Avodah Mailing List

Volume 15 : Number 047

Tuesday, July 12 2005

• Der Alter: Alei Shur (1:4)
• Re: [Hirhurim - Musings] Shaking Hands With Women
• [Der Alter] Iggeres HaMussar VI
• [Hirhurim - Musings] Mixed Theology
• Re: [Hirhurim - Musings] Shaking Hands With Women
• Dibur
• Re: Dibur
• Re: Regarding the most recent issue of "Mesora" Jewish Times - The Weekly Journal on Jewish Thought
• Re: tinok shenishba
• Re: tinok shenishba
• The halachos of "borrowing" wireless access
• [hirhurim] [Hirhurim - Musings] Hogwarts Shabbos
• Re: YGB: Daf Halachah - Shabbos 72b
• Re: [Hirhurim - Musings] Shaking Hands With Women
• Re: The halachos of "borrowing" wireless access
• YGB: Daf Halachah - Shabbos 72b
• re: [Hirhurim - Musings] Shaking Hands With Women
• Re: chasid - HP
• Re: a way to understand chazal/science/halacha?

Monday, July 11, 2005

Alei Shur (1:4)

    "G-d granted us a (special) skill with which to create human
    civilization: the faculty of speech. It's likewise true that we
    not only use speech to create human civilization, but that our very
    relationship to the Creator is built on it. For regardless of whether
    G-d 'speaks' to us or we speak to Him, at bottom it's all through
    the faculty of speech."

posted by Rabbi Yaakov Feldman at [7]8:43 AM   

SBA wrote:
> PS BTW, isn't it interesting how often we will find that those who rely
> on RMF for their chalav stam - do not accept his handshaking psak - and
> conversely those who insist on CY do accept his ruling re handshaking...?
> A case of taking kulei BS and kulei BH?

I insist on CY and do shake hands when a woman who is ignorant extends
her hand to me. I guess that make me a Yekke... ;-)

YGB

ΧΧΧ ΧΧΧ Χ’ΧΧ©Χ ΧΧ’ΧΧ¨Χ ΧΧΧ Χ’Χ Χ©:
The one who does the sin and the one who is punished are one. It is
human nature to disassociate the "hypothetical" future "self" from the
current self that commits the crime. The psychological advantages are
great, as this:

1. Permits me to still regard myself as a "good" person - that rasha
who will be punished in th future sometime, that's not "me."

2. Permits me to fully relish the sinful behavior, relegating any negative
reprecussions to some dimly remote, less understood, "future."

3. Permits me to assume that there is a lot of time to fix anything I
"very temporarily" damage - there's plenty of time!

Therefore, Mussar demands the bringing of the future into the present.
It asserts the inseparability of act and consequence, of now and later.

When people are eclectic and mix concepts from different thinkers,
there is always a danger that they will end up combining contradicting
ideas (I recently praised R. Baruch Simon for not doing this
<http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/2005/06/sayings-of-baruch.html>). Here is
an example:

When confronting the problem of suffering and evil in the world, many
turn to the idea that God intentionally hides his presence. The earliest
Jewish source in which I can recall seeing this concept is the writings of
R. Moshe Hayim Luzzatto (Ramhal). God's presence is intentionally somewhat
hidden because, otherwise, His obvious presence would force us to believe
in Him, thereby removing our free will. On the other hand, when dealing
with Creation or evolution, people argue that the "intelligent design"
<http://www.actionbioscience.org/evolution/nhmag.html> of the universe
proves that it was created.

When confining the theories to different subjects, the contradiction is
not always obvious. But when looked at comparatively, it is clear that
these two worldviews are entirely incompatible. One could reconcile them
by, for example, stating that "intelligent design" only implies a creator
but does not prove it, thereby leaving room for free will. As we have
seen in past posts
<http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/2005/06/defense-of-simple-faith-iii.html>,
however, there are those who believe that one can and must actually
prove God's existence, and not merely decide that it is the most likely
alternative. To them, such a reconciliation is meaningless. If they adopt
the Ramhal's view that God's presence is hidden to allow for free will,
they are contradicting themselves. This is the danger of eclecticism.
Using a Christian variant on the above ideas, Douglas Adams ably mocks
such inconsistent thinkers in his The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy,
p. 60:

    Now it is such a bizarrely improbable coincidence that anything so
    mind-bogglingly useful could have evolved purely by chance that
    some thinkers have chosen to see it as a final and clinching proof
    of the nonexistence of God.
    The argument goes something like this: "I refuse to prove that
    I exist," says God, "for proof denies faith, and without faith I
    am nothing."
    "But," says Man, "the Babel fish is a dead giveaway, isn't it? It
    could not have evolved by chance. It proves you exist, so therefore,
    by your own arguments, you don't. QED."
    "Oh dear," says God, "I hadn't thought of that," and promptly vanishes
    in a puff of logic.

--
Posted by Gil Student to Hirhurim - Musings at 7/11/2005 08:48:00 AM

On Sun, Jul 10, 2005 at 01:40:47AM +1000, SBA wrote:
: PS BTW, isn't it interesting how often we will find that those who rely
: on RMF for their chalav stam - do not accept his handshaking psak - and
: conversely those who insist on CY do accept his ruling re handshaking...?
: A case of taking kulei BS and kulei BH?

You're equally condeming those who take both chumros.

But in any case, who said they're accepting the pesaq /because/ it's
Rav Moshe Feinstein's, rather than citing the IM because it's the most
available written version of it?

In the case of chalav hacompanies, the kehillos who were using it were
doing so before the teshuvos in the IM. In reality, they're relying
on poseqim like R' Henkin, R' Hutner or RYBS (or RYBS's predecessor,
my greatgrandfather, even if they don't know he existed to articulate
and set the norm). For that matter, R' Yaaqov Yosef had to deal with
the question of US FDA milk. Anyone know his pesaq?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 Life is complex.
micha@aishdas.org                Decisions are complex.
http://www.aishdas.org               The Torah is complex.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                                - R' Binyamin Hecht

I'm looking for MM on dibur as the defining element of mankind. Those
based on the Rema about Asher Yatzar as relates to dibur also of interest.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

On Mon, Jul 11, 2005 at 01:18:27AM -0400, Gershon Dubin wrote:
: I'm looking for MM on dibur as the defining element of mankind.  Those
: based on the Rema about Asher Yatzar as relates to dibur also of
: interest.

I thought of two off-the-cuff while approving this post for moderation:
1- Every single seifer that divides the world into domeim, tzomei'ach,
chai, and medabeir.
2- Unqelus on "VaYipach be'apav nishmas chayim", saying that we're mud
plus ru'ach memalela.

-mi

Cantor Wolberg wrote:
> I was quite upset by the following statement contained in the recent  
> publication of "Mesora."
> [...]

I haven't access to the article, but I'm afraid this is a
misunderstanding: The statement you quote refers to religions, whereas
all the examples you bring to refute it are about people, Noahide or not.


ELPhM

brent wrote:
> I have read in a sefer discussing "tinok shenishba" that there is a shita
> that 'one who has never actually seen the Beis HaMikdash can be called
> a tinok shenishba because that person has never seen "Torah b'Tifarta"
> (Torah in its true glory). I have not been able to relocate this sefer
> since then. Does anyone know of this shita and who's it is?
...
> Anyway, does anyone know where or from whom the afore mentioned shita
> comes?

Chazon Ish, Yoreh Deah, IIRC siman 2.

YGB

brent wrote:
> I have read in a sefer discussing "tinok shenishba" that there is a shita
> that 'one who has never actually seen the Beis HaMikdash can be called
> a tinok shenishba because that person has never seen "Torah b'Tifarta"
> (Torah in its true glory). I have not been able to relocate this sefer
> since then. Does anyone know of this shita and who's it is?

Sounds like a paraphrase of the Chazon Ish.

*Chazon Ish (Hilchos Shechita 2:16): *I believe that the legal permission
to kill heretics only exists in a period of time where G-d's Providence
is revealed to everyone. In other words, only in such a time when
miracles are common and they all heard the Bas Kol (Heavenly Voice)
and they saw and acknowledged the unique Providence for the righteous
of the generation. The heretics in those eras -- despite the great
manifestation of spirituality -- had an especially powerful lust for
pleasure and rejecting all religious obligations. In such circumstances,
the destruction of the wicked served the clear purpose of improving
the world. Everyone knew that corrupt moral and violating religious
commandments brought about suffering in the world such as plague, war
and famine. However at a time when there is the absence of such clear
awareness of the importance of spirituality, then killing heretics does
not bring about improvement but rather makes things worse. That is because
in such a non-spiritual world, the punishment of heretics is viewed as
destructive and as religious coercion. Therefore, since the whole reason
for punishing heretics is to improve society, it cannot apply to an era
when it is not generally perceived as an improvement. Thus in our current
situation, we are obligated to bring the non-observant back to the light
of religion -- with acts of love and affection to the best of our ability.

Daniel Eidensohn

R' Noah Witty sent me an email from an email list for lawyers that raised
the parallel question to the below:

Is it mutar to use bandwidth on someone's WiFi (wireless internet)
network? Say someone sets up an unencrypted network, and a neighbor
who happens to have a WiFi card picks up the connection.

The first question involves the permissability in terms of getting free
service from the cable or DSL provider. I see this as a variation on
the theme of copying music raised by RGS on Hirhurim recently (forwarded
here as well.)

The second, the loss of service from the person with the WiFi network
in his home.

My feeling was that the person who paid for the access is already sharing
bandwidth. Everyone else who gets access from the same hub (e.g. off the
same telephone pole) will affect his bandwidth. This doesn't bother him
because it is so rare that anyone needs the full bandwidth available,
and moreso, that two people will be using significant bandwidth at the
same time.

So, one could say that nearly always, it would be a zeh lo neheneh,
vezeh lo chaseir. Can one rely on that rov?

What about the fact that this person chose not to "lock the door"? Does
this imply that he cared more about ease of use than denying reshus? If
it did, this yeilds a third question: The other people on that hub who
are also affected -- and at least one of them probably did make sure
to encrypt, not to use wireless, or otherwise lock-up his network. What
about needing to get their reshus? I think therefore we can ignore this
implied reshus on the part of one person.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             None of us will leave this place alive.
micha@aishdas.org        All that is left to us is
http://www.aishdas.org   to be as human as possible while we are here.
Fax: (270) 514-1507            - unkown MD, while a Nazi prisoner

This Shabbos is unique in that it is the official release day of Harry
Potter and the Half-Blood Prince (Book 6). This post will not deal with
whether one may, in general, read Harry Potter during the week or on
Shabbos. Let us assume that your rabbi is lenient and allows going to
baseball games and reading Harry Potter. The question here is about the
laws of Shabbos. Stores are timing the release of the book so that those
who have ordered in advance will receive it in the mail (or via UPS)
this Shabbos. May an observant Jewish family receive, open and read the
book this Shabbos or will they have to wait until after Shabbos (and,
if so, how long)?

Because there are so many opinions on this issue, everyone is advised
to ask their own rabbi. In this post, I will be following the position
of R. Yehoshua Neuwirth in his Shemiras Shabbos Ke-Hilkhasah (SSK).

I. Mail on Shabbos

Jews are obligated to rest from creative labor on Shabbos. Gentiles,
of course, are not. Can a Jew, therefore, ask or hire a gentile to
perform all of his needs for him on Shabbos, thereby circumventing the
laws? No. There is a specific rabbinic prohibition against doing that--
called amirah la-nokhri--that closes the loophole (although it is left
open in certain circumstances, one which we will see shortly).

Therefore, a Jew cannot give work to a gentile on Friday afternoon,
e.g. giving a suit to a dry cleaner, and demand that the work be complete
by Saturday night because the gentile will be forced to work on Shabbos
for the Jew. However, if the Jew gives it to the gentile on Friday
afternoon and demands that it be done by Monday morning, the gentile can
choose when to perform the work and, if he decides to do it on Shabbos,
it is his own choice and not prohibited.

Centuries ago, the question arose about the status of mail on Shabbos.
Can a Jew send a letter? On the one hand, the postal worker is delivering
the Jew's letter on Shabbos. On the other, the Jew does not care whether
it is delivered on that day or a later day. The consensus is that regular
mail is allowed to be sent (unless the postal service is staffed largely
by Jews, as was the case a few decades ago in NY and is currently in
Israel) but any mail that is sent to be delivered specifically on Shabbos,
i.e. express or overnight mail, is not allowed (SSK 31:20).

Similarly, mail that arrives on Shabbos is not considered as if a
prohibition was performed on it and is not, therefore, inherently
forbidden for use on that Shabbos (SSK 31:22). This is so even if the
package was brought through a place that has no eruv [such as Flatbush ;)
] or from outside of one's tehum Shabbos boundary (SSK 31:23).

II. Opening a Package on Shabbos

The Mishnah Berurah (340:41) generally prohibits opening letters (and,
by implication, packages) on Shabbos because the containers are
reusable. The SSK (28:4) quotes this ruling in the text, but in
footnote 15 quotes R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach as questioning the reason
for this prohibition, since the letter is generally disposed and not
reused. If one intentionally opens the package in such a way that the
box is no longer usable and must be thrown out, this should be
entirely permissible. This is also the position of the Hazon Ish and
R. Shlomo Fisher (cited in Piskei Teshuvos 340:29). (Assuming, of
course, that the letter or package contains no muktzeh information,
such as financial statements or bills.)

However, even the Mishnah Berurah agrees that one may tell a gentile,

such as a nice neighbor or a random passerby, that one may not open
the box because it is Shabbos. This should be enough of a hint that the
gentile will open the box for you. This is allowed despite the general
prohibition of amirah la-nokhri mentioned above (SSK 31:22).

III. Harry Potter on Shabbos

Given all the above, may one open up the Harry Potter package delivered
this Shabbos? Let me quote from the official English translation of SSK,
Shemirath Shabbath: A Guide to the Practical Observance of Shabbath
(31:23, p. 495):

  a. One may use on Shabbath the contents of a parcel delivered that
  day by a non-Jewish mailman.
  b. This is so provided that the sender was not particular that the
  parcel should be delivered on Shabbath.

In my estimation, the bookstores are very particular that this book be
delivered on Saturday, July 16. I suspect that if many people do not
receive their books on this day, there is going to be a big stink and
someone somewhere is going to be fired.

Given this point, it seems to me that one may not open the Harry Potter
package on Shabbos. Not only that, one must wait after Shabbos enough
time for a delivery to arrive, so one does not benefit timewise from
the Shabbos delivery (Mishnah Berurah 515:68). I'm not sure how long
that should be, perhaps the amount of time it takes to drive to your
nearest UPS warehouse of post office (maybe 15 minutes to half an
hour).
--
Posted by Gil Student to Hirhurim - Musings at 7/12/2005 09:38:00 AM

Holiday Decorations
?ž???›?ͺ ?©?‘?ͺ ?“?£ ?’"?‘ ?’"?‘
...?ž??”?‘?” ?•?ž?™?¨??”... ?œ??‘?™?™ ?“??ž?¨ ?—?™?™?‘... ?œ?¨?‘?
?“??ž?¨ ?€?˜?•?¨...
[If one worshiped idolatry] out of love or out of fear [of a person]...
according to Abaye, who says that he is liable... according to Rava,
who says he is exempt...
Tosafos (d.h. Rava) ask, since according to Rava a person who worships
idolatry out of love or out of fear of a person is exempt, why did
Mordechai not bow down to Haman?
Tosafos respond that it was either because Haman bore two idols on his
chest, and in bowing down to him it would seem tha Mordechai was
worshiping Haman’s idolaty. In their second explanation (as
elaborated by Piskei Tosafos #278) they answer that since Haman
expected to be worshiped in a public venue in the presence of many
people, Mordechai concluded that it was important, under those
circumstances, not to rely on Rava’s leniency, but to sanctify
G-d’s name by refusing to bow, even though it would have been clear
that he was merely bowing out of fear of Haman’s vengeance.1
Rava’s leniency, qualified by the clarification of Tosafos as to when
it is proper to be stringent, is the basis of the ruling of Rama, Yoreh
Deah 150:3 (based on Terumas HaDeshen):2
Nobles or priests that have forms of idolatry in their clothing, or who
bear the form of the sun before them, as do the governors, it is
forbidden to bow down to them or to remove one’s hat before them,
except in a non-obvious manner, such as if his coins scattered or if
rose before them prior to their arrival, and so too he should remove
his hat and bow prior to their arrival. Others, however, are lenient in
this matter, since it is known that even the non-Jews are not removing
their hats or bowing down to the form of the sun, but rather to the
noble. But it is best to be stringent, like the first approach.
Beur HaGra (ad loc. #5) however, notes that Terumas HaDeshen has not
taken the beggining of Tosafos, which makes the case that even
according to Rava, there is no license granted to serve out off love or
fear, rather an exemption after the fact to exempt such a person from
the death penalty.3
Notwithstanding the Vilna Gaon’s difficulty, later authorities have
ruled that where additional extenuating circumstances exist -
particularly where a situation like that of Mordechai’s in which he
was either faced with bona fide idolatry, or accosted in a very public
venue - one may participate in non-Jewish ceremonies. Thus, Mahari
Aszad, Yoreh Deah #170 permits Jews to light candles on Easter night.
He explains that the additional extenuating circumstances are many: It
is not a religious law that Jews must particiipate in holiday
illumination, but just the will of certain governors that the Jews in
their jurisdiction rejoice as they do; their religion is not
unmitigated idolatry; and, most importantly, the large number of
candles may be construed not as a part of the Easter celebration, but
as part of the [then] concurrent celebration of Pesach! (see Darchei
Teshuvah, Yoreh Deah 150:14 at length).
It would seem, accordingly, that in our day a Jewish merchant would be
permitted to hang β€œholiday” lighting and ornamentation during the
β€œholiday season” - again, there is no religious law requiring such
decoration. It is, rather, a commercial imperative; the
β€œcelebration” of the season is certainly not one of unmitigated
religious spirit; and, most importantly, the decorations may be
construed not as a part of the Xmas season celebration, but as part of
the concurrent celebration of the season of Chanukah!
1.
?ͺ?•???€?•?ͺ ?©?‘?ͺ ?“?£ ?’"?‘ ?’"?‘ ?“"?” ?¨?‘?: ?•?"?ͺ ?•?œ?ž??™
?“?€?˜?¨ ?¨?‘? ??ž??™ ?œ? ?”?©?ͺ?—?•?” ?ž?¨?“?›?™ ?œ?”?ž?Ÿ ?•?™"?œ
?›?“??ž?¨?™? ?Ÿ ?‘?ž?“?¨?© ?©?©?ͺ?™ ?¦?•?¨?•?ͺ ?”?™?• ?’?œ ?œ?‘?•
?•?’?•?“ ?ž?©?•? ?§?™?“?•?© ?”?©? ?›?“??©?›?—?Ÿ ?‘?™?¨?•?©?œ?ž?™
?‘?ž???›?ͺ ?©?‘?™?’?™?ͺ ?‘?€?¨?§ ?“' ?›?’?•?Ÿ ?€?€?•?? ?•?œ?•?œ?™? ?•??
??—?™?• ?©? ?ͺ? ?• ?œ?”? ?ž?™? ?‘?–?›?•?›?™?ͺ ?¦?‘?•?’?” ?•?œ?
?§?‘?œ?• ?ž?”?:
2.
?©?•"?’ ?™?•?¨?” ?“?’?” ???™?ž?Ÿ ?§"?  ???’?™?£ ?’' ?‘?”?’"?”: ?©?¨?™?
??• ?›?”? ?™? ?©?™?© ?œ?”? ?¦?•?¨?ͺ ?’?‘?•?“?ͺ ?›?•?›?‘?™?
?‘?‘?’?“?™?”? ??• ?©? ?•?©??™? ?¦?•?¨?ͺ ?—?ž?” ?œ?€? ?™?”?
?›?“?¨?š ?”?’?ž?•? ?™? ????•?¨ ?œ?”?©?ͺ?—?•?ͺ ?œ?”? ??• ?œ?”???™?¨
?”?›?•?‘?’ ?œ?€? ?™?”? ?¨?§ ?‘?“?¨?š ?©??™? ?• ? ?¨??” ?›?ž?•
?©? ?ͺ?€?–?¨?• ?ž?’?•?ͺ?™?• ??• ?©?™?§?•? ?œ?€? ?™?”? ?§?•?“?
?‘?•?? ?•?›?Ÿ ?™???™?¨ ?”?›?•?‘?’ ?•?™?©?ͺ?—?•?” ?§?•?“? ?‘?•??
(?ͺ"?” ???™?ž?Ÿ ?§?¦"?•) ?•?™?© ?ž?§?™?œ?™?Ÿ ?‘?“?‘?¨ ?”?•??™?œ
?•?™?“?•?’ ?©?’? ?”?’?•?‘?“?™ ?›?•?›?‘?™? ??™? ? ?ž???™?¨?™?
?”?›?•?‘?’ ??• ?ž?©?ͺ?—?•?™? ?œ?¦?•?¨?ͺ ?”?—?ž?” ?¨?§ ?œ?”?©?¨ (?©?
?‘?©? ?¨"?™ ?ž??€? ?•"?? ?•?ž?”?¨?™"?•) ?•?˜?•?‘ ?œ?”?—?ž?™?¨
?›???‘?¨? ?”?¨??©?•? ?”:
3.
?ͺ?•???€?•?ͺ ?©?: ?•?™"?œ ?“???‘?¨ ?¨?‘? ?“??€?™?œ?• ?œ?ž"?“
?“?—?™?™?‘ ?œ?ž???•?¨ ??ͺ ?’?¦?ž?• ?? ?œ? ?ž???¨ ?’?¦?ž?• ?œ?
?ž?™?—?™?™?‘ ?ž?™?ͺ?” ?‘?‘?™?ͺ ?“?™?Ÿ:

--
Posted by YGB to YGB at 7/12/2005 01:39:00 AM

On Fri, Jul 08, 2005 at 12:24:53PM +0000, kennethgmiller@juno.com wrote:
: In other words #1: We may be misunderstanding the cause-and-effect
: relationship of what's going on here. We presume that contact is assur
: in order to prevent hana'ah. But perhaps it is also assur in order to
: prevent becoming desensitized.
...
: Namely, the halacha that if the wife becomes a nida during relations, they
: should NOT separate immediately, because that too causes hana'ah. Rather,
: they should wait until the separation occurs automatically, so that the
: hana'ah is avoided....
: To me, this suggests that we may be mistaken about what the real issur
: is. Is it the contact, as we often say? Or perhaps contact is not assur
: at all, or is only a minor issur as compared to hana'ah...

But that's not true for negi'ah. Negi'ah is prohibited only bederekh
chibah. Harchaqos in generally are quite clearly and consistently defined
experimentally.

The actual cause of the issur seems to be the mindset. (I say "seems to
be" because in the case of ThM, it's a deOraisa, and I can only say what
seems to be in the mind of G-d.) Which unifies both this din, and follows
through to how the chachamim framed harchaqos.

-mi

On 7/11/05, Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> The first question involves the permissability in terms of getting free
> service from the cable or DSL provider. I see this as a variation on
> the theme of copying music raised by RGS on Hirhurim recently (forwarded
> here as well.)

It seems to me significantly different. RGS discussed downloading from the
internet copies of music which is normally available for sale in other
media. Here the cable or DSL service which the person with the wireless
card is getting for free is all there is, so he or she is taking it in the
form in which the provider sells it, so it seems more like stealing a CD
from a record shop than copying one which another customer has already
paid for. They are also increasing the load on the provider's servers:
I know that most providers charge a flat monthly fee, but their pricing
is based on assumptions about average usage per household which will be
too low in this case.

Daf Halachah - Shabbos 72b
Holiday Decorations

ΧžΧ‘Χ›Χͺ Χ©Χ‘Χͺ Χ“Χ£ Χ’"Χ‘ Χ’"Χ‘
...ΧžΧΧ”Χ‘Χ” Χ•ΧžΧ™Χ¨ΧΧ”... ΧœΧΧ‘Χ™Χ™ Χ“ΧΧžΧ¨ Χ—Χ™Χ™Χ‘... ΧœΧ¨Χ‘Χ Χ“ΧΧžΧ¨ Χ€Χ˜Χ•Χ¨...
[If one worshiped idolatry] out of love or out of fear [of a
person]... according to Abaye, who says that he is liable... according
to Rava, who says he is exempt...

Tosafos (d.h. Rava) ask, since according to Rava a person who worships
idolatry out of love or out of fear of a person is exempt, why did
Mordechai not bow down to Haman?

Tosafos respond that it was either because Haman bore two idols on his
chest, and in bowing down to him it would seem tha Mordechai was
worshiping Haman's idolaty. In their second explanation (as elaborated
by Piskei Tosafos #278) they answer that since Haman expected to be
worshiped in a public venue in the presence of many people, Mordechai
concluded that it was important, under those circumstances, not to
rely on Rava's leniency, but to sanctify G-d's name by refusing to
bow, even though it would have been clear that he was merely bowing
out of fear of Haman's vengeance.1

Rava's leniency, qualified by the clarification of Tosafos as to when
it is proper to be stringent, is the basis of the ruling of Rama,
Yoreh Deah 150:3 (based on Terumas HaDeshen):2

Nobles or priests that have forms of idolatry in their clothing, or
who bear the form of the sun before them, as do the governors, it is
forbidden to bow down to them or to remove one's hat before them,
except in a non-obvious manner, such as if his coins scattered or if
rose before them prior to their arrival, and so too he should remove
his hat and bow prior to their arrival. Others, however, are lenient
in this matter, since it is known that even the non-Jews are not
removing their hats or bowing down to the form of the sun, but rather
to the noble. But it is best to be stringent, like the first approach.
Beur HaGra (ad loc. #5) however, notes that Terumas HaDeshen has not
taken the beggining of Tosafos, which makes the case that even
according to Rava, there is no license granted to serve out off love
or fear, rather an exemption after the fact to exempt such a person
from the death penalty.3

Notwithstanding the Vilna Gaon's difficulty, later authorities have
ruled that where additional extenuating circumstances exist -
particularly where a situation like that of Mordechai's in which he
was either faced with bona fide idolatry, or accosted in a very public
venue - one may participate in non-Jewish ceremonies. Thus, Mahari
Aszad, Yoreh Deah #170 permits Jews to light candles on Easter night.
He explains that the additional extenuating circumstances are many: It
is not a religious law that Jews must particiipate in holiday
illumination, but just the will of certain governors that the Jews in
their jurisdiction rejoice as they do; their religion is not
unmitigated idolatry; and, most importantly, the large number of
candles may be construed not as a part of the Easter celebration, but
as part of the [then] concurrent celebration of Pesach! (see Darchei
Teshuvah, Yoreh Deah 150:14 at length).

It would seem, accordingly, that in our day a Jewish merchant would be
permitted to hang "holiday" lighting and ornamentation during the
"holiday season" - again, there is no religious law requiring such
decoration. It is, rather, a commercial imperative; the "celebration"
of the season is certainly not one of unmitigated religious spirit;
and, most importantly, the decorations may be construed not as a part
of the Xmas season celebration, but as part of the concurrent
celebration of the season of Chanukah!

                                                                       1.

   ΧͺΧ•Χ‘Χ€Χ•Χͺ Χ©Χ‘Χͺ Χ“Χ£ Χ’"Χ‘ Χ’"Χ‘ Χ“"Χ” רבא: וא"Χͺ Χ•ΧœΧžΧΧ™ Χ“Χ€Χ˜Χ¨ רבא ΧΧžΧΧ™ לא Χ”Χ©ΧͺΧ—Χ•Χ”
   ΧžΧ¨Χ“Χ›Χ™ ΧœΧ”ΧžΧŸ Χ•Χ™"ל Χ›Χ“ΧΧžΧ¨Χ™Χ ΧŸ Χ‘ΧžΧ“Χ¨Χ© Χ©Χ©ΧͺΧ™ Χ¦Χ•Χ¨Χ•Χͺ Χ”Χ™Χ• גל ΧœΧ‘Χ• Χ•Χ’Χ•Χ“ ΧžΧ©Χ•Χ Χ§Χ™Χ“Χ•Χ©
   השם Χ›Χ“ΧΧ©Χ›Χ—ΧŸ Χ‘Χ™Χ¨Χ•Χ©ΧœΧžΧ™ Χ‘ΧžΧ‘Χ›Χͺ Χ©Χ‘Χ™Χ’Χ™Χͺ Χ‘Χ€Χ¨Χ§ Χ“' Χ›Χ’Χ•ΧŸ Χ€Χ€Χ•Χ‘ Χ•ΧœΧ•ΧœΧ™Χ Χ•Χ‘ אחיו
   Χ©Χ ΧͺΧ Χ• ΧœΧ”Χ ΧžΧ™Χ Χ‘Χ–Χ›Χ•Χ›Χ™Χͺ Χ¦Χ‘Χ•Χ’Χ” Χ•ΧœΧ Χ§Χ‘ΧœΧ• ΧžΧ”Χ:

                                                                       2.

   Χ©Χ•"Χ’ Χ™Χ•Χ¨Χ” Χ“Χ’Χ” Χ‘Χ™ΧžΧŸ Χ§"Χ  Χ‘Χ’Χ™Χ£ Χ’' Χ‘Χ”Χ’"Χ”: שרים או כהנים Χ©Χ™Χ© ΧœΧ”Χ Χ¦Χ•Χ¨Χͺ Χ’Χ‘Χ•Χ“Χͺ
   כוכבים בבגדיהם או שנושאים Χ¦Χ•Χ¨Χͺ Χ—ΧžΧ” ΧœΧ€Χ Χ™Χ”Χ Χ›Χ“Χ¨Χš Χ”Χ’ΧžΧ•Χ Χ™Χ אבור ΧœΧ”Χ©ΧͺΧ—Χ•Χͺ
   ΧœΧ”Χ או ΧœΧ”Χ‘Χ™Χ¨ Χ”Χ›Χ•Χ‘Χ’ ΧœΧ€Χ Χ™Χ”Χ Χ¨Χ§ Χ‘Χ“Χ¨Χš שאינו נראה Χ›ΧžΧ• Χ©Χ ΧͺΧ€Χ–Χ¨Χ• ΧžΧ’Χ•ΧͺΧ™Χ• או
   שיקום ΧœΧ€Χ Χ™Χ”Χ קודם בואם Χ•Χ›ΧŸ Χ™Χ‘Χ™Χ¨ Χ”Χ›Χ•Χ‘Χ’ Χ•Χ™Χ©ΧͺΧ—Χ•Χ” קודם בואם (Χͺ"Χ” Χ‘Χ™ΧžΧŸ
   Χ§Χ¦"Χ•) Χ•Χ™Χ© ΧžΧ§Χ™ΧœΧ™ΧŸ Χ‘Χ“Χ‘Χ¨ Χ”Χ•ΧΧ™Χœ Χ•Χ™Χ“Χ•Χ’ שגם Χ”Χ’Χ•Χ‘Χ“Χ™ כוכבים אינם ΧžΧ‘Χ™Χ¨Χ™Χ Χ”Χ›Χ•Χ‘Χ’
   או משΧͺחוים ΧœΧ¦Χ•Χ¨Χͺ Χ”Χ—ΧžΧ” Χ¨Χ§ ΧœΧ”Χ©Χ¨ (שם בשם Χ¨"Χ™ ΧžΧΧ€Χ Χ•"Χ‘ Χ•ΧžΧ”Χ¨Χ™"Χ•) Χ•Χ˜Χ•Χ‘ ΧœΧ”Χ—ΧžΧ™Χ¨
   כבברא הראשונה:

                                                                       3.

   ΧͺΧ•Χ‘Χ€Χ•Χͺ שם: Χ•Χ™"ל Χ“Χ‘Χ‘Χ¨ רבא Χ“ΧΧ€Χ™ΧœΧ• למ"Χ“ Χ“Χ—Χ™Χ™Χ‘ ΧœΧžΧ‘Χ•Χ¨ אΧͺ Χ’Χ¦ΧžΧ• אם לא מבר
   Χ’Χ¦ΧžΧ• לא ΧžΧ™Χ—Χ™Χ™Χ‘ ΧžΧ™ΧͺΧ” Χ‘Χ‘Χ™Χͺ Χ“Χ™ΧŸ:

   posted by YGB @ [9]1:39 AM     

>Unfortunately, I cannot find this halacha right now (probably because
> it occurs so rarely), so I may be remembering it inaccurately, in
> which case I'd appreciate being corrected if I'm mistaken.

>Namely, the halacha that if the wife becomes a nida during relations, they
>should NOT separate immediately, because that too causes hana'ah.

Correct: See Kitzur SA 156:3. (Don't have a SA at work).

 - Danny

On Thu, Jul 07, 2005 at 12:46:28PM -0400, Eli Turkel wrote:
: The question is the permissibility of accepting the Besht against
: Rishonim. There were certainly major complaints against changes in the
: Nusach Hatefilla and other changes introduced by chassidut. Were there
: complaints about hasgacha pratit (eg Nefesh HaChaim).

While I'm loathe to bring up something that may yet again tie into
L'Affaire Slifkin...

Wouldn't complaints require believing there is a pesaq on aggadic issues?
Which of the 13 ikkarim requires a particular position on the scope of HP?

The NhC posits and promotes a different position. He doesn't say it's
the only permissable one.

-mi

On Fri, Jul 08, 2005 at 08:57:22AM -0400, Shaya Potter wrote:
: What I was thinking, perhaps one can say that chazal actually wasn't
: paskening halacha based on this, but was trying to explain halachot they
: had a mesorah for based on science as they understood it (I would think
: this at least works in their psakim on halachot d'oraita).

I don't think there's a "one size fits all" answer.

Yes, your reasoning would imply in some cases.

In other cases, I imagine it was something similar to what happened
years back over the babirusa (a porcine animal that supposedly chews its
cud). Most Rabbis didn't bother trying to determine the physical facts,
since it wasn't halakhah lema'aseh. Rather, they tried to suggest what
the din would be if the facts turn out to be as reported. I think this
works for the rat that is half sand.

This is related to the question of whether the din would change if the
science does. R' Dovid Lifshitz, in shiur, simply found a way to apply
a modified version of their sevara to the science as known today. R'
Kook writes that when science changes, we can question heteirim founded
on the bad science. However, chumros can not be similarly questioned --
eliminating one reason lehachmir doesn't necessarily eliminate every
reason.

I didn't ask in shiur, but it sounds like RDL would say something similar
to your position.

A third possibility, the CI writes that halakhah was defined during the
middle 2 millenia of human history, the 2,000 years of Torah. Therefore,
if they made a pesaq a particular way, it's Torah -- regardless of the
accuracy of their assumptions. As I wrote similarly in a recent post,
perhaps Hashem "revealed" the bad science as a seyata diShmaya to produce
a particular pesaq.

For a better-developed discussion, see
<http://www.aishdas.org/toratemet/science.html>. It was written for
people who nebich are "posechim beshe'eilah".

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Rescue me from the desire to win every
micha@aishdas.org        argument and to always be right.
http://www.aishdas.org              - Rav Nachman of Breslav
Fax: (270) 514-1507      	     Likutei Tefilos 94:964

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