I wrote about the word “Brisker” meaning that someone actually believes certain things, and thus differs from the word “Aristotilian” or “Existentialist” in kind.

I said nothing in that comment about whether we our beliefs should be founded on classical philosophical proof or some other justification system — and I never promoted faith without justification. (Although I believe it has value, I don’t think it’s an ideal.) I also didn’t use the phrase to describe the Rambam or following the Rambam.

The definition of belonging to a school of philosophy is different than belonging to a derekh. A school of philosophy is not defined by a set of conclusions, but by how they are reached. A religion has core teachings.

To the Rambam, na’eh bemaasav is a foundation for knowledge. Good behavior as a handmaiden for right thought. This prioritization of knowledge is something he found in Aristo, not Chazal. (To stay on my core message.)

Rambam does not allow for vague notions about “taking for granted” that one has “bought into religion”. It is here that the self contradiction of the Brisker notion you portray, reveals itself.

There is a minimal definition of student, and only one who meets this criteria may be taught Talmud Torah,whether of a Brisker variety or any other.

א אין מלמדין דברי תורה אלא לתלמיד הגון נאה במעשיו, או לתם. אבל אם היה הולך בדרך לא טובה, מחזירין אותו למוטב, ומנהיגין אותו בדרך ישרה, ובודקין אותו; ואחר כך מכניסין אותו לבית המדרש, ומלמדין אותו. אמרו חכמים, כל השונה לתלמיד שאינו הגון, כאילו זרק אבן למרקוליס, שנאמר “כצרור אבן, במרגמה–כן נותן לכסיל, כבוד” (משלי כו,ח): ואין “כבוד” אלא תורה, שנאמר “כבוד, חכמים ינחלו” (משלי ג,לה).

This priority in creating a Talmid with proper first notions is clear in Rambam’s instruction in his intro to the Mitzvot. Lest there be any confusion that “derech tova” is only about some behavioral “doing” of halacha , Rambam clearly shows that there are certain first principles which must be absorbed as well. This is made clear in Perek Chelek but also in Mishne Torah.

ספר ראשון. אכלול בו כל המצוות שהן עיקר דת משה רבנו, וצריך אדם לידע אותן תחילת הכול–כגון ייחוד שמו ברוך הוא, ואיסור עבודה זרה. וקראתי שם ספר זה ספר המדע.

Brisk is a religious trend rather than a philosophical school. It therefore not only is associated with a school of thought, but also takes for granted you bought into the religion. That’s why applying the adjective “Brisker” to a kofeir feels so wrong.

The Rambam turned his back on a lot of mesoretic ideas due to that best thinking of his day. (At least, best thinking if you didn’t side with the Platonists…) Not saying he was wrong to — I’m not arguing that (eg) astrology works. But he didn’t just recast what he received into new packaging. The Rambam also whittled off the corners that didn’t fit.

Take Dr Wolfson as a concrete example. This Harvard Professor was an avid follower of R Chaim in the sense of studying Halacha as a “legal system”. Yet, he was a self professed denier of yesodos, he was certainly kofer in the Torah, it is likely he also denied the Yesod haYesodos, I can only assume he was not Shomer Shabbat B’shitta.

Would such a one be a Brisker? How can one who denies the very definition of Talmud Torah as a service of Hashem, be classified as a lomed torah with the differentiating feature of being a Brisker subcategory of Torah student?

More than that, he held of the “best thinking” of his day to an extent that he questioned or recast as metaphor many of the beliefs held by Chazal. To many other rishonim and acharonim, he went too far. After I hit the sources, I wouldn’t say I agree, but I definitely see where they are coming from.

Now, what does this have to do with any of our original topics?

Someone who agreed with R Chaim on all things but one little issue, he held that nature was a necessary truth. Would such a one be a Brisker?

AISI after having looked at both the Moreh and Metaphysics, the Rambam really only breaks with Aristo on one issue — and all its consequences. Aristo believed that the laws of nature were necessary truths, and the Rambam held they were contingent truths. This is how the Rambam could break with Aristo’s argument that the world was eternal, as it allowed room for a creation that defies what we today call the Law of Conservation of Matter, and this break also allowed him to believe in miracles. But his angelology — straight out of Physics and Metaphysics. The role of Yedi’ah, again Metaphysics.

But more fundamentally, the Rambam spoke in Aristo’s terms, using Aristo’s list of topics and his axioms. The Rambam builds proofs based on hylomorphism (form and substance), the 4 types of causality, the notions of essence, attribute, accident, etc… His categories of thought were Aristo’s — when he disagreed, it was on Aristo’s terms.

The Rav was an existentialist for similar reasons. In fact, Existentialism is entirely a matter of topic and framework — the noted Existentialists barely agree with each other in substance on anything.

Someone who disagrees with R’ Chaim on many things, but does so building his arguments using the Brisker Derekh is still a Brisker.