Avodah Mailing List

Volume 05 : Number 082

Thursday, July 13 2000

< Previous Next >
Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2000 12:16:07 EDT
From: Bin613@aol.com
Subject:
Chiuv mezonos


    I wanted to clarify snd slightly revise my last post. The Ohr Sameach 
(Ishus 10, 19) writes that assuming that the man is not entitled after 12 
months to the woman's maaseh yadayim, then his having to feed her is just a 
knas. He mentions the Ritv"a's shita that he does get maaseh yadayim, but 
does not comment further. The Avi Ezri (sham) says that the chiuv mezonos 
after 12 months is a part of the "kinyan kidhushin v'nisuin", but does not 
come from ishus.
    Lastly, the Tos' HaRo"sh is in Ket. 97b, d"h "Mai Lav", and he compares 
it to megureshes veayno megureshes from eirusin, saying that since, in the 
end, she is prevented from marrying because of him, there is no difference 
between eirusin and nissuin - clearly a knas.


Go to top.

Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2000 10:12:33 -0500
From: "Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu>
Subject:
Fwd: Rabbi Berman's Response


Ever desiring to be helpful to our moderator :-) , I am forwarding RAL's 
note below, that parallels my comments precisely (I do not want to be 
accused of plagiarism - I only saw this after writing my response!) to Avodah.

KT,
YGB


From: alustig@erenj.com (Arnold Lustiger)
>I appreciate the posting of Rabbi Berman's response regarding amra hi.
>However, the question of the RA'N in Nedarim as originally raised by RYGB
>has not been addressed. Does Rabbi Berman's formula violate the RA'N's
>hefkerut criterion? If not, why not?

Arnie Lustiger


Go to top.

Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2000 11:39:36 -0500
From: Eric Simon <erics@radix.net>
Subject:
Nidah 31a


There are many passages which seem to make no scientific sense if taken
literally.  I've been in a discussion concerning the following passage:

"Why are the pains of a female birth greater than those of a male birth?  
The female emerges in the position she assumes during intercourse and the 
male emerges in the position he assumes during intercourse. The former, 
therefore, turns her face upwards  while the latter  need not turn his face. 
(Nidah 31a)

Some agree that this is not to be taken literally, but rather
metaphorically.  My question to this community:

What are Chazal trying to tell us here?  What do the commentators say about
this passage?

Any help would be deeply appreciated.

-- Eric


Go to top.

Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2000 11:48:07 -0400
From: "Gershon Dubin" <gdubin@loebandtroper.com>
Subject:
Nusach


From: "Noah Witty" <nwitty@ix.netcom.com>
> See Volume 20 of the Lubavitcher Rebbes Iggaros.  As memory serves, in at
> least 3 different letters he insists that the shatz must follow the minhag
> hamakom.

    Interesting. In every situation I have been in where a Lubavitcher Chasid
davened for the amud, he davened Nusach Ari, regardless of the nusach hamakom.

Gershon
gdubin@loebandtroper.com
gershon.dubin@juno.com


Go to top.

Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2000 11:59:24 -0400
From: "Gershon Dubin" <gdubin@loebandtroper.com>
Subject:
Question on Rashi in P' Korach


From: C1A1Brown@aol.com
> Rashi flows in a logical manner, introducing only that which is relevant
> directly to pshuto shel mikra.

	I saw a pshat related to this on the first Rashi,  where he says that
"parasha zo yafeh nidreshes beMedrash Tanchuma."  Aside from Rashi's usual
emphasis on pshat,  how could Rashi editorialize,  so to speak,  on the
Medrash?  The explanation is based upon the word "yafeh"  which this pshat
takes to mean,  fitting, rather than nice.  Rashi is saying that the
Medrash on this parasha fits in well with the pshat.

Gershon
gdubin@loebandtroper.com
gershon.dubin@juno.com


Go to top.

Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2000 11:30:05 -0400
From: Gil.Student@citicorp.com
Subject:
Re: Rabbi Saul Berman's Response


I think sections 1 & 2 of RS Berman's analysis are very solid.  Sections 3 & 4, 
however, leave room for further discussion.

In section 3 RSB writes "This understanding of the inoffensiveness, and 
therefore permissibility, of the bride's making a verbal indication of her 
acceptance of the offer..."  Perhaps I a missing the scholarly connotation of 
"inoffensive", but I don't see anyone saying that it is not offensive.  I only 
see them discussing whether kiddushin are valid.  I may be mistaken but I also 
don't see any discussion of lechatchila or bedieved.  The language "nasan hu..."
sounds bedieved to me.

What RS Berman has proven is that, in his case, the kiddushin are chal.

In section 4 RSB writes "I cannot explain the history of brides' silence in the 
face of this universal recognition of permissibility."

Should we be changing minhagim that we don't understand?  The reason that a 
takanas chazal can only be undone by a beis din that is bigger in chochmah and 
minyan is because otherwise the beis din might be missing some underlying reason
for the minhag.  Granted, a minhag is different.  But should we be changing 
minhagim (particularly those dealing with ishus) without understanding the 
reason for the minhag (not to mention even if we understand it)?

I think that RSB has proven what he set out to prove.  However, he did not 
address certain other issues.

This was intended with the full respect that RSB deserves.

Gil Student
gil.student@citicorp.com


Go to top.

Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2000 17:09:07 EDT
From: Yzkd@aol.com
Subject:
To tell or not to tell


WRT the discussion on Areivim, wether it is permissible to publish certain 
Aveiros etc. I will just give a few Marei Mkomos for those who wish to study 
the issue.

- Sugia in Moeid Katan 17a "Talmud Chochom Shesorach" brought in Y"D 334:42.
- Yuma 86b "Mfarsmin Es Hachanofim Mipnei Chilul Hashem"
- Megila 25a Sugia of what is read and interperted, and the end on 25b "Man 
Dsoni Shumanei" brought in the Rambam Hil. Sanhedrin 24:5, and Hagoahs 
Meimunis Hil. Mechira 14:15 (and see Ramoh and SM"E C"M 328:1).
- Shut Tzemach Tzedek (Lubavitch) Y"D # 237.
- Rambam Hil. Deiois 6:8
- when publicizing in non Jewish media consider issue of "Al Tagidu B'gaas".

Kol Tuv

Yitzchok Zirkind


Go to top.

Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2000 21:52:45 +0100
From: Chana/Heather Luntz <Chana/Heather@luntz.demon.co.uk>
Subject:
Re: Hefkerut and Kiddushin


Arnold Lustiger <alustig@erenj.com> writes:
>As far as no one paskening like the Ran, when it comes to issues as serious
>as ishus (no pun intended), one generally attempts to take into account even
>minority opinions. If indeed R. Berman's ceremony is suspect only according
>to a daas yachid, I don't think that there is a serious posek out there who
>would discount the Ran's shita when it is so easy to solve the problem by
>simply having her keep quiet!

The bit that is confusing me about this whole shitta is that it would
not seem to be enough if the woman merely keeps quiet.  She has to have
a form of negative daas, ie to "make herself hefker" so that the man can
acquire her (at least according to the reading of RYGB).

Now the essence of an object that is hefker is that whoever is koneh it
first, gets it, if you see a hefker object lying there, but I manage to
sneak in ahead of you and am koneh it, then I get it.

Thus by analogy to this, a woman would, according to the way RYGB is
reading the Ran, need to put herself in a state of mind whereby not only
was she open to kiddushin from the chassan, but from all other potential
takers as well.  I can understand such a mindset in the case of an
arranged marriage, where a dutiful daughter is willing to marry
whomsoever her father should designate, even if she has never met him
(so that if he changed his mind at the last minute, she would accept
whoever), but it is difficult to conceive of such a state of mind in
most modern women - and i am not sure, however much people might be
dedicated to the halacha, that such a mindset is actually physically
possible. 

All that seems to be being said here is that if a woman makes a
statement of ani mekabelet, she is making absolutely clear and removing
all doubt about what just about everybody who knows her knows anyway.
Certainly it was never suggested to me by anybody at any stage that I
should consider myself as having such a mindset. If anything, the way I
was told to interpret the seven circles around the chassan prior to
kiddushin (my minhag BTW not his, but I did it anyway) was as an act of
devotion, if you like, which made it perfectly clear to all around that
I was centering my life around this man and no other.  To go from that
in a split second to suddenly being available to whomsoever should have
rushed in and managed to grab me first is such a leap of imagination
that I confess I cannot manage it.

Is there any chance that the Ran could be read differently from the way
RYGB - ie that what she supposed to be doing is freeing herself from
"other" past attachments so that she can be fully acquired by the
relevant chassan.  That, I think is more in line with the mood of any
chassanah (and is fully possible, many of us have had serious dates
before, probably fallen in love before, and yet not gotten to the stage
of marriage, and there is an argument that these emotional attachments
could bind us and need freeing).  On the other hand, such a reading
would mean there is no inherent contradiction between the state required
to be created and a statement of ani mekabellet (ie you really need
both, you need acceptance, but also a freeing from your past). (This is
just speculation, I have not seen the Ran inside).

Regards
Chana

PS According to the Ran, can one learn issues such as acquiring a hefker
object for another (maklokus in Baba Basra 10, see Eruvin 39) from the
similiar issues in kiddushin (or vice versa).


Go to top.

Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2000 17:09:06 EDT
From: Yzkd@aol.com
Subject:
Re: Question on Rashi in P' Korach


In a message dated 7/7/00 10:16:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
C1A1Brown@aol.com writes:
> Rashi explains that Korach opposed the appointment of Elitzaphan and
> therefore chose to rebel. The whole episode really occurred earlier when
> the appointment took place (Ibn Ezra, Sifsei Chachamim on Rashi), and was
> placed here because of the smichus haparshiyos to tzitzis, which was the
> vehicle used by Korach to argue with Moshe. (Rashi only explains smichus
> haparshiyos when things are out of order, see beg. of Shlach as well).

> If this is correct, what's pshat in rashi 16:14 where Rashi refers to the
> gezeirah to die in the midbar bec. of the meraglim episode - the rebellion
> of Korach occurred much earlier?

MPoppers@kayescholer.com writes:
> and I would argue that RaShY felt the actual rebellion, as per his reading of
> the posuk you mention below, occurred _after_ chait ham'raglim -- see his 16:4
> comment (i.e 14:13 is the third instance and this machlokes is the fourth).

C1A1Brown@aol.com writes:
>> what leads you to believe that RaShY himself held that way? I would argue
>> that RaShY felt the actual rebellion, as per his reading of the posuk you
>> mention below, occurred _after_ chait ham'raglim.

> Obviously if we throw out the Sifsei Chachamim there is no kashe, but I'm
> willing to assume that the Sifsei Chachamim saw the same Rashi on 16:14 that
> we did and still chose to learn otherwise, ignoring the obvious difficulty.
> How/why?

He also says like the Mizrachi that Rashi reverts to the other opinion that 
the event of the Mraglim happened first, as you wrote (later in your post) -

> The problem is getting this to fit with the other Rashis. Mizrachi on
> sirchom revi'i (which I neglected to look at till you raised it) writes that
> the Rashis are based on contradictory Midrashim (which Rashi will sometimes
> use depending on his pshuto shel mikra needs). Not an approach that makes
> me very happy, but at this point I can't think of anything better.

And to add that he says that Rashi himself brings both opinions in Dvorim 1:1 
D"H V'chatzeirois.

However there are Mforshim that hold that Rashi does not bring conflicting 
opinions and that his Shita is that Miraglim happened first, they quote the 
Mechilte in Bshalach that the Yidden left Chatzeirois and went 3 Maso'ois and 
then returned back to Chatzeirois, hence the miraglim that happened in Risma 
happened between first and second rests in Chatzeirois (this is a bit Dochek 
to learn in the words of Rashi Bamidbar 33:1), and then happened Machlokes 
Korach in Chatzeirois. This is further anchored by Mforshim who hold that the 
story of the Mkoisheish hapened in the second year after The Miraglim (Rashi 
Bamidbar 15:32), accordingly everything is in the proper order Mraglim 
Mkosheish and Korach.

> Three questions that your approach doesn't answer:

> 1. Rashi only quotes Midrashim that resolve a difficulty in pshuto shel mikra.
> Why introduce the whole issue of Elitzaphan when it obscures the pshuto shel
> mikra - namely, that Korach wanted the kehuna gedola and therefore chose
> to rebel?

>  2. Why introduce the Mirdash of talis shel techeiles when there is no need
>  to do so based on pshuto shel mikra?

Here I interject what gdubin@loebandtroper.com writes:
> I saw a pshat related to this on the first Rashi, where he says that "parasha
> zo yafeh nidreshes beMedrash Tanchuma." Aside from Rashi's usual emphasis
> on pshat, how could Rashi editorialize, so to speak, on the Medrash?
> The explanation is based upon the word "yafeh" which this pshat takes to
> mean, fitting, rather than nice. Rashi is saying that the Medrash on this
> parasha fits in well with the pshat.

In Klolei Rashi (based on the Sichos from the L. Rebbe) he says at times 
Rashi quotes by name Medrosh when in Pshutoi Shel Mikra (PS"M) it may not be 
that clear, but once quoted it makes sense also in PS"M.

And in our case Rashi answers what is trublesome in PS"M why did Korach wait 
to argue on the priesthood untill now.

> 3. If Rashi's intent is to explain Korach's motivation, why introduce it here
> only after commenting on Dasan and Aviram - Korach is mentioned earlier in
> the pasuk, he was the focal point of the rebellion, and hence Rashi should
> have addressed himself to Korach first?

As the Possuk combines all together Rashi explains how and why all issues are 
interelated, how he got others to get involved.

> 2. It forces the introduction of the Midrash of talis shel techelis as well
> to explain why the Torah delayed recording the event till this point in time.

According to the MIzrachi and S"C what proof is there that Parshas Tzizis was 
said before the event of the Mraglim (that they could use that as point of 
argument)?

Kol Tuv
Yitzchok Zirkind


Go to top.

Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2000 02:09:00 EDT
From: SaulBerman@aol.com
Subject:
More on Kol Kallah


Rabbi Bechhofer is quite correct in indicating that I did not discuss the Ran 
of Nedarim 30a, s.v. Ve'isha nami.... He is also quite correct in indicating 
that the Ran is quite complex and that the line which he cited can only be 
understood within it's context. It is precisely the full context which 
indicates that the Ran raises neither conceptual nor practical objection to 
the Kallah responding verbally (II.B.) together with her acceptance of the 
object (II.A.) offered by the groom (I.A.) together with his verbal offer 
(I.B.). Let's look at the context.
    1. Mishna Nedarim 28a (3:9) says that if one makes a vow that plants 
shall be Korban (Kadosh) until they are cut down, then those plants are not 
subject to pidyon, to being redeemed from their kedusha.
    2. Gemara Nedarim 28b reports the explanation of Bar Pada that even if 
the act of redemption (pidyon) is done, the kedusha of the plants is renewed, 
even repeatedly, until they are cut down.
    3. Gemara Nedarim 29b-30a reports that Rav Avin and Rav Yitzchak proposed 
using the position of Bar Pada to resolve the following question asked by Rav 
Hoshia. If a man offers a woman two perutot (I.A.) and says, "with one 
perutah I offer you marriage effective now; with the second perutah I marry 
you again after I divorce you."(I.B.) If the woman accepts the two perutot 
(II.A.), they are married immediately. If he then divorces her, are they 
automatically remarried based on the man's earlier transfer of the perutah 
(I.A.) and verbal declaration of intent (I.B.) ? According to the reasoning 
of Bar Pada, the two Amoraim said,  the Kiddushin should be renewed 
automatically after the issuance of the Get, as the Kedusha of the plants is 
automatically renewed after the Pidyon.
    4. Gemara Nedarim 30a. Rav Yirmiah disputes the position of his two 
students. Even Bar Pada, he says, would only contend that the Kedusha of 
plants renews itself automatically when the Pidyon is done by the original 
owner who had vowed the continuity of the Kedusha until the plants are cut 
down. But if the Pidyon is done by another person, then the original owner's 
declaration lacks any continuing force over the plants, and therefore, the 
Kedusha is not automatically renewed. Likewise, says Rav Yirmiah, in regard 
to marriage, once a get is issued, the original husband no longer has any 
authority over his former wife and therefore his prior action and verbal 
declaration have no effect. Therefore, new Kiddushin do not come into effect 
automatically subsequent to divorce.
    5. The Ran at Nedarim 30a, s.v. Ve'Isha nami...,  attempts to clarify the 
position of Rav Yirmiah. He asks, since the wife originally consented to the 
renewal of Kiddushin, and even after the Get she remains subject to her own 
continuing authority, why can the Kiddushin not be automatically renewed by 
virtue of her original will?
    6. The Ran answers with a truly creative piece of jurisprudential 
analysis. It is clear that the bride's consent to the offer of marriage is 
essential in order for Kiddushin to take place. On the other hand, it is 
equally clear that the bride cannot create Kiddushin through her own offer of 
marriage (Natnah hi, veamra hi). If her will is not sufficient to create a 
marriage, what exactly is the role of her will? The Ran answers that when the 
bride consents to the marriage, she essentially submerges her autonomous will 
so that the will of the groom, expressed in action (I.A.) and in words 
(I.B.), can be actualized in the creation of Kiddushin. 
    7. Therefore, Ran concludes, in order for Kiddushin to become actualized, 
the groom's authority must be present. Since in the case of Rav Hoshia, after 
the issuance of the Get, the husband's authority is totally absent, no new 
Kiddushin can come into effect at that moment. The wife's prior consent, and 
her continuing authority over herself is not sufficient to actualize the 
Kiddushin.

    8. It should be clear then that the Ran does not at all take issue with 
the general legal requirements of consent by the bride in action (II.A.), and 
in words (II.B.). His concern is the legal meaning of the behaviors, not 
modification of the universally accepted standards. Indeed this understanding 
of the Ran is only confirmed by his discussion of the primary passage in 
Kiddushin 5a. In his commentary to the Rif at 1b, s.v. Tanu Rabbanan, he 
echoes precisely the positions of  the majority of Rishonim that Natan hu 
(I.A.), veAmra Hi (II.B.) can create valid Kiddushin if the context manifests 
the grooms intent to make an offer of marriage. 
    9. Indeed, the Ran goes on to suggest that in this latter case the 
groom's silence is equivalent to verbal affirmation, just as in the more 
usual case of Natan Hu (I.A.) veAmar Hu (I.B.), where the bride's acceptance 
(II.A.) in silence is equivalent to her verbal consent ("shtikah didah 
kehoda'ah".)  In neither of these passages does Ran suggest any hesitancy 
whatsoever about a bride adding her verbal consent (II.B.) to her action of 
acceptance (II.A.)!

    10. One further point. None of the Rishonim or Acharonim who address this 
issue suggest that the bride's verbal consent is only acceptable bediavad, 
post facto. On the contrary, the underlying principles make it perfectly 
clear that this practise is perfectly permissible lechitchila, ab initio. 
That is, when the usual performance of a marriage is taking place, involving  
Natan Hu (I.A.), veAmar Hu (I.B.), and Kiblah Hi (II.A.), then the addition 
of her verbalized consent, Amrah Hi (II.B.) is unequivocally permissible.

    11. A final point in this communication. Jordan Hirsch is quite correct 
in suggesting an analogy between the bride's consent and the Daas Makneh in a 
contract of sale which can also manifest the will of the party through action 
alone or through action accompanied by verbal expression. However, like all 
analogies, this one is somewhat imperfect since marriage is not a contract 
between a  purhasor and a vendor. This issue is addressed by Rabbi Kalman 
Kahana in his superb book, "Jewish Marriage."

Kol Tuv,
Rabbi Saul J. Berman


Go to top.

Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2000 09:05:38 +0100
From: Chana/Heather Luntz <Chana/Heather@luntz.demon.co.uk>
Subject:
Re: Hefker and Kiddushin


In message <4.3.2.7.0.20000713001120.00a86690@casbah.it.northwestern.edu
>, Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer
<sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu> writes
>Let me note that there is a siman (28) in the Bigdei Shesh on BB, based on 
>the Sha'arei Yosher 5:23, on time-limited hefker, and one can go on from 
>there to discuss individual limited hefker, ayain sham (those of you on 
>Avodah that do not possess a Bigdei Shesh have to do some serious soul 
>searching!). There are of course, many sugyos about hefker l'aniyim, the 
>case in Nedarim of Mudar Hano'o - hefker is not necessarily all out and total.
>

Agreed - I was thinking of the case of hefker l'aniyim.  But even there
,there is a *class* of persons who are able to take.  In our case,
because of takana d'Rabbanu Gershom and the Rabbanut's equivalent for
Sephardim in Israel, there are lots of men who are eliminated from
kiddushin with a penuya because of that takana (not to mention if we
were talking about a giyores ore a grusha, there are other classes of
men who are not permitted to marry, not to mention krovim etc with whom
the marriage would not be tofes anyway).  On the other hand, there are
lots of men who are available for marriage with any given penuya.

But I do not know if you can, halachically, consider an object hefker if
the class of persons who could acquire it is limited to one only - that
goes well beyond the hefker l'aniyim case.

>L'ma'aseh, though, I do not think that hefker here is necessarily more than 
>a synonym for passivity. 

Well, the problem with this is, as has been expressed on the list
earlier, hefker is a technical halachic term.  In its usual halachic
formulation, it does not just mean passivity.  All objects are passive,
a hefker object is therefore not distinguishable from any other object
by this quality.

So it seems to me that you are left to learn the Ran in two alternative
ways:

a) the use of the term hefker is lav davka (in which case you can read
it to mean passivity, but you can also read it the way Micha is reading
it or I am reading it or some other way which is not particularly linked
to the halachic meaning but has some vague association with it, it is
more a kind of drush - in which case I am surprised that one would want
to learn halachic nafka minas from it)  (Sorry about the use of read
here, but learn is really not very good English)

b) the use of hefker is davka, but in this case I do not understand how
you can merely learn passivity from a technical halachic term that
doesn't mean that. 


>I think the best peshat in the Ran is given by the 
>Or Somei'ach Ishus 9:20:
>
>"D'inyan ha'kiddushin lo dami l'mekach d'almah, d'b'kol makom ha'koneh 
>koneh v'ha'makneh makneh, ma she'ein kein b'kiddushin, d'eehee lo avda 
>ma'aseh me'tzeeda - V'Ki Yikach kesiv, v'lo Ki Tikach - v'rak ha'ba'al 
>mekkadesh v'oseh v'oseh osah k'hekdesh l'almah she'teeheyeh assurah le'kol 
>ha'olam... she'mee'tzeeda ein anu meddabrim kelum b'toras hakno'oh, kemo 
>she'kosav Rabbeinu Nissim [our Ran] b'Perek III me'Nedarim, she'be'kol 
>makom mah she'nossan oh machar zechus she'hayah lo nosein 
>l'acheir  she'yeeheyeh zeh l'ploni, mah she'ein kein b'kiddushin - atu 
>ke'she'hee l'atzmah yesh bah perat me'peratei ha'ishus?! - rak she'hee 
>mutteres l'kol adam - v'kee ha'ba'al mekkadesha hu oseh aleha issur ishus 
>l'kol adam zulaso. V'lo matzi lee'mechor zeh l'acher - rak she'hu mattirah 
>b'get, im kein havei k'hekdesh..."
>

I haven't had time to try and find the Ran (bli neder over this shabbas)
but I don't see, from that piece you have quoted here how this helps
your case.  This is distinguishing between kiddushin and general sale -
where is the reference to hefker and passivity?

>There's more, which addresses your query as to how an independent adult 
>woman's ceremony is really a derivative (perhaps) of  "es beetee nossati", 
>ayain sham heieiv.
>
>I think that our ma'asei kiddushin, according to the Ran, may rely on 
>devarim she'b'lev einam devarim.
>

I don't see how this is possible at all.  I thought about it, but cannot 
think of a case where devarim she'b'lev einam devarim is applicable in a
case where the person has demonstrated by action immediately beforehand
contrary to the supposition that is being derived from the lack of
words.

In our case, we have a woman dressing herself up in a fancy white dress
(not my normal apparel) and walking down (under her own steam - yes my
parents were there, but I was hardly carried) towards a chuppah that had
previously been acquired by my now husband for the purpose of kiddushin
(that makom, of course, not having been his a few moments before) and
under which he was standing. A tallis on four poles is not your normal
average building, and I could see him standing there and could not have
been under any illusion as to who was standing there, and whose property
it was. I therefore willingly entered into his reshus for what was
obviously the purpose of kiddushin (as signalled by the dress, not to
mention the chazan in the background singing about boi kala), and walked
around him seven times to make it absolutely clear that i recognised "my
man".

After I stopped he put on his tallis (the new one that was a gift from
me  but that he was wearing for the first time - that is his minhag and
made the shecheyiyanu), and we followed with kiddushin. 

And you are suggesting that we can rely on and assumption of passivity
on the basis of devarim sh'b'lev eneim devarim, ie that we infer from
the fact that I don't say anything that in fact I am available to all
when the actions performed completely and flatly contradict that
assumption?

Rather, if anything, in halacha, actions speak louder than words  (eg
you generally only have to bring a korban for a mistaken action, not
mistaken words) which in turn speak louder than thoughts (ie devarim
sh'b'lev einem devarim - except in limited circumstances of extreme
kiddusha, like pigul).  If in fact the thoughts match the actions, how
can the words make any difference one way or the other?

>Sof davar, I am left with my contention that the introduction of devarim 
>she'be'al peh on the Kallah's part quite likely contravene the Ran (and the 
>Or Samei'ach)'s geder of kiddushin.
>
>KT,
>YGB

Regards

Chana


Go to top.

Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2000 18:16:33 -0700 (PDT)
From: Harry Maryles <hmaryles@yahoo.com>
Subject:
Re: Rabbi Saul Berman's Response


Rabbi Berman wrote:
> I can also understand how Rabbis, cognizant of the common practise of bridal
> silence, might express some reluctance to change simply in recognition of
> the history. However, such reluctance has no sound Halachik foundation.

Just by way of co-incidence I had an opportunity to discuss this issue with
Rabbi Gedalia Dov Schwartz, Av Bet Din , Bet Din of America. Rabbi Schwartz,
who knew RYBS and attended many of his shiurim, told me that RYBS would
have expressed strong opposition to this type of response on the part of
the Kallah. He was very much opposed to tampering with established custom
even when one could justify it Halachicly. Minhag Israel Torah Hi.

This may be forwarded to Rabbi Berman.

My own personal concern is the similarity of this practice, to practices
within the Conservative movement. It my be a slippery slope fostering
possible halachic compromise by a rabbi with less integrity or halachic
knowledge than Rabbi Berman.

It also bothers me that when activities are generated by individual "needs"
which are heavily influenced by non- Torah or even subtley disguised
anti-Torah values of the dominant culture. As RYBS has stated. Judaism is
not a religion of "Rights" but one of "Obligations". The femminist agenda
concerns itself more with the rights of women than it does with the obligations
of women. Hence, Torah values and femminst values are a conflicting set of
values. Not that there's anything wrong with fighting for women's rights. It
just shouldn't be used as a springboard for innovation in Jewish custom, even
Halachicly acceptable innovation. The results of such tampering, even with the
best of intentions can be misused andultimately lead to violation of Halacha.

HM

__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Get Yahoo! Mail  Free email you can access from anywhere!
http://mail.yahoo.com/


Go to top.

Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2000 22:37:47 EDT
From: DFinchPC@aol.com
Subject:
Re: Rabbi Saul Berman's Response


In a message dated 7/12/00 11:41:30 AM US Central Standard Time, 
Gil.Student@citicorp.com writes:
> Should we be changing minhagim that we don't understand?  The reason that a 
> takanas chazal can only be undone by a beis din that is bigger in chochmah
> and minyan is because otherwise the beis din might be missing some underlying 
> reason for the minhag.  Granted, a minhag is different.  But should we be
> changing minhagim (particularly those dealing with ishus) without
> understanding the reason for the minhag (not to mention even if we
> understand it)?

The "reasons" for many minhagim may be purely cultural or sociological as
opposed to halachic. To understand these reasons -- "origins" is probably
a better word -- is to engage in an analytical process (i.e., cultural
anthropology or sociology) that is foreign to halacha. Accordingly, it
seems to me that there is some danger in measuring the validity of minhagim
according to the reasons why the minhagim came into existence. RSB's approach
is probably preferable.

David Finch


Go to top.

Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2000 00:38:25 -0500
From: "Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu>
Subject:
Re: Hefker and Kiddushin


First, please humor me in a request that we use more yeshiveshe nomenclature:
Not my "reading" of the Ran, but how I "learn" the Ran. "Readings" are
academic parlance, not my taste.

That taken care of, on to the lomdus!!

Let me note that there is a siman (28) in the Bigdei Shesh on BB, based
on the Sha'arei Yosher 5:23, on time-limited hefker, and one can go on
from there to discuss individual limited hefker, ayain sham (those of you
on Avodah that do not possess a Bigdei Shesh have to do some serious soul
searching!). There are of course, many sugyos about hefker l'aniyim, the
case in Nedarim of Mudar Hano'o - hefker is not necessarily all out and total.

L'ma'aseh, though, I do not think that hefker here is necessarily more than
a synonym for passivity. I think the best peshat in the Ran is given by the
Or Somei'ach Ishus 9:20:

"D'inyan ha'kiddushin lo dami l'mekach d'almah, d'b'kol makom ha'koneh
koneh v'ha'makneh makneh, ma she'ein kein b'kiddushin, d'eehee lo avda
ma'aseh me'tzeeda - V'Ki Yikach kesiv, v'lo Ki Tikach - v'rak ha'ba'al
mekkadesh v'oseh v'oseh osah k'hekdesh l'almah she'teeheyeh assurah le'kol
ha'olam... she'mee'tzeeda ein anu meddabrim kelum b'toras hakno'oh, kemo
she'kosav Rabbeinu Nissim [our Ran] b'Perek III me'Nedarim, she'be'kol makom
mah she'nossan oh machar zechus she'hayah lo nosein l'acheir she'yeeheyeh
zeh l'ploni, mah she'ein kein b'kiddushin - atu ke'she'hee l'atzmah yesh
bah perat me'peratei ha'ishus?! - rak she'hee mutteres l'kol adam - v'kee
ha'ba'al mekkadesha hu oseh aleha issur ishus l'kol adam zulaso. V'lo matzi
lee'mechor zeh l'acher - rak she'hu mattirah b'get, im kein havei k'hekdesh..."

There's more, which addresses your query as to how an independent adult
woman's ceremony is really a derivative (perhaps) of "es beetee nossati",
ayain sham heieiv.

I think that our ma'asei kiddushin, according to the Ran, may rely on devarim
she'b'lev einam devarim.

Sof davar, I am left with my contention that the introduction of devarim
she'be'al peh on the Kallah's part quite likely contravene the Ran (and the
Or Samei'ach)'s geder of kiddushin.

KT,
YGB


Go to top.

Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2000 00:54:14 EDT
From: JoshHoff@aol.com
Subject:
Re: nusach of tefillah belachash


> The Sha'arim Metzuyanim BaHalachah discusses this in the halachos of shemoneh
> esreh. He says that a shatz should daven his own nusach biychidus and the
> shul's for chazaras hashatz.

Other poskim say the shliach tzibbur should say the same nusach in the 
tefillah belachash as the one he uses in chazaras hashatz. This is because 
the tefillah belacash is said by hi in order to be mesader tefilaso.I think 
the Har Tzevi, among others, says this. 


Go to top.

Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2000 07:48:12 +0200
From: Kaye David Capt 86 AW/HC <David.Kaye@ramstein.af.mil>
Subject:
Nusach


From:	Joelirich@aol.com <mailto:Joelirich@aol.com> 
> Other than R' Moshe, does anyone have mekorot for the appropriate recitation
> for both the shatz and the kahal where their nusach differs from the nusach
> of the tzibbur. In particular I'm interested in secific elements of tfila(eg
> kadish).  <snip>

Here is a very quick list of mekoros. When I return home this evening
perhaps I'll have a moment to see if I can locate more. For now, however,
these should be a start:

Shut. Ubocharta BaChaim (Rav Shlomo Kluger) 24
Shut. Maharsdam 35, Y.D.153
Shut. Divrei Chaim 2:8
Shut. Meishiv Davar (Netziv) 17
Shut. Shivas Tzion (Rav Shmuel Landau, son of the Noda B'Yehuda) 5
Shut. Maharam Shik 43
Shut. Levushei Mordechai 43-10
Shut. Maharsham 3:160
Shut. Maharm Brisk 2:28
Edus L'Yisrael (Henkin) p. 162
Shut. Yaskil Avdi (Hodaya) 2:3,4:3,4, 5:17
Shut. Yabia Omer 6:10,11
Shut. Yechave Da'as 3:6
Shut. Igros Moshe 2:23,24, 4:33,34


Go to top.


********************


[ Distributed to the Avodah mailing list, digested version.                   ]
[ To post: mail to avodah@aishdas.org                                         ]
[ For back issues: mail "get avodah-digest vXX.nYYY" to majordomo@aishdas.org ]
[ or, the archive can be found at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/              ]
[ For general requests: mail the word "help" to majordomo@aishdas.org         ]

< Previous Next >