Qitzur Shulchan Arukh – 187:1-2

סִימָן קפז – הִלְכוֹת אֲבֵדָה וּמְצִיאָה

186: Laws of Lost and Found Items

א: הָרוֹאֶה אֲבֵדַת יִשְׂרָאֵל, חַיָב לִטַּפֵּל בָּהּ לַהֲשִׁיבָהּ לִבְעָלֶיהָ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר, “הָשֵׁ֥ב תְּשִׁיבֵ֖ם”. וְכֵן כָּל מָמוֹן שֶׁל חֲבֵרוֹ שֶׁאָדָם יָכוֹל לְהַצִּיל ֹשֶלֹּא יֹּאבַד, חַיָב לְהַצִּיל, וְהוּא בִּכְלַל הֲשָׁבַת אֲבֵדָה

Someone who sees something lost by a Jew, he is obligated to busy himself with it to return it to its owner, as it says, “[Do not see your brother's ox or his sheep driven away, and you hide yourself from them;] you must bring them back [to your brother].” (Devarim 22:1) Similarly, any of his friend’s money that a person can save from getting lost, he is obligated to save, and it is within the category of “returning lost items”.

ב: אַף-עַל-פִּי שֶׁמִּן הַדִין בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁרֹב גּוֹיִם מְצוּיִים, אֲפִלוּ נָתַן בָּהּ יִשְׂרָאֵל סִימָן, אֵינוֹ חַיָב לְהַחֲזִיר, מִשּׁוּם דְמִסְּתָמָא כְּבָר נִתְיָאֵשׁ הֵימֶנָּה, מִכָּל מָקוֹם טוֹב וְיָשָׁר לַעֲשׂוֹת לִפְנִים מִשּׁוּרַת הַדִּין לְהַחֲזִיר לְיִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנָּתַן בָּהּ סִימָן. וְכוֹפִין עַל זֶה. וְאִם הַמּוֹצֵא הוּא עָנִי, וּבַעַל הָאֲבֵדָה הוּא עָשִׁיר, אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לַעֲשׂוֹת לִפְנִים מִשּׁוּרַת הַדִין. וּבְמָקוֹם שֶׁיֵשׁ דִּינָא דְמַלְכוּתָא לְהַחֲזִיר אֲבֵדָה, חַיָב בְּכָל עִנְיָן לְהַחֲזִיר

Even though by the strict law, in a place where most of [the people] are non-Jews, even if a Jew put on his item a sign [the finder] isn’t obligated to return it — because the usual situation would be that [the one who lost it] gave up on it [being returned] — in any case it is good and right to go within the line of the law to return to a Jew who put a sign on the item. And we compel someone to do so. If the finder is a poor person, and the one who lost it is wealthy, he isn’t requires to go beyond the letter of the law.

In a place where there is a civil aw requiring the return of lost items, he is obligated in any situation to return it [-- Jew or non-Jew, sign or no sign].


As you may have noticed from previous comments, e.g. about charging interest (65:1), my rule of thumb is that if the action is not obligatory/prohibited where the other party is a Jew then the issue isn’t one of monetary fairness, but of brotherhood.

I therefore would conclude from here that — barring local law — “finder’s keepers losers weepers” is a valid fiscal principle. However, when local law is that a person retains ownership of a lost item, then a Jew would be obligated to return the item for two reasons:

1: Local custom can define fiscal norms, and therefore the law means the non-Jew still owns the item. To use it would be theft.

2: There is a halachic obligation to be a law abiding citizen (assuming the law neither calls for a violation of halakhah nor is anti-semitic in intent).

Qitzur Shulchan Arukh – 186

סִימָן קפו – הִלְכוֹת אֲבֵדָה וּמְצִיאָה

186: Laws of “You Shall Not Muzzle”

א: כָּל הַמּוֹנֵעַ אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה מִלֶּאֱכֹל בִּשְׁעַת מְלַאכְתָּהּ, לוֹקֶה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר, “לֹֽא־תַחְסֹ֥ם שׁ֖וֹר בְּדִישֽׁוֹ׃. אֶחָד שׁוֹר וְאֶחָד כָּל מִינֵי בְהֵמָה וְחַיָה, בֵּין טְמֵאִים בֵּין טְהוֹרִים, וְאֶחָד הַדִּישָׁה וְאֶחָד כָּל שְׁאָר מְלָאכוֹת ֹשֶל גִּדּוּלֵי קַרְקַע. וְלֹא נֶאֱמַר שׁוֹר בְּדִישׁוֹ, אֶלָא בַּהֹוֶה. וַאֲפִלּוּ חֲסָמָהּ בְּקוֹל, דְהַיְנוּ שֶׁצָּעַק עָלֶיהָ וְעַל יְדֵי זֶה לֹא תֹאכַל, חַיַב מַלְקוֹת

Whomever prevents an animal from eating at the time of its working, gets lashes [in beis din, assuming all the criteria for corporeal punishment were met; the point here is that it is a violation of a lo sa'asei, "you shall not", in the Torah]. As it says, “Do not muzzle an ox while it threshes” [by treading upon the grain] (Bamidbar 25:4). Whether an ox, whether any other kind of farm or wild animal, whether non-kosher or kosher breeds, whether threashing or whether any other work of things that grow from the ground. It only said “ox while it is threshing” because it was what exists [is common]. Even if he “muzzles” it by voice, which is to yell at it and thereby it won’t eat, he is due lashes.

ב: יִשְׂרָאֵל הַדָּשׁ אֲפִלּוּ בְּפָרָתוֹ ֹשֶל גּוֹי וּתְבוּאָה שֶׁל גּוֹי, עוֹבֵר מִשּׁוּם לֹא-תַחְסֹם

A Jew who threshes, even with a non-Jew’s cow and non-Jew’s grain [can] violate “do not muzzle”.

ג: אִם הַבְּהֵמָה אֵינָהּ יְכוֹלָה לֶאֱכֹל, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא צְמֵאָה, צָרִיךְ לְהַשְׁקוֹתָהּ

If the animal can’t eat because it is thirst, one is obligated to give it to drink. [Even though it is phrased as "thou shalt not", it goes beyond prohibition and mandates action as well.]

ד: בְּהֵמָה שֶׁהִיא עוֹשָׂה בְּדָבָר שֶׁהוּא רַע לִבְנֵי מֵעֶיהָ, מֻתָּר לְחָסְמָה, שֶׁלֹּא הִקְפִּידָה הַתּוֹרָה אֶלָּא עַל הֲנָאָתָהּ, וַהֲרֵי אֵינָהּ נֶהֱנֵית

An animal that does something which is bad for its internal organs, it is permissible to muzzle it. For the Torah is only being careful for its benefit, and this isn’t to its benefit.


Although this siman isn’t really on topic in terms of financial law, since it was both about middos and short, I didn’t leave a whole in the sequence of simanim.

Twelve Step Programs

I received the following email:

Micha, is there a problem going to 12 step programs (either for one’s self, or for/with a friend)?
Does the “higher power’ stuff smack of AZ [avodah zara] in any way?

He then wanted to share my reply, which flattered me into thinking others might be interested in my thoughts on the subject. Here was my reply (slightly enhanced):

No, the “Higher Power stuff” is pretty strict monotheism. The question is joining with people to whom it means something trinitarianism. But R’ Sholom Elyashiv looked into it and permitted, even permitting participating in meetings that use the Lord’s Prayer – and joining them in the prayer! (As it says nothing specifically Christian.) I was told this by a rebbe-chaveir who is a JACS rabbi and whose testimony I trust. But I have no idea the details of the she’eilah, ow the question was posed. E.g. how much risk to life factored into the decision? Would Rav Elyashiv have said the same thing about joining Overeaters Anonymous when the person isn’t near heart-failure type morbid obesity? I don’t know, and personally I would want the question re-asked with that context set forth before accepting the existing pesaq in a case that minor.

My own philosophical problems aren’t about monotheism, it’s founded on Christian notions of needing someone else to save you. (This hearkens back to AA’s origins in the Oxford Group, an evangelical movement, and its six steps.) This stands in stark contrast to the Jewish model of redemption. 12-Step is shot through with this notion of needing to be saved, even down to relying on a sponsor, on perpetually in recovery and never recovered (which itself is setting stakes to low IMHO for pragmatic reasons), etc…

In Yahadus, man owns his own redemption. We daven for help, but we don’t expect the Almighty to do the job for us.  Some relevant dicta:

  • Hakol biYdei Shamayim chutz miYir’as Shamayim – all is in the control of [the One in] heaven, except for the fear/awe of heaven.
  • Bederekh she’adam rotzeh leileikh sham molikhin oso – in the way a person goes, so they take him.
  • Ein davar omeid lifnei haratzon – nothing stands before the will [to do something]. (This is actually phantom maamar chazal, probably an acharonic rephrasing of the previous. Still , it’s a popular quote among numerous acharonim.)
  • Im ein ani li, mi li? – if I am not for myself, who will be for me?

IOW, steps 2 & 3 are within Yahadus (as I understand our religion):

  • We came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore us to sanity.
  • We made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of God as we understood Him.

#2 clearly so — an addiction is something where by definition we need help, something Rav Dessler would say is beyond our “bekhirah point“. #3, is a little iffy, it depends what “turn our will” means.

But step 7 is really a problem for me:

  • We were entirely ready to have God remove all these defects of character.

Teshuvah is our job, not His. He bedavka wants people who define ourselves, just as He is Autonomous. Otherwise, Hashem would have just made perfect mal’akhim and been done with it.

However, AA allows for some pretty far stretching of the “Higher Power” concept. E.g. the Big Book has an entire chapter on how Agnostics and Atheists can define it.

So, what if a Jew were to decide that the Higher Power that “could remove all the defects of character” didn’t refer to HQBH, but to the beris He struck with us? I think that would address my problem with the basic Christian overtone of the program. It means accepting that the problem isn’t one I can resolve outside of working together with my Creator together in partnership. It’s not relinquishing ownership of my teshuvah to the One in heaven, and yet it’s not trying to go it by relying on my own strength.

If we say that 12-Step programs taken naively defy Hilell’s “im ein ani li, mi li?” this alternative centers on the next clause, “ukeshe’ani le’atzmi, mah ani – but when I rely on myself [alone], what am I?”

Qitzur Shulchan Arukh – 165:13-14

Yesterday’s halakhah made me aware of this short snippet of laws about teachers that deal with interpersonal halakhah.


יב: הַמְלַמֵּד, צָרִיךְ לֵישֵׁב וּלְלַמֵּד אֶת הַתִּינוֹקוֹת כָּל הַיּוֹם וּקְצָת מִן הַלַּיְלָה, כְּדֵי לְחַנְּכָם לִלְמֹד בַּיּוֹם וּבַלָּיְלָה. וְלֹא יְבַטְּלוּ הַתִּינוֹקוֹת כְּלָל, חוּץ מֵעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת וְעֶרֶב יוֹם-טוֹב בְּסוֹף הַיוֹם. אֵין מְבַטְּלִין אֶת הַתִּינוֹקוֹת אֲפִלוּ לְבִנְיַן בֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ

A teacher must sit and instruct the children all day and part of the night, so that he teaches them to study [Torah] at day and at night. They may not desist from the children at all, except for erev Shabbos and erev Yom Kippur toward the end of the day. We do not interrupt the children even for the building of the Temple.

יב: מְלַמֵּד תִּינוֹקוֹת שֶׁמַּנִּיחַ אֶת הַתִּינוֹקןת וְיוֹצֵא, אוֹ שֶׁעוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכָה אַחֶרֶת עִמָּהֶם, אוֹ שֶׁמִּתְרַשֵּׁל בְּתַלְמוּדוֹ, הֲרֵי זֶה בִּכְלַל אָרוּר עוֹשֶׂה מְלֶאכֶת ה’ רְמִיָה. לְפִיכָךְ אֵין לְהוֹשִׁיב מְלַמֵּד אֶלָּא בַּעַל יִרְאָה, מָהִיר לִקְרֹא וּלְדַקְדֵּק. וְאֵין לַמְלַמֵּד לִהְיוֹת נֵעוֹר בַּלַיְלָה יוֹתֵר מִדַּי, שֶׁלֹּא יִהְיֶה עָצֵל בַּיּוֹם לְלַמֵּד. וְכֵן לֹא יִתְעַנֶּה אוֹ יַעֲצֹר אֶת עַצְמוֹ מִמַּאֲכָל וּמִשְׁתֶּה אוֹ יֹאכַל יוֹתֵר מִדַּי, כִּי כָּל אֵלּוּ הַדְבָרִים, גוֹרְמִים ֹשֶלֹּא יוּכַל לְלַמֵּד הֵיטֵב. וְכָל הַמְשַׁנֶה, יָדוֹ עַל הַתַּחְתּוֹנָה וּמְסַלְּקִין לֵהּ

A teacher of children who puts the children to rest and leaves, or does some other work with them, or slacks off in his learning, he is in the category of “cursed is one who is lax in doing Hashem’s work” (Yirmiyahu 48:10). Therefore, one does not setp up a teacher anyone but a person of fear/awe [of the Almighty], who is quick to read and be careful.

A teacher should not stay up too late at night, so that he won’t be lazy during the day. Similarly, he shouldn’t fast, or stop himself from food or drink, nor eat too much, for all these things will cause him to be unable to teach well. And anyone who veers from this, his hand is on the lower [i.e. his claim in a court would be weaker], and we fire him.

יב: לֹא יַכֶּה אוֹתָם מַכַּת אוֹיֵב, מוּסָר אַכְזָרִי, לֹא בְשׁוֹטִים וְלֹא בְמַקֵּל, אֶלָּא בִּרְצוּעָה קְטַנָה

He should not hit them as an enemy would smite, the rebuke of the callous, neither with whips nor with a stick, only with a thin strap.


Note that by citing 165:12 as being similar to the laws of 185, Rabbi Ganzfried is giving a second reason for it. Not only is it bad education for the children to learn that their studies are interruptable and hence unimportant, nor is such interruption good for the universe (their studies take priority even over building the Beis haMiqdash!), but here the Qitzur adds that it would be prohibited for the same reasons as for any other employee. The same could be said of the negligent teacher in se’if 13.

Se’if 14 touches on the question of corporeal punishment. Clearly R’ Ganzfried’s approach would be counterproductive with today’s children. However, as we saw in 184:2, the Qitzur only permits hitting children where that is the most effective way to correct behavior.

Qitzur Shulchan Arukh – 185:6

ו: כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁבַּעַל-הַבַּיִת מֻזְהָר שֶׁלֹּא לִגְזֹל שְׂכַר הֶעָנִי וְלֹא לְאַחֲרוֹ, כָּךְ הֶעָנִי מֻזְהָר שֶׁלֹא יִבָּטֵל מִמְּלֶאכֶת בַּעַל הַבָּיִת. וְחַיָב לַעֲבוֹד בְּכָל כֹּחוֹ, כְּמוֹ שֶׁאָמַר יַעֲקֹב אָבִינוּ עָלָיו הַשָׁלוֹם, “כִּ֚י בְּכָל־כֹּחִ֔י עָבַ֖דְתִּי אֶת־אֲבִיכֶֽן”. לְפִיכָךְ אֵין הַפּוֹעֵל רַשַּׁאי לַעֲשׂוֹת מְלָאכָה בַלַּיְלָה וּלְהַשְׂכִּיר עַצְמוֹ בַיּוֹם, – שֶכְּבָר נֶחֱלַשׁ מֵהַלַּיְלָה, וְכֵן אֵינוֹ רַשַּׁאי לַעֲשׂוֹת מְלָאכָה בִּבְהֶמְתּוֹ בַלַּיְלָה וּלְהַשְׂכִּירָהּ בַּיוֹם. וְאֵין הַפּוֹעֵל רַשַּׁאי לְהַרְעִיב וּלְסַגֵּף עַצְמוֹ, שֶׁהֲרֵי מַחֲלִישׁ כֹּחוֹ וְלֹא יוּכַל לַעֲשׂוֹת מְלֶאכֶת בַּעַל-הַבִַּיִת כָּרָאוּי. וְכֵן הוּא דִּין הַמְלַמֵּד – עַיֵּן לְעֵיל סִימָן קסה סָעִיף יב

Just as the homeowner is warned not to steal the wages of the poor nor to delay it, so to the poor person is warned not to desist from the work of the homeowner. He must work with all his ability. As Yaaqov our forefather, peace be upon him, said, “[And you know that with all my ability I served your father.” (Bereishis 31:6)

Therefore a worker is not allowed to do work at night and hire himself out during the day, for he is already weakened from the night. Similarly, he can’t do work with his animal at night and hire it out / lease it during the day. The worker is also not allowed to starve or torture oneself, for he weakens his abilities and isn’t able to do the homeowner’s work properly.

The law is similar for a teacher, see previously, 165:12


I see that while 165 deals with teaching Torah rather than fiscal law, and therefore wasn’t in my original plan, it does contain three se’ifim of interpersonal mitzvos. I will present them tomorrow, and then return to our regularly scheduled programming.

Whomever gets to the water first…

אמרין עליו על רבי חנינא בן דוסא שהיה עומד ומתפלל ובא חברבר והכישו, ולא הפסיק את תפילתו. והלכו ומצאו אותו חברבר מת מוטל על פי חורו. אמרו “אי לו לאדם שנשכו חברבר, ואי לו לחברבר שנשך את רבי חנינא בן דוסא!” מה עיסקיה דהדין חברבריא? כד הוות נכית לבר נשא – אין בר נשא קדים למיא חברברא מיית ואין חברברא קדים למיא בר נשא מיית. אמרו לו תלמידיו “רבי לא הרגשת?” אמר להן “יבא עלי ממה שהיה לבי מתכוין בתפילה אם הרגשתי.” אמר רבי יצחק בר אלעזר “ברא לו הקב”ה מעיין תחת כפות רגליו, לקים מה שנאמר ‘רצון יריאיו יעשה ואת שוועת’ ישמע ויושיעם’ (תהילים קמה:כ)”:

They say about Rabbi Chanina ben Dosa that he was standing and davening and a snake came and bit him, and he didn’t stop his prayers. They went and found the snake, dead on its hole.

They said, “Woe to the person who is bitten by a snake, and woe to the snake that bites Rabbi Chanina ben Dosa!”

What is the story with this kind of snake? When it bites a person — if the person reaches water first [after being bitten by this kind of snake], the snake dies; and if the snake reaches water first, the person dies.

He students said to him, “Rebbe, didn’t you feel it?”

He said to them, “It would come upon me [something bad; i.e. Rabbi Chanina ben Dosa made an oath] from how my heart was focused on the tefillah if I felt something.

Rabbi Yitzchaq bar Eliezer said, “The Holy One, blessed is He, created [ex nihilo] for him a wellspring under the palms of his feet, to fulfill what it says, “The will of those who fear / are in awe of Him He does, and to their cries He listens and saves them.” (Tehillim 145:20 [Ashrei])

– Yerushalmi, Berakhos 5:1, pg. 38a

This snake doesn’t sound like a natural phenomenon. I would suggest that this story is told to relay the following message.

The snake, as per the story at the beginning of the Torah, represents the yeitzer hara. The water, as is usual, is Torah.

If the person reaches the Torah first, the person fulfilled the advice written outright in the Bavli (Qiddushin 30b):

If this monstrosity [i.e. the yeitzer hara] encounters you, drag him into the study hall where you will destroy him.

If we translate R’ Chanina ben Dosa’s response literally, without interpolation, he said, “Something from what I thought about during prayer should come upon me if I felt it!” Meaning, he had been momentarily distracted, giving the “snake” an opportunity. But, had it been more than that slight hesitation, the yeitzer hara would have been able to get him. However, since his tefillah was pure, R’ Yitzchaq ben Eliezer says Hashem rewarded him by creating a wellspring of Torah under Rabbi Chanina’s feet, Rabbi Chanina focused on the Torah thoughts that flowed from his prayer, and was immobilized, freed from that momentary thought planted by the yeitzer hara.

Within this understanding of the message of the story, the second part of this warning about how this snake operates is very powerful: If the yeitzer hara reaches the water first, so that it uses selective quoting and manipulation of the Torah to convince the person that his deeds are holy and that he is doing Hashem’s will, then all is lost. Nothing is as dangerous as a “pious” sinner.

Qitzur Shulchan Arukh – 185:5

ה: שָׂכִיר שֶׁעָשָׂה מְלָאכָה לְבַעַל-הַבַּיִת וְהִפְסִידָהּ, אֲפִלּוּ בִפְשִׁיעָה, בְּאֹפֶן שֶׁעַל פִּי הַדִין הוּא חַיָב בְּתַשְׁלוּמִין, מִצְוָה עַל בַּעַל-הַבַּיִת לְהִכָּנֵס עִמּוֹ לִפְנִים מִשׁוּרַת הַדִּין וְלִמְחוֹל לוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר, לְמַעַן תֵּלֵךְ בְּדֶרֶךְ טוֹבִים. וְאִם הַשָׂכִיר עָנִי הוּא וְאֵין לוֹ מַה יֹּאכַל, מִצְוָה לִתֵּן לוֹ שְׂכָרוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֶמַר, וְאָרְחוֹת צַדִּיקִים תִּשְׁמֹר. וְזֶה הוּא אֹרַח צַדִּיקִים, לִשְׁמֹר דֶרֶךְ ה’ לַעֲשׂוֹת צְדָקָה וּמִשְׁפָּט לִפְנִים מִשׁוּרַת הַדִּין

A worker who was doing work for the homeowner and lost it, even intentionally [or through gross negligence] in a manner that by law he would have to be obligated in repayment, it is a mitzvah upon the homeowner to enter with him beyond the limit of the law and forgive him [the debt]. As it says, “so that you will walk in the ways of the good ones [or: in good ways].” If the hire is poor and doesn’t have what to eat, it’s a mitzvah to pay him his wages, as it says, “and the ways of the righteous you shall observe.”

This is the way of the righteous, so guard Hashem’s way, to do what’s right and justice beyond the letter of the law.


The Qitzur’s obvious source is the following gemara (Bava Metzi’ah 83a):

רבה בר בר חנן תברו ליה הנהו שקולאי חביתא דחמרא. שקל לגלימייהו. אתו, אמרו לרב. אמר ליה, “הב להו גלימייהו.” אמר ליה, “דינא הכי?” אמר ליה, “אין — “למען תלך בדרך טובים.’ (משלי ב)” יהיב להו גלימייהו, אמרו ליה, “עניי אנן, וטרחינן כולה יומא, וכפינן, ולית לן מידי!” אמר ליה, “זיל הב אגרייהו.” א”ל, “דינא הכי?” אמר ליה, “אין — ‘וארחות צדיקים תשמור’ (משלי ב)”:

Rabbah bar bar Chanan had some porters who broke his barrel of wine. He grabbed their cloaks. They went and told Rav. Rav said to [Rabbah] “Give them their cloaks.” He said to [Rav], “Is this the law?” [Rav] said to Rabbah], “Yes — ‘so that you will walk in the ways of the good’ (Mishlei 2:20)”. He gave them their cloaks. They said to him, “We are poor, and we labored all day, and now we are exhausted, and we don’t have anything!” [Rav] said to Raba, “Go give them their wages.” He said to [Rav], “Is that the law?” [Rav] said to Rabbah], “Yes — ‘and the way of the righteous you shall observe’ (ibid)”.

This gemara involves a favorite paradox. Rav tells Rabbah bar bar Chanan that it is the letter of the law for him in this instance to go beyond the letter of the law. That there is a time when the law requires going beyond its own limits to do what is moral and generous. The Qitzur too here codifies a law and then tells us it’s an obligation to go beyond the limits of obligation, to the ways of the righteous.

A law not in the  act — it’s beyond the limits of the laws of actions, but in who we should be — one of the good and the righteous.

Qitzur Shulchan Arukh – 185:4

ד: אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר משּׁוּם בַּל תָּלִין וְלֹא תָבוֹא עָלָיו הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן תְּבָעוֹ הַשָּׂכִיר וְיֶשׁ לוֹ מָעוֹת לִתֵּן לוֹ. אֲבָל אִם לֹא תְבָעוֹ הַשָּׂכִיר, אוֹ שֶׁתְּבָעוֹ וְאֵין לוֹ מָעוֹת, אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר. וּמִכָּל מָקוֹם מִדַּת חֲסִידוּת הִיא לִלְווֹת וְלִפְרֹעַ לַשָּׂכִיר בִּזְמַנּוֹ, כִּי הוּא עָנִי וְאֵלָיו הוּא נוֹשֵׂא אֶת נַפְשְׁוֹ. וּמִי שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִפְרֹעַ לַפּוֹעֲלִים עַד לְאַחַר הַחֶשְׁבּוֹן, אֲפִלּוּ תָבְעוּ מִמֶּנּוּ דָבָר מֻעָט שֶׁבְּוַדַּאי מַגִּיעַ לָהֶם, מִכָּל מָקוֹם אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר, שֶׁכֵּיוָן ֹשֶיָדוּעַ שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ כֵן, עַל דַּעַת כֵּן נִשְׂכְּרו אֶצְלוֹ

One doesn’t violate “do not keep overnight” and “do not allow the sun to come on him” [ie the prohibition against late payment of wages] unless the worker approaches him to collect and he has the money to pay him. But if the worker doesn’t approach him to collect, or he does approach him but he doesn’t have the money, he isn’t violating. In any case, it is a middah of piety to borrow [the money] and pay the worker on time, because he is poor and it is upon him that he carries his soul [he relies on the employer's money to keep soul in body, a roof over his head, etc...].

Someone whose [usual] manner is not to pay the workers until after doing the accounting, even if they approach him to collect a small amount that is certainly coming to them, in any case he is not violating [this prohibition] since it is known tht this is his way, and on this knowledge they accepted work by him.

Qitzur Shulchan Arukh – 185:3

ג: וְכֵן אִם נָתַן טַלִיתוֹ לְאֻמָּן לְתַקְּנָהּ בְּקַבְּלָנוּת וֶהֱבִיאָהּ לוֹ בַיוֹם, יֶשׁ לוֹ זְמָן כָּל הַיוֹם בִּלְבָד. הֱבִיאָהּ לוֹ בַלַּיְלָה, יֶשׁ לוֹ זְמָן כָּל הַלַּיְלָה בִּלְבָד. אֲבָל כָּל זְמַן שֶׁהַטַּלִּית בְּיַד הָאֻמָּן, אַף-עַל-פִּי שֶׁנִּגְמְרָה וְכָלְתָה מְלַאכְתָּהּ, אֵין בַּעַל-הַבַּית עוֹבֵר, אֲפִלּוּ הִיא אֵצֶל הָאֻמָּן כַּמָּה יָמִים. וַאֲפִלּוּ הוֹדִיעוֹ שֶׁיָבִיא לוֹ מָעוֹת וְיִטּוֹל אֶת שֶׁלּוֹ, מִכָּל מָקוֹם אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר

Similarly if he gices his tallis to a worker to fix it as a job-worker [i.e. paid for doing a task, not per hour like in the previous se'if] and she [the tailor] brings it back during the day, he has the time of that entire day only [to repay her]. If she brings it to him at night, he has the time of the entire night alone.

However, the entire time that the tallis is in the hands / posession of the worker, even though she finished and completed her work, the owners is not in violation — even if it stays with the worker a number of days. Even if she informs him that he should bring her the money and take what is his [ie the tallis], in any case he is not violating [the prohibition against delayed payment of salary].

Qitzur Shulchan Arukh – 185:2

ב: מִצְוָה לָתֵת שְׂכַר פְּעֻלַּת שָׂכִיר בִּזְמַנּוֹ. וְאִם אֵחַר, עוֹבֵר בְּלֹֹא-תַעֲשֶׂה, שֶׁנֶאֱמַר, בְּיוֹמוֹ תִתֵּן שְׂכָרוֹ וְלֹא תָבוֹא עָלָיו הַשֶׁמֶשׁ. וּכְמוֹ כֵן מִצְוָה לָתֵת שְׂכַר בְּהֵמָה אוֹ כְלִי בִּזְמַנּוֹ. וְאִם אַחֲרוֹ, עוֹבֵר בְּלָאו, שֶנֶּאֱמַר, לֹא תַעֲשֹׁק שָׂכִיר עָנִי וְאֶבְיוֹן וְגוֹ’ בְּיוֹמוֹ תִתֵּן שְׂכָרוֹ. וְאֵיזֶהוּ זְמַנּוֹ. אִם כָּלְתָה הַמְּלָאכָה בַּיּוֹם, זְמַנּוֹ כָּל הַיּוֹם. וְאִם עָבַר הַיּוֹם וְלֹא נָתַן לוֹ, עוֹבֵר עַל בְּיוֹמוֹ תִתֵּן שְׂכָרוֹ וְלֹא תָבוֹא עָלָיו הַשֶׁמֶשׁ. וְאִם כָּלְתָה הַמְּלָאכָה לְאַחַר שֶׁיָצָא הַיוֹם וְנִכְנַס הַלַּיְלָה, זְמַנוֹ כָּל הַלָּיְלָה. עָבַר הַלַּיְלָה וְלֹא נָתַן לוֹ, עוֹבֵר עַל לֹא תָלִין פְּעֻלַת שָׂכִיר אִתְּךָ עַד-בֹּקֶר. וְכֵן שְׂכִיר שָׁבוּעַ, שְׂכִיר חֹדֶשׁ, שְׂכִיר שָׁנָה, יָצָא מִמְּלַאכְתּוֹ בַיוֹם, יֶשׁ לוֹ זְמָן כָּל הַיוֹם. יָצָא מִמְּלַאכְתּוֹ בַלַּיְלָה, יֶשׁ לוֹ זְמָן כָּל הַלַּיְלָה וְלֹא יוֹתֵר

It is a mitzvah to pay the wages of an employee on time, and if he delays, he violares a prohibition, as it says “on his day you shall pay his wages, and don’t let the some come upon him” [i.e. set while he is waiting].

Similarly, there is a mitzvah to pay rental on an animal or a utensil on its [proper] time. [The root \שׂכר\ means both hiring per time and rental.] And if it’s delayed, he violates a prohibition, as it says, “do not withhold the pay of the poor and indigent… in his day you shall pay his wages/fee.”

What is “its [proper] time”? If the work was comeplete during the day, its time is the entire day. If the day went past and he didn’t pay him, he violated “on his day you shall pay his wages, and don’t let the some come upon him”. And if  the work was completed after the day left [ended] and the night entered [started], its time is the entire night. If the[entire] night passes and he didn’t pay him, he violated “do not rest the work of a hire with you until the morning.” Similarly someone hired for the week, hired for the month, hired for the year — if he leaves his work during the day, he has the time of the entire day and if he leaves the work at night, he has the time of the entire night, and no more.