Avodah Mailing List

Volume 27: Number 123

Tue, 25 May 2010

• 1. star-k on worms in fish (Eli Turkel)
• 2. Rabbi Chaim Goldberg on Star-K on Worms in Fish (Yitzchok Levine)
• 3. is there morality outside of the Torah (Hankman)
• 4. why so few first borns (Eli Turkel)
• 5. Re: everyone is a liar (Zev Sero)
• 6. borders of EY (Eli Turkel)
• 7. Re: borders of EY (Micha Berger)
• 8. Re: onshin shelo nin hadin (Micha Berger)
• 9. Re: The Torah was not given on Shavuos!! (Micha Berger)
• 10. Re: is there morality outside of the Torah (Eli Turkel)
• 11. Star-K on worms in fish (Dov Kaiser)
• 12. Re: Two Ideals (Michael Poppers)
• 13. Re: chazakah and probability (Micha Berger)
• 14. responsa (Eli Turkel)
• 15. Re: is there morality outside of the Torah (Micha Berger)

from the posting of YL from the star-K

"Until we issue policies and procedures for
inspections (as we have for vegetables and fruit)
the following species of fish (fresh, frozen or
canned) should NOT be used (even with kosher certification):"

The star-K is free to use whatever standards they wish. I find it
strange they recommend not relying on other kashrut agencies
that differ.
Do they do that on every product that they differ (more machir)
with other places?

-- 
Eli Turkel

Rabbi Chaim Goldberg,  who heads the OU "Fish Desk" sent the response 
below to my earlier email (part of which is below) on this topic.  He 
has given me permission to distribute his response. YL

1.       Gefilte fish is ground, so presumably any bugs would be 
ground too.  There is no issur of bitul issur lchatchila, since one 
does not want the bugs, and ground up they are no longer a beryah and 
therefore batul.

2.       A & B uses farmed salmon (wild is RIDICULOUSLY expensive)

Rabbi Chaim Goldberg
Rabbinic Coordinator
Orthodox Union
212.613.8340
Direct Fax 212.613.0695

From: Yitzchok Levine [mailto:Larry.Lev...@stevens.edu]
Sent: Sunday, May 23, 2010 12:20 PM
To: avo...@lists.aishdas.org
Subject: Star-K on Worms in Fish

Below is the recent Star-K post regarding checking for bugs in fish. 
It is from 
<http://star-k.org/cons-ve
gdetail.php?ID=74>http://star-k.org/cons-ve
gdetail.php?ID=74

I found the listing under "only the variety of fish found on the 
following list may be used without any need for inspection" of 
gefilte fish and minced fish sticks surprising.   After all, one 
could conceivably use some of the varieties of fish listed under 
"should NOT be used" in the making of gefilte fish and/or minced 
fish. Indeed, A & B sells (or at least did sell) salmon gefilte fish. 
See 
<http://www.gefiltefi
sh.com/product.asp?id=1&;subid=58&productID=445>http://www.gefiltefi
sh.com/product.asp?id=1&;subid=58&productID=445 


Presumably the fact that the fish is ground up and therefore the 
worms are also ground up is why the Star-K lists gefilte fish and 
minced fish as being OK, no matter what kind of fish these products 
are made from. IIRC, there was something about pureeing strawberries 
that might be bug infested and then using them.

I am not sure exactly how grinding or pureeing works halachically so 
that one may use the result. True, one can no longer see the worms or 
bugs, but why is one allowed to do this l'chatchila?  Is it not being 
mevatel an issur up front?

YL

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RET wrote:

The Mechilta quotes R Issi ben Akiba that if killing a nonJew was
prohibited before Sinai then certainly Sinai can not permit something
that was forbidden. Again assumes there are basics which the Torah
could not permit and we know it is basic since it was prohibited
befroe the Torah was given.

CM responds:

You fail to note the conclusion of that Mechilta:  "bemes amru, patur midinai basar vedam, udino masur lashomayim."

Even Issi ben Akiba doesn't prove your point as this was not self taught
from man's sense of morality (though perhaps it could have been found that
way), but GIVEN to man as the commands of the sheva mitzvoz benai Noach.

Kol Tuv

Chaim Manaster



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<<A typical Levi wife had 37 sons?! (And presumably an equal number of
daughters?!)>>

Actually more since every levi whose genealogy is given in the Torah
as a lot less. Levi has 3 sons, Amram 2 sons and a daughter,
Moshe 2 sons, Aharon 4 sons (and some daughters) and similarly
for the others listed in the Torah.


-- 
Eli Turkel

Eli Turkel wrote:
>>> Nope.   The term "tzorchei rabbim" doesn't appear there even once.
>>> You are making up halachos out of thin air and attributing them to the
>>> Shulchan Aruch.

> The Talmud allows for reinterment when the grave causes public damage
> (Sanhedrin 47a),

47b, actually.

> such as when it is found next to a public road (YD 364:5).

And yet you claimed that this se'if permitted moving a grave for
"tzorchei rabim". Now you quote it saying something quite different.
Surely you are not expecting anyone to accept that "mazik et harabim" and
"tzorchei rabim" are in some way synonymous, or even remotely similar!
There is no honest way to get from one to the other. If a road is built,
and then a grave is found on or near it, so that it is now damaging the
public it may be moved; how does that apply to a grave that is sitting
quietly by itself, minding its own business, until the public proposes
to put a road over it? How can you possibly imagine that this law allows
the public to move the grave and build the road?

On the contrary, I can prove that it is not so: if such a thing were
permitted, then why doesn't the gemara (and ultimately the SA) say so,
and we would know kal vachomer that if the road was already built the
grave may be moved? Why does it choose to speak of a grave that was found
after the road was long-established, instead of straightforwardly stating
"mefanin et hakever la'asot derech larabim"? And why even bring up the
concept of "nezek"?

-- 
Zev Sero
z...@sero.name

: I recall that there is a machloket whether the days of Ezra is to
: be taken literally or includes conquests of the Chashmanoim.

Obviously this gemara in Demai assumes the former.>>

From Encylopedia Talmudit:

Mor UKetzia assumes that any land conquered during bayit rishon
is considered land from yotzei Mitzrayim. Similarly land conquered
during bayit sheni is kedusha from Ezra.

The Kesef Mishna Shmitta and Yovel 4:28 takes it for granted
that the cities conquered by Yannai have kedusha of Ezra.
So he obviously learned differently in Demai

--
Eli Turkel




-- 
Eli Turkel

On Mon, May 24, 2010 at 11:09:58PM +0300, Eli Turkel wrote:
:>: I recall that there is a machloket whether the days of Ezra is to
:>: be taken literally or includes conquests of the Chashmanoim.

:> Obviously this gemara in Demai assumes the former.

: From Encylopedia Talmudit:
...
: The Kesef Mishna Shmitta and Yovel 4:28 takes it for granted
: that the cities conquered by Yannai have kedusha of Ezra.
: So he obviously learned differently in Demai

Or the Bavli was choleiq. That is what I was figuring (not that I claim
to have remembered it was bedavqa the KM) when I limited my comment to
"this gemara in Demai".

In any case, it doesn't look to me like the KM actually does equate
Alexander Yannai's acquisitions to qedushas Ezra. The Rambam 4:28 is
talking about shemittah derbannan WRT zeri'ah, whereas the KM says in
4:29 that qedushas Ezra creates an issur de'oraisa (when yosheveha aleha)
WRT zeri'ah. There is nothing in KM's 4:28 for me to think he is choleiq
on the Rambam.

The "ad Keziv" in the Rambam's 4:26 is the limit of olei Bavel, not of
Alexander Yannai. It is from Shevi'is 6:1, and is also an idiom used in
Y-mi Demai.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             You will never "find" time for anything.
mi...@aishdas.org        If you want time, you must make it.
http://www.aishdas.org                     - Charles Buxton
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On Sun, May 23, 2010 at 10:45:14AM +0300, Eli Turkel wrote:
: The Ran learns that Kipah is part of dinei melech. So he disagrees with Micha
: about 7 tuvei hair...

I'm not sure how the seifa follows from the reisha. The Ran says that
dinei hamelekh are to provide an ordered society. The 7 tuvei ha'ir
is an institution usable even in the golah for providing an orderly
society. Why wouldn't we assume Ran attributes the melekh's powers as
a superset of the tuvei ha'ir's?

:                     The Ran would claim that 7 tuvei hair can only make
: emergency rules for punishments but cannot introduce new rules
: that are permanent such as kipa

We discussed the Ran's position in the past. I am a daas yachid among the
chevrah who does not understand the Ran to be saying that the melekh's
power is limited to responding to the particular situation in front of us.
Rather, he passes laws to organize society as the need arises. Not just
responding to moments of need.

Also, the power of the melekh is when to use the kippah. Who said it's
the concept of kippah as a general concept?

: As I have said several times before according to many (most?) achronim
: we accept a kinyan that the merchants use but we cant have a rule that
: no kinyan is needed even if that is common practice. ie there are limits
: as to what common practice or 7 tuvei hair can introduce....

Again, I miss the link between the reisha and the seifa. There is nothing
in your first sentence that limits the power of common practice to define
qinyan. And then the question is whether the 7 tuvei ha'ir set choshein
mishpaq practices by fiat or by defining common practice.

I also miss the link between qinyanim, which rely on daas and thus norms
that change how people view an action can change the din, and kippah.

In short, you left me totally lost on this one.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             It is our choices...that show what we truly are,
mi...@aishdas.org        far more than our abilities.
http://www.aishdas.org                           - J. K. Rowling
Fax: (270) 514-1507

The origin of the idea that what we not have as TSBP was written on the
first luchos is Chazal's. The Beis haLevi (Derush 18) writes that this
meant that anything studied would never be forgotten.

RSShkop turns this into a mussar hasqeil. From my translation of his
haqdamah to Shaarei Yosher:
    The beginning of the receiving of the Torah through Moses was
    a symbol and sign for all of the Jewish people who receive the
    Torah [since]. Just as Hashem told Moses, "Carve for yourself two
    stone Tablets", so too it is advice for all who receive the Torah.
    Each must prepare Tablets for himself, to write upon them the word
    of Hashem. According to his readiness in preparing the Tablets, so
    will be his ability to receive. If in the beginning or even any time
    after that his Tablets are ruined, then his Torah will not remain.
    This removes much of Moses' fear, because according to the value and
    greatness of the person in Awe/Fear of Hashem and in middos, which
    are the Tablet of his heart, this will be the measure by which heaven
    will give him acquisition of Torah. And if he falls from his level,
    by that amount he will forget his Torah, just as our sages said of a
    number of things that cause Torah to be forgotten. About this great
    concept our sages told us to explain the text at the conclusion of
    the Torah, "and all the great Awe Inspiring acts which Moses wrought
    before the eyes of all of Israel." [Devarim 34:12, the closing words
    of the Torah]

    To my mind this can be connected to what our sages explained
    in Nedarim (daf 38[a]) on the verse "carve for yourself". Moses
    didn't get rich except through the extras of the Tablets. This is an
    amazing idea -- [is it possible that] Hashem couldn't find any way
    to make Moses wealthy except through the extras of the Tablets? But
    through what we said, we can explain this. Through this change of
    how Tablets are to be readied, there was given opportunity for those
    who receive the Torah to fear, to accept upon themselves the yoke of
    Torah. Through this it becomes appropriate for anyone entering the
    gates of Torah to separate themselves from all the preoccupations
    of his world. As they interpret the verse "'it is not on the other
    side of the sea' (Devarim 30:13) it is not found at salesman or
    importers." (Eiruvin 55) However, if the first Tablets had remained,
    then it would be sufficient to establish an easy hour for Torah,
    and spend most of your time trading and buying. For this reason the
    Holy One showed Moses as a sign to all who accept the Torah that He
    would prepare for them their income through the making of the Tablet;
    any "extras that are carved away" will provide them with income.

Working at learning, only necessary since the pesal lekha of the 2nd
luchos, comes after the pesal lekha of developing middos, which in turn
is the ehrlachkeit necessary for the "lekha" of our parnasah.

At this point, one of the YU crowd will mention the parallel to RYBS's
metaphor of the need to prepare the kelaf before writing a seifer Torah
to the need to develop ehrlachkeit before being able to absorb the Torah
one learns.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             When we are no longer able to change a situation
mi...@aishdas.org        -- just think of an incurable disease such as
http://www.aishdas.org   inoperable cancer -- we are challenged to change
Fax: (270) 514-1507      ourselves.      - Victor Frankl (MSfM)

On Mon, May 24, 2010 at 5:35 PM, Hankman <sal...@videotron.ca> wrote:
> Even Issi ben Akiba doesn't prove your point as this was not self taught
> from man's sense of morality (though perhaps it could?have been found that
> way), but GIVEN to man as the commands of the sheva mitzvoz benai Noach.

I reread the article and RAL just quotes the first part.
His main argument is from the phrase
"Is there anything that is permitted to a Jew but prohibited to a Gentile?"
and this is used for halachic discussion.

I am being slightly unfair as it is a long article and RAL quotes many sources
and certainly agrees that while halacha incorporates natural morality
nevertheless after Sinai it supersedes other systems. Nevertheless,
RAL (as opposed to Leibowitz) assumes that halacha contains an
ethical system.

-- 
Eli Turkel

R. Y. Levine wrote:

 

<<I am not sure exactly how grinding or pureeing works halachically
so that one may use the  result. True, one can no longer see the worms or 
bugs, but why is one allowed to do this l'chatchila? Is it not being
mevatel an issur up front?>>

 

My Rav when I lived in Melbourne, who treats R. Heinemann's psakim as
decisive, permitted us to buy brocolli to make soup, despite the
impossibility of checking them properly, provided we bought them with that
intention.  In other words, provided our intention in buying the brocolli
was to make a soup, there was no problem of mevatel issur l'chatchila.	Had
we bought the brocolli to eat whole, and then decided to make soup as a way
of permitting them, there would have been a problem.  I assume this is the
basis for Star-K's ruling in this case.

 

Kol tuv

Dov Kaiser

                                          
_________________________________________________________________
http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/195013117/direct/01/
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In Avodah V27#122, R'Micha noted:
> This in turn might be related to the Chassidim haRishonim and their
initial refusal to fight with the Makabiim on Shabbos (Makkabiim I 2:39),
although they did later join (v. 43). <
Some analogies to pre-M'dinah and War of Independence situations (to name
two which are in the ken of listmembers) may be drawn.

Mei'inyan l'inyan b'oso inyan: some have tried to suggest rationales for
why great communities of Torah adherents were, lo aleinu, wiped out in
recent times.  I once heard an explanation, offered w/ trepidation, that
those communities were insular and worked on improving themselves but not
on helping their fellow Jews who lived outside the community's "walls,"
albeit nearby.  My personal mnemonic for that explanation: one should be a
ba'al chessed but not a chasidah (a "sheqetz"/non-Kosher bird which only
helped its own kind [see RaShY on Vayiqra 11:19]).

All the best from
--Michael Poppers via RIM pager
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On Fri, May 21, 2010 at 10:46:53AM +0300, Eli Turkel wrote:
: We have several times discussed if chazakah depends on actual statistics

If it did, wouldn't it be a ruba deleisa leqaman?

I would define a chazaqah disvara as a rule of thumb, a law of nature or
human nature that is "lo daq" and therefore has its rare exceptions.
Thus, it would have to be consistent with statistics, but is stronger
than ruba deleisa leqaman which is entirely the statistic without any
rationale for why it would be true.

: The gemara in Nida brings a chazakah of Raba that a boy/girl at the age of 13/12
: has a chazakah that they have physical simanim needed to be an adult.
...
: The question is why is this chazakah different from other chazakot?

We only rely on this chazaqah for dinim derabbanan, so it's known to be
a weak chazaqah -- the rule has far more exceptions than usual. We rely
on it despite this weakness for tzeni'us reasons, as the alternative is
to have the metzi'us checked.

But we can't invent that qulah for mitzvos de'oraisa. And so, jumping
back in RET's post:
: Nevertheless, SA followed by MA and other poskim state that we do not allow
: a bar mitzvah boy to be motzi others in a Torah law unless we have
: evidence (R Akiva Eger 2 witnesses) that the boy has simanim. Examples
: are parshat zachor, kiddush to be motzi women who have not davened maariv,
: halitza etc.

Note these are de'oraisos. I would also add geir qatan, which is why the
geir qatan can't do a formal qabbalas ol mitzvos before a beis din. It
owuld have to be done within tokh kedai dibur of that 2nd sei'ar ---
a near impossibility.

Although zimun is only a problem if the other two aren't saying the
words themselves. I am under the impression this is why we don't follow
the SA and MA -- our situation is different than that in their pesaqim.

For our kind of zimun, for being sha"tz, for getting an aliyah, we do
rely on the chazaqah. So it's not just that the statistics changed and
the chazaqah evaporated. The statistics were always recognized as being
a small rov, and so the rule of thumb is a poor one. That plus a halachic
desideratum to avoid having to check metzi'us adds up to only being able
to outweigh a derabbanan.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             It is our choices...that show what we truly are,
mi...@aishdas.org        far more than our abilities.
http://www.aishdas.org                           - J. K. Rowling
Fax: (270) 514-1507

[To give context, the question of who has been writing shu"t lately, and
in particular the next generation's "Tzitz Eliezer, Minchat Yitzchaq, IM,
or Minchas Shelomo" was raised on Areivim. -micha]

> How do you know which of the current young rabbonim will turn out to be
> those 'equivalents'?

Better question than I have an answer. Basically the first sefer we dont
know but after a while they establish a reputation. Others start with
at least an important position, ie head of an important bet din.

I main criteria is that the shutim deal with important current issues.

Bottom line Efraim is right it is hindsight.

Part of my "gripe" is that it is become more popular to just issue psakim

As an aside I am giving shiurim now on electricity and "dud shemesh"
The responsa that allow things go into great detail.

Rav Wosner who doesnt allow using the "dud" on shabbat doesnt address
the issues of those that allow it and after a short teshuva says there
is no need to go into detail.

Similarly with the electricity issue on shabbat(when other melachot
are not a problem) we have the original set of letters between CI and
RSZA. Later poskim who hold that it is forbidden from the Torah simply
state that and dont refute RSZA's arguments.

There is a relatively new set of seforim on shabbat - Orchot Shabbat-
in discussing electrical appliances on shabbat he basically ignores
the opinion of RSZA and brings shitot that one cannot add the use of
electricity on shabbat as a derabban as one part of a heter

I really feel that one see that koach hetera requires more work and it is
"easy" to write teshuvot that are machmir on everything

kol tuv
Eli Turkel

See also RY Amital's talk at
<http://www.vbm-torah.org/archive/chag70/shavuot70-a.htm>, 2nd article.

I see there being two similar issues and their distinction is worth
underlining.

The question in the subject line is:
1- Is there morality outside of the Torah?
   This is the question of whether we believe natural morality exists.
   (RYA's section II)

2- Is there Torah mandated morality outside of halakhah?
   (RYA's section III)

   Lifnim mishuras hadin -- how does one define "within"? How do you
   define tov, yashar, qedoshim tihyu... And when chazal speak of
   derekh eretz preceding Torah by 26 generations, what is derekh eretz?
   What does ve'ahavta lereiakha obligate? The position is contradicted
   by the Ramban's concept of naval birshus haTorah, as well as his
   tatement on "ve'asisa hatov vehayashar" that it sums up interpersonal
   morality in all the myriads of way the rest of the pereq (Vayiqra 19)
   can't possibly cover. It is also rejected by the Rambam, as is seen in
   his exploration of taamei hamitzvos in the Moreh, and in Hil' Dei'os's
   discussion of vehalakhta bidrakhav. Chassidus and Mussar obviously
   both consider the notion false, as both have further practices based
   on such derived values. Etc, etc, etc...


On Mon, May 24, 2010 at 09:35:51AM +0300, Eli Turkel wrote:
: Benjamin Whichcote quotes Abraham who tells G-d that G-d Forbid that
: G-d should kill the innocent with the guilty - Shall then the judge of
: the whole earth
: not do justice? This makes sense only if there is a justice that
: applies also to G-d,
: otherwise the question is circular.

This drifts into Euthypro. Whichcote is assuming that either justice is
defined by "that which G-d declares just" or also applies to G-d. What
if Avraham was really asking, "How can you expect us to be just if You
do not model that behavior?" A vehalakhta bidrakhav based question.

More definitely along the lines of our issue:
: Abaye says the purpose of the Torah is to promote peace. So Abaye assumes
: that peace is an objective value. R Saadia Gaon in his introduction to
: Emunot veDeot says that most mitzvot could be discovered by man given
: enough time and interest and this seems to be the opinion of R. Bachya
: (from RAL).

And what about Hillel's answer to the prospective geir? "Mah desani" also
defines a natural morality.

: In Eruvin R. Yochanan states that without the Torah we could learn
: modesty from the cat, chastity from the dove etc. As Moshe indicates
: one could turn this around. Obviously R. Yochanan feels there are
: absolutes that we would learn without the Torah.

R Yeshaiah Leibowitz actually answers "no" to both, which is what
astounded RnTK recently. I find the claim amazing as well. The notion
that one doesn't derive moral values from the halakhah and thus has
requirements beyond the letter of the law makes it hard to explain
the list I gave above, RET's (RAL's?) examples of Abaye, RDC and R'
Yochanan, etc...

I know of no prior source, and much TSBP in opposition. Aside from
pesuqim I do not know how RYL would explain. Does he address defining
tov and yashar anywhere? Here we have a chiyuv, and no defined limits
other than simply "be good and ethical". Doesn't that presume a preknown
definition of these concepts?

: The Mechilta quotes R Issi ben Akiba that if killing a nonJew was
: prohibited before Sinai then certainly Sinai can not permit something
: that was forbidden...

And this highlights the problem with all these examples. The Mekhilta
is asking my second question. It is speaking know from revelation,
beris Noach, that murder is assur. The Mechilta isn't saying it's self
evident, or "mah desani", or the like. This text does not refer to the
question in the subject line.

Jumping back to part of RET's post that I skipped above:
: Abaye says the purpose of the Torah is to promote peace. So Abaye assumes
: that peace is an objective value...

Abaye holds that peace is a primary value. But was that natural morality,
or deduced from pesuqim and halakhos about shalom? 

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             With the "Echad" of the Shema, the Jew crowns
mi...@aishdas.org        G-d as King of the entire cosmos and all four
http://www.aishdas.org   corners of the world, but sometimes he forgets
Fax: (270) 514-1507      to include himself.     - Rav Yisrael Salanter


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