Qitzur Shulchan Arukh – 65:30

ל: מוּמָר אָסוּר לִלְווֹת מִמֶּנּוּ בְּרִבִּית, וְגַם לְהַלְווֹת לוֹ בְּרִבִּית יֵשׁ לְהַחְמִיר

A [Jewish] apostate — it is prohibited to borrow money from him on interest. And also lending to him on interest, it’s also appropriate to be stringent.


We close the siman on ribbis by getting back to the point. Is the verse’s “achikha” inclusive of every Jew, or only of Jews who believe in Judaism, shomerei Shabbos?

Not that this issue comes up much, since a mumar is someone who rejected a Torah upbringing, not someone who simply wasn’t exposed to the traditional Jewish worldview, or his exposure was in a context where they were prejudiced to reject it. (“See son, this is what those Orthodox people believe, but we know better…”)

Starting Monday, be”H, we will be moving on to iska, the rules of doing business — including some very-close-to-ribis looking deals.

Qitzur Shulchan Arukh – 65:29

כט: שֻׁתָּפִין שֶׁצְּרִיכִין לִלְווֹת מָעוֹת בְּרִבִּית מֵעוֹבֵד כּוֹכָבִים, יַעֲשׂוּ שְׁאֵלַת חָכָם אֵיךְ לַעֲשׂוֹת. (עַיֵן “טוּרֵי זָהָב” סִימָן ק”ע סָעִיף קָטִן ג’. “חוּוֹת דַּעַת” ֹשָם סָעִיף קָטֹן א’. וּבְֹשֻלְחָן עָרוּך “הַתַּנְיָא” הִלְכוֹת רִבִּת סָעִיף ס”ד)

Partners who need to borrow money with interest from a non-Jew, should ask a sage as to how to do this.


I enjoy seeing a halachic guide say “Ask a rabbi” rather than trying to be everyone’s poseiq on questions that really need case-wize answers. Perhaps I’m just too cynical, but I see the latter as something that unfortunately happens all too often in modern English guides.

Qitzur Shulchan Arukh – 65:28

כח: מְעוֹתָיו שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל מֻפְקָדוֹת בְּיַד עוֹבֵד כּוֹכָבִים, וְהִלְוָה אוֹתָם לְיִשְׂרָאֵל בְּרִבִּית, אִם הָיוּ בְּאַחְרָיוּת הָעוֹבֵד כּוֹכָבִים שֶׁאִם יֹאבַד הַחוֹב יִתְחַיֵּב הוּא לְשַׁלֵּם בִּמְעוֹתָיו, מֻתָּר. וְאִם אֵינוֹ בְּאַחְרָיוּת הָעוֹבֵד כּוֹכָבִים, אָסוּר – קסט. וְלָכֵן בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ קְבוּצוֹת מָעוֹת, – קֻפּוֹת חִסָּכוֹן – שפארקאסע וְכַדּוֹמֶה, שֶׁיֵּשׁ לַיִּשְׂרְאֵלִים חֲלָקִים – מְנָיוֹת – אקְציען שָׁמָּה וְיִשְׂרְאֵלִים לֹוִים מִשָּׁם בְּרִבִּית, אַף -עַל -פִּי שֶׁהַמְמֻנִּים הֵמָּה עוֹבְדֵי כּוֹכָבִים, מִכָּל מָקוֹם נִרְאֶה לִי דְּאִסּוּר גָּמוּר הוּא. וְלָכֵן אָסור לִתֵּן לְשָׁם מָעוֹת, כִּי שֶׁמָּא יִלְוֶה יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁאֵינוֹ הָגוּן. וְכֵן אָסוּר לִלְווֹת מִשָּׁם, כִּי שֶׁמָּא נָתַן לְֹשָם יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁאֵינוֹ הָגוּן

A Jew’s money that is deposited into the control of a non-Jew, and he lent them to a Jew with interest, if it was the responsibility of the non-Jew that if the debt is lost he [the non-Jew] would obligate himself to pay the money, it is permitted. And if it is not the responsibility of the non-Jew, it is prohibited.

Therefore, in a place where there are finance companies such, as savings banks and the like, where Jews own part of them, shares in the company, and Jews borrow there with interest, even if the managers are non-Jews, in any event it seems to me that this is totally prohibited. Therefore it is forbidden to deposit money with them, because they may lend to a Jew who is not careful. It is also forbidden to borrow from them, in case a Jew has invested in them, who is not careful.


The first part is another application of the idea that the difference between a proxy and someone who actually takes ownership being a middleman in back-to-back loans is whether the middleman accepts risk in the case of loss. See other examples in se’ifim 25 & 26.

The second part applies this principle to a corporate setting, for example, where the lender is a corporation in which one partner is a Jew. E.g. a savings bank where some of the shares are held by Jews. Since the shares held by the Jew represent a percentage of money for which the responsiibility doesn’t fall to non-Jews, a loan with interest would be prohibited.

R’ Ganzfried is clear that this is his own opinion. I am under the impression that this is not how we rule in practice. Consult your rabbi!

Qitzur Shulchan Arukh – 65:27

כז:יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁהִלְוָה לְעוֹבֵד כּוֹכָבִים עַל מַשְׁכּוֹן בְּרִבִּית כָּךְ וְכָךְ לְחֹדֶשׁ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּא הַיִּשְׂרָאֵל לַחֲבֵרוֹ שֶׁהוּא יַלְוֶה לוֹ אֶת הַמָּעוֹת עַל מַשְׁכּוֹן זֶה, וְשֶׁהוּא יִטּוֹל אֶת הָרִבִּית שֶׁתַּעֲלֶה מֵהַיּוֹם עַד הַפֵּרָעוֹן, מֻתָּר. אֲבָל אִם הַיִּשְׂרָאֵל הָרִאשׁוֹן כְּבָר זָקַף אֶת הַקֶּרֶן עִם הָרִבִּית לְכָל זְמַן הַהַלְוָאָה הֲרֵי הַכֹּל הִיא כְּקֶרֶן שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל, וְאָסוּר לִלְוֹת עַל מַשְׁכּוֹן זֶה מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל חֲבֵרוֹ בְּרִבִּית, דַּהֲוֵי כְּאִלּוּ נָתַן אֶת הָרִבִּית מִכִּיסוֹ

A Jew who lends a non-Jew against a collateral with interest of such-and-such a month, and afterward the Jew goes to his friend that he lend him the money on this [same] collateral, and he takes on the interest from today until the final payment date, it is permissable. However, if the first Jew already combined the principal and interest [repackaged into one payment] for the entire duration of the loan [to be paid at the end] then it is all like the Jew’s capital, and it is prohibited to borrow against this collateral from his Jewish friend with interest, because it’s like he gave the interest from his own pocket.


In the previous two laws, we saw that as long as the Jew in the middle has no risk exposure, another Jew can use him as a proxy borrow money from a non-Jew with interest. Here we see another limitation — the interest has to match the currently existing terms of the loan with the non-Jew. If the terms changed in a restructure, than the interest paid between the two Jews constitutes a distinct deal, and is prohibited.

Qitzur Shulchan Arukh – 65:25-26

(I missed Friday, so as to discourage that happening, I’m going to force myself to make it up today. There will be two se’ifim in today’s post.)

כה: עוֹבֵד כּוֹכָבִים שֶׁאָמַר לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, לְוֵה בִּשְׁבִילִי מָעוֹת בְּרִבִּית מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל עַל מַשְׁכּוֹן זֶה, אוֹ אֲפִלּוּ אֵינוֹ נוֹתֵן לוֹ מַשְׁכּוֹן אֶלָּא שְׁטַר- חוֹב, וְהַמַּלְוֶה סוֹמֵךְ אֶת עַצְמוֹ רַק עַל הַמַּשְׁכּוֹן אוֹ עַל הַשְּׁטָר שֶׁל עוֹבֵד כּוֹכָבִים, וְעַל הַשָּׁלִיחַ אֵין שׁוּם אַחְרָיוּת, מֻתָּר. וַאֲפִלּוּ אִם הַיִּשְׂרָאֵל הַשָּׁלִיחַ מֵבִיא אֶת הָרִבִּית לְהַמַּלְוֶה, מֻתָּר לְקַבְּלָהּ, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁהַמַּלְוֶה יִגְמֹר זֹאת בְּדַעְתּוֹ, שֶׁכָּל אַחְרָיוּת הַמַּשְׁכּוֹן וְהַמָּעוֹת, בֵּין בַּהֲבָאָה בֵּין בַּחֲזָרָה הַכֹּל עַל אַחְרָיוּתוֹ, וְעַל הַשָּׁלִיחַ לֹא יִהְיֶה שוּם אַחְרָיוּת

A non-Jew who says to a Jew, “Borrow for me money on interest from a Jew upon this collateral” or even if he only gave him a debt contract [IOU] and the lender relies only on this collateral or on the non-Jew’s contract, and there is no responsibility placed on the messenger — it is permitted.

Even if the Jewish messenger delivers the interest to the borrower it is permitted as long as the borrower has this in mind — that all the obligation of the collateral and the money, whether upon delivery or return,are all responsibility [if lost], and there is no responsibility on the messenger.

כו: וְכֵן יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנָּתַן מַשְׁכּוֹן אוֹ שְׁטַר-חוֹב לְיִשְׂרָאֵל חֲבֵרוֹ, שֶׁיִּלְוֶה בִּשְׁבִילוֹ עַל זֶה מָעוֹת בְּרִבִּית מֵעוֹבֵד כּוֹכָבִים, אִם הָעוֹבֵד כּוֹכָבִים אֵינוֹ סוֹמֵךְ רַק עַל הַמַּשְׁכּוֹן אוֹ עַל הַשְּׁטָר. וְעַל הַשָּׁלִיחַ אֵין שׁוּם אַחְרָיוּת, מֻתָּר. וְכֵן אִם הַיִּשְׂרָאֵל הִלְוָה תְּחִלָּה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל חֲבֵרוֹ עַל מַשְׁכּוֹן, וְאַחַר כָּךְ אָמַר לְהַמַּלְוֶה, לְוֵה מָעוֹת מֵעוֹבֵד כּוֹכָבִים בְּרִבִּית עַל מַשְׁכּוֹן זֶה וְעָלַי לְשַׁלֵּם הַקֶּרֶן וְהָרִבִּית, אִם הָעוֹבֵד כּוֹכָבִים סוֹמֵךְ אֶת עַצְמוֹ עַל הַמַּשְׁכּוֹן בִּלְבַד, מֻתָּר

Similarly a Jew who gives a collateral or a debt contract to his fellow Jew, that with it he borrow for him money on interest from a non-Jew, if the non-Jew only relies on the collateral or the contract, and the messenger has no responsibility [for loss], it is permitted.

Also similarly, if a Jew first lend his fellow Jew against a collateral, and afterward tells the lender, “Borrow money with interest from a non-Jew against this collateral, and I will pay the capital and the interest”, if the non-Jews relies on the collateral alone, it is permitted.


We saw the same key principle before in se’ifim 19 and 20. If someone assumes risk for the item, they are the owner. In se’if 19, this meant that a friend helping another sell merchandise who did not assume responsibility for the merchandise was actually a borrower, and any extra the helper makes would be prohibited as interest. In #20, it is the difference between paying a delivery man or paying someone for the time he held an item for you.

Here, it’s the difference between someone being your messenger in a loan to or from a non-Jew, or having two loans– one between two Jews, and one between one of those Jews and a non-Jew, where the Jew in the middle ends up flat, receiving and paying the same amount. However, in the latter situation, where the Jew assumed responsibility for the money, the loan between the two Jews can’t involve interest, and therefore money given to him to be indirectly paid to the non-Jew as interest would be prohibited.

Qitzur Shulchan Arukh – 65:24

כד:ישראל שלוה מעובד כוכבים ברבית, וישראל אחר יהיה ערב, עם הוא בענין שאין העובד כוכבים יכול לתבוע תחלה אלא את הלוה, ואך כשלא יהיה אפשר לגבות מן הלוה, אז יכול לתבוע מן הערב, מתר. אבל אם הוא בענין שהעובד כוכבים יכול לתבוע תחלה את הערב, אם כן, הוי כאלו הערב לוה מן העובד כוכבים והלוה לישראל הלוה ואסור. וכן עובד כוכבים שלוה מישראל ברבית וישראל אחר הוא ערב, אם הוא בענין שאין המלוה יכול לתבוע תחלה אלא את העובד כוכבים הלוה, ואך כאשר לא ימצא אצל העובד כוכבים הלוה אז יגבה מן הערב, מתר. אבל אם הוא בענין שיכול לתבוע תחלה גם את הערב, אם כן הערב הוא כמו לוה, ואסור. ואם הישראל ערב רק בעד הקרן ולא בעד הרבית מתר – בדין ישראל שלוה מישראל וישראל אחר יהיה ערב, והלוה משלם לו עבור זה שה”טורי זהב” וה”שפתי כהן” ב”נקדות הכסף” מקלין, הנה דעת ה”חוות דעת” להחמיר, עין שם – ק”ע

A Jew who borrows from an aku”m [literally "a star worshipper", sometimes it is specific to polytheists, and sometimes refers to non-Jews in general] with interest and another Jew is the guarantor, if they have an agreement that the aku”m can only collect at first from the borrower, and only if he failed to get from the borrower can he then demand from the guarantor, this is permitted.

However, if the agreement was that the aku”m can first demand from the guarantor, it is as if the guarantor borrowed from the aku”m, and then loaned to the Jew the money, and it is forbidden.

Similarly, a aku”m who borrowed from a Jew with interest and another Jew is the guarantor, if there was an agreement that the lender may only collect at first from the aku”m borrower, and even if he does not find [the money] at the aku”m borrower, can then he collect from the guarantor, this is permitted.

However, if if the agreement was that he can claim first also from the [Jewish] guarantor, then the guarantor is like a borrower, and this is forbidden. If the Jew is guaranteeing only the principal, and not the interest, this is allowed.

Qitzur Shulchan Arukh – 65:23

כג: מתר להרבות בנדונית חתנים, כגון שפסק נדוניא לבתו והתנה עם חתנו שכל שנה שיניח אצלו את הנדוניא יתן לו כך וכך שכר, מתר, שאין זה אלא כמוסיף לו נדוניא, וכאלו אמר לו אני נותן לך מתנה כך וכך לזמן פלוני. ואם לא אתן לך לזמן פלוני, עוד אני מוסיף לך כך וכך, דמתר. ודוקא כשהתנו כן מיד בשעת כתיבת התנאים. דכיון דעד עתה לא היה עליו שום חיוב, אם כן הכל הוא חיוב אחד. אבל אם בשעת כתיבת התנאים, נתחיב בסתם סך נדוניא ובשעת החתנה רוצים להתפשר לתת לו דבר- מה בשביל הרחבת הזמן, אסור, וצריכין לעשות בדרך התר

It is permissible to pay an increase on a dowry. For example: He promised a dowry for his daughter, and made an agreement with his [future] son-in-law that every year he [the son-in-law] leaves the dowry with him [the father], he will pay him such-and-such profit, this is allowed. Because this is just like adding on more dowry to him, and as as if he said to him, ”I will give you a present of such and such on a certain date, and if I don’t give it to you on this date, I will add on for you such and such.” This is allowed. This is specifically if they agreed on this at the time of writing the [pre-marital] terms of agreement, since until now he didn’t pledge anything, all of it is now treated as one obligation.

However, if at the time of writing the terms of agreement, he obligated himself without conditions such-and-such as dowry, and at the time of the wedding he wants to change it, and give him a certain amount in return for extending the time, this is forbidden, and he can do it through a permissible loophole [such as the heter iska discussed in ch. 66.].

Qitzur Shulchan Arukh – 65:22

כב: ודוקא בשכירות קרקע מתר לו להרבות בענין הזה, מפני שהקרקע נקנית לו מיד. אבל להרבות בשכירות פועל, אסור בענין זה, דהינו שאם שוכר את האדם שיעשה לו מלאכתו לאחר זמן ומקדים לו שכרו היום קדם שנכנס למלאכה ובשביל זה יעשה לו את המלאכה בפחות מן הראוי, זאת אסור, דכיון דהפועל אינו משתעבד מהשתא הוי ליה כמו הלואה. אך אם הפועל נכנס למלאכתו מיד, אע”פ שלא יגמר את המלאכה עד לאחר ימים הרבה, מתר להקדים לו שכרו בשביל שיעשה בזול, דכיון שיתחיל מיד במלאכה הוי ליה שכירות ולא הלואה – סי’ קע”ו וחו”מ ססי’ קצ”ה

It is specifically with regard to the renting of land that one may increase payment in this manner. [That is, as discussed in the previous halakhah, an agreement where “If you pay me the rent immediately, it will cost you 10 gold coins a year, and if you pay me each month, you must give me for each month 1 gold coin.”] Because land is acquired for him immediately.

But with regard to the payment of a worker, this is prohibited. That is, if he hires a person to do work for him after time, and pays him early today before he starts working, and for this the [worker] will do the work for him for less pay than it is worth — that is prohibited. Since the worker isn’t obligated from now, [the early pay] is like a loan.

But if the worker starts the work immediately, since he won’t complete the job until after a great number of days, it is permissible to pay him early so that he will work cheaply. Since he starts work immediately, it is hiring, not a loan.

Qitzur Shulchan Arukh – 65:21

כא: מתר להרבות שכר הקרקע. כיצד. השכיר לו את החצר ואמר לו קדם שהחזיק בו, אם תתן לי את השכירות מיד, הרי הוא לך בעשרה זהובים לשנה. ואם תשלם לי בכל חדש, תתן לי בעד כל חדש זהוב אחד, מתר. והטעם בזה, משום דמצד הדין שכירות אינה משתלמת אלא לבסוף . הלכך כאשר לוקח ממנו זהוב בכל חדש, דהוו להו שנים עשר זהובים, אין זה שכר המתנת המעות, שהרי אינו מחיב לשלם במקדם, ומה שאמר לו אם תתן לי מיד, הרי היא לך בעשרה, אז מוחל לו שני זהובים, לפי שמקדים לו לשלם קדם זמן הפרעון, וזה מתר

One is permitted to increase the rent on real estate. How is this done ?

Someone who rents him a courtyard, and says to him before he takes ownership, “If you pay me the rent immediately, it will cost you 10 gold coins a year, and if you pay me each month, you must give me for each month 1 gold coin.” This is allowed.

The reason/motivation for/something one may learn from this is because from the point of the law rent only has to be paid at the end. Therefore, if he agrees to take from him 1 gold coin each month, which is equivalent to 12 gold coins [for that same year]. This is not considered as payment for delaying the rental, because he was not obliged to pay him in advance, and what he said to him: “If you pay me now, it will cost you 10″ he is letting him off 2 gold coins, because he is paying in advance of the due date, and this is allowed.


If the fee isn’t due until later, the variable is saving money for early payment, not charging money for the extra time.

That line “[t]he reason/motivation for/something one may learn from this” is a nod to various definitions of the concept of ta’am hamitzvah.

Qitzur Shulchan Arukh – 65:20

כ: ראובן שהולך למקום שקונים סחורה בזול, יכול שמעון לומר לו, הבא לי סחורה משם ואני אתן לך רוח כך וכך, ובלבד שתהא אחריות הסחורה על ראובן עד שהוא מוסרה לשמעון

If Re’uvein is traveling to a place where they sell some product cheaply, Shim’on is allowed to say to him, “Bring me merchandise from there, and I will give you this-and-this for profit.” As long as the responsibility for the merchandise [i.e. the loss for any loss of merchandise] falls upon Re’uvein until he brings it to Shim’on.


This is another example of defining who owns the merchandise based on who would lose the money if something were to happen to it. If Re’uvein owns the merchandise until the moment it’s delivered to Shim’on, then Shim’on bought it at their agreed upon price. Re’uvein made money conveying the product.

If, however, Shim’on takes ownership when Re’uvein buys it, then he bought it for cheap in the remote location, and is paying Re’uvein extra for the time delay — which is the very definition of prohibited interest.