Avodah Mailing List

Volume 14 : Number 029

Friday, November 19 2004

• Re: Torah and Science
• Re: Torah and science
• Tiqun Olam
• Re: Two observations in a beis olam
• Re: Torah and Science
• Re: Torah and Science
• Re: An Orthodox Conservative Rabbi?
• Re: An Orthodox Conservative Rabbi?
• Re: Choni HaMagel vs. Musar masters
• Re: An Orthodox Conservative Rabbi?
• Re: LECTURE #3: TORAH AND SCIENCE -- Rambam, methodological naturalism, and the starlight p
• Torah and science
• Re: Torah and Science

On Thu, Nov 18, 2004 at 08:33:24AM -0800, Harry Maryles wrote:
:> Just for the record, truth = facts. 

: I do not agree that facts equal truth. They are not one and the same.

This is a debate about English. FWIW, the dictionaries back up RnTK,
a fact is a single true idea. Truth is the property that all facts
have in common.

Merriam-Webster: something that has actual existence : a matter of
objective reality...

Webster: 1. A doing, making, or preparing. [Obs.]....
2. An effect produced or achieved; anything done or that comes to pass;
an act; an event; a circumstance....
3. Reality; actuality; truth; as, he, in fact, excelled all the rest;
the fact is, he was beaten....

American Heritage: 1. Knowledge or information based on real
occurrences....

Cambridge American English: something known to have happened or to exist

Babylon English-English: actuality; reality; deed; proof (Law) 

Babylon English-Hebrew (transliteration mine): uvedah, metzi'ut qayemet,
ma'aseh, hockhachah (bemishpatim)

Babylon English-Klingon: ngoD <g>

: Truth can be based on belief without the benefit of facts. Facts are by
: definition in the realm of the physical universe....

You're using the legal, not the common definition.

As a matter of fact, the common usage is about truth -- just think about
the idiom at the start of this sentence.

I bothered to reply to what I see is a thread about language because there
si an underlying reason why the term is getting transvalued in western
speech. With the rise of relativism, people are confusing that which is
true with that which is demonstable, as though each person has what is
"true for them" and only the empiricably provable are fact. By overloading
a word that refers to truth, they're implying that the non-physical is
less real, that something I can't prove to others is not factual.

As people who believe in absolute objective numenous truths, we must and
who believe that even Noach's non-Jewish children must accepts these as
facts, we must resist and combat this NewSpeak.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "The most prevalent illness of our generation is
micha@aishdas.org        excessive anxiety....  Emunah decreases anxiety:
http://www.aishdas.org   'The Almighty is my source of salvation;  I will
Fax: (270) 514-1507      trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya

On Tue, Nov 16, 2004 at 08:13:29AM +0200, Akiva Atwood wrote:
: Depending on your definitions, of course. And shouldn't that be "Truths"
: with a capital 'T' to differentiate them from truths with a small 't',
: which *can* be contradicted by science?

: (for example: "the world is flat" was a "truth" that was contradicted
: by science.)

Actually, in my lexicon:
Truth with a capital T is the platonic truth, things about the olam
ha'emes. Using a capital to speak of the platonic Horse or Beauty
is typical. That which is necessarily true.
One speaks of truth with a lower case t when speaking of what happens
to be true. A different modality than Truth.
Facts are concepts that are true, whether believed by anyone or not.

RHM is speaking of justified beliefs when he uses the word "fact". The
justification may be falacious, and the belief false.
(Knowledge is classically defined as a justified true belief. There
are flaws in that definition, but there hasn't been agreement on a
better one. TYpical suggestions add criteria, not object to the three
parts given.)

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             It isn't what you have, or who you are, or where
micha@aishdas.org        you are,  or what you are doing,  that makes you
http://www.aishdas.org   happy or unhappy. It's what you think about.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Dale Carnegie

On Mon, Nov 15, 2004 at 04:00:28PM -0500, T613K@aol.com wrote:
: If you are alluding to environmental concerns, then yes, mankind has a
: duty to keep our water and air clean, as part of our duty to build and
: maintain civilization [=tikun olam]...

Is that tiqun olam? I've only heard tiqun olam defined that way in non-O
circles. I thought it was about ha'alas hanitzotzos or tiqun hakochos
(chassidus and Nefesh haChaim, respectively), ie about using the world to
serve Hashem and therefore restoring it to its purpose. Not in increasing
its function through building and maintaining , but in assignging it
its proper function.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             You will never "find" time for anything.
micha@aishdas.org        If you want time, you must make it.
http://www.aishdas.org                     - Charles Buxton
Fax: (270) 514-1507      

 From: "Zev Sero" <zev@sero.name>
> I assume the same arrangement would also allow someone to carry in the
> street on shabbat. At least, I know the human mechitzah works on shabbat,

How would it work on Shabbos. The problem is not moving within the box,
but moving the box itself. The box works by carrying.

I have seen our local Chabad Shaliach (who is a Kohen) use it to attend
and conduct Levayas. It just feels very strange to me. Until recently
I have never seen such a thing. I just find it hard to understand that
for thousand of years no one devloped such a box. it does not require
high technology. Thinking of Hilchot Sukkah, if wall move/flap there
is a problem. When the Kohen lifts up the box and walks with it arent't
the walls moving?

Harry J. Weiss
hjweiss@panix.com

RTK:
>:> Just for the record, truth = facts. 

HM 
>: I do not agree that facts equal truth. They are not one and the same.

RMB: 
> This is a debate about English. 

I would say that the debate is definitional.

> FWIW, the dictionaries back up RnTK,
> a fact is a single true idea. Truth is the property that all facts
> have in common.

No argument here.

> Merriam-Webster: something that has actual existence : a matter of
> objective reality...

Objective reality is a term that at least implies provable existence in
the physical universe. Is the existence of God an objective reality? Not
by my defintion. But is the existence of God a Truth? Absolutely!
Objectivity implies some sort of independent, non belief based verifiable
datum. Once belief enters the picture objectivity is compromised.

> Webster: 1. A doing, making, or preparing. [Obs.]....
> 2. An effect produced or achieved; anything done or that comes to
> pass;
> an act; an event; a circumstance....
> 3. Reality; actuality; truth; as, he, in fact, excelled all the
> rest;
> the fact is, he was beaten....

Truth as reality? Fine. Truth represented by fact? Fine again. Fact that
"he was beaten"... as true? Once again fine. All these facts are true.

Facts are true. Truth need not contain facts. Truth can be based entirely
on belief. I do not see the equation of fact and truth here.

> American Heritage: 1. Knowledge or information based on real
> occurrences...

No equation here either. Truth: knowledge based on facts. I agree,
as staed above and in earlier posts.

> Cambridge American English: something known to have happened or to
> exist.

This definition comes closer to what I have been saying. Something
known to have happened. But where do you see "facts" mentioned in this
definition? It isn't. One can "know" something happened without empirical
facts. The Mabul comes to mind. Perhaps someday we will be able to prove
through the discovery of facts that it happened but presently the facts
seem to point in the opposite direction. Yet we still know it is true.

> Babylon English-English: actuality; reality; deed; proof (Law)

I didn't even know such a dictionary existed. Where is the word "fact"
in the above?

> You're using the legal, not the common definition.
> As a matter of fact, the common usage is about truth -- just think about
> the idiom at the start of this sentence.

I'm using the definition I have come to conclude is the most accurate. I
never meant it to be understood in the way it is commonly used. For
purposes of philosophical discussion I choose to differentiate between
facts and belief as both being legitimate avenues in the search for
truth. Facts have a more scientific basis and belief has a more spiritual
basis. The two can be combined or used independently to arrive at truth
but IMHO they are not definitionally the same.

> I bothered to reply to what I see is a thread about language because there
> si an underlying reason why the term is getting transvalued in western
> speech. With the rise of relativism, people are confusing that which is
> true with that which is demonstable, 

I think that difference is legitmate. Facts are always demonstrable.
Truth may not always be. This is not relativism.

> as though each person has what is
> "true for them" and only the empiricably provable are fact. 

Isn't that really the same argument we are having about the age of
the universe, though? Can't we apply the same phrase there? For the
literalists, the universe is 5765 years old. That... is "true for
them". To those of us who factor in the available data, the age of
the universe is much older than that. That... is "true for us". Two
truths. Elu V'Elu. This does not take away the "fact" that only the
empiricably provable are fact.

> By overloading
> a word that refers to truth, they're implying that the non-physical is
> less real, that something I can't prove to others is not factual.

It isn't necessarily factual if it can't be proven. But that does not
make it any less true. That they conclude otheriwse is their problem.
I do not agree with them. No believer in God could agree with them.

> we must resist and combat this NewSpeak.

I do not see it as NewSpeak at all. I believe that defining truth and
fact the way I do, is a legitmate way of understanding some of the
philosophical differences between us.

HM

On Thu, Nov 18, 2004 at 05:07:47PM -0800, Harry Maryles wrote:
: Objective reality is a term that at least implies provable existence in
: the physical universe. Is the existence of God an objective reality? Not
: by my defintion. But is the existence of God a Truth? Absolutely!

WADR, you're abusing the language. Heaven is real, G-d is real,
objectively so. They are part of objective reality.

: Objectivity implies some sort of independent, non belief based verifiable
: datum. Once belief enters the picture objectivity is compromised.

Objectivity does not imply verifiability. Rather, that the truth is not
a feature of a given perspective or less than all perspectives. Thus,
the opposite of subjectivity.

To get this back on topic for Avodah:
We MUST fight the trend amongst English speakers to make it sound like
G-d is less real, less objectively so than a rock, and that somehow the
topic of science is more primary than other truths.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                    ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (270) 514-1507      

MYG:
> Does his "lifestyle choice" show that he doesn't accept the 13 ikkarim
> (as conservative judaism doesn't)?

R' ELPh Minden:
> But he wouldn't have to, would he?

I'm not sure what you mean. Would you elaborate?

R' HM:
> A lot depends on whether he publicly violates Shabbos.

I believe the point you are making is based on the gemara in Chullin
that says of one who publicly violates Shabbos that his shechita is
treifah. This leads right back to my question regarding the 13 ikkarim,
because the reason for "treifing" the shechita of a m'chalel shabbos is
because he is kofer b'ma'aseh b'reishis; the gemara also says the same
halacha regarding an oved avodah zarah - who is in essence, one who is
kofer in one or more of the 13 ikkarim. Is being a conservative rabbi,
by definition, a kofer b'ikkar?

R' HM:
> Does he for example use a microphone?
<snip>
> Also how does he handle some of their apostate views?

Sorry, I don't know him that well. The question is meant more as a
general one: Is a conservative rabbi a kofer by definition?

R'n TK:
> It's clear to me that as long as he is the "rabbi" of a non-kosher place
> of worship, his halachic status is that of a non-frum Jew. 

I believe that it is generally accepted, that the rabbi of a non-kosher
institution of a lower status, halachically, then his/her congregants. I
believe this is because no one says that tinok shenishba applies to the
rabbi.

R' MB: 
> RMYG assumes this "rabbi" keeps chovos ha'eivarim but not chovos
> halvavos. What if he actually believes the 13 ikkarim in some form, but
> doesn't hold they define Jewish belief. Such a person may feel comre
> comfortable affiliating with the broader umbrella of C. But since he
> himself believes the ikkarim, is he still O?

What does "some form" mean? If he believes they don't define Jewish
belief - and therefore doesn't believe in them - why should that change
his status?

My gut feeling is that these days, with conservative judaism being not
merely "Orthodox Lite" (as it may have been considered fifty years ago),
but an inconsistant blob of contradictory beliefs, of which every member
is free to choose as he/she wishes, any rabbi associating with it is
cutting himself off from Klal Yisroel. I don't have a proof to this
contention, which is why I put it out to y'all.

Kol tuv,
Moshe Yehuda Gluck
mslatfatf@access4less.net
www.esefer.blogspot.com

RMYG asked:
> What do my fellow Avodites think is the Halachic status of a  
> conservative rabbi who considers himself Orthodox?
> Would he be kosher l'edus?

Minden replied:
> Not according to Rav Soloveitchik zetzal, would he? (re geires;
> rabbis identifying with an ideology that denies toure min hashomayem
> notwithstanding their personal lifestyle)

We should not assume he denies Torah min hashamayim. A range of positions
on revelation are espoused by Conservative thinkers; see for example "Emet
Ve-Emunah: Statement of Principles of Conservative Judaism." Generally,
right-wing Conservatism holds views that are the same as some Orthodox
positions.

Jonathan Zuess

>In the gemora about Choni HaMagel, he awakes after a 70 years slumber,
>finds he has no friends, then states: Chevrusa o'Mesusa.
>There are stories of Hasidic and musar masters who all they wanted was
>solitude to learn.
>Choni was at least as great as those people, so why would Choni want to die?

See "My Uncle the Netziv" where the Torah Temimah quotes the Netziv as
saying that the reason for many of the Rambam's mistakes in halacha was
because he learned by himself while putting together the Yad Hachazakah.
(I don't know if it is in the censored version.)

Moshe Yehuda Gluck

On Thu, Nov 18, 2004 at 09:06:18PM -0500, MYG wrote:
:> RMYG assumes this "rabbi" keeps chovos ha'eivarim but not chovos
:> halvavos. What if he actually believes the 13 ikkarim in some form, but
:> doesn't hold they define Jewish belief...

: What does "some form" mean? If he believes they don't define Jewish
: belief - and therefore doesn't believe in them - why should that change
: his status?

Not what I meant.

In this hypothetical (as opposed to my 2nd one: maybe he's trying
to minimize damage to this congregation) he DOES believe in the
ikkarim. However, does not believe one is obligated to.

The "in some form" refered to the fact that few of us believe in the
ikkarim the way the Rambam meant them. And none of us (AFAIK) hold that
one must believe in them exactly as presented by the Rambam in order to
be within the fold.

E.g. According to the Rambam, sechar va'onesh is about
    act -> knowledge -> sechar vs act -> further ignorance -> onesh
Would someone who objects to this formulation be a kofeir? To be more
specific, I believe that sechar is for moral growth, not knowledge. (I
find the Rambam's position that my Shuby has a "smaller soul" and less
potential for reward because he has downs beyond merely difficult to
accept.) Someone else may believe it's for acts, not the effects of
those acts.

For that matter, according to R el-Qafeh (Kapach), both pater and filis,
anyone who accepts the Zohar's conception of the sefiros violates the
ikkarim.

We all believe in the ikkarim only in "some form". It's a matter of pesaq
to define the limits of that form. Just as with many other mitzvos, even
if the core din is accepted by all, there are gray areas around the edge.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole
micha@aishdas.org        heart, your entire soul, and all you own."
http://www.aishdas.org   Love is not two who look at each other,
Fax: (270) 514-1507      It is two who look in the same direction.

On Mon, Nov 15, 2004 at 11:01:52AM -0500, hlampel@thejnet.com wrote:
: Ok, so you're saying that in his mussar works, Maharal treats the
: p'sukim of Brayshis as facts (re: time, sequence, place of origins),

No. I'm saying that he *ignores* historicity, what you are calling "facts
(re: time...."

It would be poor rhetorical style when discussing X to repeatedly mention
a side-issue. Picture if a speaker would say "Hashem acted in a manner
that looked like anger in response to Sedom's actions, acted as though
He 'came down' from heaven to judge them -- which itself wasn't really
judgement or justice but that which looks to us like the actions of a
person who was coming from a loftier perspective and performs things
that in a person we'd attribute to his desire for justice...

Would you be able to get a sense of the parshan's point?

Wouldn't you instead choose to simply ignore the philosophical niceties
and just go along with the idiom used in the text?

I'm arguing that the Maharal doesn't treat historical claims as facts in
his mussar works, rather he avoids distracting the reader by addressing
the issue altogether.


More importantly, the Maharal says that ma'aseh bereishis is
incomprehensible, not pure metaphore. IOW, that it's perfectly true
that the world was created in six literal days. However, we have
no idea what that really means, and therefore what that rules out.
(Much like REED's claim that 6 days can be the same period of time as
the subsequent six millenia.)

Picture trying to describe electricity to a kid. You'd be peppering
your speech with "kinda" and "sorta" and other indications that you're
oversimplifying. And most of the conclusions the child reaches about how
electricity works would be false. And yet, everything you said was true.

My application of the Maharal's principle to understanding the science of
cosmology through the origins of man is not that the Torah is speaking in
parable. But rather, that the Torah and science could both be accurately
describing the same truth -- because the fullness of that truth is beyond
us in ways neither science nor nevu'ah can help.

However, the Torah's description of that truth is guaranteed to be
useful on other levels, and therefore the elements we have, while
useless in constructing a clear or even a consistant picture, do have
value as metaphor.

...
: I'm not reinterpreting. I'm interpreting differently than you are. It
: seems obvious to me that one can accept the basic outline of facts as
: stated in Braishis while pointing out that the process was not natural
: (how do creatures appear "poof" and/or out of the ground, for instance)and
: (largely therefore)not comprehensible to us or to prophets...

The Maharal's thesis is about the incomprehensibility of certain ideas,
specifically ma'aseh bereishis, ma'aseh merqavah, and the sod behind
arayos. He says that both chokhmah and nevu'ah can't reach these
realms.

We can mentally picture a plain that is bare one moment and grassy the
next. We can't picture how. That's picturing, the power of dimyon,
and therefore within the realm of nevu'ah. You speak of the "how",
not the "what" of yeish mei'ayin, while the Maharal dismisses the
comprehensibility of genesis by beings who have only experienced its
products. The "how" of /any/ neis is incomprehensible -- even of those
witnessed by man. Not just these three topics of "Ein Doreshin".

The Maharal writes that chokhmah, through the power of extrapolation,
can get closer to the truth than through dimyon. How does that apply to
the how of yeish mei'ayin?

Nor would your limited explaination fit the other two examples discussed.
His discussion of ma'aseh hamerqavah isn't about the incomprehensibility
of the how of one element.

Then there is the Maharal saying that ma'aseh bereishis is the sheishes
yamim, and arayos is about how the objects created interact. He defines
it as all the events of the six days -- and besides, defines a different
incomprehensibility as being about the moments they start working together
on Friday night! His period of incomprehensibility goes beyond the final
moment of bereishis, not just the "how" of a couple of instantaneous
events within it.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes
micha@aishdas.org        exactly the right measure of himself,  and
http://www.aishdas.org   holds a just balance between what he can
Fax: (270) 514-1507      acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham

I see that I have started some further excitement on the old topic of
conflict resolution in torah and science. I don't intend to rehash prior
arguments, but some points warrant explanation.

One reader assumed that I held a deistic belief that the Creator no
longer exercises a supervisory role in the world. That is certainly not
the case. I only referred to "divine cessation from overt regulation of
earthly affairs". The situation since the end of the biblical period is
better characterized by hidden supervision rather than open, miraculous
intervention. Similarly, "Ever since (the end of the biblical period)
we have been left to direct our affairs as best we can" refers to the
end of prophetic guidance. The Rabbinic authorities who succeeded the
prophets were, in important ways, more successful than the prophets in
educating the people - although historical circumstances, i.e. the 200
year period under the aegis of the near-monotheistic Persian emperors
certainly played an important role (see Malachi 1:11).

Another reader seems to feel that treating the 6 days of creation as 6 of
the more recent eras in the very ancient history of the world is contrary
to the Rambam in his Moreh (citation, please). What of it? Why would we
need to conform to the ideas about nature of any of the classical sources?
Is not our knowledge of such matters much greater because of the great
accumulation of knowledge of the world and its workings since their time.
The torah has been interpreted in numerous ways. Why should we not
also be permitted to develop an understanding of the text using our
more developed knowledge as a guide? We are, after all, attempting to
interpret the torah in a way consistent with the best scientific data,
and are not making any innovations in halachic matters.

A number of readers see the difference between scientific and traditional
understandings of the origin, nature, and history of the world and
universe as reflecting exclusive and antagonistic viewpoints.

We are cautioned against siding with the evil scientists who, supposedly,
seek to undermine traditional beliefs. There is also a misunderstanding
of the scientific enterprise and the nature of scientific knowledge. I
will be the first to admit and proclaim that science does not claim
infallibility or absolute, unchanging truth. What we observe in the
present does not necessarily dictate what will happen in the future
or necessarily describe what happened in the distant past. Yet, by
inductive reasoning, we have reason to expect that those rules that
we have developed to explain our observations and experimentation
will hold in the future just as they have held without exception in
the present and recent past. The more basic the rule is to a detailed,
quantitative understanding of the world, the more confidence we express
in its applicability over time - even vast stretches of time.

It would take the most powerful arguments and counter-demonstrations
to convince us otherwise. The constancy in the speed of light (c)
regardless of time or reference frame is one such rule that lies at the
heart of Einstein's Special theory of relativity which has been amply
verified in numerous careful experiments - not to mention the sometimes
unfortunate application of his E = mc^2 derivation. Jonathan's citation
of some speculation by a few theorists of a much different value of c at
some time in the past is of little consequence. Evidence of a compelling
nature would be needed to convince knowledgeable physicists of such a
claim. Besides, Jonathan's value for c in the 4th, 5th, and 6th day of
creation would need to be 10^12 (a quadrillion) times the value that
which we have measured over the last 2 centuries if the 10 billion
year light from distant reaches of the universe really took only 5760+
years to reach us. Such an enormous difference from the historical value
implies a universe with much different properties than what we observe.
Life on earth is consdered to be rather sensitive to the incident
energy and the properties of matter. How could life have arisen and been
sustained in Jonathan's creation week? Only by a miracle! Why, however,
create unnecessary miracles?

[In fact, one can demonstrate that Jonathan's c value for the 3 days of
creation since the appearance of the heavenly illuminants i.e. the sun
and other stars is not consistent with astronomical observations of the
1987A supernova in the large Magellanic cloud galaxy. The distance to
that "nearby" galaxy was determined to be 166,000 light years (it took
light from stars in that galaxy that long to reach earth - assuming the
current value of c of 300,000 km/sec). That distance and light travel
time determination was made using a calibrated relationship between
the cyclic variation of brightness and intrinsic luminosity of certain
stars called Cepheid variables. In Jonathan's scheme that time is much
shortened due to the alleged vastly greater light speed in the creation
days. In 1987, however, a new measure of the distance of that galaxy to
earth was made available when a lit up ring was discovered around the
star which had undergone the supernova explosion some days earlier.

Assuming that the ring consisted of previously ejected material that
was now lit up by energetic photons from the supernova explosion, one
could calculate the diameter of the ring. Using that value based on
the historical value for c and measuring the small angle subtended on
earth by the ring gave a value for the distance to the ring of 166,000
light years. If Jonathan were correct then that correspondance with the
Cepheid data should not have occurred.]

I have greater difficulties, however, with the idea proclaimed by Zvi
and others that Hashem created an old appearing world replete with
fossils of creatures and plants that never lived, and whose rocks
contained artificial compositions of radioisotopes and their nuclear
decay products. Are we to believe that there is divine delight taken in
fooling us or in some odd sense of divine aesthetics? I don't know if I
would place my trust in such a being. We appear to have a scenario which
serves to demean the Creator in order to make the text of His torah be
literally true. I would rather take some liberty in reinterpreting the
verses than to accept such a theological stance.

Yitzchok Zlochower

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
>: Objectivity implies some sort of independent, non belief based verifiable
>: datum. Once belief enters the picture objectivity is compromised.

> Objectivity does not imply verifiability. Rather, that the truth is not
> a feature of a given perspective or less than all perspectives.> Thus,
> the opposite of subjectivity.

What about elu V'Elu? Are you saying that there is only one objective
reality and one of the perspectives is actually false? This is not my
understanding of it.

You don't think belief is subjective? Is belief less valid a truth
than fact? That is all I am saying. They are not equal. One is
subordinate to the other. All facts are true. All truth is not fact.
Maybe I misused the the term "objectivity" but I do not misuse either
the term "fact" or "truth". I think they mean different things.  Let
me ask you point blank. What evidence is there of it? Do not facts
have to verifiable in order to ...BE... facts. If one cannot verify a
fact how does one know of it? Isn't such information simply belief,
and not fact? I do not think you can classify anything as fact that
isn't verifiable through any of the five physical senses. 

Do you think the Mabul was a fact? How so? Yet both you and I would
agree that it happened. Why? Because of a belief based on things
other than fact, be it Mesorah or Emunah P'shutah or anything else.
But fact? That belongs in the realm of science. Truth is greater than
fact and encompasses belief as well.  And as I have been saying fact
can be used to ascertain truth but is not the exclusive method of
obtaining it. KNLD. 

You may counter that I misdefine fact, that fact = truth,  and facts
do not have to be verifiable, but I remain unconvinced as of yet.

> To get this back on topic for Avodah:
> We MUST fight the trend amongst English speakers to make it sound like
> G-d is less real, less objectively so than a rock, and that somehow the
> topic of science is more primary than other truths.

I agree with that, but by the same token it behooves us to speak in
clear and distinct tones. Refinig our definitions help to make things
more understanable, IMHO.

HM

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