Avodah Mailing List

Volume 15 : Number 003

Thursday, April 21 2005

• Who knows four?
• Re: Rambam and miracles
• RSRH and RYS on Aggadita and Emunas Chachamim
• Sair L'Azazel / Birds of Metzora
• chometz erev shabbas
• Re: RSRH and RYS on Aggadita and Emunas Chachamim
• Re: Erev Pesach she'chal b'Shabbos
• Re: How wicked can one's child be?
• Re: Non-Jew at a Seder (or other Shabbos or Yom Tov meal)
• Re: Avodah V15 #2
• Kitniyos and bitul
• RE: Thanking Hashem for the land of Israel in the Haggadah
• The Geder of Mitzvas Charoses
• Re: Eruvin
• Re: Rambam and miracles
• FW: Rambam and miracles

 From my "Aspaqlaria" blog <http://www.aishdas.org/asp>...

 -mi


The number four appears in the seider so frequently that its presence
is often commented upon:
    * The four cups of wine -- and the four terms of redemption and the
      four mentions of the word "cup" when the butler discusses his
      dream with Yoseif, the sources of this law
    * The four questions
    * The four "barukh"s in "Barukh haMaqom"
    * The four sons
    * The four names of the holiday: Pesach, Chag haMatzos, Chag haAviv
      and Zeman Cheiruseinu
    * The four matzos

"The four matzos"? Don't we in fact have three (or, as R' Moshe Feinstein
and R' JB Soloveitchik did, following the Vilna Gaon, have two) matzos?

What I mean by that are the four meanings we associate with the mitzvah
of matzah:

1- We start with "Ha lachma anya -- this is the poor man's bread which our
   forefathers ate in the land of Egypt..." The bread of
   servitude. "Lechem oni -- bread of poverty."
2- Then we ask questions, and teach Maggid embodying the other idea of
   "'lechem oni', she'onim alav devarim harbei -- that we answer upon
   it many things."
3- We have the matzah upon which one must eat the qorban
   pesach. Historically, this concept of matzah was given third, before
   the actual redemption.
4- The matzah also represents the haste of the exodus itself. Rabban
   Gamliel's is the matzah that we eat "because the dough lacked [the
   time] to leaven before the King of Emperors. the Holy One blessed be
   He, revealed Himself to them and redeemed them."

(1) Poverty and suffering, transformed through (2) Torah study and (3)
mitzvah observance, becomes (4) redemption. The story of Mitrayim and
Yetzi'as Mitzrayim is that exile and troubles exist for the sole purpose
of turning them into opportunities for growth and redemption.

That too is how the four cups divide the seider:
1- First cup:
Qadeish: necessary before drinking wine
Urchatz: necessary before...
Karpas: Vegetables, as in "the cucumbers we had in Egypt" that the
    exodus generation complained of missing in the desert, dipped in
    salt water resembling tears
Yachatz: breaking the middle matzah, because poor people need to save
    for later, and saying "Ha lachmah anya"

The first cup is dominated by symbols of life in Mitzrayim. Then we fill
the second cup...

2- Second cup:
Maggid: telling over the story. The matzah of teaching.

3- Third cup:
Motzi, Matzah, Maror, Koreich, Shulchan Areich, Tzafun, Bareich: these
steps will (G-d willing, soon) be the actual eating of the qorban pesach
"on matzos and maror". The matzah of the mitzvah.

4- Fourth cup:
Hallel, Nirtzah: Praising G-d. The post-redemption Jew.

In the song "Echad mi yodei'ah?" each verse combines the answers of the
previous verses. So that when you get to "Who knows four?" the answer is
"Four are the mothers, three are the fathers, two are the luchos haberis,
one is G-d..."

I would like to suggest that the answer doesn't end after the word
"imahos" (mothers), but includes the whole sequence.

G-d is one.

Man is created in His Image, which means we exist to similarly be
free-willed creative beings, but also we exist as recipients of His
good. Therefore man lives in two worlds: G-d's and the one we share
with our fellow man. And these are expressed in the two tablets: one
containing mitzvos between us and Hashem, the other between people.

This balancing act requires that we have three loci in our soul: our
existence in this world, our existence in heaven, and the world within
our minds, where we choose between them. The chesed of Avraham, the
avodah of Yitzchaq, and the torah study of Yaaqov. Three are the fathers.

As actors, we act in three planes. However, in receiving from G-d, we
realize we receive on planes beyond three -- reception is perceived in
fours. Rosh haShanah, when we act to repent and earn our redemption,
we have a three-part Mussaf (Malkhos, Zichronos, Shoferos). Pesach,
the gifted redemption, is in four.

The meaning of four is therefore build on that of three, which in turn
comes from two and The One.

The work of the seider is therefore to make the transition from being a
oni, a creature batted around by the winds of fate, living in "Mitzrayim"
between two narrows, between "the pan and the fire". And through thought
and deed we accept our redemption, becoming a servant of G-d.

Something to think about tonight, during bedikas chameitz: Chameitz
then is the ignoring of this gift of redemption. Standing back when the
opportunity is there. The passivity of letting the dough rise. Falling
short on one's Torah study and mitzvah observance; perhaps one even
takes these tools in hand, but doesn't use them redemptively. This is
the chameitz of which the Ari haQadosh writes, "Anyone who removes all
chameitz from their house is guaranteed to have a year without sin."

Chag kasher vesamei'ach! (belashon "lo zu af zu")

(As per R Micha's request I am transfering my post from areivim to
Avodah... with some minor alterations - HM)

"Shinnar, Meir" <Meir.Shinnar@rwjuh.edu> wrote:
> 4) RHM argues that creatio ex nihilio is an ikkar, and that denying
> one renders one is heresy - this is not in the moreh nevuchim, who
> explicitly accepts (in the moreh) that platonic emanation is
> compatible with torah, nor in the kuzari, who accepts eternal
> matter as being not kfira 

The Rambam clearly believed in creatio ex nihilio. IIUC this was the
primary dispute that the Rambam had with Aristotle. Greek rationalists
maintained the impossiblity of creation in time. That is consistent with
their doctrine of natural necessity being the sole cause of events. The
Rambam realized that such a doctrine limited God because accordingly,
the universe is due to causality and necessity and NOT an act of creation
by God. Creatio ex nihilio is in complete contradiction to this and
God Himslef would be bound by the laws of cause and effect. Thusly,
the Rambam disputes the Aristotalian view of the eternity of the universe.

The Rambam's Shita, in contra-distinction to Aristotle, is creatio ex
nihilio. In the begining God alone existed. He then produced from nothing
all existing things by His own will and desire.

Plato holds that the "heavens" are transient but their substance is
eternal. His opinion does not agree with our belief. We believe that
the heavens were created from absolutely nothing. Plato believes that
they were formed from something... a pre-existing eternal substance.

As to whether the Kuzari accepts eternal matter as being not kfira,
I cite the following passage which may be what you are alluding to:

    The question of eternity and creation is obscure, whilst the arguments
    are evenly balanced. The theory of creation derives greater weight
    from the prophetic tradition of Adam, Noah. and Moses, which is
    more deserving of credence than mere speculation. If, after all,
    a believer in the Law finds himself compelled to admit an eternal
    matter and the existence of, many worlds prior to this one, this would
    not impair his belief that this world was created at a certain epoch,
    and that Adam and Noah were the first human beings.

I must admit that it is a perplexing statement. But I think it falls
short of endorsing the permissiblity of such a belief. The Kuzari was
merely using this as a basis for arguing "that this world was created at
a certain epoch even thouhj worlds existed prior to this one, and that
Adam and Noah were the first human beings." In other words, he was trying
to prove a point by extending the argument of the creation of THIS world
and the creation of man even to a belief that, in some way, matter had
always existed. He does not however say that such a belief is permissible.

It seems a basic tenent of Judaism to beleive that God preceded everything
else.

HM

Does anyone have a copy of RSRH's letters to R' Pinchas Wechsler (1876)
on the subject of emunas chachamim and aggadita? They were published in
Hama'ayan in 1976 by R' Mordechai Breuer.

His position, I'm told 2nd hand, is very liberal. What I was told is that
he says that the mesorah only includes halakhah (shades of RMS!) and
aggadita should be viewed as their personal opinions. The opinions of
giants, people well informed in Torah, etc... but not Torah miSinai.
Then he speaks of never knowing what's intended to be literal, and what
is Mashal.

Obviously, I'd love to see it inside, and perhaps put it on line for
the chevrah. 2nd hand info isn't all that reliable, nor complete.

A new source: R' Yisrael Salanter.

    We are living now in the period following the German conquest of
    several districts of France. The German Kaiser has now become
    the mighty sovereign of many isolated provinces, which he has
    united into one mighty state. In order to immortalize its victory,
    the German govenrment changed the appearance of the eagle in its
    national emblem, making it two-headed instead of one-headed (as it
    was until now). Historians, writers and poets praise the conquest
    with exagerated descriptions. I myself have read the lines, "The
    German eagle has spread its wings from Memel to Metz. One of its
    claws grips Keln, whle the other is in Baden." Instead of detailed
    and realistic descriptions of international wars, what they record
    for posterity are symbols and hints that are only well understood
    by the generation in which the events occurred.

    With the changes of time, memory of the events will fade, and all that
    will remain will be the terse symbolic account. A long time from now,
    people will read that in German a two-headed eagle spread its wings
    for 500 miles. Perhaps they will laugh at this, just as they laugh at
    [the stories in] the aggada.

    The same thing happened to us. Chazal used terse symbolic language
    to describe the events of and before their time, and they recorded
    the Torah's wisdom and mussar in epigrams. These sayings were only
    understood by the people of their generations, and by mequbalim of
    later generations.

It's interesting to see that last bit of praise for mequballim. RYS
had much use for work of the Ramak (in particular, "Tomer Devorah")
and Ramchal. And yet, his own teaching holds no hint of qabbalah. (R'
Itzeleh Blazer's report, not mine.)


-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole
micha@aishdas.org        heart, your entire soul, and all you own."
http://www.aishdas.org   Love is not two who look at each other,
Fax: (270) 514-1507      It is two who look in the same direction.

The Ramban makes the connection, the Rakanati follows up and elaborates.

The suggestion that one not eat chometz after zman biur is based on the
Gemara saying put away food for two meals - a possible implication -
is only food for two meals - no more.
See piski teshuvos volume 5 section 444:7 footnotes 57,58. The minhag
is not to be machmir - one can argue that it sounds like a potential
baal tosef problem...

Ari Kahn

Micha Berger wrote:
>Does anyone have a copy of RSRH's letters to R' Pinchas Wechsler (1876)
>on the subject of emunas chachamim and aggadita? They were published in
>Hama'ayan in 1976 by R' Mordechai Breuer.

The english is taken from Light magazine and was distributed as a fund 
raiser for Neve Yerushalayim. I don't know what the copyright status is. 
The Hebrew is the translation from the German and appeared in HaMa'ayan 
1976.

<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/hirschAgadaHebrew.pdf>
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/hirschAgadaEnglish.pdf>

R' Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer wrote:
> ROY notes that even those who have the minhag not to eat gebrokts on
> Pesach may eat gebrokts on Erev Pesach. [U'milsa d'mistabra hu, as lo
> adif Erev Pesach from Shemini shel Pesach!]

My presumption was that he was referring to Erev Presach *morning*,
perhaps the last two hours of the morning, or perhaps he was refering
to eating gebrokts on the Pesach dishes even earlier.

But he responded to R' Simon Montagu's question by writing
> Gebrokts is a chumrah. And it is not at all clear that in the absence
> of a korban pesach there is an issur d'orysa of chametz on EP.

This makes it very clear that RYGB is referring to the AFTERNOON of
Erev Pesach. In which case I really do not understand why *anyone*
would think that <<< lo adif Erev Pesach from Shemini shel Pesach >>>.

The most RYGB is claiming is that the afternoon of Erev Pesach is only
safek d'Oraisa. But Shmini shel Pesach is definitely not d'Oraisa at all!

I can see that a posek might say that the lack of karays on Erev Pesach
is sufficient reason to allow gebrokts. But that's not what RYGB is
aguing. He is saying that Erev Pesach is no worse than Shmini, and I
just do not see that.

Akiva Miller

Subject:   Re: How wicked can one's child be?
> The shoresh is unusual; it could be "kaha" spelled "kuf,hay,hay" and also
> alternatively "kof,hay,hay". I don't know of any other shoresh with two
> succeeding hays. That doesn't mean there aren't any -- just that I don't
> know of one.

That is true but there are otehr usages of the same putative root to
be considered. Whether it is the same word is not all that clear. F.E.
Genesis 49:10 that "The scepter will not depart from Judah, nor
legislation from his descendants. Nations will submit to him until the
final tranquility comes."

This is R. Kaplan's note on the word Ykhas:
submit to him (Targum; Ibn Ezra; Radak, Sherashim, s.v. Yikah;
cf. Proverbs 30:17). Others, 'He will gather nations' (Ramban; Bereshith
Rabbah 99); 'He will have a gathering of nations' (Rashi; Rashbam); or
'He will make nations gnash their teeth' (Bereshith Rabbah 99).

The Ramban if I correctly recall discusses the use of the word here in Genesis and in Mishlei (Yikhas aim).

M. Levin

"Y. Dovid Kaye" <haravydk@yahoo.com>
> It is clear that there is a halachic distinction between a Yom Tov and
> Shabbos meal because of the Yom Tov preparation concerns. However, those
> who have written regarding allowing this on Shabbos are in error for
> a different reason. See the Taz in 512:6 that only under very pressing
> circumstances (I will leave it for another time for the defintion of these
> crcumstances) is one permitted to have a non-Jew even at a Shabbos Seuda.

The Taz's words against eating with goyim apply equally to *any* meal,
whether on shabbos or during the week. I know he says 'especially on
shabbos', but he doesn't give any reason why shabbos should be different.

But he doesn't say "very pressing circumstances", he says "hechrech
ktzat", a bit of compulsion. Nor is he talking specifically about
inviting a goy to ones home; what he says applies equally to eating
together anywhere.

And yet my impression from the gemara is that Chazal didn't seem to have
any reluctance to eat together with goyim. And Rebbi invited Antoninus
to his home davka for a shabbos meal, when he certainly didn't have to.

-- 
Zev Sero
zev@sero.name

> I have never heard of this Minhag Yisroel to refrain from eating
> chometz after the fourth hour on the 13th of Nissan when Pesach falls
> out on Motzei Shabbos (and frankly, it doesn't make that much sense to
> me....). Is this a widespread minhag that I somehow never picked up on?
> Sources anyone?

I don't remember if eating chometz was mentioned, however, my Rav did
tell us that it is proper to burn the Chometz on Friday within the proper
time so that there would be no confusion for the following years.

J Kaufman

RZS wrote on Areivim:
> The Rema says explicitly that kitniyot is batel berov, so non-kitniyot
> cooked in a kitniyot pot by someone cooking primarily for sefardim
> (i.e. he is not being mevatel issur lechatchila) should be fine for
> ashkenazim to eat. In fact, it should be ok to eat the meat and other
> non-kitniyot ingredients from a hamin/cholent that included kitniyot;
> once again, there was no intent to be mevatel issur, and whatever kitniyot
> has been absorbed in the meat is certainly less than 50%.

Does "mevateil issur lechat-chilah" apply to the mevateil's definition
of issur? I could see arguing that it should be, based on the fact that
bitul lechat-chilah by a nachri is bitul. However, I thought that had to
do with the nachri's lack of relevent da'as. By saying that it depends
on the mevateil, one makes it look like this is some kind of onesh for
trying to get away with bitul, rather than a kelal in birur.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes
micha@aishdas.org        exactly the right measure of himself,  and
http://www.aishdas.org   holds a just balance between what he can
Fax: (270) 514-1507      acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham

I wrote:
> Someone forwarded me an email from Rabbi David Mescheloff in which he
> writes that the requirement of doresh m'arami oved avi ad she'yigmor es
> ha'parsha kula means that one should also darshen the 5th pasuk:
> "v'yivi'einu el ha'makom hazeh va'yiten lanu . . . eretz zovas chalav
> u'dvash."

I discussed this with Rav Matanya Ben-Shachar, rav of my yishuv, Neve
Daniel. He suggested that perhaps in galus people didn't say this because
the point of this is to thank Hashem for our current situation, and in
galus, people can't thank Hashem for "this" land. I also spoke with Rav
Yechezkel Lichtenstein, professor of talmud at Bar Ilan (and resident
of my yishuv). He noted that the old Eretz Yisrael nusach (brought by
Rav Kasher in his haggadah) does darshen the 5th pasuk. He also noted
that most of the rishonim said, based on their nusach in the gemara,
that we should have 5 cups of wine because of the pasuk of v'heiveisee
eschem el ha'aretz. Consequently, l'shitasam it makes sense that Arami
Oved Avi should be darshened through the 5th pasuk.

Chag kasher v'sameach.
Moshe 

The Mishnah (Pesachim 114a) records a dispute between Chachamim and R'
Eliezer B"R Tzadok. Chachamim assert that charoses is not a mitzvah,
while REBRT posits that it is a mitzvah.

The Gemara (ibid. 116a) cites an apparent dispute between R' Levi and R'
Yochanan. R' Levi states that charoses is zecher la'tapuach (the unique
relationship between Hashem and Am Yisroel signified by tachas ha'tapuach
orratich in Shir HaShirim, and the miraculous and painless births of
the nashim tzidkaniyos in Egypt under apple trees [see Rashi and Tos. ad
loc.]). R' Yochanan, however, states that charoses comes zecher la'tit
(the mortar used in the construction in Egypt; see Tos. ad loc. for a
third zecher). Abaye then explains how the making of the charoses should
reflect both the aspect of the tapuach and the aspect of the tit.

In the Peirush HaMishnayos the Rambam states that according to REBRT
one makes a berachah on the eating of charoses, but that the halachah
does not follow REBRT.

In Hil. Chametz U'Matzah 7:11, however, the Rambam writes that charoses is
a mitzvah Me'Divrei Sofrim, that it is zecher la'tit, that therefore it
is made is a manner that reflects the process by which tit is produced,
and that therefore it is brought on the table on Pesach eve. The Lechem
Mishneh asks the obvious question, that it would seem that the Rambam
here rules according to REBRT, contradicting his ruling in the Peirush
HaMishnayos. Moreover, the Rambam does not mention any berachah here, and
thus seems to contradict his other assertion in the Peirush HaMishnayos
- that if charoses is a mitzvah, it is associated with a berachah (see
Rabbeinu Manoach to Hil. CuM 7:11 and the Tur, OC #475 for the reason
there is no berachah on charoses).

The question is, obviously, what happened between the Rambam's perspective
in the Peirush HaMishnayos and his ruling in the Yad.

The Harerei Kedem (RYBS) 2:94, on the basis of a girsa in the Mordechai,
Hil. Seder Shel Pesach and the Bigdei Yesha (loc. cit. #19) posits that
according to REBRT's understanding, one would have to eat a kezayis
of charoses, because it is a mitzvah of achilah, while according to
the Rambam's definition of the mitzvah is only that one needs to place
charoses on the table, not to eat it. It is only since the charoses is
already on the table that the Rambam rules in Hil. CuM 8:2,6,8 that the
karpas, matzah and morror are all dipped in charoses, so that "she'lo
tihyeh biaso biah reikanis."

Hence, continues the Harerei Kedem, according to the Rambam's new
definition in the Yad of the mitzvah of charoses, there is no berachah
because it is not a mitzvas achilah.

However, according to the Harerei Kedem, the Rambam in the Yad rules
in accordance with REBRT, and thus reneges on his ruling in the Peirush
HaMishnayos. Originally the fact that we do not eat a kezayis nor make
a berachah on the charoses led him to believe that halachah must be in
accordance with Chachamim, but when he "realized" that one could define
the mitzvah as one of placing the charoses on the table, he decided to
rule in accordance with REBRT, as the Gemara cites Amoraim who argue
concerning his position, thus indicating that they held that the halachah
followed REBRT's position.

It is obvious how difficult it is to accept that the Rambam completely
reversed his position from the Peirush HaMishnayos to the Yad. It is
also very difficult to accept that the Rambam would actually rule in
accordance with REBRT over Chachamim.

V'asher al kein yeira'eh lomar that the Rambam does rule, in fact, in
accordance with Chachamim. The Rambam - both in the Peirush HaMishnayos
and the Yad - is consistent in this respect. His position is that this,
in and of itself, was the machlokes between REBRT and the Chachamim
- whether the mitzvah of charoses is a mitzvas achilah or a mitzvas
hava'ah. The nafka mina is, of course, whether there is a berachah on
the charoses or not: If the mitzvah is one of achilah, then of course it
follows that it should have its own berachah. But if it is a mitzvah of
hava'ah, it is no different than the other mitzvos hava'ah of the Seder -
viz., the zero'a and beitzah - upon which no berachah is made.

But why, then, does the Rambam require all these dippings in charoses? Let
the charoses just sit on the ke'arah like the zero'a and beitzah?

As far as this point is concerned, we must preface an answer with another
question: Why does the Rambam only cite the tit aspect of the charoses,
and not its tapuach aspect?

It seems that the omission may best be explained if we understand the
Rambam to hold that the zecher aspect of the charoses is actually the
subject of a dispute between R' Levi and R' Yochanan. Evidently, since
the halachah normally follows the views of R' Yochanan, here too the
Rambam ruled in accordance with R' Yochanan.

And, indeed, the difference of opinion between R' Levi and R' Yochanan
is substantial: According to R' Levi the zecher is of the yeshuah -
the Chasdei Hashem already manifest in the unique tapuach relationship
of Hashem and the Bnei Yisrael while the latter were yet enslaved in
Egypt. According to R' Yochanan, OTOH, the zecher is of the avdus -
the sufferings of the slavery itself.

With this premise in mind, we may readily understand all the tibbulim in
the charoses very well. To begin with, the Rambam has the karpas dipped in
charoses. Our minhag, OTOH, is to dip the karpas in salt-water. Indeed,
Hagahos Maimonios, Hil. CuM 8:3 cites several Rishonim who forbade
dipping the karpas in charoses. What is the nekudas ha'machlokes?

One of the cited Rishonim who forbade dipping karpas into charoses
is Rabbeinu Yechiel (he calls such conduct a minhag shtus!). The same
Rabbeinu Yechiel, cited in the Hagahos Maimonios, Hil. CuM 7:9 emphasizes
that the recipe of the charoses must reflect the reason given by the
Yerushalmi - that it is zecher l'dam - the first makkah, also a zecher
of yeshuah.

It is evidently for this reason that RY forbids the dipping of the karpas
in charoses: The karpas's dipping is meant to be zecher l'avdus. It is
therefore our minhag to use salt-water, zecher to the tears of Bnei
Yisrael while they worked as slaves. The zecher l'yeshuah aspect of
charoses runs directly counter to that symbolism, and therefore charoses
cannot be used.

However, according to the Rambam, charoses is only zecher l'avdus. It
is therefore, in fact, appropriate to dip the karpas in the charoses. It
is much for the same reason that the marror is dipped in charoses.

It remains, however, to understand why the Rambam has the matzah dipped in
charoses. The question is compounded by the further question posed by the
Hararei Kedem 2:95: Why does the Rambam not have the Korban Pesach (Hil.
CuM 8:7) or Afikoman (ibid. 8:9) dipped in charoses? (His answer is that
both the Korban Pesach, and the Afikoman, as a zecher l'KP, must be eaten
"l'mashchah v'l'gedulah - in a princely manner, and thus by themselves,
without any condiments.)

But according to our explanation, the distinction is simple and
self evident: Korban Pesach is a zecher l'yeshuah. Hence, it would be
inappropriate to dip it in charoses, which is zecher l'avdus. As far as
the matzah is concerned, however, it inherently commemorates both the
avdus, as lechem oni; and the yeshuah, as the food made in haste as the
Bnei Yisrael sped from Egypt.

The two times we eat the matzah represent, respectively, the two
aspects of its zecher. As the Rambam writes explicity (Hil. CuM 8:6),
the Motzi Matzah is zecher l'avdus - and that is why we use a broken
piece of matzah, because a poor person is accustomed to a broken piece
of bread. It is therefore appropriate to dip the Motzi Matzah in charoses.

But the Afikoman, just like the KP it represents, is zecher l'yeshuah
(which is doubtless why its taste is supposed to linger...). It is
obvious, then, that according to the Rambam, it cannot be dipped in
charoses.

Tein l'Chacham v'yechkam od...
YGB 

IIRC, R N Lamm was the rabbi or the assistant rabbi of the Jewish Center
at the time that he dealt with R A Kotler on the West Side eruv. This
story was mentioned b y R Lamm at a shiur that he gave at an OU Convention
in 1992.

Steve Brizel
Zeliglaw@aol.com

R Harry Maryles wrote:
> It seems a basic tenent of Judaism to beleive that God preceded everything
> else.

As in "Atah Hu Rishon, veAtah Hu Acharon..."?

But Hashem is "beli reishis beli sachlis". A number of meforshim comment
on this. One approach is that He is before all, not that He had an
earlier start than everything else. However, another is that the pasuq
is referring to Hashem being logically prior, not chronologically. (And
similarly, "Acharon" means that He is Ultimate Purpose.)

Such a statement would be satisfied by the belief in an Eternal Borei who
is therefore ne'etzal an eternal universe. The causality is preserved,
without giving a first moment of time.

So, while I agree with RHM that it seems to be that way, perhaps the
point of the Rambam saying that the text of ma'aseh bereishis could be
understood without yeish mei'ayin is through some mechanism like this one.

Although I would think it's technically belief in yeish mei'ayin, but
"just" that the "mei-" doesn't mean the yeish was after the ayin in time.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes
micha@aishdas.org        exactly the right measure of himself,  and
http://www.aishdas.org   holds a just balance between what he can
Fax: (270) 514-1507      acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham

"Shinnar, Meir" <Meir.Shinnar@rwjuh.edu> wrote:
>> 4) RHM argues that creatio ex nihilio is an ikkar, and that denying
>> one renders one is heresy - this is not in the moreh nevuchim, who
>> explicitly accepts (in the moreh) that platonic emanation is
>> compatible with torah, nor in the kuzari, who accepts eternal
>> matter as being not kfira 

RHM 
> The Rambam therefore in contra-distinction to Aristotle, beleived in
> creatio ex nihilio. In the begining God alone existed. He then
> produced from nothing all existing things by His own will and desire.

> Plato holds that the "heavens" are transient but their substance is
> eternal. His opinion does not agree with our belief. We believe that
> the heavens were created from absolutely nothing. Plato  believes
> that they were formed from something... a pre-existing eternal
> substance.

IMHO, RHM mixes up several separate issues.
1) What the rambam himself believed to be true.
2) What the rambam believed was required belief

This is complicated by the fact that the rambam himself says (in
his introduction) that one has to be very careful in interpreting
his statements. Thus, while the rambam states that aristotle causes
major problems, major figues such as ibn tibbon (not just modern
academics)understood that the rambam himself believed in aristotle, and
many have understood him to believe in the platonic position. The fact
that plato's position was not the mainstream Jewish one is one that the
rambam was well aware of - but he did not anywhere in the mishne torah
or moreh describe as kfira.

What is clear is that major Jewish commentators of the rambam have
understood the rambam as accepting plato

> As to whether the Kuzari accepts eternal matter as being not kfira, I
> cite the following passage which may be what you are alluding to: 

>      "The question of eternity and creation is obscure, whilst the
> arguments are evenly balanced. The theory of creation derives greater
> weight from the prophetic tradition of Adam, Noah. and Moses, which
> is more deserving of credence than mere speculation. If, after all, a
> believer in the Law finds himself compelled to admit an eternal
> matter and the existence of, many worlds prior to this one, this
> would not impair his belief that this world was created at a certain
> epoch, and that Adam and Noah were the first human beings."

> I must admit that it is a perplexing statement. But I think it falls
> short of endorsing the permissiblity of such a belief. The Kuzari was
> merely using this as a basis for arguing "that this world was created
> at a certain epoch, and that Adam and Noah were the first human
> beings." In other words, he was trying to prove a point by extending
> the argument even to the belief that matter has always existed. He
> does not say that such a beleif is permissible.

Huh???? It seems quite clear, not perplexing at all.... This is not an
endorsement of the statement as true, but as acceptable.
This is symptomatic of much of the debate - having clear convictions
(that may be well based, but that is a different issue), and therefore
assuming and interpreting everything as in line with those convictions.
The Kuzari is quite explicit (and here, actually, is close to the rambam -
perhaps even more radical, as he doesn't have the same problem that the
rambam has with aristotle). He recognizes that creation and eternitiy
are two plausible alternatives, that the "prophetic tradition" supports
creation, and therefore should be believed - but that the "prophetic
tradition" does not deal with ex nihilio (the understanding of bara as
ex nihilio is not simple, nor the only, pshat) - and therefore does not
rule out eternal matter.

RHM
> It seems a basic tenent of Judaism to beleive that God preceded
> everything else. 

The rambam is very clear (MN 2:30) that it is wrong (wrong!!) to say that
hashem temporally preceded the world - because the very notion of time
is part of creation. One can only say that hashem is logically prior
to everything - which is consistent with either creationism, plato,
or aristotle...

Meir Shinnar

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