Avodah Mailing List

Volume 28: Number 148

Wed, 03 Aug 2011

• 1. the effect of our davening on the behira of others (Simi Peters)
• 2. diff between small nick in koneh vs veshet (Hankman)
• 3. Re: diff between small nick in koneh vs veshet (Alan Rubin)
• 4. Re: Feedback, causality & G-d (kennethgmil...@juno.com)
• 5. various outside groups (was karaites....) (Joseph Kaplan)
• 6. Re: "God who knows the future" (David Riceman)
• 7. Re: "God who knows the future" (Lisa Liel)
• 8. A Shaitel In The Nine Days (Prof. Levine)
• 9. Re: Feedback, causality & G-d (Micha Berger)
• 10. Re: "God who knows the future" (Micha Berger)
• 11. Re: "God who knows the future" (Micha Berger)
• 12. Re: "God who knows the future" (David Riceman)
• 13. Re: Feedback, causality & G-d (David Riceman)
• 14. Re: Freeing a Slave (Micha Berger)
• 15. Re: Freeing a Slave (Zev Sero)
• 16. Re: Freeing a Slave (Micha Berger)
• 17. Re: "God who knows the future" (Joel C. Salomon)

I think it is very simple.  Our davening cannot affect other people's
behira because that would tamper with a fundamental defining characteristic
of tzelem Elokim (retzono shel adam kevodo) and wreak havoc with issues of
personal responsibility and the validity of sehar va'onesh, among other
things.  However, our davening for others can affect *us* and the way in
which we relate to the people we daven for.  A person who davens with any
sincerity for someone will feel differently about him and treat him better,
even in very subtle ways and perhaps without being conscious of this.  A
case in point:	when Rabbi Meir stopped davening for the biryonim to die
and began to daven that they do teshuva, *he* changed.	He became their
neighbor, as opposed to a person who hated them, and began to relate to
them differently.  When his attitude to them changed, they began to change,
not because he had set in motion some mystical effect through his tefilla,
but because he had set in motion 
 a psychological effect through his behavior.  When you are Rabbi Meir's
 enemy, you have no reason not to behave like an animal.  When you are the
 neighbor of an exalted sage who smiles and says hello in the morning, you
 pick your socks up.  Don't we see this with kids all the time?  A lot of
 their self-esteem is dependent upon what we expect of them and how we
 treat them.

The principal operates on a larger scale, too.	When we daven for our
soldiers, we are contributing to the elevation of the spiritual atmosphere
in society in a very concrete way, and that has a knock-on effect on the
behavior of others.  Leaders (e.g., the kohen gadol) who set a good example
effectively do the same thing.	So a kohen gadol who really puts his heart
into his job (i.e., davens with attention to detail and with true kavana)
can have a very tangible, practical effect on the society, thereby lowering
the probability of accidental murder. Conversely, think about how often
people justify corruption or other bad behaviors with 'Everyone does it.'
or 'Even cabinet ministers are corrupt.  Why should I be a frier?' In a
society where 'everyone does it' means 'everyone is very virtuous', things
would look very different.  

We are social creatures (lo tov heyot ha'adam levado!) and very much
affected (consciously and unconsciously) by the behavior of others. Malcolm
Gladwell (The Tipping Point) makes a good case that what drastically
reduced crime in the NYC subways was, in part, cleaning the graffiti off
the cars and fixing the turnstiles.  The population of the city did not
change, but when people felt like they were in a 'clean, well-lighted
place'	they behaved better--in response to a better atmosphere.

Of course, when we daven for our children's spiritual welfare, we are
really asking Hashem to make the circumstances of their lives conducive to
their spiritual welfare (the right opportunities, like good teachers and
friends, etc.)	Even God himself cannot change our behira (hakol biyedei
Shamayim hutz miyir'at Shamayim)--that is, in fact, what behira *means*.  

The rare exceptions to that (like the hardening of Par'o's heart and the
preventing of teshuva in the case of Hofni and Pinhas) are actually a form
of punishment.	The other possible exception (lev melahim ve'sarim beyad
Hashem) is really talking about decisions that are not about personal
morality, but could change the course of history.  So a king's ability to
sin (or not) in his personal life would not be affected by Divine
intervention, but Hashem would intervene to prevent him from starting a war
(or not) because those decisions have ramifications for *God's* plan.

Kol tuv,
Simi Peters
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RAR wrote:

I do think that a similar size tear would be much more dangerous in
the oesophagus. Infection would be much less of an issue with a nick
in the trachea which is much 'cleaner' than the oesophagus.

CM responds:

I hear what you are saying. the risk of infection is higher in the
oesophagus and the risk of enlarging the tear is also greater in the
oesophagus due to the peristalsis of the oesophagus. But you avoided
responding to how serious you think a "fine needle" hole (from an
injection) in the oesophagus would be (I suspect medically not too serious)
- yet halacha would call that a treifa.

RAR wrote:

Another thing to consider is that with the oesophagus being placed
behind the trachea any injury to the oesophagus is likely to be
accompanied by injury to other structures, in particular blood
vessels. The trachea is much more superficial and it is easier to
imagine an injury to the trachea which does little damage to other
structures.

CM responds:

Your response is of course very logical if the injury is caused by some
external trauma. However in the context of hilchos treifa it is probably
irrelevant as no other damage is required, just the nick in the oesophagus
is sufficient to render the animala treifa. Furthermore the common case of
the hole in the oesophagus more often than not, comes from internal injury
such as swallowing a thorn, needle, nail or the like which makes the hole
in the oesophagus without any damage to the nearby organs or tissues.

Kol Tuv

Chaim Manaster
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RCM wrote>
> I hear what you are saying. the risk of infection is higher in the
> oesophagus and the risk of enlarging the tear is also greater in the
> oesophagus due to the peristalsis of the oesophagus. But you avoided
> responding to how serious you think a "fine needle" hole (from an injection)
> in the oesophagus would be (I suspect medically not too serious) -?yet
> halacha would call that a treifa.

I do not think that the hole created by passing a needle into the
oesophagus would create a serious risk. Indeed our Rabbi has told us
that in some herds of cattle many of the animals have been treated for
colic by passing needles into their stomachs and this creates a
potential kashrus issue. I have not learned this gemara but I suspect
that when you study the various pleural lesions which are regarded as
halachically problematic you will encounter the similar difficulties.

Alan Rubin

R' Daniel Eidensohn wrote:

> I am working on the issue of feedback. I can not find any Jewish
> sources regarding feedback - to pick a reference and modify behavior
> or processes or efforts to maximize the referent. This is a
> fundamental Western idea - but not Jewish. It seems that the
> official Jewish view is that human effort does not cause success but
> only provides merit which justifies G-d making you successful. This
> issue cuts across a wide range of issues from child abuse, education,
> parnossa etc etc.

I don't have a clear understanding of what you are referring to. When I think of "feedback", I think of some sort of self-reinforcing mechanism.

For example, many mitzvos regulate our emotions: we are told to be happy at
these times, to be sad at those times, and to believe in G-d at all times.
When the question is raised, "I either feel that way or I don't; how can I
control it?", one of the answers frequently given is to immerse oneself in
a group of people who feel that way, and their feelings will slowly but
inexorably "rub off" on the individual.

It seems to me that this would be the sort of Torah idea that RDE is
looking for in the first half of the portion that I quoted. But the second
half confuses me greatly. RDE seems to be saying that even if an individual
immerses himself in a society which is sad on Tisha B'Av, and which is
disgusted by child abuse, this does not guarantee that he will be
successful in his efforts to become a person who is sad on Tisha B'Av, and
who is disgusted by child abuse.

I suppose I'd have to agree. Guarantees are hard to come by in this world.

But be careful, be *very* careful. If one gets too close to "the official
Jewish view ... that human effort does not cause success but only provides
merit which justifies G-d making you successful", he'll run the risks of
relying on his merits and not bother with the required hishtadlus. He'll
choose not to buy a lulav, figuring that even if he buys one he might lose
it, and even if he doesn't buy one, a lulav might happen to become
available. So why bother?

And similarly, because there is no guarantee that feedback will work, he'll
also not bother with immersing himself in a community which is sad on Tisha
B'Av and which is disgusted by child abuse.

Or, more likely, I've totally misunderstood the question.

Akiva Miller

____________________________________________________________
57 Year Old Mom Looks 27!
Mom Reveals $5 Wrinkle Trick That Has Angered Doctors!
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3131/4e38bb632e63a380c45st04vuc

"They're pesulim le'edus, and thus presumed liars."

I don't understand the "thus."  There are others who are passul le'edus who are not presumed liars; e.g., women, a king etc.

Joseph Kaplan

RTK:
> From our human point of view G-d makes it appear "as if" He doesn't 
> know what we will do -- He does that by the simple expedient of keeping 
> US in the dark about the future. But of course He does know and yet that 
> does not take away our bechira, because WE don't know.

How do you see that in the Ramban?

> To say that if G-d has total foreknowledge, then we don't have free 
> will, or if we have free will, then He doesn't have foreknowledge, is a 
> plain contradiction to what Chazal said. It's in Pirkei Avos. "Hakol 
> tzafui vehareshus nesunah."

I would say that the naive translation of that is: "You can do what you 
want, but God sees what you do".  "Tzafui" need not imply prediction.

David Riceman

On 8/3/2011 7:54 AM, David Riceman wrote:
> RTK:
>> From our human point of view G-d makes it appear "as if" He doesn't
>> know what we will do -- He does that by the simple expedient of
>> keeping US in the dark about the future. But of course He does know
>> and yet that does not take away our bechira, because WE don't know.
>
> How do you see that in the Ramban?
>
>> To say that if G-d has total foreknowledge, then we don't have free
>> will, or if we have free will, then He doesn't have foreknowledge, is
>> a plain contradiction to what Chazal said. It's in Pirkei Avos. "Hakol
>> tzafui vehareshus nesunah."
>
> I would say that the naive translation of that is: "You can do what you
> want, but God sees what you do". "Tzafui" need not imply prediction.

Can you think of any other source where tzafui means what you suggest?

Lisa

 From http://revach.net/article.php?id=4648

Piskei Tshuvos - A Shaitel In The Nine Days
The Mishna Brura (551:20) brings from the Pri Megadim that although 
haircuts are assur in the nine days, it is perfectly permissible to 
comb and brush your hair.  This is Mutar even during Aveilus.

The Piskei Tshuvos (20) asks about the status of a Shaitel.  May you 
comb it?  What about washing it and setting it?  He answers that he 
heard from Morei Hora'ah that a Shaitel has a Din of clothing as 
opposed to hair.  Therefore it is assur to wash it in water or other 
cleaning agents.  It is also assur to style it and set it using 
electric equipment.  This would be like ironing which is assur.  You 
[may] however, he says, brush it and comb it unprofessionally in your home.

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On Tue, Aug 02, 2011 at 01:04:15PM -0400, Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
: I am working on the issue of feedback. I can not find any Jewish sources
: regarding feedback - to pick a reference and modify behavior or processes or
: efforts to maximize the referent. This is a fundamental Western idea - but
: not Jewish....
...
: I also can't find where and when this idea developed in the Western World.
...

As I wrote RDE in private (in an email that included the suggestion that
he ask the chevrah)...

The concept of feedback was probably first applied to people
metaphorically, by comparison to mechanical engineering. In engineering,
there are two kinds of feedback loops. Some involve positive
reinforcement, maximizing small changes in the input. This is how one
would design a PA system, for example. Others involve negative feedback,
so as to stabilize the system's output. An early example of negative
feedback was the governor put on steam engines to keep them from running
fast enough to break themselves apart. (It's actually pretty clever,
see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Centrifugal_governor>.)

Until the late 18th cent, I don't think feedback was abstracted out to be
a concept bifnei atzmah. So if you're looking for feedback in earlier
sources, you're going to have to find references to metacoginzance and
awareness of one's thought, and thinking about thoughts, but without
the tool of being able to frame it as feedback.

As some might recall from earlier debates in which I made bold claims
about the mental life of animals -- or lack thereof -- I think this
is Unqelus's point on the creation of man. The "nishmas chayim", the
soul which turns Adam into a dynamic being, is "translated" to "ruach
memalela". "Memalela" could be trivially taken to refer to a soul with
the ability to speak to others. However, given the words being explained,
I think Unqelus is pointing to the ability to "hear" one's own stream
of consciousness.

: *Chovas HaLevavos (4:4)* Even when you are fully aware that effort is
: worthless without G-d's decree, nevertheless you must act like the farmer
: who plows, removes the thorns, seeds and waters his field if there is no
: rain. At the same time he trusts that G-d will make it fertile, guard it
: from calamity, make a bountiful crop and bless it...

Backgammon.

-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Zion will be redeemed through justice,
mi...@aishdas.org        and her returnees, through righteousness.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On Wed, Aug 03, 2011 at 09:20:22AM -0500, Lisa Liel wrote:
>> I would say that the naive translation of that is: "You can do what you
>> want, but God sees what you do". "Tzafui" need not imply prediction.
>
> Can you think of any other source where tzafui means what you suggest?

Are you asking how often does tzafui means seeing the present from afar,
as opposed to seeing the future?

Like "Mitzpei Yericho" or the "tzofim" of "Har haTzofim"?

-Micha

On Sun, Jul 31, 2011 at 01:09:12PM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
> I happened accross a curious Ramban recently (Parshas Shlah, ed. Chavel,  
> p. 242):" God, who knows the future, commanded him to send one man from  
> each tribe of Israel, and that they be leaders, because God wanted all  
> of the aristocrats (gedolim) to share equally in this matter, so that  
> maybe they would remember and return to God (ulay yizkru v'yashuvu el  
> hashem)."

> But doesn't that last clause imply that God didn't know the future here?  

Speaking for myself, not answering about the Ramban's position, I see no
way one can logically say Hashem knows the future. Not as a statement
about Divine Knowledge, but because of using the word "future" WRT the
Creator.

http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2005/01/divine-timelessness.shtml

    ...
    G-d's timelessness seems to also pose problems with free will. How
    can I be free to choose when G-d already knows what my choice
    will be? Rabbi Aqiva seems to simply take it as a divine mystery,
    "hakol tzafui vehareshus nesunah -- all is foreseen, but freedom is
    granted." The Rambam, in Hilkhos Teshuvah, also describes it as a
    Divine Mystery. If we can't understand what it means that He knows
    something, where He and His Knowledge are one, and where learning
    (which is a process of change, and therefore of time) is not involved,
    how can we discuss mysteries about how that knowledge interacts our
    free will?

    The Or Samei'ach explains it slightly differently. Just as His
    Knowledge of the past does not change the nature of the present,
    so too His Knowledge of the future. Because to Him, past and future
    are the same.

    Rav Dessler writes that our perception of the flow of time is a
    product of eating of the tree of knowledge. With eating the fruit,
    man's free will became centered on a progression from desire to
    effort to fulfillment or frustration. This gives our concept of
    time a flow, a direction. Rav Dessler compares our perception of
    time to looking at a map through a piece of paper with a small hole
    in it. One can move the hole from city to city along the roads. But
    that progression is a product of how we're looking at the map, not
    the map itself. Adam saw "from one end of the world to the next",
    an expression also used of a baby's soul before birth. They see the
    map without the paper in front; all of time from one end to the other.

    Rav Dessler's metaphor is akin to Paul Davies' description of
    Einsteinian spacetime. In relativistic physics, the universe is a
    four dimensional sculpture. We think of it as a 3d movie, with time
    having a flow that the three spatial dimensions do not. But that's
    an illusion of our perception.

    From this perspective, the Or Samei'ach's answer is compelling. G-d
    is like an observer, looking at a sculpture. Yes, the observer could
    look at one point in the height of the sculpture while touching or
    moving a lower one. Just as G-d could Know the entirety of history
    while interacting with any one point in it.

    G-d doesn't know today what I will decide tomorrow, because G-d
    doesn't have a "today". G-d simply knows. The nearest way in which we
    can assign a point in time to His knowledge is when speaking of when
    His actions impact creation. And Hashem assures us, using Yishma'el
    as an example, that man is judged "ba'asher hu sham as he is there"
    not based on his future. Within time, the direction of causality
    is preserved.
    ...

> The naive reading of this passage is that the Ramban agrees, if you'll  
> pardon the anachronism, with the Ralbag, who says that God can't know  
> all the details of the future because that would deny human free will.

Someone asked me about the Ralbag. It's Milkhamos Hashem 3:3. He limits
Omniscience to knowing the outcome of every possible sequence of choices
people could make.

Of course, according to the Rambam's Negative Theology, "Omniscience"
really means that there is no limitation in G-d due to a lack of knowledge.

> Is there somewhere else where the Ramban makes his position clear?

I think he's clear here, as per the reisha of your paraphrase. The
Ramban's words: "VeHashem, hayodeia' asidos, tzivehu..." So it's not
a question of whether the Ramban believes Hashem can know the future,
but how to explain the seifa of the paragraph in that light.

The only way the Ramban could hold like the Ralbag is if "asidos", in the
plural, doesn't mean future events (and thus plural) but rather plural
possible futures. I don't know the Ramban's usage, but this would seem
a HUGE stretch to me.

Here's a way to read the Rambam at conflict with the Ralbag: Hashem
wanted ("ki chafeitz Hashem...") that the world be set up for whether
they repent ("ulai yizakhru veyashuvu") or not ("ve'im lo"). It fits
RnTK's reasoning -- that HQBH desires to act in a way that doesn't
require our later choosing one or the other. Even though He Knows the
choice. And this fits the Ramban's explicit statement that He knew at
the time which way things would actually turn out.

-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Zion will be redeemed through justice,
mi...@aishdas.org        and her returnees, through righteousness.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

Me:
>> I would say that the naive translation of that is: "You can do what you
>> want, but God sees what you do". "Tzafui" need not imply prediction.
> RLL:
>
> Can you think of any other source where tzafui means what you suggest?
>
> Lisa
>
>
See Bartenura ad. loc., which the Tashbetz in Magen Avos cites in the 
name of Rashi.  See also Even Shoshan's concordance, which cites 36 uses 
of Tzafah in the Bible, and says that 26 of them (more than 2/3) mean 
"ra'ah, hazah".
   Tzafui is just the passive participle of tzofeh.

David Riceman

RDE:

<<I can not find any Jewish sources regarding feedback - to pick a 
reference and modify behavior or processes or efforts to maximize the 
referent. This is a fundamental Western idea - but not Jewish.>>

What about the Rambam's letter on astrology (Igros HaRambam, ed. 
Sheilat, pp. 478-490)? In the paragraph on p. 480 he blames hurban 
habayis on neglecting the study of war and instead studying astrology.

David Riceman

On Tue, Aug 02, 2011 at 10:11:31AM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
>> That's the whole point of the answer. We can't ask a question from an
>> eved to chameitz bepesach, because the case of shikhrur eved is a special
>> qulah.

> Where do you get that?  All he says is that freeing a slave is easier
> than transferring property; he doesn't say anything about a leniency.

Again, "qal" means qulah, not easier (although the two concepts do overlap).
This is the meaning across the Y-mi, as I showed by some examples. It's also
the meaning in EY in R' Yishmael's day, as in "qal vachomer". I don't know
why Bavli Aramaic switched, and thus set our norm, but that doesn't change
history.

>> the Qorban haEdah (d"h "qal hu beshikhrur") "hiqhilu chakhamim
>> beshikhrur, daa"p delo shelo hu legamrei..." And the Penei Moshe
>> (same d"h), "... shani beshikhrur" -- note, "shani", an exception --
>> "shehiqilu bo ..."

> Im kabalah hi nekabel, but it's not in the words.  And it's certainly
> not enough to create a machlokes between Bavli and Yerushalmi over
> whether something is a mitzvah or an avera!

It IS in the words, given what I said about "qal" which you didn't
comment upon the first time around. IMHO if your reluctance to accept
the Y-mi is choleiq didn't make you assume a different reading, it would
have seemed befeirush.

-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Zion will be redeemed through justice,
mi...@aishdas.org        and her returnees, through righteousness.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On 3/08/2011 4:11 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> Again, "qal" means qulah, not easier (although the two concepts do overlap).

Then what is Leshon Y-mi for "light" or "easy"?

> It's also
> the meaning in EY in R' Yishmael's day, as in "qal vachomer".

Huh?  Kal vachomer means "light and heavy"; nothing to do with an attitude
of leniency or strictness.  It's the *argument* that is light or heavy,
not the practical outcome.  The equivalent in English is "a fortiori",
which means "from the stronger"; again referring to the argument as strong
or weak, not to the outcome.   Chumra and kula, OTOH, are about the outcome
being easy or difficult for a person to comply with, and thus have to do
with how much sympathy we should have for the person, and how far we should
go to make their lives easier.

-- 
Zev Sero        If they use these guns against us once, at that moment
z...@sero.name   the Oslo Accord will be annulled and the IDF will
                 return to all the places that have been given to them.
                                            - Yitzchak Rabin

                    
                

On Wed, Aug 03, 2011 at 04:26:38PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
>> Again, "qal" means qulah, not easier (although the two concepts do overlap).
>
> Then what is Leshon Y-mi for "light" or "easy"?

I don't recall. However, I did show you a number of examples. Google for
qal and "inurl:http://www.mechon-mamre.org/b/r" (limiting your search
to Mechon Mamre's copy of the Y-mi) for more cases.

In any case, the acharonim on the page clearly understand "qal" in our
original context to mean qulah, as they speak of chakhamim choosing
"lehaqeil". So aside from your "im qabbalah hi...", you would be at a
loss to explain why they read the gemara as they do if "qal" didn't mean
"qulah".

>> It's also
>> the meaning in EY in R' Yishmael's day, as in "qal vachomer".

> Huh?  Kal vachomer means "light and heavy"; nothing to do with an attitude
> of leniency or strictness.  It's the *argument* that is light or heavy,
> not the practical outcome...

Which is why "qal vachomer she'ata dan techilaso lehachmir vesofo
lehaqeil eino din"? And what about the two potential directions "min
haqal el hachomer" and "min hachomer el haqal"? It's not the outcome
or arghument that is being called light or heavy, it's the dinim being
compared. We are more meiqil in one topic than the other. And that
first topic is being called the "qal".

My take on qal vachomer, some personal guesses/chiddushim follow:

Qal vakhomer describe the relative stringencies of the two dinim. Let's
call them P and Q.

We find that the set of situations in which P implies an issur or a
chiyuv is a superset of the situations in which Q holds. We assume
there are no Black Swans that aren't discussed. This is a weak point
in inductive reasoning -- there may be the case that falsifies your
hypothesis out there waiting for you. The middah shehaTorah nidreshes
bo says that if such a case existed, HQBH would let us know -- we're
safe. And this, from
    for all x of which we know Q(x): P(x) also holds
AND
    for some y: P(y) and not Q(y)

THEN we can label P the chamur, and Q the qal, and thus
    for all z: P(z) implies Q(z)  -- min hachomer el haqal
and contrapositively:
    for all z: not Q(z) implies Q(z) -- min haqal el hachomer

Notice I'm separating the a fortiori reasoning from the rule that any
Black Swans would be recorded. If it were only the former QvC would be
a rule of sevara and wouldn't belong in a list of derashos. "Lamah li
qera, sevarah hi?" -- sevara and derashah are distinct concepts. However,
this rule about the text would justify counting QvC as a middah.

-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Zion will be redeemed through justice,
mi...@aishdas.org        and her returnees, through righteousness.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On 08/03/2011 08:54 AM, David Riceman wrote:
> RTK:
>> To say that if G-d has total foreknowledge, then we don't have free
>> will, or if we have free will, then He doesn't have foreknowledge, is
>> a plain contradiction to what Chazal said. It's in Pirkei Avos. "Hakol
>> tzafui vehareshus nesunah."
> 
> I would say that the naive translation of that is: "You can do what you
> want, but God sees what you do".  "Tzafui" need not imply prediction.

Not sure if your na?ve translation is even possible, but in the context
of the Mishna the apparent paradox (based on the usual translation
"tzafui"=foreseen) seems to be the point of what the Tanna is saying.

--Chesky


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