Avodah Mailing List

Volume 13 : Number 051

Tuesday, July 20 2004

• Re: Evolution
• Re: Evolution
• The Dynamics of Anger
• Kavod to inanimate objects
• Re: Popular Animism
• Re: Pronunciation of word in parshas Balak
• Re: Old tests
• Re: Hu yaaseh shalom aleinu
• Nonjews and Tefillin
• Foreknowledge vs free-will
• Re: Divine knowledge of future righteousness
• Re: Tfillin not worn
• Re: Singing the Zemer 'Bar Yocha'i in Shul
• Re: Kavod to inanimate objects
• tachash
• Re: ush'ma
• Re: Maariv at Mincha minyan
• Re: Evolution
• Re: Bamidbar 23:18
• 9 days question
• Re: The Dynamics of Anger

> In term of genetic anlysis, an area I know a littel bit about, it is not, in
> my opinion, ironclad. What it depends on is relative frequencies of alleles
> in different populations and correlation with historical evidence of
> migration patterns. It has been done with blood groups, prevalence of genetic
> diseases and DNA polymorphisms. There are several crucial assumptions that
> may not apply in pre-historic times.

Why look for such explanations? Unless you insist that the science of
Chazal was both literal and part of TSBP, it's quite obvious that all the
many and varied Gedolim wrote in terms of the science/mysticism of their
own day. You'll find all sorts of claims in the science of the last 1000
years, and I would be very surprised to hear scientific speculation in
the sources that did not stem directly or indirectly from the current
scientific theories. With all due respect, this seems symptomatic of
the anti-intellectual position of modern America which has infiltrated
into even the MO world. Of any group of Jews, MO should be treating the
evidence of science seriously. And yet there is so little understanding
of basic scientific concepts.

Take this genetic analysis issue as an example. If you're suggesting an
abrogation of the principle of uniformity in the period of the beriah,
you're simply invoking 'magic'. You can invoke 'magic' if you choose, and
clame that HKBH did all sorts of weird and onderful things at the beriah
to make things look like they are now. That's fine, but it's avoiding the
issue. It makes no statement trying to harmonise Bereshit with science
even, because it just says - well the laws of nature were abrogated.

If one wants to make any coherent academic/scientific statement, one
has to use Occam's Razor. This means not insisting on abrogations of
the Principle of Uniformity on the basis of Bereshit unless it is clear
that the Torah must be interpreted in that way. And it is not clear,
as Rambam pointed out. Therefore I see no reason to reject the premise
that we can believe the evidence of our eyes.

jcoh003@ec.auckland.ac.nz wrote:
>                                            As Rambam says, if Plato's
> view of the eternity of the world were provable we would accept it and
> re-interpret Torah....

This is the subject of a recurring debate between myself and RMShinnar. If
you look, the Rambam gives two criterion for when to allegorize:

1- If the philosphical argument is conclusive.

But Arisotle [not Plato] doesn't really prove his case. Therefore,
the Rambam doesn't believe this case calls for it.

Our disagreement is about the second criterion:

2- If the interepretation would not run counter to all the words of our
sages and prophets.

I believe this excludes declaring something an allegory without a source
for the idea in the mesorah. And that the Rambam is noting that Bereishis
1 does have such a source.

RMS -- and I agree that this is the common opinion amongst scholars
(as opposed to mefarshim on the Moreh who seem not to find reason to
comment) -- believes that the Rambam is only excluding ideas that deny
basic core beliefs. So that he's only excluding allegorizing something
of central import like Matan Torah.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Zion will be redeemed through justice,
micha@aishdas.org        and her returnees will come in righteousness.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

In Iggeres haRamban, the Ramban says that ka'as come from too little
anavah. R' Dr Alan Morinis is convinced this is because anger comes
from a "Why did this happen to ME?" And without that overemphasis on ME,
anger wouldn't follow.

If I had to think of an opposite to ka'as, it would be bitachon. For
similar reason. Because "Why me?", that feeling that it's unfair and
wrong that things didn't go your way can only exist if you don't believe
the way things went are quite likely better than what you wanted.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Zion will be redeemed through justice,
micha@aishdas.org        and her returnees will come in righteousness.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

In an Areivim thread called "Popular Animism", we were discussing the
idea of showing respect to various things, such as kissing a siddur, or
covering the challah so that it is not "embarrassed" when we ignore it to
say Kiddush on the wine. Someone questioned how such things can be
embarrassed, and why we should care about such nonexistent "feelings".

I wrote <<< As I understand it, G-d ordained that bread has a higher
status than wine does, out of respect for *Him*, we take the bread out of
the picture so that when we give priority to the wine, we are not
blatantly going against His prioritization.>>>

R' Jonathan Baker responded <<< Actually, no. It's a memorial of Roman
table manners. See Pesachim 100b Tosfos s.v. She'ein. The "priority" of
wine and bread isn't in it, since it's all part of rabbinic halacha.  In
this situation we say X then Y, in that situation we say Y then X.  No
embarrassment involved.>>>

I saw nothing in that Tosfos about the priority of bread and wine. It
only spoke about how to deal with that priority in an era when tables are
too large to move in and out of the dining room.

As far as <<< rabbinic halacha>>>, well, yes, I'd have to agree that
there's no d'Oraisa which requires us to give more kavod to the bread
than to the wine. However, the idea that bread does have a higher status
than wine does have its source in the Torah, specifically Devarim 8:8 as
cited in Brachos 41a.

Akiva Miller

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R Elly Bachrach wrote:
> 1) there are objects that have a Torah defined holiness (tefillin,
> mezuzos) and there are other objects to which chazal extended a treatment
> as if they were holy.

There are devarim shebiqdushah that are inherently holy (tefillin),
and there is the devar mitzvah which is holy because that's how it's
used. But both are deOraisa.

...
> 3) These objects and the halachos about their bizayon are in no way
> related to covering challos, or hiding a tv for shabbos!

Qedushah isn't the only reason to ban bizayon. Chazal say that Moshe
Rabbeinu couldn't initiate the first makos because he owed a hakaras
hatov to the water (for hiding him as an infant) and sand (for hiding
the Mitzri). The notion of expressing hakaras hatov even to inanimate
objects is raised with issues other than hamotzi.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Zion will be redeemed through justice,
micha@aishdas.org        and her returnees will come in righteousness.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

This is an add on to plug up omissions on my previous posting.

Before someone asks how come we know that the Keter has these chatafim 
when we also know that most of the chumash was lost or destroyed in 
1948, these words are on R' Ya'akov Sapir's list of words checked 
against the Keter.

It should also have been pointed out that, to the best of our 
knowledge, most words in the Torah in which the sh'va follows an 
initial "u", the sh'va was pronounced (or not pronounced) as nach. This 
led to the grammatical rule that such sh'vaim are always nach.  
Unfortunately, it appears that Moshe Rabbenu and also Aharon ben Asher 
didn't know the rules of dikduk that hadn't been invented yet. So the 
Torah has many exceptions that ben Asher marked by putting a little 
horizontal line called patach next to the sh'va. 

If it were not for the evidence of the Keter, the two different 
punctuations could be a machloket whether these words follow the rules 
or are exceptions. To those who accept the Keter as "the" authority, 
there is no machloket. Thus, for Keterniks, the presence or lack of the 
chataf does not change the pronunciation of the sh'va na'. 

Over the generations, unfortunately, Hebrew pronunciation has gone to 
the dogs. Among Americans, for example, the sh'va na., that was usually 
a mild "ah" or "eh" is most often an "i"or "iy" (as in tov miyod). In 
much of Ashkenaz Europe, especially among Yekkes, the chataf patach 
that was a weak "a" (or e) changed to a full, and oft emphasized, 
patach.  (Listen at KAJ to HallAluya and BorAkhu es H'. or to those who 
read ushAma, usAdei, tzalAlu, yitzAchak-li, etc.) It seems that Breuer, 
a Yekke, preferred to omit chatafim wherever he could justify it by 
following the Leningrad rather than the Keter on them and thus avoid 
peculiar pronunciation that is madgish the chatuf.

So never emphasize that which is chatuf. It's a contradiction. And 
always follow the Keter except when it differs from the sefer Torah 
from which you are reading.

I deleted the original posting before I wrote these postings but I 
suspect that the poster noted that R' Scroll's chumash had the hataf. 
If so, it ruined my day. I am happy only when I can show that Scroll 
had it wrong. Nu, another day ruined which is appropriate for today, 
Rosh Hodesh Av.

Enuff awready,

k"t,

David

In a message dated 07/18/2004 10:12:43 PM EDT, 
carmy@ymail.yu.edu writes:

<< The situation is the following. The student knows that the teacher repeats
 the same exam with minor changes. The teacher is relying on the honesty
 of students not to take advantage.>>
Has the teacher told his students not to look at old exams?
KT
Joel Rich
PS Yasher Koach on your approach

In a message dated 7/18/2004 10:12:52 PM EDT, hlampel@thejnet.com writes:
>>The MB quoting the MA on O"C 123 makes a big deal of saying 
>>who yaaseh shalom aleinu, vaal kol yisrael. 
>>No reason is given for the importance of the pause at that point. 

>>Is there a difference in the meaning? Any ideas as to the concern? 

> The Mishna Berura (123:1, 5) doesn't say "pause," but is speaking about
> bowing in three directions while saying "oseh shalom etc." He says we
> should assign each bow to each of the three parts of the sentence. I.e.,
> (1) Oseh shalom bi'm'ro'av, (2) Hu ya'aseh shalom aleinu, (3) V'al kol
> Yisroel... He makes a point of not distributing the "aleinu" to the
> 3rd bow. 

Right, but I don't know how you can move from bowing to the right to the
center without a pause. In kaddish the last 2 lines have the same words
- yet if you look in the Artscroll, in the last line (where one bows)
there is a comma after aleinu(since the next bowing takes place) What
i was wondering was whether the penultimate line should be said in the
same way even though there is no bowing or whether it should be said as
a single thought(which seems more logical from the text )

KT
Joel Rich

Rav Dr. Josh and I are having an argument in email over the permissibility
of a non-Jew (in this case a Reform convert) putting on tefillin.
He suggested we appeal to the group wisdom of Avodah.

Here's the initial exchange (names genericized):

======================================================

In article <>, A Maimonidean writes:
> A Reform Convert writes:

>> But I have a question independent from my status. Are gentiles permitted to 
>> lay tefillin?

> Yes, but they cannot say the berachah "... asher qiddeshanu vetsivanu..." 
> because they are not *commanded* to put them on.  Nevertheless, they may
> put them on or do any other mitsvah if they wish. (except talmud torah
> and keeping shabbat).

-------

R' Josh Backon responds:

> God forbid ! See: Rambam Hilchot Melachim 10:9. It is categorically
> prohibited for a gentile to put on tefillin (or to observe any mitzva).
> Chachamim hizaharu b'divreichem !!!

-------

A Maimonidean replies:

> And read the very next halachah, 10:10 - "ben noaH sheratsah la`asot mitsvah 
> meshe'ar mitsvot hatorah, keday leqabel sechar, 'ayn mon`in 'oto la`asot
> 'otah kehilchatah..."

> "A Noahide who wished to perform any of the other mitsvot of the Torah 
> (besides torah study and shabbat), in order to receive a reward, we do not 
> prevent him from performing [that mitsvah] according to halachah".

> hizaharu indeed...

-------

To which R' Josh responds:

> Look at the RADBAZ there: "u'mikol makom b'mitzvot she'tzrichin kedusha
> v'tahara kegon TEFILLIN, sefer torah u'mezuza, ani chochech l'hachmir
> SHELO YANICHU otam " (the Rav David Ibn Zimra, a major commentary
> on the Rambam, specifically prohibts a Ben Noach to have anything to do 
> with holy objects like TEFILLIN).

> See also the Ohr Sameach and the Avi Ezri on this paragraph.

========================================================================

Now, I had trouble with his citations of 

+ the Rambam in 10:9 (who only assers shabbat and torah study, albeit
with a warning per his later teshuvah on the subject
(chayav mitah =/= neherag));

+ Radbaz (who seems to express only minimal hesitation about letting
non-Jews wear tefillin, given Jastrow's construal of "chocheich" as
"hesitation);

  Also, I just noticed that the Radbaz's girsa has another word that
  Josh left out: "SHELO YANICHU otam LAASOTAM". Is it possible that
  the Radbaz was talking about *making* sifrei STA"M, rather than USING
  them?  So "lo yanichu otam" doesn't mean "putting them on", which
  doesn't make sense in terms of S"T and mezuza, but "letting them".
  Clearly, *we* can't use such STA"M, but could a goy use tefillin that
  he had made for himself?

+ and with the Or Sameiach, which seemed to address a totally different
question, about the death penalty for non-Sheva-Mitzvot violations.

However, maybe I'm reading them wrong.  Can anyone shed light on this?

   - jon baker    jjbaker@panix.com     <http://www.panix.com/~jjbaker> -

RDE:
: There is a problem trying to refute my understanding of the Rashi in
: Sotah[2a] by citing the absence of such an explanation in Rashi on Avos on a
: related topic. Rashi could have simply been explaining each according to
: what he felt was the view of the particular text - and was not voicing
: his own opinion.

RMB:
> 2- In the one place where the mishnah could be taken as discussing the
> relationship between foreknowledge and control, Rashi does not connect
> the two.
> Therefore, why do you[RDE]?

I would like to summarize. In Sotah 2b Rashi says that due to "hakol
bidei shamayim hutz miyiras shamayim" it is impossible for the zivug
rishon, the marriage mate that is determined before birth to be based
on a person's future righteousness. This future behavior is not
"bidei shamayim". RDE made the following conclusion: Rashi is saying
since Hashem does NOT know one's future behavior, therefore this future
behavior cannot possibly be factored in the Divine choosing of a marriage
partner before one's birth.

RMB objected saying that Rashi does not really define why one's future
actions which are not "bidei shamayim" may not be used as a factor in
the Divine choice of a future mate. It could be that pshat is that
it is inappropriate for shamayim to use this knowledge of the future,
this could be the meaning of 'not bidei shamayim'.

If one looks there on the daf, one can see that the Bach agrees that
the simple understanding is like RDE yet it is preferred, presumably
for haskafa reasons, to learn along the lines of RMB.

For some reason, Rashi learns the Mishna in Avos as not referring to
Hashem's knowledge of the future. Therefore, though others learn this
Mishna as relevant to the issue of Foreknowledge versus free-will, Rashi
finds this Mishna irrelevant to this discussion. Thus it cannot be
refuting RDE's understanding, since it is irrelevant to this discussion.

Shlomo Goldstein

Micha Berger wrote:
>: The Rashi is not clear. I simply am proposing one solution while
>: acknowledging that it might be wrong...

>Again, I don't see the lack of clarity, nor the grounds for your solution.

>Rashi simply says "hareshus nesunah". You use this to suggest that perhaps
>Rashi has a limited understanding of "hakol tzafui". As you point out,
>Rashi says nothing about foreknowledge, only that somehow a bas qol would
>rule out that the decision was based on foreknowledge. So why assume
>anything more than that; why assume there is even a question to address?

The gemora asserted that a person marries based on his deeds but we also
know that 40 days before the person is created a bas kol announces his
bride and this announcement occurs before it is known what his deeds
will be. Thus since a person's bride is determined before he acquires a
spiritual level the bride can not be determined by the spiritual level.
Rashi then suggests a reconciliation by noting that in fact G-d knows the
future and thus even before birth G-d knows the future spiritual level and
thus the bride can be according to the person's future spiritual level.

The next part is what we are disagreeing about. Rashi then retracts
this solution because fear of Heaven is not in G-d's hands. Support for
this refutation is the gemora in Nida which also says that it is not
predetermined whether a person is righteous. Your explanation is that
since man has free will - his righteous is not predetermined. [G-d's
knowledge is not causative] The problem with this is simply that since
G-d knows He could readily have the bride according to deeds announced in
Heaven without violating the principle of free will. Therefore there is
no reason why a person can't marry according to his deeds and also have
it announced 40 days before creation. According to your understanding why
is there a need to retract the solution of G-d's foreknowledge. But the
gemora as Rashi understands it - that the marriage according to deeds
and announcement of bas kol - is inherently irreconcilable. Thus the
solution that deeds determined second marriage while mazel determines
first marriage.

Therefore your reading of Rashi does not explain why the principle of
G-d's foreknowledge doesn't reconcile marriage according to deeds and
bas kol before birth. How do you understand how G-d's foreknowledge does
not reconcile? How is man's free will a refutation? A logically sound
answer is offered by Tosfos HaRosh - that the Bas kol is heard by man
and it states that "this future righteous person is marrying this future
righteous woman". Since such a public labeling creates the illusion that
righteousness is predetermined it is not permitted. Such a view does
succeed in making G-d's foreknowledge unusable. [My objection to this
is simply that there is nothing in the gemora which indicates that a
person's righteousness is actually publicly announced.] However we see
from Tosfos HaRosh that the mere fact of free will is not a refutation
and invalidation of the validity of G-d's foreknowledge reconciling the
marriage according to deed and bas kol announcement.

My solution is to say that Rashi eliminates resolution of marriage
according to deed and bas kol announcement by saying that G-d does not
know how a particular person will utilize his free will and thus doesn't
know whether he will be a tzadik. Yiras shamayim is not in G-d's hands
not because it is left to man's free will but because G-d choses not to
know.Therefore the only resolution of the the conflict is to say that
marriage according to deed is for second marriage while bas kol applies
to first marriage. The major problem is that this solution puts Rashi
in the same group as the Ralbag or the kabbalists.

In sum - there is a major problem understanding Rashi. Your way
simple doesn't make sense logically - though it does theologically. My
explanation is logical but it is problematic on a theological level.

           Daniel Eidensohn

Joelirich@aol.com wrote:
> The gemora in Shabbat (130a) mentions mitzvot that B"Y kept during gzerat
> malchut and those that they weren't moser themselves on. Tfillin is the
> example of the latter...
>     Could this possibly partially explain why R" Tam and Rashi could
> have different tfillin?

The only chiyuvim to wear tefillin at a particular time is not to
look like a liar when saying Shema and the problem of oqeir mitzvah
beyadayim. The latter is a non-issue when it would require mesirah, and
qarov lesheqer just didn't motivate mesiras nefesh either. Inherently,
tefillin is a mitzvah qiyumis, not a chiyuv. Unlike the mitzvos for which
we did risk our necks, such as milah, where there is an issur involved
in non-performance.

As for the machloqes Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam... According to the braisa in
Menachos, Shemos 13:1-10 and 11-16 are on the right, the first ("Shema")
and second ("Vehayah im shamo'a") chapters of the Shema on the left.

Rashi describes the ordering to be the same as that in the Torah,
with Shemos 13:1-10 first, and "Vehaya im shamo'a" last. Rabbeinu Tam
has the quotes from Shemos going right to left, but switches the two
from Devarim so that they are in order from left to right -- "Shema"
becomes the leftmost chapter.

A third style found in Qumran, but not in the older geniza nor amongst
the rishonim is right-to-left: Shemos 13:1-10, Shema, Shemos 13:11-16,
Veyaha im shamoa. This has each chapter from Devarim to the left of one
from Shemos, as well as the rightmost being from Shemos and the left-most
from Devarim, which would fit a third possible reading of the braisa.

That does place the source of the machloqes far closer to the
chashmona'im.

Alternatively, the origin is an eilu va'eilu since Sinai. The question
would then be why did Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam suddenly find a need to
choose between rulings? But since the machloqes was certainly around
for a millenium before them, the question "why pasqen now? exists anyway.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Zion will be redeemed through justice,
micha@aishdas.org        and her returnees will come in righteousness.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

R Zev Sero wrote:
> No, it is not at all the same thing. In kabbalat shabbat we are *not*
> speaking to Hashem; hence there is not a single word addressing Him
> directly....

Most understand to Lekhah Dodi to be an invitation to the Shechinah to
join you in greeting the neshamah yeseirah, the Malkah.

-mi

In a message dated 7/19/04 10:31:10 PM EDT, kennethgmiller@juno.com writes:
> In an Areivim thread called "Popular Animism", we were discussing the
> idea of showing respect to various things, such as kissing a siddur, or
> covering the challah so that it is not "embarrassed" when we ignore it to
> say Kiddush on the wine. Someone questioned how such things can be
> embarrassed, and why we should care about such nonexistent "feelings".

See Rashi Shmos 20:23, (Bamidbar 20:12).

Kol Tuv,
Yitzchok Zirkind

A readily accessible reference to the various opinions on the nature or
identity of the tachash skins used as the outer covering of the mishkan
is the "Living Torah" by Aryeh Kaplan. He includes the various opinions
cited in this list and lists some others. The most appealing to my mind
are the dugong, a large aquatic mammal closely related to the Floridean
manitees that are found on the coasts of the Red Sea and other Pacific
shores. Its name in Arabic is "tuchush". He also cites a specially
processed leather ("black leather") which was called, apparently,
"tachash" in ancient Egyptian. Whatever its source or mode of manufacture,
its expected properties would be weather resistance (water resistance),
suppleness, and durability in order to function as an outer covering
for both the mishkan and its furniture when these were transported to
eretz Canaan which has a rainy season.

Yitzchok Zlochower  

Earlier I wrote
> Now if there is no meteg under the vav, most medakdekim (except eg the
> Ba'al HaTanya) read the sh'va as nach. With a meteg most read it as na.
> L'tosefet bi'ur, some redactors wrote it as a chataf patach, so that
> it would be na.

This should be corrected according to the Porosho Mafo^rosho to state
that al pi rov such a case with a meteg is read nach. However certain
cases are exceptions such as uz'hav, us'de (Vayikra 25:34), which some
write with a chataf patach l'tosefet biur. Some words have machloket
such as ush(')ka (Bereshit 27:26)

Jonathan Cohen
jcoh003@ec.auckland.ac.nz

> One has davened mincha before mincha ketana and knows they will not
> be able to get a maariv minyan btibbur after plag. There is however a
> mincha minyan davening btzibbur after plag before shkia.  Relative value
> to an individual of davening maariv at the same time that the tzibbur is
> davening mincha so that their amidah's coincide (does the individual get
> credit for tfilla btzibbur) versus davening in complete ychidut after
> tzeit?

R' Reisman speaks about it in one of his Navi shiurim. For many years,
R' Reisman spent summers in the mountains. Often, he would go catch a
Maariv minyan (after shkia) at the local Satmar beis medrash, but found
that they were getting ready to daven mincha. R' Reisman discussed the
issue and concluded that an individual does get credit for tefillah
btzibbur even if he is davening a different tefillah than the tzibbur.

KT
Aryeh

> Take this genetic analysis issue as an example. If you're suggesting an
> abrogation of the principle of uniformity in the period of the beriah,
> you're simply invoking 'magic'. You can invoke 'magic' if you choose, and
> clame that HKBH did all sorts of weird and onderful things at the beriah
> to make things look like they are now. That's fine, but it's avoiding the
> issue. It makes no statement trying to harmonise Bereshit with science
> even, because it just says - well the laws of nature were abrogated.

> If one wants to make any coherent academic/scientific statement, one
> has to use Occam's Razor. This means not insisting on abrogations of
> the Principle of Uniformity on the basis of Bereshit unless it is clear
> that the Torah must be interpreted in that way. And it is not clear,
> as Rambam pointed out. Therefore I see no reason to reject the premise
> that we can believe the evidence of our eyes.

You are right that there are different approaches to the question
of Chazal and science. One nice review of 5 possible approaches is
by N. Sifkin, a member of this list, in The Science of Torah, Targum
Press. However, Occam's Razor is just a working principle. It is not magic
to consider that conditions have changed. There is no evidence "before
our eyes" in terms of genetics; rather, it is all well hidden form our
eyes and is inferred from experimental and non-experimental evidence.

Would you say that rapid genetic change is impossible under conditions
of high ambient radiation levels, for example. The evolutionary theories
that invoke jumps are reasonable and within the scientific method. The
Netsiv can be updated in that langauge without any violence to the laws
of science.

M. Levin  

Elly Krimsky writes:
> When the bal koreh got to Bamidbar 23:18, the baal Koreh read the sixth
> word of the pasuk "ushama". One gabbai (using a Hertz chumash) corrected
> him as he saw the word ushma. I was using an ARt Scroll Stone chumash
> and saw 'ushama' with a chataf patach."....I believe ushama is past...

Interesting that this should come up. History repeats itself. I remember
the same argument between the the Baal Koreh and his audience about this
pronunciation (either here or the other place where it occurs in Chumash)
more than 50 years ago in Staines Yeshivah (near Heathrow airport which
was then under construction).

Of course this was wll before the days of Art Scroll. The Hertz Chumash
had been published but was regarded as little better than Mendelson's
Biur.

ER

anyone aware of use of
1] eicha niggun in birkot hachodesh for menachemav and
2] use of elli tzion niggun for lecha dodi on shabbat chazon?

any pros and cons?

R' Micha Berger wrote:
>In Iggeres haRamban, the Ramban says that ka'as come from too little
>anavah. R' Dr Alan Morinis is convinced this is because anger comes
>from a "Why did this happen to ME?" And without that overemphasis on ME,
>anger wouldn't follow.

>If I had to think of an opposite to ka'as, it would be bitachon. For
>similar reason. Because "Why me?", that feeling that it's unfair and
>wrong that things didn't go your way can only exist if you don't believe
>the way things went are quite likely better than what you wanted.

Nedarim (22b): Whoever becomes angry not even the Shechina is important
to him... He also forgets his learning and becomes even more stupid...
It is also certain that his sins outnumbers his merits...

Ran ( Nedarim 22a): Whoever gets angry suffers all the types torments of
Gehinom. That is because anger brings a person to deny G-d as it says
Shabbos(105b). Whoever breaks things out of anger should be viewed as
some one who worships idols.

Reishis Chochma (Humility #3): When a person fully realizes that all
that happens is from G-d who supervises every little detail as it says
(Chulin 7b): A person doesn't bruise his finger unless it has been
decreed in Heaven - he won't get angry. Because a person doesn't get
angry at what G-d does.

Maharal (Bamidbar 20:12): You should know that the sin of Moshe and Aaron
as it says "Since you didn't cause them to believe in Me to sanctify
Me..." and this that Moshe hit the rock twice when the miracle was done
to produce water from the rock was a lack of faith. That is because the
action was done out of anger. Someone who does G-d's mitzva out of anger
,especially when it involves a miracle, as they said: "Listen you rebels"
and the hitting of the rock - this is not faith. Faith - bitachon in G-d -
is only done in a state of joy. It is characteristic of emuna and bitachon
that it leads to joy. In contrast anger is incompatible with faith...

Tanya ( Igros Kodesh #25): Whoever gets angry is if he worships idols...
The reason is obvious to those with proper understanding, because at
the time a person is angry his faith leaves him. If he truly believed
that everything is from G-d he would not get angry at all. This is even
when a person - who has free will - curses, hits or causes him financial
loss and incurrses punishment by the laws man and G-d. The fact is that
his loss was decreed from Heaven and if he hadn't suffered from this
person there are many alternative paths to receive the decreed loss.
Furthermore even at the actual moment that he is being hit or cursed
the assailant is receiving his strength from G-d to be able to cause
the harm. ...Even the thought to cause the harm came from G-d... Thus
the suffering is from G-d because without G-d's active involvment it
would impossible for the assailent to do anything.

Chofetz Chaim (Shem Olam 1:3): And similarly concerning all manner of
suffering that happen to a person and cause him to complain. In fact
they are all the result of Divine decrees because of his sins. The
reason that he suffered at the hands of a particular person is because
the assailant deserved to be the messenger for suffering because of
his own sins. Therefore if someone hit him - even intentionally -
this is also because of Divine decree. A proof is that our sages tell
us that when a person is hit by another that the assailant must pay
also for medical care according to the Torah. The reason given [Rashi
Bava Kama 85a] is "So it shouldn't be said that G-d causes damage and
the victim must pay for the medical treatment." We see that the verse
permitting medical treatment is dealing with the case when someone is
hit intentionally by another person and yet this is described as being
caused by G-d. Similarly we find that Dovid was cursed and stoned by
Shimi ben Gera - nevertheless he viewed this as being from G-d. Also this
suffering is done by G-d for the benefit of the person in order that it
should atone for his sins. When a person thinks this through, not only
is it not necessary to respond to the one who caused him harm, but he
should give thanks to G-d that he was given an opportunity to atone for
his sins... When he fully understands that he has received great benefit
from this suffering, it becomes very easy not to seek revenge or hold
a grudge. For example no one is resentful for being washed clean with
hot water by another even though at the time of the cleaning the heat
was unpleasant. My brother - look at what is stated in Bereishis Rabbah
(91:10): When Yaakov said to his sons "why have you made it bad for me
by telling the Egyptians that you had another brother", G-d complained
about him saying "I am bringing him salvation and he is criticizing"...
That is because Yaakov should have understood that the whole matter was
from G-d and was beneficial and not attribute bad to these events.

Chinuch(241-242): [241] A person is not to seek revenge. Typically
when someone harms another person the response is to search after the
oppressor until he has afflicted him in a similar way to what was done to
him. However G-d commanded us not to see revenge. The basis of the mitzva
is that a person must fully understand that everything that happens to
him - both the good and the bad - was caused by G-d. Therefore when
a person is distressed or harmed he needs to realize that it was his
sins that caused G-d to decree this bad to happen to him. Consequently
there is no reason to seek revenge since it was not the tormenter but
G-d which caused this to happen because of his sins. Furthermore this
mitzva provides great benefit in that it terminates disputes and removes
hatred from the heart. When there is peace between people, G-d provides
peace for them. [242] A person is not to bear a grudge...

Minchas Chinuch(241:1-2): Contrary to the view of the Chinuch that
the prohibition of revenge applies to all matters, we find in the
Rambam(Hilchos Da'os 7:7) and Yoma(23a) that it only applies to monetary
issues. In contrast suffering is not governed by the prohibition of
revenge or bearing a grudge. Not to take revenge concerning suffering from
others is only recommended as an aspect of piety and not halacha according
to Yoma(23a) while the Rambam doesn't mention it even as an aspect of
piety. The Chinuch does not mention the distinction between money and
physical suffering and apparently holds that all issues are governed
by the prohibition against revenge - in direct contradiction to the
gemora. Furthermore it also seems from the Semag(11th prohibition) that
there is no prohibition against revenge concerning physical suffering...

Rambam(Hilchos De'os 7:7-8): He who takes revenge violates a
Torah prohibition... Even though he isn't punished by stripes it
is an exceedingly bad attribute. Instead he should show forbearance
concerning worldly matters since the truly intelligent person understands
that these concerns are trivial and are not worth taking revenge. An
example of revenge is if after his neighbor refused to lend him a tool,
he reciprocated and refused to lend the neighbor something he wanted
solely because he had been refused in the past. Rather he should lend
his tools wholeheartedly and not treat his neighbor the way the neighbor
treated him... Similarly one who expresses spite transgresses a Torah
prohibition...For example if his neighbor refused to lend him a tool and
later his neighbor needed to borrow from him. If he lends it but announces
"I am not like you because I lend my tools". Rather he should erase
the resentment from his heart and not harbor it. As long as he harbors
this resentment and keeps recalling it, he might come to revenge. That
is why the Torah is concerned with resentment until he erases the sin
from his heart and doesn't remember it at all. This is the correct way
which enables society to survive through people's healthy interactions
with each other.

*********************


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