To the Editor:

In a fine essay: “Teaching Churban Europa to Our Children” (JO, May ‘03), Rabbi Yaakov Feitman shlita presents the following cogent point as one of the lessons that we can learn from the Hitlerian plot to annihilate the Jewish people, R”l:

“Disappointment in the Gentiles - Rabbi Hutner zt”l taught us that one of the prime lessons of Jewish history is learning not to be enamored of the gentiles and their ways by recognizing their unreliability throughout the ages.”

While this is an invaluable lesson, care must be taken in its presentation, particularly to young students. This is because there is cause for concern lest we inadvertently cause racism and bigotry to develop in our society.

It is essential that we take care that it does not become acceptable in our society to use pejorative terminology to describe other races, especially since there are ever-increasing numbers of Jews, Shomrei Torah u’Mitzvos, of other races. We must be careful never to present people of other races as stereotypical examples of degenerate and dim-witted behavior, particularly in light of the evident accomplishments and prominence of many individuals of other races. A special pitfall to be avoided is the acceptance of questionable “Biblical” justifications of such attitudes. Indeed, most of these rationalizations may be traced to Southern, pro-slavery, antebellum (pre-Civil War) Christian preachers.

To expand somewhat, there are many problems in such attitudes and modes of expression. Among these problems are the following:

1. These attitudes and modes of expression will not go unnoticed by general society. If they were to become known, they would likely to lead to Chillul Hashem and to setbacks in our task of leading, by refined example, to “Yakiru v’yeidu kol yoshvei seivel ke lecha tichra kol berech (“May all the world’s inhabitants recognize and know that to You every knee should bend” - second paragraph of Aleinu, based on Yeshayah 45:23). They certainly would not help the other races (nor gentiles in general) to recognize that “rak am navon v’chacham ha’am ha’zeh” (“Surely a wise and astute people is this great nation!” - Devarim 4:6).

2. Additionally, all generalizations only apply generally - at best. Nevertheless, they create stereotypes, branding individuals with the typecast of the group.  Thus, upstanding members of other races who remain gentiles, yet may fall into the category of Chasidei Umos Ha’Olam (pious non-Jews who - see Rambam, Hilchos Melachim 8:11) may become subsumed in the derogatory categorization.

3. Such attitudes and modes of expression are likely to spill over when we would not want them to do so. Olam ha’Bo issues of malbin pnei chaveiro (deriding one’s friend - see Bava Metzia 58b-59a) and other explicit d’oraysa prohibitions, such as ona’as ha’ger (deriding a convert - see Bava Metzia, ibid.) - and, of course, Chillul Hashem - are involved in such “slips of the tongue.”

4. The usage of pejorative terms - particularly when the word’s intended use is clearly coarse - may constitute nibbul peh.

5. Perhaps most importantly, were such attitudes to take root in our society, chas v’shalom, they would  clearly run counter to the refinement of middos and to the pathways of mussar to which every Ben Aliyah and Ba’al Avodah should aspire. Haughtiness (ga’avah), scoffing (leitzanus), derogation (bittul) and other middos ra’os pervade such attitudes. The tumas sefasayim that is inherent in such modes of expression doubtless impacts negatively on the neshama of the speaker.

In this brief piece I have focused on the pitfalls of bigotry and racism. This is not the vehicle for a comprehensive treatment of our relationship with non-Jews of various orientations. Nevertheless, it is perhaps worthwhile to provide, at the very least, a springboard for further consideration. To the best of my knowledge, the finest comprehensive treatment of that topic is an essay in Divrei Talmud vol. 1 by Rabbi Avrohom Eliyahu Kaplan zt”l. Without going, here, into the broad scope of issues he addresses, it is worth citing some of his conclusions:

1. Non-Jews who keep their seven laws as a result of their personal convictions, and not because of their belief in the divinity of the Torah, do not fall into the category of rei’ah, and we are not obligated to provide them with monetary support. Nevertheless, because Hashem has endowed all men with divine qualities, they are, therefore, “chaviv” (see Avos 3:14), and hence we are required to save them from any danger and not stand idly by when they are in peril.

2. Non-Jews who accept upon themselves in a Beis Din, as a result of their belief in the divinity of the Torah, to keep their seven laws, do fall into the category of rei’ah. It is obligatory for us to provide them with monetary support, to conduct ourselves with a high measure of respect towards them.

3. It is unclear whether the status of non-Jews who accept their seven laws upon themselves, as a result of their belief in the divinity of the Torah, but not in a Beis Din fall into the first or second category. Therefore, as in all matters of doubt that touch on d’orysa issues, we must be stringent, and it is incumbent upon us to provide them with monetary support, etc.

(Rabbi Kaplan also addresses the status of non-Jews who do not accept their seven laws, and whether the concept of tinok she’nishba is relevant to non-Jews.)

Perhaps, however, all the technical categories are moot, as the Yerushalmi (Bava Metzia 2:5) states so powerfully (free translation):
Rabbi Shimon ben Shetach dealt in linen. His students said to him: “Rebbe, desist from this trade. We will buy you a donkey [to make an easier living as a donkey driver] and you will not have to toil so much.” They went and purchased a donkey from a bandit. The students subsequently found a precious stone dangling from it. They went back to Rabbi Shimon ben Shetach and said to him: “From now on you need not exert yourself.” He asked: “How so?” The students responded: “We purchased a donkey for you from a bandit and a precious stone was dangling from it.” Rabbi Shimon ben Shetach asked: “Did the donkey’s seller know that the stone was there?” They answered: “No.” He then said to them: “Go return it.” The students remonstrated with Rabbi Shimon ben Shetach: “Although theft from an idolater is prohibited, is one not permitted to keep an object that an idolater has lost?” He responded: “What do you think, that Shimon ben Shetach is a barbarian? More than all the wealth of the world, Shimon ben Shetach desires to hear [the non-Jew say]: “Berich Eloko d’Yehudo’ei” (“Blessed is the God of the Jews”).                  
Our paramount value, beyond even halachic considerations, must be Kiddush Shem Shomayim.

In sum, therefore, while Rabbi Feitman’s point is well taken, it must be nuanced. There are cases in which we must denigrate evildoers, but there are cases where denigration is out of place - indeed, counter to the Torah’s expectations of us. There is a fine line to be tread between “Ein lanu l’hisha’en elah al Avinu she’Bashomayim” (We cannot rely on anyone but our Father in Heaven - see Sotah 49b) and Al tehi baz l’kol adam (“Do not denigrate any person” - Avos 4:3).