> To qualify as a *Ba'al* Machashavah a *contemporary* authority must take 
> note of all available approaches.

On the contrary, what distinguishes a "baal" of anything is that he has
the expertise to choose which approach he uses. Do you expect a baal
tefillah to adopt niggunim from all customs? You are defining what it
takes to be a m'laket, not a m'chadesh.

Take a look at the chapter in Immanuel Etkes's book on R. Yisrael Salanter
where he describes R. Yisrael's relation with kabbalah (he says there's
no published evidence for any such relationship). I'm not sure it's true,
but it's true that he (RYS) deliberately avoided mentioning kabbalistical
ideas in any of his written (letters) or published works. Was he then
not a "baal machshava"?

David Riceman


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Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2004 10:17:23 -0500
From: "Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <ygb@aishdas.org>
Subject:
Re: Requesting this list to list machshava classics


At 10:12 AM 11/25/2004, David Riceman wrote:
>On the contrary, what distinguishes a "baal" of anything is that he has 
>the expertise to choose which approach he uses.  Do you expect a baal 
>tefillah to adopt niggunim from all customs? You are defining what it 
>takes to be a m'laket, not a m'chadesh.

I expect a Ba'al Tefillah to have studied all the approaches, to present 
evidence of his awareness of all sorts of niggunim and be capable of 
expressing himself in a broad selection of them. Yes.

>Take a look at the chapter in Immanuel Etkes's book on R. Yisrael Salanter 
>where he describes R. Yisrael's relation with kabbalah (he says there's no 
>published evidence for any such relationship).  I'm not sure it's true, 
>but it's true that he (RYS) deliberately avoided mentioning kabbalistical 
>ideas in any of his written (letters) or published works.  Was he then not 
>a "baal machshava"?

R' Yisrael Salanter was NOT a Ba'al Machashavah. He WAS a Ba'al Mussar.

YGB 


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Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2004 08:34:33 -0800 (PST)
From: Harry Maryles <hmaryles@yahoo.com>
Subject:
Tachlis HaBeriah


"Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <ygb@aishdas.org> wrote:
> At 06:30 PM 11/24/2004, Harry Maryles wrote:

>>In a nutshell,The purpose of existence is for Man to encounter and
>>cognate the physical universe through religious eyes and engage it
>>through Torah and Mitzvos... Halakhic Man.

> 1. That's not a tachlis for the Beriah; that is what Man does with
> the world.

What Man does with the world is the Tachlis HaBriah (purpose of
creation), No?

> 2. Is this a contribution of any sort? It basically states the
> obvious!

It is not obvious if you are Homo-religiosus. It is not obvious if you
are Cognitive Man. The above is true only if you synthesize the two as
RYBS does.

Homo-religiosus is interested in Dveikus with God. He doesn't necessarily
need Mitzvos to get there but admits that is the avenue where-by God
directs us to achieve it. That is why Homo-Religiosus pays more attention
to Hechsherei Mitzvos than the Mitzvos themselves. To Homo-religiosus
the end is not the Mitzvah but where the Mitzvah takes you... to Deveikus
with God.

To Cognitive Man there is no such thing as D'veikus. He does not
recognize the spiritual. God does not matter to him. God is not in the
realm of the cognitive. To Cognitive man the only thing that matters
is the physical universe and how it works. He studies what he can sense
with his 5 physical senses. If the 5 senses can't detect it, then it is
irrelevant to him.

Only Halachic Man who is the synthesis of the two will contemplate the
intersection of the spiritual and the physical world. Halacha is the
means that allows one to know how to interact with the physical universe.

HM


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Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2004 11:51:24 -0500
From: "Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <ygb@aishdas.org>
Subject:
Re: Tachlis HaBeriah


At 11:34 AM 11/25/2004, Harry Maryles wrote:
>> 1. That's not a tachlis for the Beriah; that is what Man does with
>> the world.

>What Man does with the world is the Tachlis HaBriah (purpose of
>creation), No?

No. The tachlis ha'beri'ah is why Hashem created the world. What we
shall discuss below has nothing to do with tachlis ha'beriah but with
darchei avodah.

To be honest, I suppose RYBS would postulate that we do not and should
not attempt to know the tachlis ha'beriah.

>> 2. Is this a contribution of any sort? It basically states the
>> obvious!

>It is not obvious if you are Homo-religiosus. It is not obvious if
>you are Cognitive Man. The above is true only if you synthesize the
>two as RYBS does.

>Homo-religiosus is interested in Dveikus with God. He doesn't
>necessarily need Mitzvos to get there but admits that is the avenue
>where-by God directs us to achieve it. That is why Homo-Religiosus
>pays more attention to Hechsherei Mitzvos than the Mitzvos
>themselves. To Homo-religiosus the end is not the Mitzvah but where
>the Mitzvah takes you... to Deveikus with God.

Does anyone (perhaps other than RYBS) hold mitzvos are an end in and
of themselves? What about lo nitnu ha'mitzvos elah l'tzaref bahen
es ha'beri'os? What about those pre-Mattan Torah individuals who had
no mitzvos?

>To Cognitive Man there is no such thing as D'veikus. He does not
>recognize the spiritual. God does not matter to him. God is not in
>the realm of the cognitive. To Cognitive man the only thing that
>matters is the physical universe and how it works. He studies what he
>can sense with his 5 physical senses. If the 5 senses can't detect
>it, then it is irrelevant to him.

Then this is not Judaism and merely a mistake. Thus irrelevant to 
Machasheves Yisroel.

>Only Halachic Man who is the synthesis of the two will contemplate
>the intersection of the spiritual and the physical world. Halacha is
>the means that allows one to know how to interact with the physical
>universe.

Do you really think that Chassidim don't believe that Halachah is the
means that allows one to know how to interact with the physical universe?!

YGB


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Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2004 10:02:48 -0800 (PST)
From: Harry Maryles <hmaryles@yahoo.com>
Subject:
Re: Tachlis HaBeriah


"Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <ygb@aishdas.org> wrote:
> At 11:34 AM 11/25/2004, Harry Maryles wrote:
>>What Man does with the world is the Tachlis HaBriah (purpose of
>>creation), No?

> No. The tachlis ha'beri'ah is why Hashem created the world. 

When I say purpose of creation, it implies your statement. IOW, the
tachlis ha'beri'ah is the purpose of creation by God of the physical
universe. Isn't it true that we believe that the universe was created
so that Man can serve God?

...
> Does anyone (perhaps other than RYBS) hold mitzvos are an end in and of 
> themselves? 

RYBS stays well within the Hashkafos of Brisk ...the idea of "What" versus
"Why". That we can derive from that the Tachlis HaBeriah (the "Why") is
perhaps a by-product, ...a deduction... a peirush on his philosophy. The
"end" in RYBS's philosophy is to know "How" to do the Mitzvos. Fulfilling
them the way God intended us to, is the end in itself. No other end has
any meaning for Halakhic Man. His is not to know why we do the Mitzvos. He
likely believes that we ultimately CANNOT know the "Why". That knowledge
is in the realm of God, not Man. We can at best only speculate as to what
God's purpose for creation is. And there is no purpose for Man to know
the "Why"... only what and how. To man, The physical universe is a given
(both in a physical and philosophical sense). Our purpose is to serve him.
That's it.

> What about lo nitnu ha'mitzvos elah l'tzaref bahen es 
> ha'beri'os? 

I assume you are quoting Gemmarah here. The Gemmarah will often make
poetic statements about "why we do this or that mitzvah. But can we
say with any real conviction that such statements are THE definitive
reasons? They may be valid and truthful statements but I question the
definitive value of such statements.

> What about those pre-Mattan Torah individuals who had
> no mitzvos?

Pre-mattan Torah is part and parcel of God's creative process leading
up to Mattan Torah. Would anyone question Mattan Torah as apex of our
existence as Jews? Is there any other point in history that has any more
significance than Mattan Torah?

>>To Cognitive Man there is no such thing as D'veikus. He does not
>>recognize the spiritual. God does not matter to him. God is not in
>>the realm of the cognitive. To Cognitive man the only thing that
>>matters is the physical universe and how it works. He studies what he
>>can sense with his 5 physical senses. If the 5 senses can't detect
>>it, then it is irrelevant to him.

> Then this is not Judaism and merely a mistake. Thus irrelevant to 
> Machasheves Yisroel.

In order to develop the idea of Halakhic Man, one has to first understand
what Cognitive Man is. That Cognitive Man makes his mistake is a feature
in his flawed status. Homo-religiosus, too, makes a mistake as to what he
considers the most important feature of existence. While the latter may
not be the Kofer that the former is, his views are still incomplete and
therefore incorrect. It requires the capacities of both, to synthesize
Halakhic Man.

> Do you really think that Chassidim don't believe that Halachah is the means 
> that allows one to know how to interact with the physical universe?!

That's not what I said. I said they believe ("admit" ...is the word
I used) that Halacha is the means given to us by God to achieve
Deveikus. But their emphasis is on Deveikus and they look at Mitzvos
only as a means to achieve it. Halakhic Man rejects this view as mere
speculation on their part. To Halakhic Man the Mitzvah is the end and
not the means. I'm not sure Halakhic Man would even concede the concept
of Deveikus. But if he does it is at best a peripheral.

HM


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Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2004 19:04:09 +1100
From: "SBA" <sba@sba2.com>
Subject:
Vort from a Isho Chachomo..


The sefer Tosefes Brocho by the baal Torah Temimo brings a
clever pshat this week beshem 'Isho Chachomo' -
[the sister of Rav Yeshaye Berlin z'l].

Rashi on 'Im Lovon Garti' [32:5], quotes the Midrash that
Yaakov told Eisov "Lo naaseisi sar vechoshuv - eloh **ger**.
Eincho kedai lisnoy oysi al...sheborcheni ovi "Havei **gvir** le'achecho,
sheharei lo niskaymo **Bi**.."

She explained Rashi's 'arichas haloshon' thus:

The first and last letters of "Gvir" make "Ger'.
The 2 middle letters of "Gvir" make 'Bi"

Yaakov was pointing out to Eisov - that Yitzchok's brocho:
"Havei GVIR.." - "...lo niskaymo BI",
ie: "Bi" is missing from the word "Gvir" - and so rather than
becoming a Gvir  - I was just a Ger...

Midei dabri bo - another nice pshat from the TB:

Re the maaseh of Shechem and Dinah - the Torah says:
"Ki nevolo oso beYisroel...Vechein Lo ye'oseh" [34:7].

The TB says that the inflection of "Vechein Lo ye'oseh" doesn't come over
harsh enough as a suitable commentary for Shechem's heinous crime. These
words would lechoreh be more suitable when criticising someone who does
something minor - 'vos passt nisht' - not such a criminal act!

He suggests, that often when someone has had an avla done against him,
the victim says to himself: "One day I will take revenge and do the same
to him [as per the posuk Emor 24:19 - "kasher oso kein ye'oseh lo",
Shimshon with the Plishtim and Chazal's "al de'ataft atfucho'] - ie,
he will do 'middah keneged middah'.

However, in the case of the rape of Dinah - which was 'Nevolo Oso
beYisroel' - the brothers couldn't take their revenge Middah Keneged
Middah - because amongst Bnei Yisroel - "Vechein Lo Ye'oseh.." Jews
don't do such things...

And to a topic we discussed a while ago -"Matzevos", the TB has a 2 page
essay on Vayatzev Yaakov Matzevo [p 284.(wrong mm)]

SBA


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Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2004 15:02:23 -0500
From: "" <hlampel@thejnet.com>
Subject:
Torah and Science


R. Meir Shinnar requested evidence that the Rambam holds that the "natural
law" we observe in this era did not apply for the first 6 days, that
the earth preceded the heavenly bodies, or that the world was created in
such a fashion that applying our reason would lead to wrong conclusions
in any area.

Technically, the clause "or that the earth preceded the heavenly bodies"
should not be included as the Rambam's position, because although he held
that this is an acceptable position, he personally did not hold it. He
held that both the heavens and the earth were created simultaneously
(MN II:17, below). Nevertheless, the idea that the biblical version of
events must be understood as historically incorrect, because the way the
world looks now indicates a different history, is the the basic issue
the Rambam is addressing, and his answer applies to this as well.

Moreh Nevuchim, Part II

CHAPTER XVII
ANYTHING produced in the realm of time that comes into existence from
non-existence -- or even anything that already has been in existence,
and has only changed its form -- the nature of that thing after having
been produced in the realm of time and has arrived at its final state
and achieved stability, is different from the nature it possessed during
its commencement and transition from potentiality to reality.

For example, the nature of the human ovum contained in the female's
blood when still included in its vessels is different from what it is
in state of pregnancy, after it is met by the male's semen and begins
to develop from potentiality to actuality. And even then, its nature is
different from the properties of the living being after its birth when
fully developed.

No inference can be drawn, in any respect, from the nature a thing
possesses after having passed through all stages of its development, to
what the condition of the thing has been in the moment when this process
commenced; nor does the condition of a thing while it is being generated
show what its previous condition had been. If you make this error, and
attempt to prove the nature something had in potential existence, by its
properties when actually existing, you will fall into great confusion:
you will consider things that must be so impossible, and things that
are impossible you will consider undeniable.

To illustrate our point, let us assume that a man born without defect
had, after his birth, been nursed by his mother only a few months and
the mother then died. He was then brought up on a lonely island, where
he grew up, became intelligent, and acquired knowledge. Now, this child
has never seen a woman or the female of any animal species. Accordingly,
he asks someone: How did we come to exist, and in what way were we
generated? Thereupon the person he asked replies: "Man begins his
existence in the belly of an individual of our species, but who is female,
which has such-and-such a form. While in the belly he is very small;
yet has life, moves, receives nourishment, and gradually grows, till he
arrives at such-and-such a stage of development. Thereupon an opening is
opened up for him in the lower part of the body, from which he issues and
continues to grow till he is in the condition in which we are now." The
orphan will naturally ask: "Did this little being, while he lived!
, moved, and grew in the womb, eat and drink, and breathe through
his mouth and his nostrils and produce excrements?" He is answered,
"No." Undoubtedly, he will then attempt to refute the statements of
that person, and to prove their impossibility, by referring to the
properties of a fully developed person. He will argue, "When any one of
us is deprived of breath for a short time, he dies, and cannot move any
longer. How then can we imagine that any one of us has been inclosed in
a thick bag in the midst of a body for several months and remained alive
and able to move? If one of us were to swallow a living bird, the bird
would die immediately when it reached the stomach, not to mention the
lower part of the belly! And if we should not take food or drink with our
mouth, in a few days we should undoubtedly be dead. How then can a human
remain alive for months without taking food? And if any person would take
food and would not be able to excrete it, great pains and death would!
 follow in a short time. Yet I am to believe that man has lived for mo
forated, he would die within days. Yet I am to believe that the navel
of the fetus has been open?! Why should the fetus not open the eyes,
spread forth the bands and stretch out the legs, if, as you think,
the limbs are all whole and perfect?"

This mode of reasoning would lead to the conclusion that man cannot
come into existence and develop in the manner described. If philosophers
would consider this example well and reflect on it, they would find that
it represents exactly the dispute between Aristotle and ourselves. We,
the followers of Moses, our Teacher, and of Abraham, our Father, believe
that the Universe has been produced and has developed in a certain manner,
and that it has been created in a certain sequence [viz., fish and birds
before mammals, etc.--ZL]. The Aristotelians oppose us, and base their
objections on the properties the things in the Universe possess when in
actual existence and fully developed. We admit the existence of these
properties, but hold that they are by no means the same as those which
the things possessed at the moment of their production; and we hold
that these properties themselves have come into existence from absolute
non-existence. Their arguments are therefore no objection whatever to
our theory. They would have demonstrative force only against those who,
unlike I, claim that the present nature of things in existence proves
the Creation.

I will now return to our theme, viz., to the description of the principal
proofs of Aristotle, and show that they prove nothing whatever against
us, since we hold that God brought the entire Universe into existence
from absolute non-existence, and that He caused it to develop into the
present state....

In short, the properties of things when fully developed contain no
clue as to what have been the properties of the things before their
perfection. Therefore [even though we personally hold that all the
objects of the universe were created simultaneously--ZL], we do not
reject as impossible the opinion of those who say that the heavens
were produced before the earth, or the reverse, or that the heavens
have existed without stars, or that certain species of animals have
been in existence, and others not. For the state of the whole Universe
when it came into existence may be compared with that of animals when
their existence begins: the heart evidently precedes the testicles, and
the veins are in existence before the bones, although, when the animal
is fully developed, none of the parts is essential to its existence
missing. This additional remark is needed if we would subscribe to the
simple meaning of Scripture [that each of the six days witnessed the
new creation of things, as opposed to saying that all the universe and
its inhabitants were really created simultaneously--Crescas and Shem
Tov]. But in reality, it cannot be understood in this simple way, as
will be shown when we shall treat of this subject [in chapter 30].

The principle laid down in the foregoing must be well understood; it is
a high rampart erected round the Law, and able to resist all missiles
directed against it. Aristotle, or rather his followers, may perhaps
ask us how we know that the Universe has been created, and that other
forces than those it has at present were acting in its Creation, since
we hold that the properties of the Universe, as it exists at present,
prove nothing as regards its creation. We reply, there is no necessity
for to answer this this according to our position, for we do not desire
to prove the Creation, but only its possibility. And this possibility is
not refuted by arguments based on the nature of the present Universe,
which we do not dispute. When we have established the admissibility of
our theory, we shall then show its superiority. In attempting to prove
the inadmissibility of Creation ex nihilo, the Aristotelians can therefore
not derive any support from the nature of the Universe. They must resort
to the notion our mind has formed of God. Their proofs include the three
methods which I have mentioned above, and which are based on the notion
conceived of God. In the next chapter I will expose the weak points of
these arguments, and show that they really prove nothing.

CHAPTER XXIII

IN comparing the objections raised against one theory with those raised
against the opposite theory, in order to decide in favour of the least
objectionable, we must not consider the number of the objections, but
the degree of improbability and of deviation from real facts [pointed
out by the objections. For one objection may sometimes have more weight
than a thousand others.

But the comparison cannot be trustworthy unless the two theories be
considered with the same interest, and if you are predisposed in favour
of one of them, be it on account of your training or because of some
advantage to be gained, you are too blind to see the truth.... I mention
this lest you be deceived. For someone might some day, by some objection
which he raises, shake your belief in Creation, and you may then easily
let yourself be misled. You would then adopt the theory which is contrary
to the fundamental principle of the Torah, and which leads to "speaking
words that turn away from God." You must rather have suspicion against
your own reason, and accept the theory taught by the two prophets form
the pillar supporting the betterment of mankind’s beliefs and social
relations. Only demonstrative proof should be able to make you abandon
the theory of the Creation: but such a proof does not exist in Nature.

You should not find it strange that I introduce into this discussion
historical matter in support of the theory of the Creation, seeing
that Aristotle, the greatest philosopher, in his principal works,
introduces histories in support of the theory of the Eternity of the
Universe. In this regard we may justly quote the saying, "Should
not our perfect Law be as good as their prattle?"  (B. T. Baba
batra, 115 b). When he supports his view by quoting Sabean
stories, why should we not support our view by that which Moses
and Abraham said, and that which follows from their words?

CHAPTER XXX
... One of the things you ought to know, is that the particle "eth"
in the phrase "eth ha-shamayim ve-eth ha-aretz" ("eth the heavens and
eth the earth") signifies" together with." Our Sages have explained
the word in the same sense in many instances. Accordingly, they assume
that God created with the heavens everything that the heavens contain,
and with the earth everything the earth includes. They further
say that the simultaneous Creation of the heavens and the earth
is implied in the words," I call unto them, they stand up together"
(Ps. xlviii.). Consequently, all things were created together, but were
separated from each other successively. Our Sages illustrated this by
the following simile : We sow various seeds at the same time; some spring
forth after one day, some after two, and some after three days, although
all have been sown at the same time....In Bereshit Rabba, our Sages,
speaking of the light created on the first day according to the Scriptural
account, say as follows: These lights [of the luminaries mentioned in the
Creation of the fourth day] are the same that were created on the first
day, but were only fixed in their places on the fourth day. The meaning
[of the first verse] has thus been clearly stated....

Although the result of the second day's creation forms an important
element among the existing things, the firmament was not its primary
object in the organization of the Universe, and therefore it could not
be said" that it was good" : it was only the means for the uncovering
of the earth. Note this.

Our Sages have already explained that the herbs and trees, which God
caused to spring forth from the ground, were caused by God to grow,
after He had sent down rain upon them; and the passage beginning,"
And there went up a mist from the earth" (ii. 6), refers to that which
took place before the creative act related in the words, "Let the earth
bring forth grass," etc. (i. ii.). Therefore Onkelos translates it:
"And there had gone up a mist from the earth.” It is also evident from
the text itself, where it is distinctly said," And every plant in the
field before it was in the earth," etc. (ii. 5)....

...Note also the saying of our Sages:" When the Universe was created,
all things were created with size, intellect, and beauty fully developed,
i.e., everything was created perfect in magnitude and form, and endowed
with the most suitable properties: the word zibyonam (their beauty)
used here has the same meaning as zebi, ' glory '" (Ezek. xx. 6). Note
this likewise, for it includes a principle fully established.

The following point now claims our attention. ... the portion which
follows describes the creation of Eve from Adam, the tree of life,
and the tree of knowledge, the history of the serpent and the events
connected therewith, and all this as having taken place after Adam had
been placed in the Garden of Eden. Now, all our Sages agree that this took
place on the sixth day, and that nothing new was created after the close
of the six days. And none of the things mentioned above is impossible,
because the laws of Nature were then not yet permanently fixed.

[End of citations]

I hope this IS satisfactory evidence for my statement about the Rambam
and for my approach towards understanding maaseh braishis vis a vis
current theories.

Zvi Lampel


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Date: Fri, 26 Nov 2004 14:04:40 +0200
From: "Shoshana L. Boublil" <toramada@bezeqint.net>
Subject:
News reports that impact on our lives


A week ago, on Shabbat morning, a roadworks engineer (in North Israel)
committed suicide b/c of a report naming him as the person responsible
for deaths on the roads.

The report was aired the previous night, and according to reports in all
the newspapers, it was supposed to supply only the information in the
indictment against the engineer. Instead the report pointed the finger
at him as being guilty. This happened at the same time that the case is
being tried in court.

There are interesting reviews in Ma'ariv, but they are only in hebrew.
Here is one source in English.

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/503991.html

What I was wondering was: In a State of Halacha:

a) Would the report have aired, assuming that it relied on public record
facts + the conclusions of the reporters?

b) Would the fact that the issue is being tried in court change things --
could a reporter in a Medinat Halacha report cases that are being tried
in court?

Shoshana L. Boublil


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Date: Fri, 26 Nov 2004 00:03:56 -0500
From: "Michael Frankel" <michaeljfrankel@hotmail.com>
Subject:
Re: Sanhedrin stuff


RZL:
>... traditional (and halachically obligatory) scenario that the Chochmei
>HaTorah never sat with Saducees...

"halachically obligatory"? despite the certitude with which this is
asserted, I think not. But rather than get side-tracked into a discussion
of the halakhic permissibility of disagreeing about factual matters,
including historical factoids, maybe i'll send in a separate note with
my own perspective about that. meanwhile -- a last time into the breach.

RZL:
> R. Mechy Frankel asserted,.. Sanhedrin "had representation from groups
> other than the A-team, notably including Saducees,...".. there were two
> occurences of a Saducee-usurped Sanhedrin—one in the days of Shimon ben
> Shetach..and one near the days of the churban.. except for during the
> period that Shimon ben Shetach was strategically replacing the Saducees
> with chochmei Yisroel (during which time we can be certain that no
> Torah-matters were decided upon.)

you repeat unfounded assertions. You claim there were exactly "two times"
the Sanhedrin did contain both Ps and Ss. I assume that's because you felt
for some reason you couldn't squirm out of those instances. naniach as a
gedanken experiment -- if the sources had specified in a way you couldn't
re-interpret, a third time where Ss and Ps sat together, is there any
reader of this exchange who doubts you would simply have claimed there
were exactly/only three times this happened, but the rest of the time
it was pure P?

and you confidently assert -- without basis in any source -- that in
those times when Saducees did sit with Ps (i.e. they never did except
when they did) you can be <<certain no Torah matters were discussed. >>
Really? -- I understand that conclusion is one you find congenial. But
congeniality is not yet enough of a reason to make stuff up in the
absence of descriptive sources.

RZL:
> So I look up Antiquities XX199-XX200, which reads, "but this younger
> Ananus,.. took the high priesthood...he was also of the sect of
> the Sadduccees,.. So he assembled the Sanhedrin of judges, and... he
> delivered them to be stoned" This passage R. Frankel characterizes as:
> "Antiquities XX200, where it is explicit that Josephus is describing a
> sanhedrin convened by a saducee cohen,"... Huh? Hyrcanus, the Saducee
> High Priest, arranges for a Sanhedrin to convene; therefore the sanhedrin
> was made up of Pharisees and Saducees?? And if Herod would have convened
> a sanhedrin, would that indicate that the sandedrin included Edomeans?

You seem to think that practically anyone in authority could assemble the
Sanhedrin. Unless you've just invented another new power of which nobody
else seems to have heard. At the time of this particular convening for
example, if you'll read a bit further in that josephus passage, there
was also a king in place This cohen gadol, absent his membership in the
Sanhedrin, is far from having the capability to convene a Sanhedrin.

> R. Frankel offers a second source...So I look up Antiquities XIV175,
> which reads, "...when Herod.. slew all the members of this sanhedrin,
> and Hyrcanus himself..excepting Sameas. This passage, R. Frankel says,
> "recounts herod's murder of all members of the sanhedrin with the
> exception of one pharisee--implying the existence of non-pharisee members"
> Again, huh? Had the passage at least mentioned the word "pharisee"..there
> may be some excuse for such a "diyyuk."...The third Josephus passage
> R. Frankel brings as evidence is the parallel account in XV6 where
> the sanhederin members killed were fourty five members of antigonus'
> party. the latter party known for tz"duqi.... So, how does one conclude
> that Josephus says "the sanhederin members killed were fourty-five
> members of antigonus' party"?

> So, fortunate enough to have been connected up by R. M. Feldman with his
> father, Dr. Louis H. Feldman, I query the expert. ...
>               To which Dr. Feldman replied, The correct translation
> .. There is no mention of the word "Pharisee." There is no alternate
> reading containing the word "Pharisee."

I too think that it's fortunate you've connected up to Prof. Feldman,
a scholar of note, and one you respect to boot. though read on. and
I certainly hope nothing I cite below would detract from such well
deserved respect given its described basis. First for the quote-to-far re
"Pharisee". That at least is correct. I re-checked my source (ironically
a paper in a volume edited by Feldman and Hata titled Josephus, the
Bible and History, Wayne St. U Press) and found I had misplaced the
quotation marks. The sentences printed in that volume read ".according to
A XIV 175 "killed all the members of the Synhedrion" with the exception
of one Pharisee, and according to the less exaggerated and therefore
more reliable report in A XV6 had "forty five of the leading members
of Antigonus' party killed." Both accounts clarify the King's desire
to weaken the Saducee backed Synhedrion and the power base of the high
priest". a"k

But I am curious why you passed up the opportunity to pop the real
question to Prof. Feldman who is after all, a distinguished classical
-- and Josephus -- scholar and a frum individual in the bargain. I.e
instead of piddling around with this or that girsa, or the import of
being able to assemble the Sanhedrin, just ask him what he thinks of the
(halakhically impermissible to suggest?) notion of Ss and Ps together in
Sanhedrin based on his grasp of the sources? While I eagerly await the
results of that inquiry, let me anticipate a response by quoting from
the extensive introduction written by Prof. Feldman to the scholarly
volume he edited, which I cited above.

Herewith from p. 32 of that work. Prof Feldman: "We may also suggest
that the two sects may have actually been less bitterly disposed toward
one another than would appear to be the case from Josephus and rabbinic
writings. The very fact that we never hear in the Talmud of the
excommunication of the Sadducees, that, indeed, the Pharisees and the
Sadducees seem to have managed to serve together in the Temple and in
the Sanhedrin....would seem to indicate that the division is not as
sharp as one would gather from Josephus..."
That would seem to be clear -- except for the possibility that Prof
Feldman too was only referring to those "precisely two" brief periods
you keep mentioning. I await clarification.

RZL:
> Apparently R. Frankel has placed too much trust in the authors he
> studied, assuming that their representations of Josephus were honest,in
> lieu of sources such as the Doros HaRishonim, which he describes as having
> "approached material with the bias that the received tradition was almost
> always accurate history."

sigh. It seems evident to me that you have access to doros horishonim and
seem convinced that his interpretations -- often quite novel themselves
and about 100 years old at this point -- are practically torah may
'hashshomayim.(Out of curiosity, is that where the notion that there were
"precisely two" brief times the Sanhedrin was joint P and Stan comes from?
I've not heard it elsewhere.)

anyway, let me clarify my perspective here because I actually admire
Halevy and fear that perhaps didn't come through strongly enough. Halevy
was the first (and last) true charedi historian. he employed great
analytic insight and great familiarity with talmudic sources and was
the charedi antidote to Graetz and the entire wissenscaft crowd of
historians, all of whom he outshown and frequently showed up, in his
mastery of talmudic, rabbinic, and halokhic sources. He was able to show
that conclusions from the Graetz crowd stemmed occasionally from sheer
anti-rabbinic bias rather than objective consideration of sources. (no
wonder frummies loved him.) In this respect he was in many ways the
fore-runner of Gedaliah Allon who often cited Halevy's work respectfully.

However, along with his virtues as a jewish historian he had serious
lacks, among them a less than thorough grasp of external sources
coupled to a lack of any grasp of the languages which would enable him
to consider many sources first hand, a disinclination -- or lack of
knowledge of-diqduqei sof'rim affecting his talmudic based inferences,
and a tendency to reach for unfounded or strained conjectures. Here's what
some frum admirers! said of him. "..His work showed obvious weaknesses
and deficiencies...His arguments were not free of forced interpretations
and fantastic conjectures... As a scholar he had many distinct advantages,
but also the disadvantages of the auto-didact." (Mordechai Breuer), also
R. Dovid Tzvi Hoffman,while generally favorable, criticized halevy for
his unfamiliarity withth scientific literature and for his hypothetical
conjectures, R.Hoffman thought Halevy's work would have the most use not
as real history, but in showing the value of historical learning as an aid
in learning g'moroh properly. He also wrote in an extremely aggressive,
polemical style heaping scorn on his adversaries which sometimes made it
hard to separate the wheat from the chaff. so by all means look at doros
horishonim. but don't do so under the illusion that it is the last word
on whatever.

As a final note, on this topic I note that R. Lampel has not even
attempted to come to grips with a number of external Christian sources
which include, for example, a description of rabbon gamliel (a very
respectfully described) sitting in Sanhedrin in concert with Ss. As
masiach l'fi sumo eidus, these are not lightly dismissible. Oh, but then
they are Christian (x-tian?) so perhaps they are.

Mechy Frankel
Michael.Frankel@osd.mil
michaeljfrankel@hotmail.com


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