Avodah Mailing List

Volume 13 : Number 024

Monday, May 17 2004

• Re: Fw: Rabbi Akiva
• Re: coincidence according to the Maharal
• Re: Indian hair, Sheitels and AZ
• Re: gematrios as conspicuous consumption
• Re: Indian hair, Sheitels and AZ
• Indian Hair
• Re: Indian hair, Sheitels and AZ
• Re: sources re pluralism/tolerance
• Re: Indian hair, Sheitels and AZ
• RE: Indian hair, Sheitels and AZ
• Re: sources re pluralism/tolerance
• Re: Sources regarding pluralism/tolerance
• re: Indian hair, sheitels and AZ
• Sheitels
• Re: Indian hair, sheitels and AZ
• About the water controversy
• Controversy in Halachah
• Endangering one's life to recover body parts
• Fw: Endangering one's life to recover body parts
• Re: Endangering one's life to recover body parts

On Tue, May 11, 2004 at 09:24:10AM +0200, S Goldstein wrote:
: Perhaps the solution can be found in Yerushalmi Brachos 9:5 and Y. Sotah
: 5:5.  The Yerushalmi is like the Gemara in Brachos with the major difference
: being that instead of the talmidim asking Rabbi Akiva it is Turnus Rufus.

I'm thrown by this. Didn't Turnus Rufus's widow, Rufina become a giyores
and eventually marry R' Aqiva? How then was Turnus Rufus at R' Aqiva's
petirah?

On Mon, May 10, 2004 at 11:22:57PM +0200, he added:
: It is interesting to note that the Yalkut in Mishlei is at variance with
: our Gemara. The Yalkut says no one was present when Rabbi Akiva died. The
: Gemara Brachos 61b says his talmidim were present and discussed with
: him the mitzva of kiddush Hashem.

Perhaps the gemara in Berachos is describing a discussion that occured
in prison or on the way to execution.

The sequence of evwents can't be literal, as R' Akiva is described as
starting shema before the question, and said "achad" after. Perhaps
it was inserted here parenthetically, as part of the description of
simchah with which he said shema and faced the entire event.

:-)BBii!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 38th day, which is
micha@aishdas.org        5 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Tifferes sheb'Yesod: How does reliability
Fax: (413) 403-9905           promote harmony in life and relationships?

On Thu, May 13, 2004 at 06:47:11PM +0200, Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
: In sum, chance, mazel, accident, nature do exist...

Except according to REED who says they're ma'asei H' but part of hester
panim, that teva is an illusion. The Ramban might hold similarly,
depending upon which Ramban you look at. Which would be a lack of HP
(RDE's point), but not because Hashem allows something else to to
take over.

Also FWIW, mazal in the sense of destiny is denied by contemporary
science. Science analyzes events in terms of causes, not
purposes. Teleological cause was taken off the chart.

Contemporaries who believe in destiny, in things happening for a purpose,
do so as part of belief in hashgachah. That Hashem involves Himself not
only to reward and punish, but also to aid one in getting their mission
accomplished.

Hashgachah also can include "bederekh she'adam rotzeh leileikh, sham
molikhin oso".

Just pointing out that HP and sechar va'onesh in this world are different
questions; HP is broader.

:-)BBii!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 38th day, which is
micha@aishdas.org        5 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Tifferes sheb'Yesod: How does reliability
Fax: (413) 403-9905           promote harmony in life and relationships?

On 13 May 2004 at 14:46, Joelirich@aol.com wrote:
> Does anyone have a sense of the percentage of sheitels of Indian
> origin? If it's significant, 

It's significant but I don't have numbers.

>                                 does the story of the GRA trying to
> reintroduce daily duchening play a role(ie should we see this as a
> heavenly psak that sheitels are inappropriate since so many who live
> al taharat hakodesh were nichshol?) 

That's what many of the pashkevils in Yerushalayim said today. 

On 13 May 2004 at 12:06, Kohn, Shalom wrote:
> This website cited by R. Hojda says that the Indian women cut their
> hair as an offering to their god. It is still unclear, however,
> whether that makes the hair prohibited as "takruvot avodah zarah." 

My son said that R. Donner's brother told them last night that it 
quite definitely was AZ. 

I have just sent RSK the write up from the Charedi papers that RSBA 
sent to a bunch of us yesterday. I would offer to send it to anyone 
else who wants it, but it's 20 minutes to Shabbos here. I don't know 
who else has it, but if someone wants it, drop me a note and I will 
try to send it after Shabbos (I have a ton of work to do tomorrow 
night, but bli neder I will try to get on long enough to read the 
mail). 

 - Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son, 
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much. 

A tangentially relevant story:

When R' Baruch Simon, a rosh yeshiva in YU, was a bachur, he asked the
Steipler how he came up with the gematrios in Birkas Peretz. The Steipler
replied, "Lemai nafka minah?"

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

Henoch Moshe Levin wrote:
> It has been suggested by R' Shalom L. Kohn that although the gezizah may
> be an act of avodah zara, the hair itself is not necessarily tikroves. It
> seems however from the following American news story published more than
> a year ago that the hair is very much an offering given to the avodah
> zarah, i.e. tikroves.

I read the article but while the author emphasized ideas like offering
to god and the like, I wondered about the absence of any act of
presentation, no ceremony - just shaved and given to the temple.  What
if an as part of their religion people give to the temple's priests -
is that too tikroves a'z?

More generally, can someone who knows these simanim in yo'd give a
synopsis of the halachos tikroves (takroves?) avoda zarah, including
how something qualifies?

elly

-- 
Elly Bachrach
Engineering Intent http://www.EngineeringIntent.com
EBachrach@EngineeringIntent.com

RSBA wrote:  
> I quote from the main  Indian temple site:
>> DEVOTION - Devotees contribute gold, jewellery and hair to help 
>> V. [name of AZ] repay the debt on his wedding loan.
>> OFFERINGS -  Many V. temples observe the practice of hair offerings.

> Sound pretty AZish to me

Is this intended as kedushat ha-guf or kedushat damim?

Shalom L. Kohn

Carl and Adina Sherer wrote [to Areivim]:
>> Does anyone have a sense of the percentage of sheitels of Indian
>> origin?  If it's significant,

> It's significant, but I don't know the exact numbers.

Here's what I can glean from web sites around the wig industry (instant
authority, by Google <g>):

At least around here in the US, it's a mi'ut. Which should be enough
lehatir, judging from cases in the gemara.

Most affordable human hair and blended wigs are from Chinese hair from
what the web sites seem to say. The highter priced are from India,
and only the real top-of-the-line use the *much* more rare European
hair. (How many European women (even including the former USSR) would
you think sell their hair compared to numbers in China or India? And,
Indian and Chinese hair stand up to bleaching and coloring better.)

Chinese hair needs to be processed to get a European-like texture. Indian
and European hair can be sold as "Remy Hair", ie whole from follicle
up. Such wigs, as RDH already wrote, tend to be labeled "Remy" in the
marketing material as that's a higher quality. So, looking at wigs not
labeled "Remy" and it should certainly be a small mi'ut.

So, again: at least as sold in the US market, I would think that we can
rely on that. Waiting to hear a real pesaq.

:-)BBii!
-mi

PS: Georgie's web site <http://www.georgiewigs.com> has a big picture on
the home page about using absolutely NO Indian hair in any of the wigs
advertised there. And they have a list of which wigs did use Indian
hair. Judging from a reseller's web site, most of Georgie's hair is
Chinese, FWIW.

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 38th day, which is
micha@aishdas.org        5 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Tifferes sheb'Yesod: How does reliability
Fax: (413) 403-9905           promote harmony in life and relationships?

IIRC, there is an Orthodox Forum book on this issue with some fascinating
material from R M Rosenzweig and others.

Steve Brizel
Zeliglaw@aol.com

Interesting reading on Rabbi A. Abadi's web site regarding the previous
investigation of Indian hair.

http://www.kashrut.org/forum/viewpost.asp?mid=7727

>From: Akiva Atwood <akiva@atwood.co.il>
>> Maybe you'd be doing the world a favour by discussing all this with the
>>RMSternbuch - who first brought it to the worlds attention.

>This time, maybe -- but it's NOT a new shailah. I know people who went into
>the Eidah 15 years ago with the same shailah -- and there was at least one
>more round of the shailah years before that.

RM Sternbuch shlit'a wrote about the problem over 30 years ago!

SBA

Zeliglaw@aol.com wrote:
>IIRC, there is an Orthodox Forum book on this issue with some fascinating
>material from R M Rosenzweig and others.

- Between Authority and Autonomy (Hebrew ) edited by Prof Avi Sagi &
  Prof Zev Safrai
- Pluralism: Tolerance in Jewish Tradition by Prof. Ravitsky page 396 in
  Between Authority and Autonomy (Hebrew)
- Pluralism and the Category of the Ethical by Prof Carmy Tradition 30:4
  1996 page 145
- Eilu v'Eilu by Prof Avi Sagi 1996
- Rabbinic Authority and Personal Autonomy Orthodox Forum 1992

On Tue, May 11, 2004 at 02:40:59PM -0400, Allen Gerstl wrote:
: Please see the lecture by Moshe Halbertal on Controvery in Halacha...
: at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/Gruss/halbert.html

Beqitzur nimratzh. He proposes that there are three shitos:

1- Retrieval: All of Torah was given at Sinai, and therefore machloqesin
are due to forgotten information.
    Typical sources: Geonim, Seifer haQabbalah
    Typical maqor: Machloqesei batei Hillel and Shammai are because
	"shelo shimshu es rabosam"

2- Accumulative: Torah is built analytically from what was given. Therefore,
   machloqesin come from different minds reaching different conclusions.
    Typical source: Rambam
    Typical maqor: R' Aqiva's derivation of halakhos from tagim

(We'd be inclined to say that these aren't soseir eachother, and perhaps
both happen. Except that according to the Rambam, there are no machloqesin
in underived law. He makes the flawlessness of the mesorah incontravertable.
Only contructions are open to debate.

(So, while one can embrace the idea that both occured, one must be aware
that that's not shitas haRambam.)

3- Constitutive: The poseiq doesn't discover what's correct
halakhah. Rather, part of the *definition* of "correct" is the poseiq's say-so.
    Sources: Ramban, Ritva, Ran
    Typical maqor: In order to make sanhedrin you needed to be able to
	find 49 arguments that something is tamei, and 49 that the same
	something is tahor.

(Here, I don't see why one must assert they are different. After all,
even the Ramban and his Talmidim don't give the poseiq carte blanche. If
one formulates it as halakhah being accumulative -- thus given the
poseiq well defined choices from which to choose -- but the definition
of which conclusion is correct involves the poseiq, one embraces both
of the latter two shitos.)

On Thu, May 13, 2004 at 03:58:32PM -0400, Gil Student wrote:
: Try R' Michael Rosensweig's article "Elu Va-Elu Divre Elokim
: Hayyim: Halakhic Pluralism And Theories Of Controversy" at
: <http://www.lookstein.org/articles/elu_ve_elu.htm>.

(I'm skipping the first two sections, getting right to the subject of
machloqes within halakhah.)

RMR cites the ma'aseh of "eilu va'eilu" (Eiruvin 13b) and the gemata
(Chagiga 3b) describing learning as one rav insisting tamei, the other
tahor to open a discussion of halakhic plurality.

The Nesivos haMishpat holds that one shitah is wrong, but the mitzvah
of talmud Torah includes the studying and winnowing out of wrong shitos,
and RMR considers this to mean that studying this shitos is part of
the encounter with devar H'.

The Neziv defines two types of pesaq:
- Hora'ah, dating back to the role of the kohein. From this perspective,
  both shitos are cheftzah shel Torah, in true "eilu va'eilu".
- Hakhra'ah ledoros, the logical analysis of the shofeit mechoqeiq. This
  produces the hilkheta gemirei, and as Moshe Rabbeinu was taught "kol
  mah shetalmid vasiq asid lehoros", Moshe was actually taught that one
  was more true than the other.
  Within this category, there are two subtypes:
  = Nitzotzos (term taken from Sanhedrin 34a), or netu'im (from Chagiga
    3b), which maintain some or Torah, but of lesser quantity.
  = Those which are outright rejected.

RMR then shows that the Rama might conform to this model.

Rashi (Kesuvos 57a, "QM"L") seems to support a real plurality. To quote:
    When a debate revolves around the attribution of a doctrine to a
    particular individual, there is only room for one truth. However, when
    two Amorairn enter into a halakhic dispute, each arguing the halakhic
    merits of his view, each drawing upon comparisons to establish the
    authenticity of his perspective, there is no absolute truth and
    falsehood. About such issues one can declare that both represent
    the view of the living God. On some occasions one perspective will
    prove more authentic, and under other circumstances the other view
    will appear to be more compelling. The effectiveness of particular
    rationales shift as conditions of their application change even if
    only subtly.

(This is a pretty clear statement of true plurality, and invokes
the phrase eilu va'eilu as a principle that goes beyond batei Hillel
veShammai. Thus my cut-n-paste from the article.)

The Ritva (on "eilu va'eilu", Eir' 13b) writes, "When Moshe ascended
to receive the Torah, it was demonstrated to him that every matter was
subject to forty-nine lenient and forty-nine stringent approaches. When
he queried about this, God responded that the scholars of each generation
were given the authority to decide among these perspectives in order to
establish the normative halakha."

(Which fits the other article labeling the Ritva's position as
"constitutive". However, if you note, approaches were demonstrated to
Moshe, not conclusions presented. Which would seem to fit my combined
accumulative-constitutive suggestion.)

The Maharshal writes that since each soul was at Har Sinai, each soul
presents its perspective on emes. The soul doesn't simply passively
report the emes.

The Maharal speaks of the Platonic Ideal pesaq, and how man in the
"real world" can only approximate that Ideal. The reason for plurality
is because the actual emes can't be captured within olam hazeh.

(This reminds me of R' Moshe Koppel's [a lurker] position in
"Metahalakhah". Search the arhives for the book's title for more
detail. He argues that halakhah is best transmitted the same way grammar
is: the native speaker's feel for right and wrong. It's only due to loss
of our status as "native speakers" that we need to codify rules. And
just like codified rules of grammer, the rules only approximate the
reality they're trying to describe.)

RMR opens section IV with an explicite statement of the "constitutive"
perspective. Since halachic truth includes plural views, the poseiq is
defining which truth is law. The fact that the other is true doesn't
make is any more acceptable as a fall-back position.

According to the Maharshal and AhS, the need for pesaq is shelo yihyu
keishsei Toros.

The zaqein mamrei (ZM) is punished because the effects of his actions
(kishtei Toros, ruining the entire concept of halachic process) are so
damaging -- not because he's promoting sheqer.

The Ran and the Chinukh apply lo sasur to modern rejections of rabbinic
conclusions. Maharam ibn Habib (should I recognize this name?) applies a
ZM parallel to any judge, and "ein cholqin bemamon achar harov" requires
him to acquiesce to the majority.

I'm going to skip the rest, and just to his chiluq between ta'us beshikul
hada'as vs ta'us bedivar mishnah. Sorry, I don't do well after 11pm.

Gut Voch!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 39th day, which is
micha@aishdas.org        5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a
Fax: (413) 403-9905                          reliable person?

        Afar ani tachas raglei g'dolei haposkim, but I find the rulings
in the current sheitel brouhaha highly puzzling.  

        From what I have read in impartial sources, the hair is in no way
an offering to idols.  As an Indian woman worded it, "We sacrifice our
beauty by having our hair removed.  The hair itself is garbage."  Indeed,
as all sources agree, until it was discovered by the monks that the hair
can be sold for wigs, it was discarded, with no special treatment, as the
hair of men who undergo the shaving still is.  The act of cutting is not
performed in the presence of the idol and is not offered up to the idol;
the individual, after the hair has been removed, then goes before the
idol to present him/herself..  The service is that the beauty represented
by the hair be gone; the hair as such has no significance.  Tikroves
avodah zarah, as I understand it, is an object offered to an idol, not an
object which serves merely as the means of performing an action.  For
instance, if an idol's worship would be by jumping rope, where any rope
could be used and would not be considered by the ovdei avodah zarah to be
sanctified by virtue of its use, that rope would not be tikroves.  Here,
the woman is to render herself unbeautiful; that is the service.  The
manner in which this is done is the removal of hair, but the hair itself
is not offered.  

        The hair might possibly be in the category of m'shamshei avodah
zarah (although the razor used in its removal is more of a m'shameish
than the hair itself), but even if it is, for m'shamshim bittul helps if
done by a goy prior to their coming into a Jew's possession.  The sale of
the hair itself for secular purposes might well constitute bittul by the
priests, akin to selling a metallic avodah zarah to a smith, where the
presumption is that the goy knows it will be defaced.  Even if the
initial sale is not deemed bittul, it could be sold to a goy who could
explicitly be m'vateil, after which it may be purchased by a Jew.

        There is the further problem of benefitting avodah zarah by the
purchase, but again if the Jew purchases the hair from a goy who has
purchased it from the priests, the avodah zarah has already benefitted
prior to his purchase, and his buying it adds nothing to the avodah
zarah, and should thus be permitted.

        Unfortunately, the p'sakim that were issued do not disclose the
basis on which it was decided that the hair has a din of tikroves.  That
it does was taken for granted, and the p'sakim only indicated what the
consequences of that assumption are, halacha l'ma'aseh.  Can anyone
clarify where the above is incorrect, either in fact or in halacha?

EMT        

I have the three-page teshuvah of RYSE from 1990 in which he was mattir
the Indian sheitels. If anyone wants it, let me know. As Reb Saul Guberman
pointed out, the gist of the issue, somewhat sharply phrased, is at:

http://www.kashrut.org/forum/viewpost.asp?mid=7727

It is worthwhile pursuing:

  http://www.dalitstan.org/books/tirupati/tiru26.html)

for more information,

There seems to be a tzad on a sheitel that does definitely contain Indian
hair to construct a sfeik sfeika - safek if it is AZ, and im timtzei
lomar it is safek if this is from the AZ. (In some places perhaps a rov
is machria the safek on origin l'chumra, as it seems from R' Efrati's
pask in the name of RYSE issude late last week).

YGB 

From: Elazar M Teitz
>           From what I have read in impartial sources, the hair is in no
> way an offering to idols.  As an Indian woman worded it, "We sacrifice
> our beauty by having our hair removed.  The hair itself is garbage."
...

I believe that R. Teitz is correct. The hair, according to the description
of the rite by the Indians themselves, is not taqroves AZ; it is scarcely
m'shamsheho (the knife might be); and I strongly doubt that it is what
the Rambam calls "kal hanna'aseh bishviloh," which refers to things
like the clothing and jewelry that Hindus and others used to clothe the
idols. The only thing I can find mentioned by Chaza'l that is similar is
"AZ sheyesh loh ginno o merhatz": something that was bought/built/given
to AZ, but not used in offerings to the god.

In that case, hano'oh is muttar, unlike m'shamsheho or kol hana'aseh
bishviloh, and it is only ossur to use b'tovah.

I believe this is what lies behind the statement in the p'saq of R.
Vozner and R. Karelitz that "al al pi sheyesh tz'dodim bahalokho";
it is pretty clear that they said one should be machmir because of AZ,
not because it is clearly osur.

The further question is that even if one should avoid it, a chumra would
be botel b'rov, unlike AZ itself. Most wig manufacturers blend hair to
get the cheapest wig that is acceptable; the majority of hair available
in the US is Chinese. Even if Indian hair is the majority in EY, the
situation in the US is definitely different. After talking some years
ago to wig manufactureres, I discovered that in order to decide about
a particular wig, one would have to know not only the manufacturer,
but the model of the wig and the year of manufacture, data that is not
readily available. It is comparable to the situation with chodosh; it
took years of persistance and takes countless hours of effort for R.
Herman to get the data. It will be easier with wigs, but someone will
have to supervise the project.

Seth Mandel

[In reply to the same letter by REMT. -mi]

As one might expect, a lot of time is spent in the hallways of the OU on
the sheitel and the water business. The individual who found the bugs
in the water, reportedly in Brooklyn and mid-Manhattan, was brought down
to the OU, where he worked for 3 hours trying to find a single bug or
crustacean. There were none. He did bring a sample of what he had found;
all everybody could see without a magnifying glass was dots and specks.

Someone reported that the Chazon Ish assered dots on oranges that he was
told by experts with magnifying glasses were bugs. I don't know the case,
but it is clear according to halokho that if I see a speck I don't have to
bring it to someone with a microscope to look at, unless I see it moving.
So we have three issues:

1) the bugs, at least those that I was shown, have no legs or antennae
clearly visible with the naked eye. Why should I be required to treat
them as bugs?

2) SA YD 84 says if they grow in the water in kelim they are muttar;
do these have that din?

3) since it was proven that they are not found in all the buildings
in Manhattan, at least not all the time, one would have to investigate
the percentage of buildings in which this is a problem. Is it because
of the pipes in those buildings in which it is found? Is it the water
storage tanks in which the bugs grow? Is it only certain water mains?
I do not believe that anyone has done such investigation yet.

The question was submitted to both R. Hershel Schachter and R. Yisroel
Belsky, who are the poskim for the OU. Based on what they know, both
have been mattir. R. Hershel did so on the grounds of 1) above. R.
Belsky has not finished his t'shuva yet, so I cannot report the basis,
however it was different from R. Schachter.

This summary represents my own thoughts on the matter; the only think
I can report in the name of others is in the last paragraph.

Seth Mandel

On Tue, May 15, 2004, R' Micha Berger wrote:
: to the Rambam, there are no machloqesin in underived law. He makes the
: flawlessness of the mesorah incontravertable.
: Only contructions are open to debate. (So, while one can embrace
: the idea that both occured, one must be aware that that's not shitas
: haRambam.)

It was in order to clarify (and ultimately deny)this understanding
of the Rambam that I actually began the research that developed into
my sefer, Dynamics of Dispute (which R' Berger has been kind enough
to cite on occasion). Please read chapter 4, "The Rambam's Attack on
Attributing Machlokess to Forgetfulness." And, regarding the issue of
eilu v'eilu, please see chapter 11 (nothing to do with bankruptcy),
and regarding pluralism, the Eplilogue, "Hillel and Shammai Vs. Orthodox
and Anti-Orthodox" should be helpful.

The recent situation in the Gaza Strip where 11 soldiers were blown up
and other soldiers had to risk their lives to retrieve body parts for
kevura, has lead to extensive debate. To what extent can one (or must
one) put oneself in danger? Choshen Mishpat 420:31 indicates that one
who injures himself even though he isn't permitted to is not subject to
punishment. See also Yoreh Deah 155:1 in Shach s"k 7.

Halachic discussion on danger has ranged from diets (Iggrot Moshe CM
II 65), aesthetic plastic surgery (IM CM II 66, Chelkat Yaakov III 1,
Minchat Yitzchak VI 105 #2, Tzitz Eliezer XI 41), performing a mitzva
(e.g. drinking wine at Seder for someone with a severe allergy to wine
(Halacha u'Refuah Sefer Daled p. 125), undergoing risky medical procedures
(Shvut Yakov III 75; Achiezer II 16 #6; Binyan Tzion I 111; Beit Meir
YD 339 #1; Yad Halevi I YD 207; Harav Unterman in NOAM Vol. 13, p. 5;
Tzitz Eliezer IV 13 and X 25 #17; Shearim Metzuyanim B'Halacha 190 s"k 4;
Mor u'Ktziya 328), volunteering for medical research, and others.

ENDANGERING ONE'S LIFE TO SAVE SOMEONE ELSE: This is discussed in
Choshen Mishpat 426:1. Although the Yerushalmi indicates that a person
MUST place himself in a *possible* risk in order to save someone else,
see the SM"A there that this isn't brought down since most Rishonim
didn't hold this way.

HOWEVER: the Pitchei Tshuva CM 426 s"k 2 indicates that although
a potential rescuer should evaluate risks, he shouldn't be overly
cautious. The Mishna Brura OC 329:19 states that there is no obligation
in risking one's life to save another but still does mention this
Pitchei Tshuva. More relevant is the Tzitz Eliezer XIII 100 who rules
that in time of war, one may take extraordinary risks in order to save
others. Rav Elyashiv in his Kovetz Tshuvot #124 (re: doctors' chiyuv to
treat everyone any time of day or night) states that one must undergo
pain and suffering in order to save the life of someone else (he does
mention the Rambam in Sefer hamitzvot Lo Taaseh #297 and the SM"A in CM
426 quoting the Yerushalmi).

PIDYON SHEVUYIM?
On the one hand, halacha (YD 252) holds that Pidyon Shevuyim is the
highest mitzva. Needless to say this refers to live humans who are being
mistreated (Rambam indicates those who are starving, in tatters). On
the other hand, we have the case of Maharam mi'Rottenberg who forbade
his disciples from ransoming him from jail (7 years) and from ransoming
his body (14 years) to prevent blackmail of the Jewish community.

YAVESH GILAD:
The only historical precedent I could find for endangering one's life to
retreive body parts is the story told in Shmuel Alef 31 (and in Divrei
haYamim Alef 10:12) about the residenst of Yavesh Gilad who risked their
lives to retrieve the body parts of Shaul HaMelech and his sons who were
killed in battle with the Pelishtim. I checked all the mefarshim in
both places and the only relevant one was Rashi in Divrei HaYamim who
specifically indicates how the residents of Yavesh Gilad MASRU ATZMAM
B'SAKANA. Since Rashi makes no negative comment about their actions (and
indeed seems to praise it) it looks like it's permissible to endanger
one's life to retrieve body parts for kevurat yisrael.

Josh

> To what extent can one (or must
> one) put oneself in danger?
< snip >
> I checked all the mefarshim in
> both places and the only relevant one was Rashi in Divrei HaYamim

the hebrew-enabled among us can find some more at
http://www.yeshiva.org.il/Shiurim/klali/more/heter_viskut.htm

the same, in different layout, at the end of
<http://www.geocities.com/proppentrecker/bioethik.html>
see e.g. yam shel shelomoh.

/dw

On 17 May 2004 at 1:49, BACKON@vms.HUJI.AC.IL wrote:
> YAVESH GILAD:
> The only historical precedent I could find for endangering one's life
> to retreive body parts is the story told in Shmuel Alef 31 (and in
> Divrei haYamim Alef 10:12) about the residenst of Yavesh Gilad who
> risked their lives to retrieve the body parts of Shaul HaMelech and
> his sons who were killed in battle with the Pelishtim...

I meant to look this up over Shabbos but did not get to it. But my
wife suggests that one could be m'chalek that this could be a special
case because of the bizayon to the mlucha of having Shaul and his sons'
bodies degraded, and it may not apply to ordinary soldiers.

-- Carl

mailto:cmsherer@fandz.com      mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for my son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.
Thank you very much.

*********************


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