Avodah Mailing List

Volume 10 : Number 043

Tuesday, October 29 2002

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Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 23:06:48 +0200
From: D & E-H Bannett <dbnet@zahav.net.il>
Subject:
Re: Oseh shalom bimromav


There were a number of postings about saying imru Amen after oseh shalom
bimromav at the end of shmoneh esrei,. They were written shortly after my
posting of 11 October on oseh ha-shalom that quoted my previous posting
from a few years back where I suggested that imru amen in shmoneh esrei
was copycatting from the oseh shalom ... v'imru amen in kaddish.

As to the idea of commanding the angels to say Amen, I refer to the
Ta"z on the beginning of siman 3 of Orach Chayyim where he states that,
nowadays we do not speak to angels as we are not at the level where they
accompany us. (Yes, I know that the Sha'arei T'shuva disagrees.)

I'd like to add to that the Siddur R' Shabtai Sofer has the word v'imru
in parentheses at the end of kaddish. In his commentary he states that
one should not say v'imru in the oseh shalom at the end of bentching or
shmoneh esrei but one can say the word Amen alone as that is an ending.

In O"Ch, 189, the B"Y states that, as v'imru is a command we say
v'nomar Amen at the end of the Harachaman for ba'al habayyit in birkat
hamazon. The Pri Megadim comments that one should not say v'imru at the
end of shmoneh esrei or bentching.

 From my previous posting: <<BT"W, neither the Sa'adia Gaon nor Amram
Gaon siddurim have the oseh shalom sentence in Elohai n'tzor. They do
have a short personal prayer starting with Elohai netzor and ending with
yih'yu le-ratzon without the additional request for shalom.>>

To add to that, R' S. Baer in Siddur 'Avodat Yisrael notes that the
Rambam also omits v'imru.

The Yemenite Baladi and Darda'i nusach has a double Amen v'"amen at the
end but no v'imru before it.

To end with a bit of bewilderment: R' David Yitzhaki mentions that R'
Ya'akov m'Emden says, in 'Amudei Shamayim re: tefilat rosh hashana,
that the individual should not say v'imru, but only the chazan says it.
But where and when does the chazan say it? If in the silent 18, why is
he different from everyone else. If in the chazara, I've never heard it
said out loud so, again, he is no different from anyone else. Even those
who say yihyu l'ratzon aloud don't continue with oseh shalom aloud. If
they delay the three steps back until the end of kaddish, they then say
v'imru aloud. But, is that what R'Ya'vetz is talking about? For quite
a while, I've meant to check the source but never get around to it.

k"t
David


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Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 14:34:27 -0500
From: David Riceman <dr@insight.att.com>
Subject:
Re: Dor Revi'i on the moral obligation to be intelligent


David Glasner wrote:
> for the Ramban, of blessed memory, has
> written in his novellae about the response that we find in the Talmud
> "if you like I will cite a Scripture and if you like I will expoud a
> rational argument" (iy ba'it eima qra v'iy ba'it eima s'vara).

Do you happen to know the location of this citation?

David Riceman


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Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 22:04:15 GMT
From: kennethgmiller@juno.com
Subject:
Re: Defining death.


R' David Bannett wrote: <<< Rabbi Halperin's comment on those who
insist that only heart and breath define death is that, according to
them, anyone revived by CPR cannot go home to his wife because they
are not married. She is halakhically a widow. He cannot take any money
from his bank account, because, his estate belongs, by halakha, to the
yor'shim. Just as this sounds absurd, so too is that old definition of
death. >>>

It may *sound* absurd, but that does not mean it *is* absurd.

Is Rabbi Halperin using this as an argument to show that someone revived
by CPR was obviously *not* dead? Or is he raising legitimate shailos
about the status of the revived person?

We should all keep in mind that whatever was said about heart transplants
yesterday, or is said about CPR today, may also be said about reattached
heads tomorrow.

Why do we have this knee-jerk reaction that if a person's health has
improved, this proves that has wasn't really dead? Why must it be that
way? Maybe CPR recipients WERE dead?

A few years ago, I read a newspaper article about a person who needed
some particularly delicate heart surgery. So they not only stopped his
heart, but then cooled him down to something like 60-70 degrees F so
that they could drain all the blood from his body for the duration of
the surgery. After the surgery, they put the blood back, warmed him up,
and recovered nicely. The article is buried somewhere at home. And now
we can discuss whether or not he was alive during the surgery. Maybe not!

Akiva Miller


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Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 15:05:37 -0700 (MST)
From: Daniel Israel <daniel@pluto.ame.arizona.edu>
Subject:
Re: the son of the Shunamis (was: Fw: A question from my father r.e. this week's Haftarah)


From: kennethgmiller@juno.com
> Throughout history, people have seen others die, but only in the sense
> that they saw a person while he was alive, and then (without interruption)
> they saw him dead. But I say that this is not the same thing as witnessing
> the act of dying. To the best of my knowledge, no human being has ever
> seen - with his eyes - a soul depart from a body.
...
> The most any doctor can do is to say that the symptoms shown by the
> patient are consistent with a diagnosis of death. Regardless of the
> symptoms of death to which this doctor subscribes, or the century in which
> the doctor lived (or will live), when he pronounces someone to be dead,
> he is stating a professional opinion, *not* an obective fact.

> [More interesting stuff snipped for bandwidth]

Your point is well taken, but one thing I'd like to point out here,
is that the most basic signs of death, such as complete cessation of
heartbeat and respiration have been long since know. I point this
out not so much to argue with your point (which I don't necessarily
find compelling, but which I do find to be a very interesting POV) as
to correct a tendency that I think we find in contemporary readings of
historical accounts of "supernatural" events - namely the underestimating
the scientific knowledge of the people of those times. In short, I
think it is reasonable to assume that they could generally correctly
"diagnose" death.

> R' Micha Berger asked <<< Why not be literal? Is there a reason to
> be minimalist in our claims here, or is it just a modern westerner's
> instinct to find rationalizations for whatever he can?>>>

> I'm not sure what is meant by "rationalizations" here. Isn't it a normal
> part of learning the stories of Tanach, to try to understand the details
> of the stories, and the motivations of the characters? If someone asks,
> "How did they know the boy was dead", is that not a legitimate question?

IMHO, this story is different.  I think that the description of how
Elisha revived the boy sounds, to the modern ear, sufficiently close to
CPR/mouth-to-mouth that there is a strong temptation to understand the
story along those lines.  This would be a grave error, as it would turn
a Navi into a "mere" medical genius.

-- 
Daniel M. Israel
<daniel@cfd.ame.arizona.edu>		1130 North Mountain Ave.
Dept. of Aerospace & Mechanical		The University of Arizona
  Engineering				Tucson, AZ  85711


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Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 17:12:06 -0500
From: "Gil Student" <gil@aishdas.org>
Subject:
Re: Ramo and psak


Moshe Feldman wrote:
>Also, if further proof is needed, the sefer chassidim says that a father 
>should not kiss (...) his son in Shul......

>I think the point is that the Sefer Chasidim is known to be the ultimate 
>source of the minhag.

I thought the source is Rashi, Avodah Zarah 17a sv avi chadayhu.

Gil Student


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Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 17:21:42 -0500
From: "Feldman, Mark" <MFeldman@CM-P.COM>
Subject:
RE: Ramo and psak


From: Gil Student [mailto:gil@aishdas.org]
> Moshe Feldman wrote:
>> Also, if further proof is needed, the sefer chassidim says that a father 
>> should not kiss (...) his son in Shul......

>>I think the point is that the Sefer Chasidim is known to be the ultimate 
>>source of the minhag.

> I thought the source is Rashi, Avodah Zarah 17a sv avi chadayhu.

All he's saying was that there was a minhag to kiss one's parent (doesn't
say child) when leaving a shul. How does Rashi imply that it's *assur*
to do it inside?

Kol tuv,
Moshe


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Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 17:24:28 -0500
From: MPoppers@kayescholer.com
Subject:
Re: Yehei shlama rabba


In Avodah V10 #42, MBerger wrote:
> The "min shemaya" is only said about peace because of the next line:
> "Oseh shalom bimromav..."

See http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol10/v10n041.shtml#05. Whether or not
"Oseh shalom" was a later addition, what would you posit about "Y'hai
shlama" if there was no "Oseh shalom" line?

All the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ


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Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 22:35:12 +0000
From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
Subject:
Re: Yehei shlama rabba


On Mon, Oct 28, 2002 at 05:24:28PM -0500, MPoppers@kayescholer.com wrote:
: See http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol10/v10n041.shtml#05. Whether or not
: "Oseh shalom" was a later addition, what would you posit about "Y'hai
: shlama" if there was no "Oseh shalom" line?

The truth of the line is all that's relevent. Shalom is something that
shamayim has and we aspire to. Therefore it's "min shamaya". The
same can't be said of chaim (except anthropomorphically).

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When we long for life without difficulties,
micha@aishdas.org            remind us that oaks grow strong in contrary
http://www.aishdas.org       winds, and diamonds are made under pressure.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                            - Peter Marshall


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Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 19:25:22 -0500
From: Yisrael Dubitsky <yidubitsky@JTSA.EDU>
Subject:
karov be-einai


Does anyone have an opinion (or can refer to sources) re the phrase "karov 
be-einai" which Rambam uses 5 times in Mishneh Torah? We had talked once 
before about the significance of "Yir'eh li"  -- used many times in Rambam 
-- but I wonder what the significance of the change of phrase to karov 
be-einai might be [mah ba-zeh she-ein ba-zeh?]. Three of those 5 times 
refers to "a mi-divre sofrim" issues but not the other two.

It is true that once in the Gemara [Yevamot 39b and quoted in Yevamot 109a 
and in Yalkut Shimoni 938 (Ki Tetse) ] and once in Rif  [to Makot; Rif also 
quotes the gemara in Yevamot at Ketubot 27b] the phrase is used, but in 
light of Raavad's criticisms at Hil Kelim 5:1 ["zot ha-*kurvah* lo yadati 
me-ayin ba'ah lo"] and Hil. She'ar Avot haTum'ah 2:10 ["zo hi ahat 
mi-sevarotav ve-ein be-kulan pehutah mi-zo"] one wonders if Rambam had a 
conceptual hidush in mind.

I have checked both R. Y.H. Sofer's and R. MM Laufer [based on sihot etc of 
RMMS]'s *Kelalei haRambam* but neither mentions it.

Yisrael Dubitsky


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Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 20:01:44 -0500
From: Yisrael Dubitsky <yidubitsky@JTSA.EDU>
Subject:
ii


[The following ammendment to his earlier post came too late. -mi]

It is true that once in the Gemara [Yevamot 39b and quoted in Yev 109a and 
in Yalkut Shimoni 938 (Ki Tetse) -- all based on Tosefta Yev 6:10 but there 
*without* the word "be-einai" so the meaning changes]

thanks!

yd


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Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 17:36:08 -0500
From: "Gil Student" <gil@aishdas.org>
Subject:
Re: Ramo and psak


Moshe wrote:
> All he's saying was that there was a minhag to kiss one's parent (doesn't say
> child) when leaving a shul.  How does Rashi imply that it's *assur* to do it
> inside?

One could be medayek (and I believe that the She'arim Metzuyanim
BaHalachah does) that one kisses one's parents specifically after leaving
shul because one may not do so in shul.

Gil Student


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Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 17:48:05 -0500
From: "Feldman, Mark" <MFeldman@CM-P.COM>
Subject:
RE: Ramo and psak


From: Gil Student [mailto:gil@aishdas.org]
> One could be medayek (and I believe that the She'arim Metzuyanim BaHalachah
> does) that one kisses one's parents specifically after leaving shul because
> one may not do so in shul.

First of all, while this is a possible a diyuk, it is not muchrach.
It is hard to say that this definitely the source of the Ramo. In fact,
the Ramo himself quotes Shu"t Binyamin Zeev no. 163 who quotes the Agudah
in the name of the Kol Bo that one should not kiss one's children in shul
(the Kol Bo--which I do not have easy access to--collects many minhagim
of his period; it would not be surprising to quote the Kol Bo rather
than the Sefer Chasidim, as the Sefer Chasidim has many minhagim which
did not become popular outside the small circle of Chasidei Ashkenaz and
only some of them entered the mainstream); the Ramo did not quote Rashi.

Also, the Ramo refers to kissing small children (while Rashi does not
make such a qualification) and says the reason not to kiss them in shul
is to establish in one's heart that there is no love equal to the love
of HKBH. It is well known that a father loves his child more than the
child loves him, and that the love of Hashem for us is compared to the
love of a father for his children. Consequently, it makes sense that
the minhag quoted by the Ramo is a one-way minhag: a father may not
kiss his small children. There is no prohibition placed upon a child
to refrain from kissing his father (which is the case mentioned in Rashi).

Kol tuv,
Moshe


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Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 18:19:37 -0500
From: "Shinnar, Meir" <Meir.Shinnar@rwjuh.edu>
Subject:
RE:atzas gdolim


RYGB
I am very tempted to be verbose, but since it seems no one is listening to 
us debate other than ourselves, I will try to be brief.

me
While I concur, that seems to be the end result of most of our debates...

I thank RMS fro clarifying what is so objectionable in the approach I 
believe he takes (is this similar to Yeshaya Leibowitz?) in reducing 
Judaism to a religion of halacha, shorn of theology (aka Agada?), for which 
one's own common sense (aka the imperative not to be a shoteh?) 
substitutes. If not Leibowitzian, at least Mendelosohnian.

Me
No, here you misunderstand me.  I am not denying a theology, nor claiming
just a religion of halacha.  I am merely saying that what the theology says
is not quite as pashut -   quite a different view. (setting up straw men is
apparently quite popular on both sides...:-))

old me
>It is impossible for any objective person learning the Rambam moreh
>nevuchim and other philosophical articles not to realize that his approach
>to hilchot deot is not based on a pshat understanding of maamre hazal,
>even those maamre hazal that seem to reflect a deliberate statement
>on hilchot deot rather than merely ma'asim. This is zil kare be rav.
>(I wonder how one could, for example, learn the rambam on what it means
>that hashem is menasse bne adam without such an understanding_

RYGB
Did someone here disagree? Not I!

me
The original issue is that you required a pshat understanding of a
particular maamar hazal, and insisted that reinterpretation is limited to
particular items - ma'asim - rather than a general approach to aggadta.  It
is this narrow approach that I don't think can be supported.

me citing rambam
>This should not cause you any difficulty, that it is not appropriate that
>a man should leave halacha lemaa'se and go after different questions and
>answers, and similarly it is not appropriate for a man to leave the
>words of reason that were already proven by proofs, and shake his hands
>from them, and rely on a statement of one of the chachamim, that it is
>possible that he forgot something, or that there is in those words a
>hint (remez), or he said that according to the hour and an event that
>was before him.

RYGB
"Proven by proofs" means those found in the Nevi'im and Chazal! (Who,
the Rambam held, were, of course, of keen philosophical capactiy and
wisdom.) See the letter to Marseilles p. 21 (LE ed.), Hil. akum perek
1 and perek 11.

Me
from where do you get the first part? Clearly the rambam held the second
part (no question). However, the proofs the rambam brings are based on
reason, not on imre hazal or the neviim, even though he viewed them as
having "keen philosophical capactiy and wisdom"

This is clear in the preceding part of the letter (p 487 in the Shelat
edition)

after bringing two opinions - the first the philosophical opinion that
everything is random (keri) and the second the opinion of the astrologers
that all is ordained

and these two things are false (sheker) according to us. THe words
of the astrologers sheker according to the daat (mind), that all those
nonsense (havalim) that they said were already nullified by reason by
clear proofs. And it is also sheker by us because of kabbalat hadat,
because if it was so, what would help the torah?

The rambam clearly differentiates the realm of reason and that of
kabbalat hadat - reason may use the rationale of hazal but it is an
autonomous realm.

Similarly, just before that (p 485-486), he brings statements of maamre
hazal and psukim to prove that man's fate is not random. After that, he
says in addition vechen yesh lanu reayot shel daat - we have in addition
proofs of reason. the word da'at in the rambam does not refer to proofs
from hazal (although he views hazal as supporting da'at) but means reason

Indeed, he ascribes that hazal themselves used reason (rather than
kabbalat hadat) for some conclusions (eg Onkelos) - as hazal were keen
philosophers, but he always separates proofs of reason from proofs
from hazal.

This is again, crystal clear. The conclusion is that a man (any man
with reason) should never leave his reason behind - and reason is
clearly defined by the rambam. There are limits (because man's reason
is limited), but we are no where near those limits.

>Lastly, the conclusion of the rambam is precisely my fourteenth ikkar
>(I am surprised by the issue of bal tosif of the 13 ikkarim, but in
>polemics, everything is acceptable)

It seems so, doesn't it? ;-)

>A man should never leave his reason behind, that the eyes are in front
>and not in back.
>
>With your citation of the mishna:

>A man should never leave his reason behind, that the eyes are in front
>and not in back.

RYGB
You keep coming back to that line, as if the Rambam meant that where
you and Chazal differ, and your reason tells you X while Chazal tell
you Y, follow X! But this is not what the Rambam means! He means you
reject emunos tefeilos - red bands around wrists and the like - not
divrei Chazal.

me
One doesn't reject divrei chazal - one tries to understand what they
really meant, which is not necessarily the pshat, even if it is not
allegorical (this is, of course, a major hilluk between the rambam and
rav sherira gaon, but that is another issue). Believing that chachamim
have some innate connection to the heavens is (to some of us) as much
an emuna tefela as red bands..(and of potentially far greater harm)

RYGB
Your chiluk between being called a shtoeh and being one is obvious, but
you misunderstand me. I mean that you will never know, being of limited
intellectual capacity, whether your self-confident assumption that you are
not being a shoteh is really your unwillingness to be called a shoteh...

Me
Of course, one's willingness to be called a shoteh may also make himself
one. I think that my approach actually supports the wisdom and honor of
hazal (as the rambam brings down elsewhere, that those who support the
plain pshat of midrashim actually denigrate the hazal they wish to honor).

Lastly, the issue of "unwillingness to be called a shoteh" - in these
forae, one is subject to far more abuse for being LW intellectually -
the issue here is not trying to placate the secular public, but personal
self perception and understanding. One may delude oneself, but the
notion that this position is done for public appearances is insulting.

Furthermore, I can honestly say that in keeping halacha in public in
nondati environments, I have been called a shoteh in the sense that
the mishna means, and that has not stopped me.

>Similarly with the eyn makshin - the issue isn't allegory, and the gmara
>in question isn't allegory. The rambam defines the categories of maamre
>hazal shemakshin bahem - that is, that have normative meaning so their
>meaning has to be specifically understood and reconciled with the rest
>of the torah shebealpe. Things that are

>  lo divre kabbala, velo asor velo muttar, velo din min hadinin,

>do not fall in the normative category - simple pshat, consistent with
>everything else in the rambam.

RYGB
Nope. He defines those as the categories in which one does not *pasken,*
not the ones in which *makshin* or not.

Me
but the language the rambam  uses for these categories is "eyn makshin"....

>lastly, the fact that you find some of the 13 ikkarim irrational,
>so therefore I should reject them (note that I am not talking about
>arational - no rational proof is required), so would think that I should
>question them - suggests that ultimately, you do view the criteria of
>reason to be threatening, and that is our difference. However, the
>fact that you view the ikkarim to be irrational says more about you than
>either me or the ikkarim.
>
>Meir Shinnar

Irrational?! I hold Agada is rational! You're the one who takes Agada as a 
priori bereft of stature and authority, and thereforw would be expected to 
reject at leat some of the 13!

me
I have not denied aggada as bereft of stature and authority, merely the
pshat of aggada - quite a different thing.   Furthermore, I am not claiming
that everything needs to be proven by reason - merely that it not be
irrational - and you suggest that means I should reject some of the ikkarim
- suggesting that you don't believe they stand up to the light of reason.

Lastly, I want to cite Rav Lichtenstein, as cited in avodah 3:155
(Eli Clark posted this)
For the record, as both talmid and preparer of the typescript, I would
like to present R. Lichtenstein's words as delivered, so that his words
be better understood in context:

                 Confronted by evident contradiction, one would of
course initially strive to ascertain whether it is apparent or real: to
determine, on the one hand, whether indeed the methodology of madda does
so inevitably lead to a given conclusion and, on the other, whether the
received content of Torah can be interpreted or reinterpreted so as to
avert a collision.

This interpretation or reinterpretation may take one of several forms.
It may focus narrowly upon the meaning of a particular term. Whether,
for instance, the term "vermin which do not multiply and increase" in
Shabbat (107b), is to be understood to refer to spontaneous generation --
now out of fashion with some biologists -- or just to a lower level of
sexual reproduction.

At another level, one may alter the substance of whole areas by examining
them, legitimately, through a different prism. The great model here
is Maimonides, whose recourse to the concept of "Torah speaks in the
language of man [i.e. in human idiom] (Sifrei, Shelah 112)," on the one
hand, and to the mode of allegory on the other, enabled him to interpret
so much of Bible and midrash aggadah in a philosophic rather than purely
literal, popular vein.

At still a third level, admittedly far more controversial, one might
perceive an entire corpus differently. Sensing that incessant eighteenth
century debates over scriptual veracity -- largely conducted under
rules at least implicitly set down by rationalists -- were leading to a
dead end, Coleridge decided to stop searching for piecemeal solutions
and rejoined instead with the radical -- in two senses of the term --
view that the Bible was intended to convey moral and spiritual, but not
necessarily historical and scientific, truth, thus seeking to undercut
the whole debate at one fell swoop.

[passages omitted]

But let there be no mistake about the fundamental stance; when push
comes to shove, there can be only one answer: "For eternity, o Lord,
Your word stands erect in Heaven" (Ps. 119:89). When all options of
reconciliation have expired, devar ha-Shem and only devar ha-Shem reigns
supreme. Commitment to it receives normative priority even at the apparent
expense of personal intellectual integrity.


This approach is quite consistent with my fourteenth ikkar (although I
don't know whether Rav Lichtenstein would agree either with my formulation
or precise application) - to the extent possible, one reconciles reason
and tora, and this includes allegorical explanations even of apparently
pshat passages.

Meir SHinnar

ki lo nitna hatora laasher en daat lo, vehamalach ben haadam velokav hu
sichlo
ibn ezra


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Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2002 01:20:21 +0000
From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
Subject:
Re: Takannat Hakahal - RG


To clarify my point:

Making a takanah boils down to advising the tzibbur to accept a new
practice. After all, the tzibbur have veto power over takanos made
by Sanhedrin too.

Why wouldn't RMF's words be taken to mean just that?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When we long for life without difficulties,
micha@aishdas.org            remind us that oaks grow strong in contrary
http://www.aishdas.org       winds, and diamonds are made under pressure.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                            - Peter Marshall


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Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 22:26:01 -0500
From: "Feldman, Mark" <MFeldman@CM-P.COM>
Subject:
Re: Takannat Hakahal - RG


RMB:
> Making a takanah boils down to advising the tzibbur to accept a new
> practice. After all, the tzibbur have veto power over takanos made
> by Sanhedrin too.

> Why wouldn't RMF's words be taken to mean just that?

Because the takanah shouldn't go into effect at the point that the advice is
given, but at the time the tzibbur accepts the takanah upon itself.  The
Moetzes Gedolei HaTorah is not the tzibbur but the group advising the
tzibbur.  Frankly, in the context of the disunity that characterizes American
Orthodoxy, I imagine that it would be very difficult to have the tzibbur
ratify any suggestion (in contrast to the Shu"m communities or the Va'ad Arba
Aratzos).

Kol tuv,
Moshe


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Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2002 17:31:28 -0500
From: "David Riceman" <driceman@worldnet.att.net>
Subject:
atzas gedolim


I've been musing for a while about the Ramban Rabbi B cited, and I've
come to the conclusion I don't understand it (I don't own a Ritva on Bava
Bathra so I can't check it for help). I'd like to rehash the argument
and then present my problems.

It started with a discussion (from Areivim) about whether or not the
prewar gedolim of Europe were culpable for not having advised people
to flee Europe. Everyone agreed that they were not culpable, and two
reasons were suggested:

1. They gave the best advice they could, and
2. God deliberately misled them.

The argument between 1 and 2 (apparently RMS and RYGB's positions) is
that 1 believed that gedolim's advice is what is to be expected from
their skills and knowledge, and 2 believed that it is normally augmented
by ruach hakodesh, but in this unusual case was not.

I'm don't think that one can discuss culpability without adducing
detailed specific cases, but I will point out a flaw in each position
as an introduction. In 1, why did the gedolim agree to give advice
if they were unfamiliar with contemporary German politics? 2 requires
us to be believe that one can have ruach hakodesh without knowing it
(otherwise they would have said that this was not a case where they
could give gedolim-quality advice, since they're lacking their usual
ruach hakodesh). It is this that I want to examine more closely.

Bava Bathra 12a-b presents an argument between R. Yochanan and R. Avdimi.
R. Avdimi says that prophecy, since the destruction of the temple, has
been transferred from prophets to sages, and R. Yohanan says that it
has been transferred to fools. Several acharonim comment on R. Avdimi's
opinion, and say "chacham adif minavi". The Ramban comments that this
is because of the ruach hakodesh that Chachamim have. If indeed this is
a halachic dispute, as Rabbi B believes, I would have expected that we
follow R Yochanan against R. Avdimi, but I've been wrong before about
things like that.

The gemara's examples of ruach hakodesh of chachamim, as understood by
Rashi, come in halachic contexts. The Gaon, Mishlei 22:12, cites it in
the context of judgment [din as opposed to psak] (and restricts it to
worldly wise judges who are also sages). Rabbi B expands this to include
advice, but does not provide details about what type of advice qualifies
for ruach hakodesh.

The Ramban doesn't tell us what ruach hakodesh is, or under what
circumstances a chacham has it. If the parallel to prophecy holds, of
course, he does discuss the mechanism of prophecy in several places, but
the parallel to prophecy requires that one be conscious of its source
(as do the Rambam's versions of ruach hakodesh), which, at least,
is not how Rabbi B understands the Ramban (as I demonstrated above).
It also implies that the ruach hakodesh is not available at will, again,
by implication, not how Rabbi B understands it.

So my questions are: what is ruach hakodesh (according to the Ramban), by
what mechanism does it work (parallels with nevuah would be helpful here),
and under what circumstances does it operate for contemporary chachamim ?

David Riceman


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Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2002 14:53:19 +0200
From: "Mishpachat Freedenberg" <free@actcom.co.il>
Subject:
RE: the son of the Shunamis (was: Fw: A question from my father r.e. this week's Haftarah)


> IMHO, this story is different. I think that the description of how
> Elisha revived the boy sounds, to the modern ear, sufficiently close to
> CPR/mouth-to-mouth that there is a strong temptation to understand the
> story along those lines. This would be a grave error, as it would turn
> a Navi into a "mere" medical genius.

Why would this be a grave error? We know that CPR does not always work,
and even less so mouth-to-mouth. Who is it that makes it successful or
not? Certainly not the person doing it [as long as they know what they
are doing, obviously]. We know that it's only up to Hashem.

Even if "all" Elisha did was to do CPR, it was still a miracle that the
boy came back to life. I think that sometimes we lose sight of the fact
that even all of the medical intervention that we are able to do today
is not a guarantee of anything. Sometimes people can be brought back to
life and sometimes they can't, even with the most advanced machinery.
Every time that a person's life is saved, it is a miracle from Hashem.
Besides, since there weren't any accredited medical schools then that I
know of, even a Navi knowing what to do to revive the boy was certainly
proof that he got his knowledge min ha shamayim as he certainly didn't
learn it in science class.

I believe that Rambam teaches that Hashem does miracles/interventions in
the most "natural" way possible [in other words, as much through derech
hateva as possible]. In that case, why wouldn't CPR given by a Navi not
be as miraculous as, Ich veis nisht, jumping up and down three times
and saying "I want to go home", a la Dorothy?

---Rena


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