The story so far: In the first post, I suggested that it was Rav Yehudah, founder of the Yeshiva in Pumbedisa, who really developed the style of shaqla vetarya (dialectic) that we find in the Talmud Bavli. Which implied that we wouldn’t expect to find the similar argument style in Israel. In the second post, I tried to show how in the Talmud Yerushalmi they not only didn’t use the same dialectic style, they give every appearance of eschewing it. Preferring instead a system of learning more centered on the transmission of traditions, an emphasis on quotes. Therefore the Israeli amoraim not only had less reason to engage in such dialectics, even when they could not resolve a question by dialectic they refused to. In fact, they often ridicule the Bavliim and their circuitous lines of reasoning. Such extrapolation would adulterate memory of the tanna’s actual statement.

This does not mean, however, that there is a dirth of logical argument in the Talmud. Rather, the argument is of a very different style. That will be the topic of the majority of this post. But first, a discussion of how the Yerushalmi does handle unanswered questions.

I already mentioned the difference in nomeclature between the Bavli and the Yerushalmi. What the Bavli calls a mesechta, the Yerushalmi calls a meikhla. To translate: The Bavli considers one volume of Talmud to be a “net”, with gaps that the amoraim must fill in. The Yerushalmi considers it a “piece”, and as we’ll see, their analysis involves more connected the pieces to a larger whole.

Lateral Reasoning:

Here is an example of a style of reasoning one would find much more readily in the Yerushalmi than in the Bavli:

1. רב הונא אמר: ג’ שאכלו זה בפני עצמו וזה בפני עצמו וזה בפני עצמו ונתערבו מזמנין.
2. רב חסדא אמר: והן שבאו משלש חבורות.
3. על דעתיה דרבי זעירא וחבורתיה: והן שאכלו ג’ כאחת.

רבי יונה על הדא דרב הונא הטביל ג’ איזובות זה בפני עצמו וזה בפני עצמו ונתערבו מזה בהן.

רב חסדא אמר והן שבאו מג’ חבילות.

על דעתיה דר’ זעירא וחבורתיה והוא שהטביל שלשתן כאחת.

אין תימר אין למידין אזוב מברכה ואנן חזינן רבנן קיימין בסוכה וילפין מטיט הנרוק.  כיי דתנינן תמן הרחיק את הסיכוך מן הדפנות שלשה טפחים פסולה הא פחות מיכן כשירה מהו לישן תחתיו התיב רבי יצחק בן אלישיב הרי טיט הנרוק משלים במקוה ואין מטבילין בו אף הכא משלים בסוכה ואין ישינין תחתיו.

1. Rav Huna said: Three who eat, this one by himself, this one by himself, and this one by himself, who then mix together should bentch with a mezuman.
2. Rav Chisda said: But this is [only] when they come from three [separate] groups [of three people, so that each ate with an obligation of zimun, even if from different groups].
3. According to the logic of Rabbi Zei’ira and his friends: But [the only may make a zimun] when they ate together.

1. Rabbi Yonah [commented] on that which Rab Hunah [was just quoted as saying]: If [the kohein] dipped three hyssop sprigs [into the water made with the ashes of a parah adumah], this one by itself and this one by itself, and mixed them [the hyssops] together, one may sprinkle [the person needing taharah] with them.
2. Rav Chisda said: But this is [only] when they come from three [separate] groups [of three sprigs, so that each sprig was dipped as part of a group of three, even if different groups].
3. Acording to the logic of Rabbi Zei’ira and his friends: But [the only may may be used for sprinkling parah adumah water] when they were dipped together.

- Yerushalmi Berakhos 7:1, 51b

The Yerushalmi draws a parallel between what could have been two separate disputes. One was about zimun, saying the opening blessing before bentchin, and the other about the hyssop used to sprinkle the water from a parah adumah to purify them after contact with a dead body. Both require a group of three. Typically, three men who ate together and now wish to bentch together, or three sprigs that were one bunch when they were dipped as well as when the person is sprinkled.

Rav Hunah says that a group of three is defined by the time of the mitzvah. Therefore, three people could eat separately, and Rabbi Yonah extrapolates that he would say the three sprigs could be dipped separately — as long as they are together at the time of bentching or sprinkling, respectively.

Rav Chisda, who speaks for himself in both disputes, feels that while they only need to be a group for the mitzvah itself, to be a member of the group requires being part of an obligating group when doing the preparation. Therefore, three men who each ate alone could not combine to make a zimun, only three men who each ate in a group of at least three. But they could recombine to create a new group of three for zimun. Similarly, one could take a sprig of hyssop out of three different groups to make a new group, because such sprigs were both dipped as part of a group of three and used for sprinkling as part of a group. This would mean that if a kohein had three people before him to sprinkle and dipped three large bunches of hyssop for them, and then along comes a fourth person, the kohein can redivide the hyssop into four groups and sprinkle all four.

Rav Zeira and his peers require that the group be the same group throughout. You can’t recombine people from different zimun groups, or sprigs from different bunches to make a new one.

This is “horizontal” reasoning. We saw one dispute, we are trying to find how it relates to other topics. The search is for a general philosophy of some aspect of halakhah.

Logical discourse in the Bavli is far more “vertical”, drilling down into the details of the particular decision before us, finding how it can be understood in an internally consistent way. What does either opinion do with the other’s proofs and source texts, and the like.

A second example, from Terumos, vilna 13b, that I will treat more concisely:

תמן תנינן: כביצה אוכלין שהניחן בחמה ונתמעטו, כן כזית מן הנבילה, וכעדשה מן השרץ, כזית פיגול, כזית נותר, כזית חלב — הרי אילו טהורין.

דרומאי אמרי: והוא שיהא כזית מעיקרו.

ר’ יוחנן ור”ש בן לקיש תריהון אמרין: ואע”פ שאין כזית מעיקרו.

תמן תנינן: אמרו לו, “אף היא היתה חסירה או יתירה.” מני אמרו לו? ר”מ: פעמים שהשאור יפה והוא תפוח. הא אילו סולת היתה צמוקה, ועכשיו שהוא שאור יפה והוא תפוח, את רואה את התפוח כילו צמק ונראית חסירה. ופעמים שהשאור רע, והוא צמק. הא אלו סולת היתה תפוחה, ועכשיו שהשאור רע, והוא צמוק את רואה את הצמק כילו תפח ונראית יתירה.

על דעתיה דר’ ירמיה דרומאי ור’ יוחנן ור”ש בן לקיש שלשתן אמרו דבר אחד ביתירה. על דעתייהו דר’ יונה ור’ יוסי שלשתן אמרו דבר אחד בחסירה. אילין דבר פטי בשלון אורז אנשין מתקנתה יתיה חברייא סברין מימר ייסב חיי לו לקביל מבשל אמר לון ר’ יוסי אף אנא אמר כן למה שדרכו לתפוח:

Here the gemara links together three statements, showing how they have a common theme. In all three cases, the issue is whether we measure intial volume, current volume or whether the fact that it is normal to go to that current volume should make a difference. This is seen as being a common principle whether it’s something that dries up and shrinks, or something that soaks up water and bloats, whether we are speaking of tum’ah or of tithing rice.

Lomdus

Suppose you saw a discussion in which the following distinction is made with regard to food bought with money that had the sanctity of maaser sheini placed upon it. (In lieu of bringing the second tenth of one’s fruit to Yerushalayim, the sanctity was transfered to money, which is then used upon arrival to buy food to be eaten there.)

In one ruling, shelamim which one bought with maaser sheini money does not have the sanctity of maaser sheini, only that of the offering. In another, if a kohein buys with such money terumah, the result is that the food bought is now both terumah AND maaser sheini.

Vus iz der chiluq? (What’s the difference between the cases of maaser sheini and terumah?)

There is a mitzvah to buy a qorban shelamim with maaser sheini money. Therefore, if one buys a shelamim with maaser money one completed the job of handling maaser. The chalos sheim maaser sheini (the fitting under the label of maaser sheini) falls off with the purchase.  However, there is no such mitzvah of buying terumah over any other food, and therefore it’s maaser sheini until consumed or as long as it remains edible.

The way I phrased it, this discussion sounds like 19th century lomdus, the style of logic they used for analyzing the Bavli and rishonim. However, the above is a description of the discussion in the Yerushalmi at the top of Maaser Sheini 16a (3:2). (There is also a similar discussion about when a law of maaser sheini ends on Maaser Sheini 1:2 5b.)

What the Brisker method does in its lomdus is divide  laws into categories, often using and reusing the same set of mechanisms. In the above, I invoked the Brisker idiom of “chalos sheim“, when something enters or leaves a halachic state (literally, when a label falls upon an object). Other such meta-principles: mitzvos that depend on the gavra, the subject doing the verb, vs. those that depend on the cheftza, the object. The distinction between a discussion of the pe’ulah, the action, and the chalos, the change in halachic state. Etc…

In Brisk, these rules are used to analyze a specific halakhah. Why do the Rambam and Tosafos disagree? Does one say the chalos comes with the pe’ulah and the other not? Does one see the obligation on the subject’s doing it, while the other sees it on the object having it done (gavra vs cheftzah)? Brisk drills downward.

However, these rules also have an orthoganal value — they are in common across a wide variety of halakhos. To the Brisker, these are tools for finding chaqiros, distinctions, between similar cases that have different rulings, or between one opinion and another. In the Yerushalmi, tools like those used in Brisk and other 19th century Lithuanian yeshivos are a the product of this same notion of lateral analysis. They are principles of mechanics seen in numerous  ways of connecting the law to others than use the same mechanism.

Another example, this one from Pei’ah 3:5, Vilna ed. pg 16a:

משנה: המוכר קלחי אילן בתוך שדהו, נותן פאה מכל אחד ואחד. אמר רבי יהודא: אימתי? בזמן שלא שייר בעל השדה. אבל אם שייר שדהו הוא נותן פאה לכל:
גמרא: עד כדון כשהתחיל לקצור. אפי’ כשלא התחיל לקצור?

נישמעינה מן הדא: לקח גז צאנו של חבירו. אם שייר המוכר, המוכר חייב. ואם לאו, הלוקח חייב. ר’ ירמיה בשם ר’ יוחנן: דר’ יהודא היא.

שנייא היא תמן בין שהתחיל לגזוז צאנו בין שלא התחיל לגזוז. וכא, לא. שניי’ ליה, בין שהתחיל לקצור, בין שלא התחיל לקצור.
מ”ט דר”י? משום דחובת הקציר בקמה, או משום דמוכר לו חוץ מחובתו?
נישמעינה מן הדא: לקח גז צאן חבירו. אם שייר המוכר, המוכר חייב. ואם לאו, הלוקח חייב. א”ר ירמיה בשם ר’ יוחנן: דר’ יהודא היא.
אית לך למימר: תמן, שחובת קציר בקמה לא משום דמכרו לו חוץ מחובתו וכא במכרו חוץ מחובתו.
מה נפק מביניהן?

1. עבר הלוקח ומפריש. אין תימר משום שחובת הקציר בקמה, הפריש הפריש. ואין תימר משום דמוכר לו חוץ מחובתו, הפריש ונוטל ממנו דמים.
2. נשרף חלקו של מוכר. אין תימר משום דחובת קציר בקמה, נשרף נשרף. ואין תימר משום במוכר לו חוץ מחובתו, נשרף נוטל ממנו דמים:

Mishnah: Someone who sold tree stalks [i.e. tree trunks or stalks of a plant] from within his field [where the pei'ah, the corner of the field, was not left for the poor to gather], he must give pei’ah from each stalk. Rabbi Yehudah said: When is this? When there is nothing left by the owner of the field [for himself]. But if he did leave something of his field, he gives pei’ah [from that] for the whole.

Gemara: Until now [we were only considering] when he already began to harvest [the crop produced when he started selling the trees themselves]. But what if he didn’t start to harvest?

We hear [this implication] from this [following ruling]: Someone who buys the shearings from his friend’s flock [without the first shearing first being given to a kohein]. If the seller left any [for himself], then the seller if obligated [to give the kohein replacement wool]. If not, the buyer is obligated. Rabbi Yirmiyah said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that this is Rabbi Yehudah’s [position].

It makes a difference over there whether he began to shear his sheep or whether he did not begin to shear. Here, could it make no difference whether he began to harvest [the stalks] whether he did not begin to harvest?

What’s the reason of Rabbi Yehudah — Is it because the obligation with respect to harvesting [and pei'ah] is with standing [grain]? Or is it that he sold it to him outside of his obligation?

We hear [this implication] from this [following ruling]: Someone who buys the shearings from his friend’s flock [without the first shearing first being given to a kohein]. If the seller left any [for himself], then the seller if obligated [to give the kohein replacement wool]. If not, the buyer is obligated. Rabbi Yirmiyah said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that this is Rabbi Yehudah’s [position].

You must [therefore] say: Over there, it is where the obligation of harvesting is when it’s still standing, and not because he sold it ouside of his obligation, [whereas] here he sold it outside of his obligation.

What is the [pragmatic] distinction between them? …

Notice here a number of things, touching on much of the past two posts in this series.

First, there is a full repetition of a quote rather than abbreviating it in the second iteration. The latter risks compromising how it is passed down in the future, so this would be against the Yerushalmi’s citation culture.

Second, note the lomdisher use of making a distinction based on when the obligation applies. Why does the law of pei’ah from harvested grain that is sold to another differ than the law of reishis hagaz that was sold rather than being given to a kohein? Why is it that in the case of pei’ah it makes no difference whether or not he began to harvest, but when it comes to reishis hagaz it does make a difference whether or not he began to shear? And the difference is that reishis hagaz only comes into effect after the shearing. An issue of when the halachic category takes hold.

Third, note that this lamdus is being used to compare to disparate laws. Lateral reasoning.

So, I recently described Rav Yehudah’s trip down to Pumbedisa, where he founded a yeshiva where learning was based on the dialectic method, the style of shaqla vetarya (question and answer) that typifies the gemara. So what was happening back in Eretz Yisrael?

To put the same question in a more straightforward way — after learning the first six mesechtos of Talmud Yerushalmi, I would like to discuss some differences in style I noted between the two talmuds.

The Talmud Yerushalmi, despite the name, was written in Northern Israel. In fact, you hear disdain for the “deromai”, the rabbis of the south, those in Judea — including Yerushalayim. As well as those in Babylonia. The work on it begins with Rabbi Yochanan and his student and brother-in-law Rabbi Shimon ben Laqish (“Reish Laqish”), in the very first generation after Rebbe compiled the mishnah. Rabbi Yochanan started out in Tzippori, which was the center of learning and housed the Sanhedrin. However, as a young rabbi, his shiur grew so popular that it caused friction with the older rabbis both due to competition for students and the number of disputes. So rather than hurt them, Rabbi Chanina was named in particular, Rabbi Yochanan moved to Teveryah. (I think something should be made of the point that R’ Chanina, the example of the older generation, is named in past tense, whereas R’ Yochanan has pretty much the future tense version of the same name. The Jerusalem Talmud is thus really a product of his school in Teveryah and the rabbis of either Katzrin (in the Golan) or perhaps Ceasarea.

(Side note: Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Laqish play a parallel role to the one Abayei and Rava do in the Bavli. They started the process that over a century later culminates in the talmud. More so than their being like Rav Ashi and Ravina, who close the vast majority of the text, with only light refinements by the savora’im. However, R’ Yochanan and Reish Laqish appear far more often, at least in the first six mesechtos of the Y-mi, than Abayei veRava do in the Bavli.)

One of the more pronounced differences one sees between the two talmuds is the greater reliance on tradition one finds in the Yerushalmi, and I intend to save other differences for another post.

Theory:

I don’t just mean that because there was no Bavli-style shaqla vetarya, the Yerushalmi fell back onto relying more on sources. Rather, in Eretz Yisrael the feeling was that citations and word-of-mouth transmission is more reliable and more meaningful than relying on reasoning. And this mode was more viable for people who were actually living on the same land and using the same institutions as the tannaim. We saw that Rav Yehudah held it was prohibited for his students to move from Pumbedisa to Israel, as the loss of deep reasoned learning was too great. But also, that kind of reasoning was more critical in Bavel, where there was that extra discontinuity.

As a metaphor, I am reminded of Rabbi Yehudah haLevi’s description of Greek Philosophy:

(יג) אמר החבר: מה שאתה אומר נכון הוא בנוגע לדת המיסדת על ההגיון ומכונת להנהגת מדינה דת הנובעת אמנם מן העיון אך נופלים בה ספקות רבים ואם עליה תשאל את הפילוסופים לא תמצאם מסכימים על מעשה אחד ולא לדעה אחת כי דת כזאת בנויה על טענות אשר רק חלק מהן יכולים הפילוסופים להוכיח במופת ואלו על אחרות נתן להביא ראיות מספיקות בלבד ויתרן אין להביא עליהן אפילו ראיה מספקת אף כי להוכיחן במופת: (tr. R’ Yehudah ibn Tibon)

13. The Rabbi: That which thou dost express is religion based on speculation and system, the research of thought, but open to many doubts. Now ask the philosophers, and thou wilt find that they do not agree on one action or one principle, since some doctrines can be established by arguments, which are only partially satisfactory, and still much less capable of being proved. (tr. Hartwig Herschfeld)

Rav Yehudah haLevi says that the dependence on reasoning introduces uncertainty, and is a stop-gap  for those who do not have a tradition. Taking this from philosophy to be a metaphor for halachic styles, this parallels Rabbi Yochanan’s view, as opposed to Rav Yehudah’s down in Pumbedisa.

Linguistics:

We see this also in terminology. The term used in Bavel for a volume of the talmud is masekhes, from the word that is also used to refer to the network of threads on a loom. Whereas in the Yerushalmi, the more common term is meikhlah, a measure or portion. (E.g. Shevi’is 10:3, Vilna 30b – R’ Yosi rules that someone who knows one meikhla who comes to a new town where they honor him for knowing two, must confess to only knowing one.) None of the implication of constructivism or filling in the holes in the network that one finds in meseches.

Another example is the difference in meaning of the keyword “ta’ama“. This appears so often in the Bavli, that I am still pretty consistently thrown by the Yerushalmi. When the Bavli asks “Mai ta’ama?” it is asking “What’s the reason?” And the answer will be the logic behind the ruling. However, in the Yerushalmi, “Mai ta’ama?” is answered with a citation of the verse that is the source of the law.

The word ba’ei is used in the Bavli in the sense of “wants to know”, introducing a question. It sometimes appears as be’ai lemeimar, “wants to say”, introducting a suggested novellum. In the Yerushalmi, just the word ba’ei is used for both, and the “wants to say” sense is far more common. In light of their distrust of deductions about existing laws, it makes sense that the rabbis of Teveryah would be more prone to mark them. It also would explain why they didn’t find it confusing to use the same keyword for “R’ X wants to know, is the halachah A?” and for “R’ X wants to say the halakhah is A”.  The difference between not knowing at all, and suggesting something without a basis, apparently wasn’t seen as that being all that great. Since otherwise confusion would have driven one of them away from using the word “ba’ei“.

(Linguistic side note: In the Yerushalmi, it seems that words were pronounced with an emphasis on the later syllables, whereas in the Bavli, the emphasis was moved forward. So, the same amora we know in the Bavli as Rav Avin, the Yerushalmi calls Rabbi Bun. Note how in Bavel, the “-i” fell off the end of “Rabbi”, so that the amoraim there are called “Rav”, and in Israel, the leading letter fell off. Similarly, R’ Elazer becomes R’ Lazer, R’ Yehudah – R’ Yuda, or sometimes, with a more Greek ending, R’ Yudan, but in either case, the hei slurs away. More dramatic — and often confusing — is when the amora the Bavli refers to as Rav Ila is called Rabbi Lo, and one has to guess whether R’ Ila is being quoted, or Rebbe is saying something starting with the word “lo” [no]. We also see alefs simply dropped out of the spelling of words and other inconsistencies, but we don’t know how many of these are simply do to inferior transcription. Unlike what I noted about names, where there is a clear pattern.)

Quoting Style:

So, given the value placed on quotes and citations, the Yerushalmi sometimes quotes entire sections repeatedly. Not just repeating the one opinion, but including the whole dialog. Usually, this is at most two or three repetitions of the same dialog in the same mesechta, each time to bring out a different point related to the current topic. But a stark example, in Mes’ Shevi’is daf 10, an entire segment is repeated in two versions that are only trivially different, Rabbi Yaaqov bar Zevidei’s version vs. Rabbi Mana’s:

1) אמר רבי יעקב בר זבדי קומי רבי אבהו לא כן אמר רבי זעירא ורבי יוחנן בשם רבי ינאי רבי ירמיה רבי יוחנן בשם ר”ש בן יוצדק נמנו בעליית בית נתזה בלוד על כל התורה מניין אם יאמר עכו”ם לישראל לעבור על אחת מכל מצות האמורות בתורה חוץ מעבודה זרה וגילוי עריות ושפיכת דמים יעבור ולא יהרג הדא דתימר בינו לבין עצמו אבל ברבים אפילו מצוה קלה לא ישמע לו כגון לולינוס ופפוס אחיו שנתנו להם מים בכלי זכוכית צבועה ולא קיבלו מהן אמר לא מתכוין משמדתכון ולא איתכווין אלא מיגבי ארנונין כמה הם רבים רבנין דקיסרין אמרי עשרה דכתיב (דף י:) (ויקרא כג) ונקדשתי בתוך בני ישראל>רבי אבונה זעירא חמנוניה פרי חורי חמרא בשבתא רבי יונה ורבי יוסי הורין מפי לארסקינס בשובתא

2) אמר רבי מנא קשיתי קומי רבי יונה אבא לא כן אמר רבי זעירא רבי יוחנן בשם רבי ינאי רבי ירמיה רבי יוחנן בשם ר”ש בן יוצדק נמנו בעליית בית נתזה בלוד על כל התורה כולה מניין אם יאמר עכו”ם לישראל לעבור על אחת מכל מצות האמורות בתורה חוץ מן העבודה זרה וגילוי עריות ושפיכת דמים יעבור ולא יהרג הדא דתימא בינו לבין עצמו אבל ברבים אפילו מצוה קלה לא ישמע לו כגון לוליינוס ופפוס אחיו שנתנו להם מים בכלי זכוכית צבועה ולא קיבלו מהן אמר לא אתכווין משמדתון ולא אתכווין אלא מיכל פיתא חמימה כמה הם רבים רבנן דקיסרין אמרין עשרה דכתיב (שם) ונקדשתי בתוך בני ישראל

This shows the significance given to precise citation. Or, this segment from Maaseros 5:3, Vilna 24b. Notice how not only is the mishnah under discussion re-quoted before Rabbi Avohu’s comment is repeated, but R’ Avohu’s introduction, that sometimes the idea he is about to give is said in the name of Rabbi Lazer and sometimes in the name of Rabbi Yossi bei Rabbi Chanina is also repeated just a couple of lines later — all to make the two word point at the end “והוא שהחמיץ” that when Rabbi Yehudah says that water that was run through wine dregs that weren’t tithed and didn’t even increase in volume is obligated in maaser anway (because it was changed by the maaser-requiring dregs), it’s only if the mixture fermented.

משנה המתמד ונתן מים במידה ומצא כדי מדתו פטור.  רבי יהודה מחייב.  …
גמרא א”ר אבהו זימנין אמר לה בשם רבי לעזר זימנין אמר לה בשם רבי יוסי בי רבי חנינא והוא שהחמיץ. תמן תנינן התמד עד שלא החמיץ אינו ניקח בכסף מעשר ופוסל את המקוה.  משהחמיץ ניקח בכסף מעשר ואינו פוסל את המקוה.  מתני’ דרבי יודה היא דתנינן תמן המתמד ונתן מים במידה ומצא כדי מידתו פטור רבי יודה מחייב.  אמר רבי אבהו זמנין אמר לה בשם רבי לעזר וזמנין אמר לה בשם רבי יוסי בי רבי חנינה והוא שהחמיץ. …

The Ridvaz comments on this (Maaser Sheini 4:1, vilna pg 28a “תםן ללא יתיר פיריי…”:

פי׳ דהוא שייך למס׳ שביעית פ״ד דשם פריך מהברייתא ההיא לענין שביעית ומשני שם דתננן דלא יתיר פירוי כו׳ ואגב גררא דמביא הברייתא מביא גם כאן זאת כדרך הש״ס הזה  ככמה מקומות כידוע לדרגילין בו :

Meaning, that this is relevant to tractate Shevi’is ch. 4, because there it asks… and it answers there… Because of “dragging”, that [once] it brought the beraisa it also brings here [this following discussion], as is the way in this talmud in numerous places, as is known to those who are used to it.

And then there is the opposite extreme — instead of repetitious verbiage in a desire to preserve the older discussion intact, the gemara will instead refer to opinions with the briefest of citations, leaving the commentaries scrambling to chase down what is being referred to. Sometimes, to wildly different conclusions. “A machloqes between what Rabbi Yehudah said on Sukkah and Rabbi Yosi said in Menachos.” Or, “since we see in the famous case of …” (without telling you the case), etc…

Similarly too, the Yerushalmi quotes the tannaim in the Tosefta regularly, far more often than the Bavli.

What one is clearly listening to is a group of rabbanim who follow very closely the exact wording of the statement. And knowing that they relied on studying that wording, they took caution to preserve it.

Things not said:

Therefore, the use of using reasoning to fill in gaps in our knowledge about the din under discussion occurs far less often. Many discussions end with an open question, rather than extrapolating from his words what a tanna probably would have said. Again, this isn’t only because the kind of reasoning Rabbi Yehudah developed was with him in Bavel. As we will see in another post, the Yerushalmi does engage in its own style of reasoning. (To give a teaser: there is more use of analogy to apply the parallel of a din to a different area of halakhah.)

Rather, I think this willingness to leave the question open is because they were very aware of the gap between the actual quote and a deduction. Also, tampering with the quote with suggestions contaminates the repetition process — they are actually detrimental to what the Yerushalmi is trying to do.

One amora who particularly suffered from this was Rabbi Yirmiyah. Every several pages or so, Rabbi Yirmiyah would propose some implausible case, something that would measure the limits of the just-quoted halakhah. In fact, he only arrives in Eretz Yisrael after being thrown out of the beis medrash in Bavel for doing this one time too many (Bava Basra 23b). For example, ֛Maaseros 3:4, 17b discusses how many fruit a picker may hold such that it still qualifies as a snack, as one may only snack in the field from food that hasn’t yet had terumah and maaser removed. R’ Yirmiyah asks about the case where the picker juggles the olives. Does the one in the air count as being “held”? In general, these questions don’t get answered.

Citation Culture:

Less directly connected, but I think part of this culture, is the Yerushalmi’s greater emphasis on finding sources in general.

For example, there is a halachic principle “ein sheliach lidvar aveirah — there are no messengers (or: proxies) for something that is a sin.” The Bavli’s explanation is logical, “the words of the Master, the words of the servant, which do you listen to?” Obviously, when given a choice between Hashem’s law and a person’s order, the Torah comes first. Therefore, someone who accepts such an appointment is culpable for making the wrong choice.

In the Yerushalmi (Terumos 35a), the source is a verse. ”שליח לוקה והוא פטור דָּ֣ם יֵֽחָשֵׁ֞ב לָאִ֤ישׁ הַהוּ ולא לשולחיו – the messenger is punished and he [the sender] is not culpable. ‘[The murder] will be considered blood for this man’ — and not the one who sent him.”

We see this more often in the greater emphasis the Yerushalmi gives asmachtos, finding references or mnemonics for rabbinic law in the Torah. For example, by Torah law, there is no minimum for terumah. However, according to Beis Hillel, the Rabbis set that the miserly must give at least 1/60^th to a kohein, the norm would be to give 1/50^th, and the generous would give 1/40^th. According to Beis Shammai, the rabbinic range for terumah was instead 1/50^th, 1/40^th and 1/30^th, respectively.  The Yerushalmi (Terumos 4:3, vilna 19b-20a) textually supports all six measures with asmachtos.

כתיב ששית האיפה מחומר החיטים וששיתם את האיפה מחומר השעורים יכול תורם חיטים א’ משלשים ושעורים אחד מששים ת”ל וכל תרומת שיהיו כל התרומות שוות שמואל אמר תן ששית על ששיתם ונמצא תורם אחד מארבעים בינונית אחד מחמשים א”ר לוי כתיב וממחצית בני ישראל תקח אחד אחוז מן החמשים כל שאתה אוחז ממקום אחר הרי הוא כזה מה זה אחד מן החמשים אף מה שאתה אוחז ממקום אחר הרי הוא כזה והרעה אחד מששים דכתיב וששיתם את האיפה מחומר השעורים. בית שמאי אומרים משלשים וששית האיפה מחומר השעורים בינונית מארבעים מן הדא דשמואל והרעה מששים מן הדא דר’ לוי דאמר רבי לוי בר חינא כל המוציא מעשרותיו כתקנן אינו מפסיד כלום מה טעמא ועשירית החומר יהיה האיפה מן החומר

Last, the Bavli will only cite a mishnah if it provides a clear source as to the law under discussion. In what I think is another instance of “Citation Culture”, the Yerushalmi will quote a mishnah that hints at the law, even if it is not usable as an indisputable proof. On Terumos 6:1, vilna 31b, Rabbi Yosi quotes a mishnah as saying “that which grows from [planting] terumah is terumah“. If someone plants terumah wheat, the entire resulting crop must be given to kohanim as terumah. (This is only rabbinically. Therefore, the Torahitic obligation of tithing still applies to the crop, and must be given by the kohanim.) Rabbi Yosi uses this mishnah to show that it’s specifically when one plants terumah itself. If someone consumes terumah and then has to reimburse the kohanim, “that which goes reimbursement for terumah is not terumah” as the mishnah speaks of terumah specifically, not reimbursements.

(One might see this as reading more into a source than what is there, thus potentially corrupting the purity of the transmitted quote. In short, as defying the entire thesis of this post. I rather see it as an implication inherent in the text, but one that simply doesn’t reach the unimpeachable source level of certainty, and thus in line with trying to find a connection to tradition for every existing law.)

Coming attractions:

In the first installment I argued that the style of dialectic (shaqla vetarya) was honed by Rav Yehudah, the founder of the yeshiva at Pumbedisa. In this essay, I tried to show how rarely the Yerushalmi engages in this argument style, instead preferring a dependency on existing sources. Next, I hope to illustrate the modes of reasoning one does find in the Yerushalmi insead.