Avodah Mailing List

Volume 13 : Number 046

Friday, July 9 2004

• Re: Rov dleita kaman
• Re: Rov dleita kaman
• Fwd: Re: Is yenem "equally right" (was Re: Flippin out)
• Re: VIDC [Voss Iz Der Chilluk] #14, MC p. 46
• Re: Megillah 16b
• Re: Disputing Earlier Generations--Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai
• Tachash
• Re: Psak-shopping
• Re: Gestation of wolf,lion,bear,leapord,elephant,and monkey
• Re: mermaids and camels
• Disputing Previous Generation and Halachah L'Moshe MiSinai
• Re: Is yenem "equally right" (was Re: Flippin out)
• Re: Is yenem "equally right" (was Re: Flippin out)
• Re: Singing the Zemer 'Bar Yocha'i in Shul
• Water
• From: "Micha Berger"

In a message dated 7/8/2004 11:10:03 AM EDT, Mlevinmd@aol.com writes:
> I did see it in the Pitchei Tshuva but you are right, I did not examine
> the actual tshuvos that he cites at the end....

Does anyone have the tshuvot-they are not in the BI-CD 

KT 
Joel Rich

Mlevinmd@aol.com wrote:
> I would think that the issue is what defines a rov. In every case
> of mrubbah porish you can look at the source or at the piece that
> separated. Beis Efraim thinks that the defining factor is the source. The
> store that sells more meat has a much greater contribution to the total
> makeup of the meat. Nodeh B'Yehuda thinks that we look at the product
> and consider the rov of which store it came from. What makes up the
> rov according to him is the chance that the product came from the
> kosher store.

A few further he'aros.

We could say that acharei rabbim lehatos is about fractions of a set, not
probability. It's a gezeiras hakasuv. In fact, making it too rationale
would be problematic: if the kelal were understandable misevarah, why
the pasuq?

This is in distinction to the position taken by RMKoppel in his tradition
article. There he discusses three of the theories of statistics: classical
(odds of "heads" is .5 because it is 1 of 2 equal possibilities),
frequentist (odds are .5 because if you flip a coin enough times it
happens half the time), and logical (the reason for heads is as strong as
for tails, so they're both as likely). RMK considers the classical model
as a good way of describing ruba de'isah lekaman, and the frequentist
model for ruba deleisa lekaman. I didn't finish the article, I assume
he has a use for the third model.

However, I'm arguing that "rabbim" isn't a discussion of statistics. We
don't care if the possibilities are equally likely or not. We are told
by the pasuq to follow the result associated with the greatest number,
not the greatest likelihood.

So, as RML writes, the question is what's the set being counted: stores
or meat, and from there we can decide which is a majority. But why would
it be the set of stores, according to the Nodah beYehudah?

Interesting to note is another case, dam nidah. We do not go by the
majority of blood, but by the majority of sources of blood. (See Tosafos,
as quoted by Sh"Sh 4:1.) It's very important to understand if he's
talking about the majority of sources of blood, as I'm assuming, or the
most likely source of blood. I am not sure if I should be medayeiq that
he means the former. I'm doing so because it's possible, and because
it supports my first paragraph about dealing with fractions of sets,
not statistics.

One possibility: The store itself is kavu'ah. In cases of kavu'ah --
kemechtzah al mechtzah dami, magnitudes are ignored. Therefore, the
size of the store is irrelevent. Or put another way, each store can't
be subdivided into bundles of meat as that would require treating it
like a parish, not a kavu'ah.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "I hear, then I forget; I see, then I remember;
micha@aishdas.org        I do, then I understand." - Confucius
http://www.aishdas.org   "Hearing doesn't compare to seeing." - Mechilta
Fax: (270) 514-1507      "We will do and we will listen." - Israelites

RGD writes: 
>From: Chana Luntz <chana@KolSassoon.net>
>> Similarly, the yeshiva velt of the charedi world is a wonderful
>> environment of pure torah. And the desire to dwell in the midbar and
>> learn only torah is fully understandable. However, it is wrong, because
>> our tafkid is to interact with the modern world

>Analogy fails here:   it was said about the dor hamidbar, 
>until they were told to go into Eretz Yisrael, that "lo 
>nitna Torah elah le'ochlei haman"  

>Their denial of their tafkid is only wrong because Hashem 
>told them to go into E"Y.

So Moshe rabbanu was wrong to beg and plead and daven to Hashem to let
him go in? If you are right, why did he get so upset? He should have
been perfectly happy to stay in the midbar and eat mon.

>  And the ma'apilim, who were told NOT to, were wrong to 
>try to go in. 

That is uncontroversial. The question is - why were they wrong to try
and go in?

You seem to be saying, because it is actually better, absent a direct
command from Hashem, not to go in.

However, I think the more conventional response is that while it is
unquestionably better to go in, it is also a privilege to be allowed
to go in, and if HaShem tells you that, as a punishment, he is revoking
that privilege, then, while it may be acceptable, as Moshe rabbanu did,
to beg and plead and daven for that decree to be reversed, it is not
acceptable to do a runner and try and force your way in anyway.

> It eludes me how you can make the statement that "our 
>tafkid is to interact with the modern world"  Who says so?

The thinkers and philosophers of Modern Orthodoxy believe so. This is a
hashkafic position, and you certainly don't have to accept it (where you
are coming from, of course you don't accept it). The question was posed
about the philosophical bases of Modern Orthodoxy, and do they believe
that yenem is equally right, and I am just explaining that at least one
hashkafic position within MO answers a clear no to that question.

Underlying all of this is, as I indicated in my previous post, the
question as to why we were placed on this world, or more specifically
(given that everybody across the MO/charedi perspective will answer,
in order to do mitzvos), why does the world look the way it does?

To give an even more specific example of the kinds of questions we
are dealing with here, is the question: what is the place of Jews in
the wider world (or as the inhabitant of the shtetl famously put it on
seeing the big city "What do they need all those shabbas goys for"?).

One answer is that the goyim stem from the koach of tumah, and our role
is to keep as far away as possible.

A second answer is that they are there to be hewers of wood and drawers
of water (ie there is no real distinction between Cham and Yafet).

But a third, and it is the MO answer, is that Yafet exists to be
incorporated into the tents of Shem. And that places an imperative
(ie a chiyuv) on us to interact with Yafet.

Now, even while you give this answer, there are disagreements as to what
that involves. So that, for example, some say that since the best of the
secular world today is to be found in the Ivy League Universities, then
that is where we should be. After all RAL has a degree from Harvard, and
RYBS had degrees from the University of Berlin (which was the equivalent
in his day). On the other hand, others say that what this means is setting
up a YU and bringing the best of secular learning within its bounds. And
while you can hold for both of these as being good ways to interact,
many people may well hold that only one or the other is the right way
to integrate and interact with Yafet.

Another example of the questions that arise and are involved in
interacting with the modern world, however, does not involve goyim,
but the medina and secular Israelis and the questions raised by their
existence. And while people of an MO perspective believe that one is
required (ie a chiyuv) to interact with the state, and since an important
and key part of the state is the army, it is important (ie a chiyuv)
for dati Jews to be in the army.

But some say that means there should be dati soldiers in all the
elite units, and some say that means setting up hesder and some say it
involves women and some say it shouldn't. And some say that having 90%
in the army, and 10% pure learners (or some other statistic) is fine
(ie the interacting is done on a society wide basis, so that, just
as nobody performs all mitzvot - the kohen performs some and the levi
others, not everybody is required to interact, just that the society is
required to, and not to denigrate the levi because he is not a kohen),
etc etc. There are lots of debates to be had even within the general,
which is why I tried to word it in its most general form - but there
is an underlying theme, underpinning the various philosophies, and it
is not a bedieved philosophy, it is a l'chatchila understanding of what
this hashkafa believes the torah requires.

>In the Gemara you alluded to (that I snipped), "harbeh asu keRShBY velo
>alsa beyadam. But some did succeed.

Agreed - which is why poskening like Rashbi (which is what you are
doing) is not outside the mesorah (remember, that section was brough
as a response to the question - can one believe that the charedim are
wrong and yet still not outside the mesorah?). However it is perfectly
understandable for somebody to hold, given the language of the gemora,
that while some did succeed under Rashbi's position, the correct way
to posken for the klal is as per the Rabbanan, and that poskening like
Rashbi is wrong, even though it is perfectly true that some may succeed.

Regards
Chana

R Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer wrote:
> In Orach Chaim #318 we learn that several Rishonim hold that ein bishul
> achar bishul b'lach. Yet several Acharonim (see Chavas Da'as Yoreh
> De'ah 94:4) hold that in the case of basar b'chalav there is bishul
> achar bishul. VIDC?

I'm missing something.

Ein bishul achar bishul is defined by the melakhah of bishul, which in
turn is defined by whether it's a melakhah, a world-changing (mideOraisa:
world-improving) act.

Basar bechalav is a question of whether the object's heat causes mixing;
actual change-of-state should be secondary.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "I hear, then I forget; I see, then I remember;
micha@aishdas.org        I do, then I understand." - Confucius
http://www.aishdas.org   "Hearing doesn't compare to seeing." - Mechilta
Fax: (270) 514-1507      "We will do and we will listen." - Israelites

R Aviva Miller wrote:
> My question is this: Regardless of how this ranking was evaluated, how
> does Mordechai's slippage (from fifth to sixth) show that learning is
> *more* important than nefashos? If anything, it shows that Mordechai felt
> that his learning was *less* important than what he could accomplish in
> the governmental arena. My only guess is that this R' Yosef sided with
> the minority view, or perhaps had an entirely different interpretation
> of that pasuk.

As Rabbi Feig explained it (back in 6th grade), your disregarding how
the ranking is evaluated is the source of your confusion. The ranking
is not on the same dimension as the greatness being compared. The way
I recall learning the gemara those many years ago is that we see how
much more Mordechai was willing to give up for learning. Had he stayed
a politician, Mordechai could have been on a higher rung on the communal
leadership ladder; he sacrificed it in order to be able to learn.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "I hear, then I forget; I see, then I remember;
micha@aishdas.org        I do, then I understand." - Confucius
http://www.aishdas.org   "Hearing doesn't compare to seeing." - Mechilta
Fax: (270) 514-1507      "We will do and we will listen." - Israelites

I thank RZL for his clairication and education. One last point:
>> To rephrase, just to make sure I understand:
>> So you must be able to derive the fact that there is a din for every
>> din, but what the din actually is may be only known by mesorah from
>> Sinai.

> Could you rephrase your rephrasing? I suspect some wrong keys on the
> keyboard were keyed.

AIUI, you're saying that:
Every din's existance must be hinted at (or directly stated) somewhere in
TBSK. So the pasuq would inform us there is a question to be asked.
The nature of the din, the answer to that question, could be purely HLM.

-mi

> Fourth, even according to this opinion, Sichas Chullin suggests that
> it just means that the tachash was only in Sinai at that time, but it
> exists elsewhere at other times. He suggests that it is the giraffe.

1. Tachash is a chaya teme'ah.
2. The giraffe already had a perfectly good Hebrew name (zemer).
   Is it likely that an animal which wasn't native to the area would
   have not just one but *two* Hebrew names?

-- 
Zev Sero
zev@sero.name

On Tue, Jul 06, 2004 at 01:00:07PM -0400, Jonathan Baker wrote:
: It goes back to the old Avodah question of "what is psak"?

: A) Is it a determination of existential reality in a Schrodinger's-cat
: sense, that is, all the possibilities exist until the psak is made,
: which condenses the possibility-vector into a real position?

: B) Is it a temporary determination of behavior, out of a universe of
: possible behaviors that continue to be valid within the mesorah?

We recently went through a list of different models. As I understood the
sources in that paper:

Pesaq could  be:
1- A resolution of doubt due to loss of information. Which would fall under
your (B).
2- A deduction from known facts, in which case the opposite deduction may
also be supportable. The process of pesaq *defines* which defucation is
halakhah. Much like your (A).
3- A this-world approximation of a supernal and uncapturable Divine Truth.
Which is about as far from (A) as from (B).

And in both (2) and (3), the determination of behavior could be final
(until the rise of a beis din gadol mimenah bechokhmah uveminyan) and
yet still be valid within mesorah qua Divrei E-lokim Chaim. That seems
to be the bas qol's meaning.

: Under (B), your reason 1 appears false, because many things are in fact
: not definable, in the absence of a Sanhedrin.

: (A) would seem to be the model of the Sanhedrin - but that doesn't exist
: any more. And given the usual thing of "circumstances alter cases", and
: what Micha said upthread about lack of objectivity in psak, it would
: seem that biases of the rav would play almost as big a role as biases
: of the questioner.

But if both answers are right, the lack of objectivity doesn't mean the
answer chosen is wrong.

Also, I do not see why (A) must be related to a Sanhedrin. One can say
that my LOR defines what is real in my universe.

: I saw Harry's comment, which is approximately your reason 1.

I see them as two very different things. RDE's first problem was "it is
desrespectful of the first and convey the impression that nothing in the
Torah is clearly definable."

RHM is concerned not about impression and respect, but in whether anything
in the Torah would in actuality be clearly definable. To quote:
> But it's logical isn't it? If one is allowed to shop for Psak then one
> can just about write their own Torah. If you look long enough, or far
> and wide enough, you can find ... SOMEONE... to give you a Heter for
> just about anything. Why bother asking at all?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             A cheerful disposition is an inestimable treasure.
micha@aishdas.org        It preserves health, promotes convalescence,
http://www.aishdas.org   and helps us cope with adversity.
Fax: (270) 514-1507         - R' SR Hirsch, "From the Wisdom of Mishlei"

On Tue, Jul 06, 2004 at 03:07:02PM -0400, Ohrchama@aol.com wrote:
:                                                                    think
: that this Gemara is an example where it would be very diifficult to say
: that the science of the Gemara is always right, as some in the Yeshiva
: world including the Chazon Ish, seem to hold....

AIUI, the CI doesn't quite say the science in the gemara is always right.
Rather, that the power to pasqen granted the 2,000 years of Torah gives
those pesaqim authority independent of the accuracy of the assumptions
under which they were made. IOW, it makes no different whether it's
right.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "I hear, then I forget; I see, then I remember;
micha@aishdas.org        I do, then I understand." - Confucius
http://www.aishdas.org   "Hearing doesn't compare to seeing." - Mechilta
Fax: (270) 514-1507      "We will do and we will listen." - Israelites

Regarding the mermaid discussion - I have a whole chapter
on mermaids in my book Mysterious Creatures, available at
<http://www.targum.com/store/Slifkin.html>.

The reproductive organ of a camel faces backwards, and thus it urinates
backwards, but it turns to face forwards during mating. I wonder if
this was the source of the statement in the Gemara about them mating
back-to-back.

I have discussion about the snake's long gestation in Mysterious
Creatures, too; it's not so straightforward. I don't have any suggestions
about the other gestation periods discussed in the Gemara, though.

Nishtaneh hateva is not as easy an answer to use as people think. I am
often amused at how people who claim that evolution is "scientifically
impossible" then suggest vastly greater evolutionary changes under
the banner of "nishtaneh hateva"! Nishtaneh hateva can be reasonably
used to account for changes such as the overall size of human beings,
but not for things such as the gestation period of animals changing
by several years, or bats laying eggs, etc. I think the idea of camels
mating backwards is probably likewise not something that can be accounted
for by nishtaneh hateva.

Nosson Slifkin
www.zootorah.com

Zvi Lampel wrote: "Just as with some details of halachos l'maaseh--details of the mechanics of the 13 hermenutical laws did come under dispute..."

To which R' Micha Berger responded In Avodah Volume 13, Number 040, Friday,
June 25 2004:
> Much more than details. The difference between R' Yishma'el's rules
> related to kelal uperat and R' Aqiva's ribui umi'ut are pretty
> significant. Kelal uperat has to do with the meaning of phrases,
> ribui umi'ut has to do with the inclusion of particular words (eg:
> akh, raq) in how the phrase is written. Semantics vs syntax. See
> <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol12/v12n047.shtml#24> for earlier ramblings
> on the subject: "R' Aqiva's system of derashah involved ribui umi'ut, and
> the specific use of words. R' Yishma'el, with his "dibra Torah belashon benei
> adam", used kelal uperat and the meanings of phrases. R' Aqiva saw derashah
> as being rules based on syntax, R' Yishma'el on semantics.

Zvi Lampel differs:

"Significant" is a relative term. Even the smallest difference in halachah
or theory is significant. By "details of the meachanics of the 13 middos,"
I simply mean that they are categorized under pre-existing rules of
drash already given at Sinai. I'm sure Reb Micha agrees to this. This
entails that both Rabbi Akiva's "system" as well as Rebbi Yishmael's
had their roots at Sinai. My disagreement with R' Micha, I believe,
is in how much detail their rules were expilcitly received. We agree
that "eth," since it was disputed, was not received as known methods
of "ribui." But if R. Akiva and R. Yishmael disagree on whether to use
the 13 middos, or whether to use ribui and miut at all, that would mean
that these were not Sinaitically originated. R' Micha's postings, above,
seem to imply such, and this is my disagreement:

Both Rebbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva darshonned using both the 13 middos
and ribui and miat words, since both these methods of drash were handed
down from Sinai.

1. Rabbi Akiva Darshonned with The 13 Middos "Of Rebbi Yishmael"

There are a few passages where R' Akiva utilizes gezeyra shavva (e.g.,
Yer. Sota 8:1)and kal v'chomer, etc. (of R' Yishmael's 13 middos). The
Talmud's statements (Shavuos 26a and elsewhere) that Rabbi Akiva--as a
talmid of Nachum Ish Gamzu--darshonned ribba umiat, and Rebbi Yishmael--as
a talmid of Nechunia ben Haknneh--darshonned klallay uprattay, is
speaking of a machlokess about a detail of just one of the agreed-upon
13 middos--klall up'rat. Specifically, they disagree when the klall
u'prat is then followed by another klall. Rebbi Yishmael holds that
the din applies to all things similar to the subjects written in the
posuk, barring only those things which bear absolutely no resemblance
to them--and calls this method "ribui u'miut." Rabbi Akiva bars anything
lacking even one property of the subjects written--and calls the method
"klall u'prat u'klall." "Acheen v'rakeen miuteen, eth'een v'gameen ribueen
(Braishis Rabbah 1:14) is a different rule altogether.

(Interestingly, RSRH [ibid., p. 182], noting the paucity of
halachic drashos of "eth" in Shas--he estimates 20-30, [out of over
4,000]--concludes "it may be assumed that the interpretations of v"eth"
offered by Nachum of Gimzo and Shimon (Nechemia) HaAmsuni (though we
are told that these men were dorsheen kol "ethin" sheh-b'Torah) were
either purely sytactic explanations or belonged, for the most part,
to the Aggadah and had no Halachic implications. Only this assuymption
could explain why so few of these nmerous interpretations have come down
to posterity."

True, to take one of the 13 middos, Shas nowhere mentions Rabbi Akiva by
name when it darshons through klall uprat (without an additional klall);
but even Rebbi Yishmael is mentioned by name utilizing it in Shas only
three times! Indeed, even in the Midrashei Halachos (Mechilta, Sifra,
etc.), klall u'prat is explicitly cited only six times (and klall prat
uklall, only eleven)! Rabbi Akiva's rebbi, Nachum Ish Gamzu, who is
attributed with having darshonned every "eth" in the Torah, is not named
as the author of any drash of "eth" at all, yet is named as darshonning
a gezeyra shavva (Yalkut Shim'oni Shmos 21:336)! The Mishnah itself
(stam k'Rebbi Mayir, teacher of R' Akiva) uses "kal v'chomer," one of
the 13 middos, about 20 times.

2. Rebbi Yishmael Darshonned With Ribuim and Miatim

Rav Shamshon Raphael Hirsch, in his Collected Writings Vol V (The Origin
Of The Oral Law, p. 170), in a masterfully presented case against Heinrich
Graetz (whom Mielziner in his "Introduction to the Talmud" follows),
writes that "R. Yishmael, no less than R. Akiba... considered particles
and superfluities... subject to interpretation." He procedes to cite
29 passages in the Bavli wherein R' Yishmael is me-ma'ate from added
objective pronouns (such as the "o"in shivto, and as the word "hee"),
the added definite article ("ha-"), and the words "rak" and "zos," and
is marbeh from k'ra yesayra, other extra wording including the word "o"
(or), and repetitive wording.

3. "Dibrah Torah K'Lashon B'nei Adam"

RSRH also notes that R' Yishmael's principle of "dibrah Torah k'lashon
b'nei Adam" is used only in cases of repetitive wording, and then, only
in certain circumstances. He also points out that it was R' Yishmael
(in Braishis Rabbah 1:14, re "eth hashamayyim v'eth haaretz;" [also
ibid. 22:2 re: kanisi ish eth Hashem," and 53:15 re: "Vayehi elokim eth
ha-na'ar"]) who criticised R' Akiva for treating "es" simply as a means
of identifying a word as an object, rather than as a ribui!

And so I still maintain that only details of some methods of intepretation
were in dispute (such as whether the word "eth" is meant as a ribui,
and how to treat a klall-prat-klall, and other details of the 13 middos
as explained in the back of mesechta Brachos). There were no major
disputes over entire systems of drash, such as syntax vs. semantics;
only over details, and which rules to apply to which p'sukim and dinim.

Zvi Lampel

P.S.--I very highly recommend Volume V of RSRH's Collected writings
for a bekius-laden (without the aid of CD-ROMS--and even concordances
wouldn't account for it) and very, very animated debunking of ideas which
had been promulgated by Graetz and which greatly influence non-Orthodox
thinking--and probably seeps into our circles as well.

RDG writes: 
><<So Moshe rabbanu was wrong to beg and plead and daven to 
> Hashem to let him go in?  If you are right, why did he get so 
> upset?  He should have been perfectly happy to stay in the 
> midbar and eat mon.>>

>By himself? Note he didn't ask to go in until the dor 
>yotz'ei mitzrayim were all gone and the dor ba'ei ha'aretz 
>were about to go in.

So you are saying that, in the ideal world, Moshe would have 
liked not to go in, and to have stayed in the midbar with 
everybody else - it was just that if everybody else was 
commanded to go in, he didn't want to be left alone?

><<The thinkers and philosophers of Modern Orthodoxy believe so>>

>You are confusing "interacting with the modern world" with 
>acting like Rabbi Yishmael recommends.  In order to "paskin" 
>like RShB"Y, one would need do nothing but learn.  

One of the infuriating things about people suddenly routing conversations
from areivim to avodah mid stream, is that people don't see one's original
posting but just responses.

If however, you go back to my original posting on areivim, you will
see that I gave three different MO philosophical positions. You are
conflagrating two of them.

I think we need to keep the positions separate, because they may well be,
and often are, held by different people.

The position that it is an imperative to interact with the modern world
(and that a rejection of interaction with the modern world is analogous
to the rejecting of the going int Eretz Yisroel by the dor hamidbar)
is indeed different from the position that the problem with the charedi
world is their unwillingness to educate for a parnassa (even if a few
of them manage to stumble across one at some later point).

>The vast majority of non-MO, with the exception of the last 
>50 years (or less) in E"Y, does not do that.
>(I consider the proportions of kollel people in E"Y to be an 
>anomalyin the greater scheme of Jewish history.); they act 
>like Rabbi Yishmael.

Assuming we are discussing the second position in my paragraph above (or
the first position in my original post) - I would agree with you about
history (in history there was no MO/charedi divide). This, however, is
a debate about how MO philosoph(ies) differ from charedi philosoph(ies)
and the official line in the non chassidic charedi world (certainly in
Israel, but even in a place like England, although perhaps less so in
the US), is that somebody who works is a yeshiva drop out - so that today
I don't believe the charedi world officially poskens like Rabbi Yishmael.

Regards
Chana

Chana Luntz <Chana@kolsassoon.net> wrote:
<<So you are saying that, in the ideal world, Moshe would have liked
not to go in, and to have stayed in the midbar with everybody else -
it was just that if everybody else was commanded to go in, he didn't
want to be left alone?>>

What I was REALLY saying was that I don't know, and to say that M"R
wanted to go to E"Y to farm is not any more reasonable than to say he
wanted to stay in the midbar and learn.

<<One of the infuriating things about people suddenly routing
conversations from areivim to avodah mid stream, is that people don't
see one's original posting but just responses.>>

Just so's you know, I didn't reroute it; one of the (other) moderators
rejected your post from Areivim. I wrote my post with more quoting than I
would have otherwise in order ot maintain context if that didn't happen.
Certainly porting the whole thread back to its roots (to mix a metaphor)
doesn't happen.

<<If however, you go back to my original posting on areivim, you will
see that I gave three different MO philosophical positions. You are
conflagrating two of them.>>

Oh, no, I didn't mean to do any flaming! <g>

I rerouted myself from trying to defend a charedi position which wiggles
around depending upon who is quoting it (MO, Charedi, Israeli,American,
or, apparently, English) to trying to express my take on it as I was
taught and believe.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

Kenneth G Miller writes:
"A minhag not to say something is *not* a minhag."

We recently had the shaila about the zebu. During the discussion,
we learned of a machlokes between the Rashba and the Rosh, about going
from a place where the minhag is not to eat a certain animal, to a place
where the minhag is to eat it. The Shach says there is no real machlokes.
If the animal is not common in the first place, there is no real minhag
about it. If, however, the first place davka has a minhag not to eat
the animal, that is a real minhag.

It would seem to me the same about a minhag not to say something. And,
as Micha Berger suggested, if Frankfort davka avoided many Kabbalah
minhagim, then Berikh Shemeih would be included.

Moshe Schlusselberg

Someone posted this.

According to R' Hershel Schachter, when you look at water from a foot
away before it is chemically treated, it is extremely obvious that
there are creatures moving around in it. This, he argues, renders these
creatures visible and prohibited. The fact that we get them from our
faucets dead and therefore hardly visible does not change their status.
Who would argue that one may not eat these creatures alive but only dead?

comments

Aryeh

I was recently listening to a tape of one of the break-out
sessions from the "Mussar Kallah II" in Houston (See
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol13/v13n019.shtml#10> for some notes
from talks that I was able to attend.)

R' Dr Alan Morinis (BCC-ed) mentioned something in passing that really
struck me. He told the famous story of the fellow who bet 400 zuz that
he could anger Hillel. (Shabbos 30b-31a) One thing in Hillel's final
reply to the man that I never took the way RDAM suggests.

Right after the fellow says "I lost by your actions 400 zuz!" Hillel
replies, "Hevei zahir beruchakha! It is worth it for Hillel that you
lose because of my actions 400 zuz and [another] 400 zuz than Hillel
get angry."

What are these words "Hevei zahir beruchakhah!" Just an empty
exclamation? A warning telling the man to watch it when cursing?

RDAM took it literally. Hillel is telling the man to go practice
mussar. If you watched your ru'ach, you too could keep your temper!

(Now to figure out how...)

:-)BBii!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             It isn't what you have, or who you are, or where
micha@aishdas.org        you are,  or what you are doing,  that makes you
http://www.aishdas.org   happy or unhappy. It's what you think about.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Dale Carnegie

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