Avodah Mailing List

Volume 08 : Number 064

Tuesday, December 4 2001

• yayin
• Re: yayin nesech
• Re: Dr. Eliezer Berkowitz and the Abrogation of the Shulchan Aruch
• Melachah vs Avodah
• Re: Triage
• Re: TIDE and TuM
• Re: Did the Rambam trump himself
• Re: Chabad Customs
• Re: aveilut
• Re: Chazon Ish on Nature
• Re: Quantification
• Re: Quantification
• Re: mitzvot tzrikhot kavanah
• Insight: The Nature of Disagreement
• RE: Triage
• Triage in halacha
• Re: Emergency crews and Tzniut
• aveilut
• round #'s
• To: Avodah - High Level Torah Discussion Group
• Re: Not in Heaven: R' Eliezer Berkovits

RRW>If I have an bottle of Yayin shein'o muevhshal and I am afraid that an
> Eino Yeshudi might contaminate the eino mevushal yayin, can i lechaitchila
> mix in a bottle of yayin mevushal together - and if I do - will that
> effectively make them the mixture mevushal in such a way that the eino
> Yehudi will no longer passul it?

SA Yoreh Deah 123:5 in Rema.

Kol tuv,
Shlomo

RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com wrote:
> If I have an bottle of Yayin shein'o muevhshal and I am afraid that an
> Eino Yeshudi might contaminate the eino mevushal yayin, can i lechaitchila
> mix in a bottle of yayin mevushal together - and if I do - will that
> effectively make them the mixture mevushal in such a way that the eino
> Yehudi will no longer passul it?

The Rambam has a tshuva in which he recounts that in his youth in Spain when
non-Jews came to visit the custom was to mix a little honey into the wine.  R.
Yona (who also lived in Spain) in Shaarei Tshuva mentions the custom and says
that it is assur to follow it.  I've never looked up how we pasken.

David Riceman

On Mon, Nov 26, 2001 at 10:05:23AM -0500, Jonathan Baker wrote:
:> B) Both minority and majority opinions are equally valid, since
:> objective Truth is of no concern to the Halacha. That is to say that

: Eilu v'eilu, what Micha would call multi-valued logic.

Still, there is a notion of objective truth -- we simply allow it to
contain things Aristotle or Boole would consider paradoxes. Beis Hillel
and Beis Shammai are different takes on that truth, but the Karaim
are not.

I personally can not see how one could validate a halachah that is
based on falsehood -- however, eilu va'eilu is addressing two different
results based on truth. Therefore, I would not assume that acharei rabbim
lehatos applies after the rabbim were demonstrably shown to be in error.

If the rabbim were definitionally correct, how do we understand Hil
Shegagos pereq 12? It would also seem (sham and pereq 13) that the
individual is held accountable for following the Sanhedrin in an obvious
error.

However, in practice it is difficult to show that error.

: That's exactly the message of the Tanur shel Achnai story, viewed
: from the Orthodox perspective. That story is a critical point for
: all three movements - how they view the overturning of R' Eliezer's
: opinion is indicative of their approach to Torah. For us, it's
: "chazal/sanhedrin/whatever carries that authority in the current
: generation has the right to decide halacha, even if it isn't objectively
: true." For Conservatives, it's "rabbis have the right..." For Reform,
: it's "humans have the right..."

I would have said that the O take is that halachic process determines
halachah. And that allows us to navigate between the different objective
truths. Note that the bas qol never says that the rabbim are wrong,
but that R Eliezer is right.

In general, I think the comparisons being made between REB and C are
unfair because REB is 1- not arguing for a body that lacks constitutional
law, nor 2- one that seeks to "accomodate societal need" rather than
advance avodas Hashem. The Sanhedrin asher bayamim haheim still is subject
to Mamrim 2. C considers codes to be an error, ossifying halachah. REB
sees them as a /necessary/ evil.

His point is that since the dynamic halachah of a Sanhedrin is the ideal,
one should be looking at that model when judging halachah's aims rather
than our current code-based system.

That said, I am bothered by the fact that REB glosses over changes made
within the system (pruzbul), cases where chazal said it /never/ was
otherwise (eg ben soreir umoreh) and changes made to the system itself
(eis laasos). While he never argues for an unconstrained Sanhedrin,
this blurring seems to say that he considers these constraints much less
primary than I would.

It also seems to assign a level of dishonesty to chazal. Someone who says
the pasuq always meant 39 lashes rather than 40 is either presenting
what the halachah was mizman, or he is lying. An honest person can not
pass off inovation as Sinaitic.


On Mon, Nov 26, 2001 at 08:13:28AM -0800, Harry Maryles quote R Twersi:
: "Dr. Berkowitz defines Halacha as "the wisdom of the application of the
: written word of the Torah to the life and history of the Jewish People".

: "With this insight, we readily understand why Halacha is necessarily an
: oral and not a written law, for it is impossible for any text to deal
: in advance with all the changes which occur in the course of historical
: development. Only an oral law has the innate flexibility to deal with
: changing situations".

As long as halachah is defined as the "application of the Torah to the
life and history" rather than the product of our history, he is not
advocating the historical school's approach.


A few other random thoughts:

REBerkovitz seems to be temimus side of the hashkafic fork. That man's
role is to impact the world around him, and mitzvos serve to produce a
person most able to make a positive impact.


He seems to have rejected Buber and Herchel on two points: 1- they are
both deveiqus oriented; 2- they asses the morality of an act with the
imact on the doer, REB with the imact on the world at large.


Detextualizing halachah does not only wait for the restoraction of
an alternative. The Sanhedrin is also a body that is manipulating
the formal representation of halachah. Mimeticism is not dictated by
rabbinic authority.

R Moshe Koppel, in MetaHalachah, talks about halachah constantly shifting
from an informal system to a formal one. To use his mashal: People who
speak English natively may not know all the rules of grammar. Formal
grammar is for the newcomer to the language. The poet, who is accomplished
at working by what "sounds right" rather than what is in the rules,
ends up with greater leeway.

Members of a Sanhedrin would need to be halachic poets. Niskatnu hadoros,
as R Papa tells Abayei, is a loss of mesiras nefesh. Since reishis
chochmah yir'as Hashem, it would seem that we lost the chochmah of
that poetry. As a /consequence/ of that loss, we could no longer hold
onto halachah without codifying it.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
Fax: (413) 403-9905             - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

In light of my recent post about REB, I thought of an interesting way
of phrasing the difference between doing a melachah and performing avodah.

Melachah is an act done in relationship to the object. When we call
something a melachah we are talking about man changing the world around
him. Therefore, shevisas Shabbos is defined in terms of melachos.

Avodah is a deed performed in relationship to the subject. So we speak
of avodas Hashem.

-mi

As many have already pointed out, Hatzoloh, at least in America,
follow standard triage rules. I wonder why, however, considering that
the Mishnah in Horiyos 3:7-8 gives a list of priorities (Kohen before
Levi...). Since Hatzoloh is under the constant guidance of venerable
poskim, their abandonment of this Mishnah is certainly based on halachic
sources. Does anyone the background to this?

Gil Student

On Fri, Nov 23, 2001 at 05:38:08PM +0000, I quoted:
: Observing the Rav's biography one cannot help marvel at his awesome
: achievement, on the one hand, and wondering about the possibility to
: imitate him, on the other....

Obviously, RYBS himself thought it was possible, otherwise it would not
be the structure underlying YU.

While it is possible that he underestimated the gap between himself and
the hamon am, this is not true WRT the allowances R Steinberger says that
RYBS made for the Bostonian population.

Along similar lines, on Thu, 22 Nov 2001 15:25:20 EST RDFinch writes of
difficulties following this path:
:                                  RYBS's cosmopolitan understanding of the
: world caused him to compartmentalize Brisk vs. Kant through a private
: dialectic that is almost impossible to replicate in other people's
: lives.....

I disagree that he did so compartmentalize. RYBS had a single worldview:
the neoKantian antimony (unresolved dialectic) becomes the conceptual
underpinning of the Brisker tzvei dinim.

Where RYBS's approach /seems/ bifurcated is that he allowed ideas to
only flow in one direction. Torah influences mada -- not the reverse.
Particularly -- in true Brisker style -- WRT halachah. Halachah comes
only from halachah; not even aggadita can be considered, never mind mada.

Therefore RYBS's limud haTorah was uninfluenced by his neoKantianism.
However, when RYBS did discuss philsosophy, his dialectics always started
from and illustrated by chakiros. The philosophy did seamlessly flow
from the halachic lomdus -- just never the reverse.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
Fax: (413) 403-9905             - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

On Thu, Nov 22, 2001 at 03:08:19PM -0500, Arie Folger wrote:
:> The only principle of faith that Rambam claimed to prove on the basis
:> of logic (and I'm not sure how "human" logic differs from logic) is
:> existence of G-d (& scholars debate even that).

: I believe that Rambam's definition of a'hdut haBore & noncorporeality
: to be philosophically derived....

RSC is discussing an attempt at a rigorous logical proof: listing postulates
and working in a manner similar to what is taught in HS Geometry.

Yes, the Rambam takes other positions based on philosophical derivations,
but not as logical proofs.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
Fax: (413) 403-9905             - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

RYGB wrote
>I do not think R C[haim] N[aeh] counts as a Chabad Posek - he was the
>safra d'dyna of the pre-State Badatz, IIRC, and recorded Minhag
>Yerushalayim, which is based on the Rambam's measure of an etzba,
>which in turn was based, IIRC, on the size of the Egyptian drachma.
>The Minhag Yerushalayim was the minhag ha'mekkubal b'chol tefutzos
>Yisroel (well, maybe not Prague, where the Noda b'Yehuda introduced
>the CI shiurim - forgive the anachronism) until the CI asserted the
>NbY to be correct. V'ho'ra'ayah - the bechers of the CC and R' Yisroel
>Salanter were smaller than the CI shiur.

It is interesting about the CC because in 271:68 he recommends being
machmir on shiurim for kiddush at night.

R. Shlomo Wahrman in his Oros HaPesach brings a list of early 20th
century gedolim who were not machmir for the doubling of shiurim (he
also answers the kashyas that led to this shitah). Some that come to
mind are R. Eliezer Silver, the Or Sameach, and the Rogatchover.

Gil Student

On 30 Nov 2001, at 14:00, Joelirich@aol.com wrote:
> In a message dated 11/30/2001 1:37:41pm EST, RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com writes:
>> It is also said that the kind of leraning that is mishkachas aveilus is
>> leraning be'iyyun. If you darshen hilchos Aveilues deeply enough there
>> is that sepcial jof of learning. Lich'ora such a joy - i.e. the joy
>> of forgetting one's tazroos - is not likely in limmud mishanyos alone
>> unless one goes very deeply into it.

> Does anyone make this chiluk lhalcha (ie banning deep learning of hilchot
> aveilut for an avel)?

I don't know how closely one follows from the other, but the Mishna 
Brura paskens that chiluk with respect to Tisha b'Av. See MB 
554:5.

-- Carl

Gil Student (8:63) wrote:
> I found a few teshuvos in which R. Moshe Feinstein discussed this.
> In all three of the teshuvos RMF takes essentially the same position
> as the Chazon Ish but expands on it a bit more. He says that since the
> treifos were halachos leMoshe miSinai they must apply to all times and
> the concept of nishtana hateva cannot remove their relevance. RMF even
> asks that if certain death determined what is a treifah, what was the
> need for an halachah leMoshe miSinai?

> However, there is an interesting (apparent) inconsistency in the teshuvos.
> In all three, RMF says that the dinnim of treifos were determined at
> Matan Torah. Whatever defect caused death is considered a treifah
> even after nature has changed. However, there is a problem with this
> because the Mishnah says that the general rule is that anything that
> cannot live is a treifah. That implies that still at the time of the
> Mishnah the treifos still definitively determined death. In addition
> to that, the gemara actually says that Amoraim tested treifos and if
> an animal lived, its defect could not be a treifah. Perhaps because of
> these questions, the teshuvah in Choshen Mishpat (dated 5742, which some
> might find significant; first paragraph in section 4) adds the seemingly
> contradictory idea that "there was a rule on the time of the Tannaim,
> the sages of the Mishnah, and possibly also the [time of the] Amoraim,
> the sages of the Gemara, and whatever was included in the rule then was
> prohibited forever as an halachah leMoshe miSinai". Sort of "mesaran
> hakasuv lachachamim" like with Chol Hamoed (although many rishonim had
> trouble with this).

All these d'huqim are avoided by the Dor Revi'i who understands the
treiphot she'nims'ru l'Moshe mi-Sinai as rules for determining treiphot
that are in the nature of humrot and whose application does not depend on
whether the injuries will ultimately result in the death of the animal.
The principle of treiphah einah hayah (which is actually the subject of
a mahloqet tanaim) has halakhic application only in determining whether
it is permissible to eat a sapheiq treiphah after it has survived for
12 months. The opinion that says that treiphah einah hayah allows a
sapheiq treiphah to be eaten if it survives for 12 months; the other
opinion does not. See the Dor Revi'i b'arihut in his p'tiha and in
numerous sugyot, especially at the beginning of eilu treiphot.

By the way, what is the source for the assertion that there is a unique
halakhic status accorded to the two thousand years of shel torah?
Has this principle ever been applied to determine a psaq halakhah and
if so by whom?

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

On 30 Nov 2001, at 13:54, MPoppers@kayescholer.com wrote:
> As I'm sure you know, in this and in other numerical guidelines, CHaZaL
> were guided by our m'sorah (e.g. in this case, Yosaif's brothers couldn't
> see the danger at the bottom of the pit they threw him into 'cuz it was
> over 20 amos deep). Without getting mired in the materialism issue per
> se, is there a m'sorah behind the number 400?

Obviously not. And if you need more proof, I have seen the actual 
guidelines (another chaveir was kind enough to send them) and 400 
does not include children under 16 years of age. 

Unless of course it's k'neged Eisav's arba meos ish :-) 

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for my son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.
Thank you very much.

To my rhetorical question, Carl replied:
> Unless of course it's k'neged Eisav's arba meos ish :-) <

Actually, I was thinking more of 20 squared, but hey, if we can learn
from the external modesty of Muslims, some of them b'nos Yishmo-el,
why not also from Eisav's am kovaid?

All the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ

On Mon, Nov 26, 2001 at 01:11:46PM -0500, David Glasner wrote:
:> Diffrent issue - Lishmo in making the matzoh (also by tzizis), we're
:> discussing kavana lotzais.

: The question is whether the matzot have to be baked l'sheim matza or
: l'sheim mitzvat matza.

RCS's distinction still holds.

How the matzos are to be baked or the tzitzis tied is a din in the cheftzah.
If made without kavanah, they are not matzvos (WRT leil rishon) nor
tzitzis. Whether lesheim matzah or mitzvas matzah -- still the peulah.

Mitzvos tzerichos kavanah is a question of whether the peulah includes
kavanah.

BTW, have we ever determined the difference and relationship between
lishmah and kavanah?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
Fax: (413) 403-9905             - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

I am forwarding this because of the line:
> Halachic debate reflects the complexity of morality.

I think RBH gives a good perspective on why the Torah had to be given
with an eilu-vaeilu structure.

As per usual, the material is provided by Nishma <www.nishma.org>.
R Binyamin Hecht can be reached by writing attn RBH to <mail@nishma.org>.
Nishma also offers print publications.

Contact info: 322 Wilson Ave.  Toronto, Ontario M3H 1S8
IN THE U.S.A.: 1740 Ocean Ave.  Suite 8-P Brooklyn, New York

-mi

Nishma
Insight 5762 - #09

The Nature of Disagreement
Rabbi Benjamin Hecht

Most human beings are troubled by disagreement. Human beings seek
tranquility; disagreements create friction. The greater the importance of
the decision, the greater the chance for animosity and, even, hostility
between the opposing parties. This is not solely because opposition may
prevent one from acting as one sees fit. Disagreement also challenges
the certainty of one's decision. We wish clarity and we wish peace. These
goals are more easily attainable when answers are unequivocal and agreed
upon by all. Disagreement shatters this perception. It declares the
answer not to be straightforward. It announces that the world is complex
and that the goal of peace demands greater effort, We are called upon to
accept complexity and learn to bond even as we disagree.1 The teaching
of this lesson is the story of the twelve sons of Yaakov.

The dominant story involving Yaakov's sons is, of course, the story
of Joseph and the brothers. Yet, the first clearly defined case of a
disagreement between righteous individuals -- and the one that introduces
the subject -- is the dispute between Yaakov and his two sons, Shimon and
Levi, in regard to Shechem.2 The Torah presents both sides of the argument
without apparently voicing an opinion on who was correct. Yaakov attacks
Shimon and Levi's behaviour in massacring the men of Shechem's city as it
will affect his relations with other peoples -- even place the family of
Israel at mortal risk. Shimon and Levi respond that their sister, Dina,
cannot be allowed to be treated as a harlot. There is no declaration of
who was correct. There is just the statements of opposition.

The commentators face a problem. If Yaakov is absolutely right then
Shimon and Levi must be absolutely wrong. How, though, could these two
righteous sons of Yaakov massacre, without proper cause, the men of an
entire city? Yet, if Shimon and Levi were correct they must have acted
with justice; how, then, could Yaakov challenge justice? What ensues is a
halachic debate. Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Melachim 9:14 declares in
support of the brothers that the Noachide Code demanded this punishment
of this city. Ramban, Bereishit 34:13 defends Yaakov's view and contends
that there was no such requirement especially in light of the possible
danger. There must be reason and moral integrity behind Yaakov's view
and there must be reason and moral integrity behind Shimon and Levi's
view. How can both views reflect moral integrity? Because morality and the
determination of what is proper is not simple. Halachic debate reflects
the complexity of morality. It is not easy to define what is right because
often a moral advancement is joined with a moral cost. Yaakov was correct
to be concerned about the consequences -- but the cost would have been
the absence of justice. Shimon and Levi were correct to be concerned
about justice for Dina -- but the cost was the potential for extended
harm. What is the answer when justice and potential harm collide? The
absence of disagreement allows one to present a simple view of ethics
whereby there is no cost and only advancement in following a specific
behaviour. We can convince ourselves that following justice will not
create greater potential harm or that being concerned with harm will
not be at the cost of justice. In regard to a current modern issue,
without disagreements, we can convince ourselves that security can be
achieved without a cost to our freedoms or that these freedoms can be
maintained without a cost of lessened security. We can have our cake and
eat it too. Disagreements between two individuals of good will force us
to see the depth of moral dilemmas; determining moral choice is difficult.

Such disagreements also force us to recognize that our understanding of
life and the human being must be approached with awe. Malbim, Bereishit
34:31 does not perceive Shimon and Levi's response to reflect a difference
in moral attitude. To Malbim, their concern was, like Yaakov, the safety
of the family. Their argument, however, was that by not acting, they were
increasing the possibility for further harm. Without a reprisal, other
nations would think that they could act as they wanted against Israel
-- after all, Shechem de-humanized Dina and was not harmed. Yaakov's
argument was that the attack could increase harm;3 Shimon and Levi
argued that it would decrease harm.4 Given that human beings have free
choice it is hard to determine what will be. The absence of disagreement
allows one to paint a simple vision of humanity that supports the desired
behaviour. Disagreement reminds us that life has many variables. Two human
beings are not similar; even one human being is often not predictable.

We wish clarity and we wish peace. Given the depth of moral issues and
the complexity of the human psyche, clarity is often an impossibility. Our
problem is that we link peace to clarity -- thus reality itself becomes a
challenge to peace. We avoid disagreement even at the cost of truth. Yet,
a peace at the expense of truth is unattainable. The answer is to
understand that disagreement is not inherently harmful but reflects
the truth of life and the ethical vision. Avot 5:20 declares that an
argument for the sake of Heaven is destined to be permanent. Rabbi
Shimshon Raphael Hirsch explains that, while in practice one view must
eventually take precedence, each side sheds new ideas on the issue
and must be valued. To reach peace, truth must be its compatriot, not
clarity. From the sons of Yaakov, we learned that only when we embrace
this reality is peace attainable.

Footnotes

1) See, further, Rabbi Benjamin Hecht, Tolerance, Introspection 5760-3.

2) Bereishit, chap. 34. Of course, there were disagreements between
righteous individuals prior to this case. For example, Yitzchak and
Rivka clearly disagreed in regard to the blessings (Bereishit, chap.
27). This is the first case, however, in which the Torah clearly presents
the disagreement without presenting a conclusive answer.

3) Ramban also argues that Yaakov believed that the circumcision of
the men of the city could have them led to righteousness. Similarly,
Radbaz contends, in defence of Yaakov, that our forefather considered
the men of Shechem's city to have been converts. Ramban specifically
states that the brothers rejected this assertion.

4) See further Nechama Leibowitz, Studies in Bereishit, Vayishlach 6 in
regard to Bereishit 35:5.

On Monday, December 03, 2001 12:55 PM, Gil Student <gil_student@hotmail.com>
wrote:
> As many have already pointed out, Hatzoloh, at least in America,
> follow standard triage rules. I wonder why, however, considering that
> the Mishnah in Horiyos 3:7-8 gives a list of priorities (Kohen before
> Levi...). Since Hatzoloh is under the constant guidance of venerable
> poskim, their abandonment of this Mishnah is certainly based on halachic
> sources. Does anyone the background to this?

About 40 years ago my grandfather was asked the following shialah (in
the presence of his wife and three daughters): The halachah says a man
must be saved first but the goyim hold the opposite. If one were c"v on
a sinking boat what should one do?

His reply was very simple: der halachah is zoi uber mir tu'in andish.

I suspect that is about as far as you'll get looking for halachic
rationale.

Coincidentally, there were three men there when my zaideh gave that
'psak'. All three have sons on Areivim.

kt
sk

One has to differentiate between saving 2 healthy people (male and female)
(where the din of hakdama applies: see: Yoreh Deah 252:8) vs. TREATING
two patients (one male and one female). The din of hakdama does NOT
apply to hospital triage. Thus, if 2 patients arrive simulataneously
and because of limited staff, one can treat only one: then only the one
who has a vadai chance of living is treated (as per ATLS triage rules)
and this is due to din of "ein dochin vadai mipnei safek". The Nishmat
Avraham YD 252 #2 goes into detail on this.

Josh (who did triage Motzai Shabbat)

> I would propose having male crews and female crews and trying (as
> best as possible) to send gender appropriate crews on each call.
> But I realize that is not a perfect solution either.

I disagree. When there is a matter of life and death, pausing to consider
issues of Tzniut is murder. "HaShoel, harei Ze Shofech Damim" (Yerushalmi,
Yoma 88). "V'Assur L'Hitmahmeha B'Chilul Shabbat L'Choleh Sheyesh Bo
Sakanah" (Rambam, Shabbat 2:3). According to the Taz (328) explaining
Rambam, even when you can have a Nachri save a life on Shabbat instead
of having a Jew break Shabbat, the Jew goes (actually Gdolei Yisrael
V'Chachmeihem) so that people don't err into thinking that Mitzvot like
Shabbat are more important than saving a life.

People must know that nothing, but nothing, is more important than saving
a life, even if that means Breaking Shabbat when it's unnecessary, in
order to make that point. Chas V'Shalom we should start becoming overly
"frum" in Hatzala or MDA. That frum would quickly lead the masses to
the crumkeit of the Chassid Shoteh.

Moshe

In a message dated 11/30/2001 1:37:41pm EST, RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com 
writes:
> It is also said that the kind of leraning that is mishkachas aveilus is
> leraning be'iyyun. If you darshen hilchos Aveilues deply enough there
> is that sepcial jof of learning. Lich'ora such a joy - i.e. the joy
> of forgetting one's tazroos - is not likely in limmud mishanyos alone
> unless one goes very deeply into it.

Does anyone make this chiluk lhalcha (ie banning deep learning of 
hilchot aveilut for an avel)?

It is generally accepted that real learning of gemaras is prohibited even
in the area of aveilut. They tell a story of the Rogachuver (sorry for
spelling) giving many chiddushin while sitting as an avel. When he was
asked about it he answered that the halacha is not to have joy while
in aveilut. However, for him not learning is a pain and one is not
required to be in pain while being an avel.

Eli Turkel

While we're on the topic,does anyone know an underlying reason why chazal
were mitaken 100 kolot? given the time period of the takana and the
fact that 100 is never mentioned bferush by her -eim sisra seems like
a stretch as a model. and clearly not a directive.

kt
joel rich

RRW>Ironically, any ShuT sysmte that ignores ShuT will invite being
ignored. So if you show me a sefer of Tshuvos that ignores precedent
and goes back to Shas, you can take that as a meta-insturction to ignore
HIS Tshuva and go back to Shas yourself


What do you mean? Certainly by definition all great Shut are NOT a
collection of previous Shut, but novel interpretation of new questions.
For example Noda b'Yehuda, Chasam Sofer etc

RRW>If you follow the Traditional School, you know that whe nit comes to
Halachah the Talmud has been filtered by Rif Rambam. Rosh, Tur SA Mappah
etc. into a form that is accessaible to us today in such sefarim as MB
or Aruch haShulchan etc.

This is a contradiction to your intro! Except for MB, none of these is
a collection of Shut!!

Shlomo Goldstein

From: Harry Maryles <hmaryles@yahoo.com>
>> Subject: Dr. Eliezer Berkowitz and the Abrogation of the Shulchan Aruch

In a message dated 11/26/01 4:03:49pm EST, jjbaker@panix.com writes:
> Already one sees the critiquer's perspective. Yes, that is indeed what
> Berkovits suggests, but then, what do the nosei keilim on the SA do,
> if not subvert the literal pshat of the SA in many places? If they
> didn't do so, there would be no need to print them/follow them. Also,
> that he's called "Dr." rather than "R'" or "R' Dr."

I'm not sure of the context. I jsut did some research into Noda Biyhuda
ORach Chaim Mahadura kamma #86 re: a Sandek being used twice for the
same father.

It seems clear to me that the NB was willing to "aborgate" a minhag in SA
when it had no {clear?} Talmudic base. While it is true that USUALLY the
SA and the Mappah make quite clear what is minhag {as in yesh nohagin},
this is not always so clear.

In this case - the base is R. Yehudah haChassid and the the Maharil.

I intend BEH to put together an article on this
 
Regards and Kol Tuv,
RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com

********************


[ Distributed to the Avodah mailing list, digested version.                   ]
[ To post: mail to avodah@aishdas.org                                         ]
[ For back issues: mail "get avodah-digest vXX.nYYY" to majordomo@aishdas.org ]
[ or, the archive can be found at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/              ]
[ For general requests: mail the word "help" to majordomo@aishdas.org         ]